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THE

SALVATION OF ALL MEN

STRICTLY EXAMINED;

AND THE

ENDLESS PUNISHMENT

OF THOSE WHO DIE IMPENITENT, ARGUED AND DEFENDED AGAINST THE OBJECTIONS AND REASONINGS OF THE LATE

REV. DOCTOR CHAUNCY, OF BOSTON,

IN HIS BOOK ENTITLED

"THE SALVATION OF ALL MEN," &c.

SECOND EDITION.

BY JONATHAN EDWARDS, D. D.
Formerly President of Union College, N. Y.

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PACIFIC SCHOOL
OF RELIGION

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

AN APPENDIX,

BY REV. NATHANIEL EMMONS, D. D.
Franklin, Mass.

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PREFACE.

It is to be hoped, that no man, who believes a future state of existence, will grudge the time and pains which are necessary to obtain satisfactory evidence concerning the nature of that state. A mistake here may be fatal. If the doctrine advanced in the following pages be true, it is a most important, a most interesting doctrine. However contrary to the wishes of any, however mortifying to their feelings, however dreadful, it is by all means necessary to be known. Surely no man would wish "to flatter himself in his own eyes, till his iniquity be found to be hateful." To a rational and scriptural view of the truth in this case, and to a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which have been objected to it, great attention and close examination are necessary. And whether both our duty and interest require us to subject ourselves to the labour of this attention and examination, rather than to sit down easy in the expectation "of peace and safety, till sudden destruction come upon us;" no rational man can hesitate.

PACIFIC SCHOOL

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CHAP. I.

IN WHICH THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF DR. CHAUNCY'S SYSTEM CONCERNING FUTURE PUNISHMENT ARE POINTED OUT AND COMPARED WITH EACH OTHER.

SECTION I.

In which the fundamental principles, &c. are pointed out, &c.

BEFORE we enter into the consideration of the particular arguments of Dr. Chauncy, it may be proper to give some account of the fundamental principles of his system.

Beside the doctrine of the salvation of all men, to establish which is the design of his whole book; there are several other doctrines, which may be considered as fundamental to his system. He does not deny all future punishment of the wicked; but allows that they will be punished according to their demerits, or according to strict justice. Thus he allows that "many men will be miserable in the next state of existence, in proportion to the moral depravity they have contracted in this. There is no room for debate here."* "They must be unavoidably miserable in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices."† "For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of GOD is eternal life through JESUS CHRIST our LORD: i. e. if men continue the servants of sin, the

* Page 9. † P. 10.

wages they shall receive, before the gift through CHRIST is conferred on them, will be the second death."* If some men suffer that punishment which is the wages of sin, they doubtless suffer all which they deserve. No man deserves more than his *wages.* "In the collective sense, they will be tormented for ages of ages; though some of them only should be tormented through the whole of that period; *the rest* variously as "to time, *in proportion to their deserts.*"† "There shall be a difference in the punishment of wicked men, *according to* the difference there has been *in the nature and number of their evil deeds.*"‡ He speaks of the wicked as liable "to positive torments awfully great in degree, and long in continuance, *in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes.*"§ "The pardonableness of all other sins and blasphemies," [except that against the HOLY GHOST] "lies in this, its being possible for men, to escape the torments of hell, though they should have been guilty of those sins.—Accordingly the unpardonableness of the blasphemy against the HOLY GHOST, must consist in the reverse of the pardonableness of other sins—in the impossibility of their escaping the torments of hell, who are chargeable with this sin.—This now being the meaning of the unpardonableness of blasphemy against the HOLY GHOST, it is quite easy to perceive, that even these blasphemers, notwithstanding the unpardonableness of the sin they have committed, may finally be saved—For if they are not saved till after they have passed through these torments, they have never been forgiven —*The divine law has taken its course;* nor has any intervening pardon prevented *the full execution of the threatened penalty on them.*—Forgiveness strictly and literally speaking has not been granted them."‖ "This kind of sinners being absolutely excluded from the privilege of

* P. 90. † P. 307. ‡ Page 320. § P. 350, 351. ‖ P. 335, &c.

forgiveness, must, as has been said, suffer the torments of another world, before they can be saved."*

In these passages concerning the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost, the author plainly supposes, that not only those of that character, but all who suffer the torments of hell are finally saved without forgiveness, having satisfied by their own sufferings the utmost demands of strict justice. He who is delivered from further punishment in consequence of having suffered a punishment however great in degree and long in duration, but not equal to that, to which he is liable by strict justice, is the subject of forgiveness. Just so much punishment is forgiven him, as is lacking to make the punishment, which he hath suffered, equal to that, to which he is liable by strict justice. Now our author, in the passages just quoted, supposes that both the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost and all others who pass through the torments of hell, are finally delivered, not in consequence of a punishment inferior in degree or duration, to that which may be inflicted on them, according to strict justice; as in that case they would be the subjects of forgiveness: but in consequence of that punishment, which is according to strict justice, and therefore they are delivered without forgiveness. He says, "The pardonableness of all other sins, lies in the possibility, that those who have been guilty of them, should escape the torments of hell." Those therefore who actually pass through the torments of hell receive no forgiveness; but are liberated on the footing of strict justice. If pardonableness, or which is the same, a possibility of pardon consist in a possibility of escaping the torments of hell; then actual pardon consists in an actual escape from those torments. Of course they who do not escape them, but pass through them, receive no pardon.

* P. 340.

Again: the only observation made by Dr. C. to show, that the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost are not forgiven; or the only respect in which he asserts, that they are not forgiven, is, that they pass through the torments of hell. But as this holds good with regard to all the damned, it equally proves, that none of them are forgiven; and that the divine law takes its course on them all; and that no intervening pardon will ever prevent the full execution of the threatened penalty on them.—Now if the divine law take its course on the damned, and the penalty threatened in the law, be fully executed on them; they are undoubtedly punished according to their demerits, or according to strict justice; and if after all, they be liberated from punishment, they are liberated not in the way of forgiveness, nor on the footing of grace or favour; but on the footing of strict justice.

But if this conclusion concerning all the damned be denied; yet as the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost are some of mankind, *some* of mankind at least, if not all the damned, will be saved on the footing of strict justice, and without forgiveness.

The same observations for substance, may be made on the other quotations above. If the damned suffer "a misery in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices;" if "they receive the wages of sin;" if they be "tormented variously as to time, in proportion to their deserts;" and "according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds;" if they suffer "positive torments awfully great in degree and long in continuance, in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes;" they are punished to the utmost extent of justice. To punish them any further would be excessive, injurious and oppressive. To exempt them from punishment, is so far from an act of grace or favour, that it is an act called for by the most rigorous justice.

By these quotations, and by the observations on them, it appears, that our author holds, that the damned suffer a punishment properly and strictly vindictive, and vindictive to the highest degree, and to the utmost extent to which vengeance in any just government can proceed. Indeed speaking of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, he plainly asserts a vindictive punishment both of those cities, and of the damned; he says,* that "the destruction of those cities" was, "for a public example of the divine vengeance to after ages. And the fire of hell is doubtless called everlasting for the like reason;" i. e. because it will last, till it shall have accomplished the design of heaven in the destruction of the damned, for a public example of the divine vengeance. In his *Five Dissertations* p. 110, he speaks of the labour, sorrow and death which men suffer in this world, as "testimonies of GOD's *vengeance*,—as *judgments* on his part, and *real evils* on theirs;" By vindictive punishment is meant, that which is sufficient to support and vindicate the authority of the divine law, or which is sufficient to satisfy the justice of GOD. But no advocate for vindictive punishment ever supposed, that to vindicate the authority of the law and to satisfy the justice of God, a greater punishment is necessary, than is according to justice or according to the desert, or the nature and number of the sins, the vices, the crimes of the person punished: or that to those ends, a greater punishment is necessary, than is inflicted, when "the divine law takes its course;" or than is implied "in the full execution of the threatened penalty." A punishment greater than that which answers those descriptions, would be so far from satisfying justice, that it would be positively *unjust:* it would be so far from supporting the authority of the divine law, that it would bring it into contempt by violating it.

* P. 274.

If that positive torment, which in degree and continuance is according to the desert and the nature and number of the evil deeds of the sinner, be not sufficient to satisfy the justice of GOD, I wish to be informed what would satisfy it.—But Dr. C. himself holds, that the punishment which satisfies the justice of GOD, is vindictive and opposed to that which is disciplinary and medicinal; "If the next state is a state of punishment not intended for the cure of the patients themselves, but to satisfy the justice of GOD, and give warning to others; it is impossible all men should be finally saved."* So that I am perfectly agreed with Dr. C. in his idea of a vindictive punishment, and whether he do not hold such punishment in the utmost extent, I appeal to every candid reader, who shall have perused the forecited quotations, or the pages from which they are taken.

Yet Dr. C. is a great enemy to vindictive punishment, and it is a fundamental principle of his book, that the future punishment of the wicked is *disciplinary* and intended for the good, the repentance and reformation of the patients, and not to satisfy the justice of God. This appears from the quotation just now made from page 11th; and by innumerable other passages, some of which I shall now recite. "The wicked shall be sent to a place of weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth; not to continue there always, but till the rebellion of their hearts is subdued, and they are wrought upon to become the willing and obedient subjects of God."† "For ages of ages, the wicked shall be miserable—as a mean to destroy the enmity of their hearts and make them GOD'S willing and obedient people."‡ "The rest ["the wicked"] shall have their portion in the place of blackness of darkness, as a suitable and necessary discipline, in order to their being reduced under moral subjection to CHRIST."§

* P. 11. † P. 220. ‡ P. 221. § P. 221.

"The other ["the wicked"] shall be banished to dwell in unspeakable torment, till they repent of their folly, and yield themselves up to GOD, as his obedient servants."* "He considers the many dispensations," through which he supposes the wicked will pass, "as variously adapted for the discipline of stubborn and rebellious creatures."† "Is it not far more reasonable to suppose, that the miseries of the other world are *a proper discipline*, in order to accomplish the end" of the recovery of the damned, "than that they should be final and vindictive only?"‡ "The consideration of hell as a purging fire, is *that only*, which can make the matter sit easy on one's mind."§ With approbation he quotes from Mr. Hartley these words; "the doctrine of purgatory, as now taught by the Papists, seems to be a corruption of a genuine doctrine held by the ancient fathers, concerning a purifying fire."‖ He considers the misery of hell as "intended for the good of the patients themselves;"¶—for "their benefit;"** as "a discipline by which is to be effected the *personal good* of wicked men."†† He says, "The reason why the wicked suffer the torments of the next state, is that they might be made the willing people of GOD."‡‡

As this is his idea of the nature and end of the future punishment of the wicked, he often rejects with abhorrence the idea, that they are to be punished for any other end exclusive of their own personal good. What he says in p. 325, implies, that unless we believe, that the future punishment of the wicked is intended for their personal good, we must believe, that "the character of GOD, as the Father of mercies, and the God of pity, is limited to this world only;" and that he is not the "same good being in the other world, that he is in this;"—

* P. 224. † P. 309. ‡ P. 322. § P. 324. ‖ P. 324. ¶ P. 325. ** P. 326. †† P. 328. ‡‡ P. 343.

That on that supposition, "we shall say that of our Father in heaven, which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father."* And in page 11th, before quoted, he absolutely rejects all punishment which is not disciplinary.

But how these two fundamental parts of Dr. C's system can be consistent with each other, is difficult to be conceived. Is that punishment which is according to the deserts of the sinner; that which in degree and continuance is according to the nature and number of his evil deeds; in which the divine law takes its course upon him, and in which the penalty threatened in the law is fully executed: is this punishment no more than a suitable and necessary discipline to the sinner; necessary "to reduce him to a moral subjection to CHRIST;" necessary "to his personal good," "his benefit," &c.? If so, then that punishment which is according to strict justice and "satisfies the justice of GOD," and that which is a mere merciful and beneficial discipline, are one and the same. The damned sinner suffers no more punishment, than is necessary for his good, nor can without injury and oppression be made to suffer more: and all ground of distinction between vindictive and disciplinary punishment entirely vanishes. But if any man should avow this sentiment, that such punishment only, as is necessary and conducive to the sinner's personal good, can consistently with justice be inflicted; I beg leave to refer him to the next chapter, in which the subject is considered at large.

In the mean time, it may be proper to observe, that Dr. C. could not consistently adopt the sentiment just mentioned; because he in page 11th before quoted, distinguishes expressly between that punishment, which is intended for the cure of the patients, and that which is intended to satisfy the justice of GOD; and asserts that

* P. 327.

the latter is inconsistent with the salvation of all men. His words are, "If the next state is a state of punishment, not intended for the cure of the patients themselves, but to satisfy the justice of GOD—'tis impossible all men should be finally saved." On this notable passage, I observe, 1. That Dr. C. here, as every where else through his book, distinguishes between a vindictive and disciplinary punishment; or between that punishment which is conducive to the sinner's good, and that which satisfies divine justice. It cannot therefore be said, that according to Dr. C. a punishment conducive to the sinner's good, is all that can in strict justice be inflicted on him.—2. He asserts, that if future punishment be intended to satisfy divine justice, it is impossible all men should be saved. Yet he himself in holding, that the wicked will be punished according to their deserts, and in degree and continuance according to the nature and number of their sins, crimes and evil deeds; and that the divine law will take its course on them, the whole threatened penalty be inflicted, and they never be forgiven; holds that punishment, which entirely satisfies the justice of GOD. Therefore, as he also holds that such future punishment as satisfies the justice of GOD, is inconsistent with the salvation of all men; to be consistent, he must give up the doctrine of the salvation of all men, to prove which, he wrote his whole book.

Another fundamental principle of Dr. C's book, is, that all men, both those who are saved immediately from this life, and those who are saved after they have suffered the pains of hell; are saved by the mere *mercy*, *compassion*, *grace* or *favour* of GOD, *through* CHRIST.—He allows,* that the Apostle's Doctrine of justification stands "upon the foot of grace through CHRIST," and

* Page 43.

"that mankind have universally sinned and consequently cannot be justified upon any claim founded on *mere law*." —"The gift by CHRIST takes rise from the many offences, which mankind commit in their own persons, and finally terminates in opposition to the power and demerit of them all, in their being restored, not simply to life, but to reign in it forever."* "As mankind universally are subjected to damage through the lapse of Adam; so they shall as *universally* be *delivered from it*, through *the gift by* CHRIST."† "The *gift on* CHRIST's part,—ought to be taken in its abounding sense."‡ "The plain truth is, final everlasting salvation is absolutely the *free gift of* GOD to *all* men, *through* JESUS CHRIST—he has absolutely and unconditionally determined, of his *rich mercy*, through the intervening mediation of his son JESUS CHRIST; that all men, the whole race of lapsed Adam shall reign in life."§ He speaks of GOD as exercising *pity*, *tender compassion* and *grace*, towards the damned; and speaking of the disciplinary punishment of the damned, he says, "that GOD, in the other world as well as this, must be disposed to make it evident, that he is a being of *boundless and inexhaustible goodness*."‖ "He speaks of the doctrine of universal salvation, as the gospel plan of mercy *extensively benevolent;* and a wonderful design of mercy"¶ as "the scripture scheme of mercy," and of the vilest of the human race as "the objects of *mercy*."** He quotes†† with approbation, from Mr. Whiston, "That there may be in the *utmost bowels of the divine compassion*, another time of trial allotted" to the damned, in which many or all of them may be saved, by the *infinite indulgence* and *love* of their CREATOR."

Our author abundantly declares also, that this *rich mercy*, this *free gift*, this *tender compassion and grace*, this

* P. 56. † P. 62. ‡ P. 75. § P. 86. ‖ P. 326. ¶ P. 360. ** P. 365. †† P. 405.

infinite indulgence and *love* of their CREATOR, this *boundless* and *inexhaustible goodness*, in the salvation of all men, is exercised *through* CHRIST only, and *for his sake.* "JESUS CHRIST is the person *through whom* and *upon whose account*, happiness is attainable by any of the human race."* "The obedience of CHRIST, and eminently his obedience *unto death*, is *the ground* or *reason*, upon which it hath pleased GOD to make happiness attainable by any of the human race."† "It was *with a view to* the obedience and death of CHRIST, *upon this account, upon this ground, for this reason*, that GOD was pleased to make the gospel promise of a glorious immortality to the sons of men."‡ "CHRIST died not for a select number of men only, but for mankind universally and without exception or limitation."§

Now, how can this part of Dr. C's system be reconciled with that part, in which he holds, that all the damned will be punished *according to their deserts?* Can those who are punished *according to their deserts*, after that be saved *on the foot of grace through* CHRIST? Can those who are punished according to the nature and number of their evil deeds; in degree and continuance, in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes; in whose punishment the divine law takes its course, and the threatened penalty is fully executed: can these persons be saved by *a gift?* by a gift taken *in the abounding sense? by the free gift of* GOD *through Christ?* by *rich mercy*? by *pity, tender compassion* and *grace?* by *mercy extensively benevolent?* by a *wonderful* design of *mercy?* by *boundless* and *inexhaustible goodness?* by the *utmost bowels of the divine compassion?* by the *infinite indulgence and love of their* CREATOR? Is the man who by his crimes has, according to law, exposed himself to the pillory, or to be cropt and branded, and on whom the law has taken

* P. 17. † P. 19. ‡ P. 20. § P. 20.

its course, and the threatened penalty has been fully executed; is he after all delivered from further suffering by *grace*, by *pity*, by *tender compassion*, by *indulgence and love*, by the *utmost bowels of compassion?*—No; he has a right on the foot of *mere law*, and of *the most rigorous justice*, to subsequent impunity, with respect to the crime or crimes, for which he has been thus punished: and to tell him after he is thus punished, that he is now released by grace, by pity, by utmost compassion, by indulgence and love, would be the grossest insult.

Again; how can those who have been punished according to their deserts, be saved *through* CHRIST, or *on his account?* How can the obedience and death of CHRIST be the *ground* or *reason* of their salvation? Having suffered the full penalty threatened in the law, they have a right to demand future impunity, on account of their own sufferings. What need then have they of CHRIST, of his obedience and death, or of his mediatory intervention, to be brought into the account? Dr. C. speaks of the "deliverance" or "the redemption which CHRIST has purchased" for all men.* But what need is there, that CHRIST should purchase deliverance for those, who purchase it for themselves, by their own personal sufferings? Nay, what justice would there be in refusing deliverance to a man, unless it be purchased for him by another, when he hath fully purchased it for himself? What if the person before described to have suffered some corporeal punishment according to the strictness of law, should be told at his release, that he is delivered from further punishment, not on account of his own suffering; but *on account* of some other person? *on the ground*, and *for the reason* of the obedience or merit of that other person? Might he not with just indignation reply; Wherein hath that other person afforded me any

* P. 153, 154.

relief? I have suffered all that could be inflicted on me consistently with law and justice; and let the merit of that other person be what it may, I thank him for nothing: his merit hath benefitted me nothing. As little benefit from CHRIST does he derive towards his deliverance, who suffers according to his deserts; and with as little propriety can it be said, that he is redeemed or delivered *through* CHRIST or *on his account.*

On the whole, Dr. C's scheme comes to this; That not bare goodness, but that goodness, which is boundless and inexhaustible; not bare compassion but the utmost bowels of the divine compassion; not bare indulgence and love, but the infinite indulgence and love of our creator; will grant to his creatures of mankind, just so much relief from misery, as they are entitled to, by the most rigorous justice.

Nor did Dr. C. fall into these inconsistences, by mere inattention; he was driven to them by dire necessity, provided it was necessary for him, to adopt his favorite doctrine of the salvation of all men. Every one of the forementioned principles is essential to his system, and can by no means be spared.

1. That the damned are punished according to their deserts, is manifestly essential to his system. For if in ages of ages they do not suffer a punishment which is according to their deserts, they do not suffer that which might justly be inflicted upon them; or, which is the same thing, that punishment which is denounced in the divine law: and according both to justice and the divine law, the damned might be made to suffer a greater punishment, than that which is for ages of ages; or than the longest punishment, which any of them will in fact suffer. But as nobody pretends there is any greater punishment threatened in the law, or in any part of scripture, than that which in scriptural language is said to be for ever

and ever, which Dr. C. supposes to be for ages of ages only, and to be actually suffered by some men at least; he was necessitated to hold, that some suffer the utmost punishment threatened in the law, and of course the utmost which they deserve.

Beside; if he had allowed, that the damned do not suffer so long a punishment, as they deserve, or as is threatened in the law; he might have been asked, how much longer that punishment is, which is threatened in the law, than that which they actually suffer. And the answer must have been, either that it is a longer temporary punishment; or that it is an endless punishment. But which ever answer should have been given, inexplicable difficulties would have followed. If he should have answered, that the punishment threatened in the law, and which the sinner justly deserves, is a longer temporary punishment, than that which the damned actually suffer, he might have been challenged, to point it out, as contained in the law, or in any part of scripture: and it is presumed, that he would not have been able to do it.

But if he should have answered, that the punishment threatened in the law, and which the sinner justly deserves, is an *endless* punishment, he must at once have given up all arguments in favour of universal salvation, and against endless punishment, drawn from the *justice* of God. Surely the justice of God does not oppose that which is just, and which the sinner deserves; or that which the just law of God threatens. He must also have acknowledged the infinite evil of sin, which seems to have been a most grievous eye-sore to him. For nothing more is meant by the infinite evil of sin, than that on the account of sin, the sinner deserves an endless punishment.

Again; Dr. C. could not assert, that the damned do not suffer all the punishment, which they deserve, with-

out contradicting apparently at least, many clear and positive declarations of scripture: such as, That God will render to every man according to his deeds, and according as his work shall be; That every one shall receive according to the things done in the body; That the wicked shall not come out of the place of punishment, till they shall have paid the uttermost farthing, and the very last mite; That he shall have judgment without mercy, that shewed no mercy, &c. &c.

2. It was equally necessary, that he should hold that the punishment of the damned is a discipline, necessary and happily conducive to lead them to repentance, and to promote their good.—Otherwise he must have holden, that future punishment is vindictive and intended to satisfy the justice of God; which kind of punishment is, according to his own account, inconsistent with the salvation of all men.* And otherwise he must have given up all his arguments from the divine goodness, mercy, compassion and grace, which are the chief arguments, on which he himself depended most, for the support of his cause, and which are the most popular, and the most persuasive to the majority of his readers. Otherwise too, he could not have pretended, that his scheme of universal salvation is a scheme of such benevolence, of such boundless and inexhaustible goodness, of such tender compassion and grace, of such infinite indulgence and love: and must have given up all the principal texts of scripture, from which he argues universal salvation; as they are inconsistent with the idea, that the damned will be finally admitted to happiness, having previously suffered the whole punishment, which they deserve.

3. Nor could he make out his scheme of universal salvation, unless he held, that all men are saved in the

* Page 11.

way of mere grace and favour through CHRIST. If he had not holden this, what I observed under the last article, would be observable under this too, that he must have given up all arguments drawn from the divine goodness; and also all arguments drawn from what the scriptures say of the extent of CHRIST's redemption; particularly those texts from which Dr. C. chiefly argues in support of his scheme. Every one of those texts holds forth that all who are saved, are saved *by grace, through* CHRIST. He must also have given up all arguments from scripture. The scripture knows of no salvation, but that which is founded on the mere favour of GOD forgiving the sins of men, according to the riches of his grace, and justifying them freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in JESUS CHRIST.

Thus Dr. C. was compelled by necessity to associate in his scheme, principles which will wage eternal war with each other.

SECTION II.

In which objections to the preceding reasoning are considered.

I. IF to some part of the preceding reasoning, it should be objected, that though the sinner, having suffered a punishment according to his deserts, has a right on the footing of justice to subsequent impunity, and therefore cannot be *delivered from further punishment* by grace, or through CHRIST; yet, as he has no right on the footing of justice, to *the positive happiness* of heaven, he may be admitted to this, entirely by grace, and through CHRIST: This would by no means be sufficient to reconcile the forementioned inconsistences; as may appear by the following observations.

1. That Dr. C. asserts, not only that all men will be admitted *to the positive happiness* of heaven, by free grace; but that they will in the same way *be delivered from the pains of hell:* As in these instances;* "*The gift through the one man* JESUS CHRIST, takes rise from the many sins which men commit, in the course of their lives, and proceeds in opposition to the power and demerit of them all, so as finally to terminate in justification, justification including in it *deliverance from sin*, as well as *from death;* their being made righteous, as well as reigning in life." †"By the righteousness of the one man JESUS CHRIST the opposite advantageous gift is come upon all men, which *delivers them from death*, to reign in life for ever." ‡"It seemed agreeable to the infinite wisdom and grace of GOD, that this *damage should be repaired*, and mankind *rescued from the state of sin and death*—by the obedience of one man." §"Salvation *from wrath* is one thing *essentially* included in that justification which is the result of true faith." He speaks to the same effect in many other places. Indeed he never gives the least hint implying, that he imagined, that the introduction of the sinner to the positive happiness of heaven is more an act of grace, than his *deliverance from the pains of hell:* but all that he says on the subject, implies the contrary. Nor do I state this objection, because I find it in his book; but lest some of his admirers should start it, and should suppose, that it relieves the difficulties before pressed upon him.

As Dr. C. allows, that the deliverance of sinners from the pains of hell, in all instances, is as really an act of grace, and as really through CHRIST, as their admission to the joys of heaven; so the scriptures are very clear as to the same matter. Gal. iii. 13. "CHRIST hath redeemed us *from the curse of the law*, being made a curse

* P. 25, 26. † P. 27. ‡ P. 30. § P. 37.

for us." Rom. v. 9. "We shall be saved *from wrath* through him." 1 Thes. i. 10. "JESUS which *delivered us from the wrath to come.*" And pardon or forgiveness, which is a discharge from deserved punishment, is, in its very nature, an act of grace, and is, in scripture, always spoken of as such, and as dispensed through CHRIST only. Nor is any thing more clear from the scriptures, than that every person, who is saved, is saved in the way of *forgiveness.*

2. There would be no propriety in saying, that a person who has suffered all the punishment which he justly deserves, who is on the footing of law and justice released from all further punishment, and is placed in a state of mediocrity, in which he is the subject of no misery; is admitted to the positive happiness of heaven, by *mercy*, by *pity* or *compassion:* much less by "*tender* compassion" and "*wonderful* mercy," and by the "*utmost bowels* of the divine compassion." A being who has by his personal sufferings, satisfied the law, stands as right with respect to that law, as if he had never transgressed it; or as another person, who retains his original innocence. Now, does any man suppose, that Gabriel was admitted to celestial happiness, in the way of *mercy*, *pity*, or *tender compassion?*—That he was admitted to it in the exercise of *goodness*, is granted. The same may be said of his creation, and of the creation of every being rational and animal. But no being is created *out of compassion.* With no more propriety can it be said, that an innocent being, or, which is the same as to the present purpose, that a being who has indeed transgressed, but has in his own person made satisfaction for his transgression, and on that footing is delivered from all punishment and misery, is admitted to high positive happiness, by mercy, pity or compassion. And how much more improperly are the strong epithets used by Dr. C. ap-

plied in this case? Is it an instance of *tender* pity, of *wonderful* mercy, of the *utmost bowels* of the DIVINE compassion, to admit to the happiness of heaven, an *innocent* creature, or one who, in his own person, stands perfectly right with respect to the divine law, and is not the subject of any misery?

3. To grant that those who shall have suffered a punishment according to their deserts, will on the footing of justice, be delivered from further wrath or punishment, and yet to insist that their admission to high positive happiness, is truly and properly an act of *grace;* would be only to raise a dispute concerning the proper meaning of the word *grace*, and at the same time to grant, that the deliverance of the sinner from wrath, is no fruit of *forgiveness*, or of *grace*, even in the very sense in which the objector uses the word *grace*. It is no act of favour, or of *goodness*, as distinguished from *justice*, to deliver a person from wrath, who is innocent, or who in his own person has satisfied the law, and therefore now stands right with respect to it. But the idea of delivering a sinner from wrath, without forgiveness, and without grace, is as foreign from the scriptures, as that of the admission of a sinner, without grace, to the positive joys of heaven.

II. Perhaps it may be objected to part of the preceding section, that by punishment "in proportion to their deserts," and "according to their evil deeds," &c. Dr. C. meant not a punishment *equal* to strict justice, or *satisfactory* to the justice of GOD; but one in which a due proportion to the deserts of the various persons, with respect to one another, who are the subjects of the punishment, is observed.—But to this it may be answered, Dr. C. doubtless meant to use the expressions, "in proportion to their deserts," "according to their evil deeds," &c. in the same sense in which the scriptures

say, "according to their works;" "according to the fruit of their doings," &c. This is manifest not only by the similarity of the expressions, but by his own reference to those phrases in scripture, as in the following passages, "Which is plainly inconsistent with that difference *the scripture* often *declares* there shall be, in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds."* "Under the prospect of being condemned *by the righteous* JUDGE of all the earth—to positive torments awfully great in degree, and long in continuance, in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes."† Here he undoubtedly refers to those passages in which the scriptures assure us, that the judge "will render to every man according to his deeds;" "according as his work shall be," &c. Now these phrases of scripture are clearly explained to us, by those representations, in which the punishment of the wicked is illustrated by the imprisonment of a debtor, till he shall have paid the uttermost farthing, the very last mite, &c. and by the passages, in which it is declared, that the wicked shall have *judgment without mercy;* that GOD will *not pity, nor spare* them, &c. Whereas, if they suffer less than they deserve according to strict justice; so far they are the objects of *mercy* and *pity;* so far GOD does *spare* them; so far they have *mercy mixed with judgment.* Nor can it be said, that they pay the *uttermost farthing* of the debt.

Again; Dr. C. allows, that the wicked will in the second death receive the wages of sin. But the wages of a man are not merely a part, or a certain proportion of what he deserves, or has earned, but the whole. No man who has faithfully done the work, which he contracted to do for ten pounds, will allow, that five pounds are his wages for that work.

* P. 320. † P. 350.

III. It may also be objected to a part of the former section, that though "the law shall have its course" on some men, and "the full penalty threatened in the law, be executed on them;" still this does not imply a punishment equal or satisfactory to strict justice; as the divine law itself does not, nor ever did threaten all that punishment, which is deserved according to strict justice: and therefore though the damned shall suffer all which is threatened in the law, yet they will not suffer a vindictive punishment, a punishment which shall "satisfy the justice of GOD."—Concerning this objection it may be observed;

1. That by *the law* is meant, to use Dr. C's own words, "the moral law," "the law of nature, the law of *reason*, which is the law of GOD:" and to say, that this law does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of justice, is to say, that it does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of reason. If so, it is not the law of reason; which is contrary to the supposition. Therefore to say, that the law of reason does not threaten a penalty adequate to the demands of justice, is a real contradiction.

2. That Dr. C. neither does nor could consistently make this objection; because if the objection were just, men might be justified, "on a claim founded on *mere law*." On the principle of the objection, the law threatens a punishment far less than we deserve; and a man having suffered this punishment, may be justified on the foundation of mere law: the law would be satisfied, and the man would stand right with respect to it, nor would it have any further claim on him, in the way of punishment, more than on a person who had never transgressed. Therefore he thenceforward obeying the law, might as truly be justified on the foot of *mere law*, as if he had rendered the same obedience, without ever transgressing.

But Dr. C. holds, "that mankind universally have sinned, and consequently cannot be justified upon a claim founded on *mere law*."* And † that "the whole world had become guilty before God, and were therefore incapable of being justified upon the foot of mere law." That all men are ‡ "incapable of justification upon the foot of mere law, as having become guilty before GOD." To the same effect in various other passages. So that according to Dr. C. if future punishment be intended to satisfy *the law*, it is equally impossible, that all men should be saved, as it is on the supposition, that future punishment is intended to satisfy *justice*.

3. Dr. C. allows, that a man having suffered the penalty of the law, is not, and cannot be, the object of forgiveness. §"If they are not saved, till after they have passed through these torments, they have never been forgiven—The divine law has taken its course; nor has any intervening pardon prevented the full execution of the threatened penalty on them. Forgiveness strictly and literally speaking, has not been granted to them." But if those who suffer the penalty of the law, are not, in their subsequent exemption from punishment, the objects of forgiveness, they suffer all they *deserve*. So far as they are exempted from *deserved* punishment, they are forgiven: forgiveness means nothing else than an exemption from deserved punishment.

4. Dr. C. says, that Adam (and for the same reason doubtless men in general) "must have rendered himself obnoxious to the *righteous resentment* of his GOD and KING, had he expressed a disregard to any command"‖ of the moral law, the law of which the Doctor is speaking in that passage. But the righteous resentment of

* P. 43. † P. 34. ‡ P. 36. § P. 336. ‖ 5 Dissertations, P. 55.

God for transgression is a just punishment of transgression; and a just punishment is any punishment, which is not unjust. And it is impossible that Adam should be obnoxious to such a punishment, if the law, the most strict rule of God's proceedings with his creatures, had not threatened it.—Thus Dr. C. himself grants, that the punishment threatened in the law is the same which is deserved according to strict justice.

The Doctor every where holds, that "the law of God is a perfect rule of righteousness."* But if the law do not threaten all the punishment which is justly deserved by sin, it is no more truly a perfect rule of righteousness, than the gospel is.—Again; "Is the law that rule of right, "which God knows to be the measure of men's duty to him, and of what is fit he should do for, or inflict upon them, as they are either obedient, or disobedient? There is, without all doubt, such a rule of men's duty towards God, and of God's conduct towards men, in a way of reward or punishment, according to their works."† There could scarcely be a more explicit concession, that the divine law threatens all that punishment, which is according to justice. It is declared to be, not only the *rule of right*, but the *measure of what is fit in punishment*, as well as of duty. Indeed Dr. C. never once, so far as I have noticed, suggests the idea, that the divine law does not threaten all that punishment, which is deserved by sin.

5. According to this objection, the moral law is a dispensation of grace, as truly as the gospel. But how does this accord with the scripture? That declares, that "the *law* was given by Moses, but *grace* and truth," or the gracious truth, "came by Jesus Christ;" John i. 17. —"If they which are of the law be heirs, faith is made

* Particularly 12 Sermons, P. 36. † Ibid. P. 39.

void, and the promise made of none effect. Because the law worketh *wrath*.—Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by *grace*;" Rom. iv. 14.—"The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law;" 1 Cor. xv. 56. As in the objection now under consideration, the law is supposed to be as really a dispensation of grace, as the gospel; we may say, The strength of sin is the *gospel*, as truly as, The strength of sin is the *law*.—Beside; if the law be a dispensation of grace, how can it be said to be the *strength* of sin? It threatens a part only of the punishment deserved by sin; and therefore it neither points out, how strong sin is, to bring into condemnation, nor does it give to sin its proper force to terrify and torment the sinner, by exhibiting the whole punishment deserved by sin. On the ground of this objection, the strength of sin consists in the rule of strict justice, not in the law.

6. The apostle tells us, that "by the law is the knowledge of sin." But the knowledge of the evil or demerit of sin is obtained by the knowledge of the *threatening* of the law only. If the law do not threaten all that punishment, which sin deserves, we know not by the law, what sin deserves, or how evil it is.—And if we know not this by the law, neither do we know it by any other part of scripture, nor by any other means whatever. Nor do we know our own demerit, nor our own proper characters as sinners; nor are we in any capacity to judge concerning our obligation to gratitude for the redemption of CHRIST, or for salvation through him; nor have we the proper motive to repentance set before us, in all the scriptures. The proper motive to repentance is the evil of sin.—And if we have not the knowledge of the evil of sin, it is impossible we should know the grace of pardon, or of salvation from that punishment which is justly deserved by sin.

7. The apostle declares, as we have seen, that "by the law is the knowledge of *sin*," and that "the law worketh *wrath*." But on the principle of this objection, by the law is the knowledge of *grace*, and the law worketh *grace:* and GOD without any atonement did grant to sinners some remission or mitigation of deserved punishment. Why then could not complete remission or pardon have been granted in the same way? What need was there of CHRIST and his death? Yet Dr. C. holds, that "it was with a view to the obedience and death of CHRIST, *upon this account, upon this ground, for this reason*, that GOD was pleased to make the gospel promise of a glorious immortality to the miserable sons of men."

8. If the full punishment to which the sinner justly exposes himself by sin, be not pointed out in the law; it is not a good law, as it does not teach the subject of the law the truth in this matter; but it is a deceitful law, or is directly calculated to deceive. It threatens a punishment, which the subject would naturally believe to be the whole punishment to which he is exposed by transgression, or which can be justly inflicted on him.—But this, if the objection be well grounded, is by no means the case. Thus the law would naturally tend to deceive fatally all its subjects.

9. From what is granted by Dr. C. it certainly follows, that the threatening of the law is all that can be inflicted consistently with justice, and that the punishment threatened in the law, and that which is allowed by strict justice, is one and the same. He says, "Whatever sin may in its own nature, be supposed to deserve; it is not reasonable to suppose, that it should be universally reckoned to death, when no law is in being that makes death the special penalty of transgression."*—"Sin is

* Page 23.

not reckoned, brought to account, *ought* not to be looked upon as being taxed with the forfeiture of life, when there is no law in being, with death as its affixed sanction."* Therefore whatever sin may be supposed to deserve, it is not *reasonable*, that it should be reckoned, it *ought not* to be reckoned, or which is the same thing, it is *not just*, that it should be reckoned to any punishment whatever, when there is no law in being, which makes that punishment the special penalty of transgression. Therefore, as I said, the punishment threatened in the law, is all which can be inflicted consistently with justice; and the punishment threatened in the law, and that which is allowed by strict justice, are one and the same.

10. If the law do not threaten all that punishment, which is just, we cannot possibly tell what is a just punishment, or what justice threatens or admits with regard to punishment, and what it does not admit. If once we give up the law and the testimony, we are left to our own imaginations. Dr. C. holds, that the wages of sin are the second death, and that this death is a punishment which shall last, according to the language of scripture, *for ever and ever.* Are these wages, and this punishment which shall continue *for ever and ever*, adequate to the demand of justice or not? If they are, then the law threatens all which justice requires.—If they are not, then the wages of sin, and the punishment for ever and ever, are a *gracious* punishment, and sinners *deserve* a longer punishment. But how do we know, that sinners deserve a longer punishment, than this? No longer punishment is threatened in the law, or in any part of scripture.

11. If sin deserve a longer punishment, than that which is threatened in the law, it deserves either an endless

* Page 47.

punishment, or a temporary punishment longer than that which is threatened in the law. But if sin deserve an endless punishment, it is an *infinite evil*.—If it deserve a temporary punishment though longer than that which is threatened in the law, all men may finally be saved, even though the state of future punishment be intended to satisfy the divine justice: the contrary of which however is asserted by Dr. C.

12. If the damned, though they shall be punished according to law, will not be punished as much as they deserve; what shall we make of the scriptures, which declare, that they shall have judgment without mercy; that GOD will not spare, nor pity them; that wrath shall be poured upon them without mixture? &c.

I now appeal to the reader, whether, notwithstanding this objection, the damned, in suffering the whole penalty threatened in the divine law, do not suffer as much as they deserve according to strict justice, and therefore suffer a penalty to the highest degree vindictive.

IV. If it should be further objected, that there is no inconsistency in representing future punishment to be fully adequate to the demerit of sin; and yet to represent it as disciplinary, and adapted to the repentance and personal good of the patient: as both the ends of the personal good of the patient, and of the satisfaction of justice, are answered by it: it is to be noticed,

1. If this objection mean, that the punishment which is merely adapted to the personal good of the patient, be all which is deserved by sin; I beg leave to refer the objector to the next chapter.

2. If it mean, that though sin do deserve, and the damned will suffer, more punishment, than that which is conducive to the personal good of the patient; even all that punishment which is according to strict justice; yet all will be saved finally: then it will follow that an end-

less punishment is not deserved by sin. In this case, I beg leave to refer the objector to chapter VI.

3. Still on the foundation of this objection, the damned, as they will have previously suffered all that they deserve, will finally be delivered from further suffering of wrath, not by forgiveness, not by grace, nor through CHRIST; but entirely on the footing of strict justice, as having suffered the full penalty of the law.

4. Dr. C. could not consistently make this objection. The objection holds, that the damned do suffer a punishment entirely satisfactory to justice: and Dr. C. allows, that if the punishment of the wicked be intended to "satisfy the justice of GOD, and give warning to others, 'tis impossible all men should be saved."*

Having in this first chapter, so far attended to Dr. C's system concerning future punishment, as to find, that it appears to be a combination of the most jarring principles; and having particularly pointed out the mutual discordance of those principles; I might spare myself the labour of a further examination of his book; until at least it should be made to appear, that those principles do in reality harmonize with each other.—But as some may entertain the opinion, that though there be inconsistences in the Book, yet the general doctrine of universal salvation is true, and is defensible, if not on all the grounds, on which Dr. C. has undertaken the defence of it, yet on some of them at least; therefore I have determined to proceed to a more particular examination of this doctrine, and of the arguments brought by Dr. C. in support of it.

* Page 11.

CHAPTER II.

WHETHER THE DAMNED DESERVE ANY OTHER PUNISHMENT, THAN THAT WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO THEIR PERSONAL GOOD.

On the supposition, that future punishment is a mere discipline necessary and happily conducive to the repentance and good of the damned; it may be asked, whether such discipline be all which they *deserve*, and which can consistently with strict justice be inflicted; or whether they do indeed deserve a greater degree or duration of punishment, than that which is sufficient to lead them to repentance, and that additional punishment be by grace remitted to them. Let us consider both these hypotheses.

The *first* is, that the wicked deserve, according to strict justice, no more punishment, than is necessary to lead them to repentance, and to prepare them for happiness.—That this is not a mere hypothesis made by an opponent of Dr. C. but is a doctrine *implied* at least, if not expressly asserted in his book, may appear by the following quotations. *"Is it not far more *reasonable* to suppose, that the miseries of the other world are a proper discipline in order to accomplish this end" [the recovery of sinners] "than that they should be final and vindictive only?" If a final and vindictive punishment be entirely just, what has reason to object to the infliction of it, in some instances at least?—†"The consideration of hell as a purging fire, is that only which can make the matter sit easy on one's mind." But if hell, though not merely a purging fire, be justly deserved, why does not the thought of it sit easy on one's mind? So that it is

* P. 321, 322. † P. 324.

manifestly implied in this reasoning of Dr. C. that no other punishment of the wicked can be reconciled with justice, than that which is adapted to their personal good.

The same is implicitly asserted by other writers on the same side of the question concerning future punishment. Bishop *Newton,* in his *Dissertation on the Final State of Mankind,** says, "It is *just* and wise and good, and even merciful, to correct a sinner as long as he *deserves* correction; to whip and scourge him, as I may say, out of his faults" Therefore all the punishment of the sinner, which is *just*, and which he *deserves*, is correction, or to be scourged out of his faults. The Chevalier *Ramsay* tells us, that "Justice is that perfection in GOD, by which he endeavours to make all intelligences just."† "Vindictive justice, is that attribute in GOD, by which he pursues vice with all sorts of torments, till it be totally extirpated, destroyed and annihilated."‡ Therefore if GOD inflict any punishment with any other design, than to make the subject of that punishment just, and to extirpate vice from him, he violates even *vindictive* justice. *M. Petitpierre* in a tract lately published in England, and highly applauded by some, declares, that "repentance appeases divine anger, and disarms its justice; because it accomplishes the end infinite goodness has in view, even when arrayed in the awful majesty of avenging justice; which was severe, because the moral state of the sinner required such discipline; and which when that state is reversed, by conversion and holiness, will have nothing to bestow suitable to it, but the delightful manifestations of mercy and forgiveness."§ "The honour of the divine law is sufficiently guarded by the punish-

* As transcribed in the Monthly Review for March, 1783.

† Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, Vol. i. p. 432.

‡ Ibid. p. 434. § Thoughts on the Divine Goodness. p. 110.

ment of the sinner as long as he remains impenitent, and by the faithful and obedient adherence of the penitent offender. Divine justice is always satisfied when it attains its end; and this end is always attained, whenever the sinner is brought to repentance."* So that it is evident, that all these writers implicitly held the proposition now under consideration, which is, that the wicked deserve according to strict justice, no more punishment than is necessary to lead them to repentance, and prepare them for happiness. This is not only a real tenet of those writers, but is most essential and important to their system; for if the contrary can be established, consequences will follow, which will greatly embarrass, if not entirely overthrow that system. I therefore beg the patience of the reader, while I particularly examine that tenet: Concerning it the following observations may be made,

1. It implies that the punishment which is necessary to lead the wicked to repentance is the curse of the divine law. Without doubt that punishment which amounts to the utmost, which strict justice admits, includes the penalty or curse of the divine law. The latter does not exceed the former; because the divine law is founded in perfect justice, and whatever is inconsistent with justice, is equally inconsistent with the divine law. If therefore the sinner deserve, according to strict justice, precisely so much punishment as is necessary to lead him to repentance and no more, then this is the true and utmost curse of the divine law.—Yet such a punishment as this, is really on the whole no evil, and therefore no curse even to the subject; because by the supposition it is necessary to lead him to repentance, and prepare him for the everlasting joys and glory of heaven.

* Thoughts on the Divine Goodness, page 112.

Dr. C. has given us his idea of a *curse*, in his Five Dissertations,* in the following words, "A testimony of the divine displeasure against man's offence:" "A testimony of the *vengeance* of GOD, which is a *judgment* on his part and *a real evil* on man's part." In the same book,† he states his idea of a blessing to a man, to be, "That which is greatly to his advantage." But the pains of hell, if they be absolutely necessary, and most happily conducive to the repentance and endless happiness of the damned, are no *real evil* on their part, nor any *judgment* or testimony of *vengeance* on GOD's part: and therefore are no curse at all; but are according to the Doctor's own definition a real *blessing*, and a real testimony of the *benevolence* of GOD to the damned. Surely a medicine of disagreeable taste, but absolutely necessary to preserve the life, or restore the health of a man, and administered with consummate judgment, is no evil or curse to the man to whom it is administered; but is a desirable good, or a blessing to him; and the administration of it, is a full proof of the benevolence of the physician to his patient. A proof equally demonstrative of the divine benevolence to the damned, is the whole of their punishment in hell, if it be designed merely to lead them to repentance and to prepare them for happiness: and this fruit of the divine benevolence can, according to Dr. C's own definition of a curse, be no curse.

It is granted by Dr. C. and in general by other advocates for universal salvation, that the torments of hell are not only wisely adapted, but that they are absolutely necessary to lead the damned to repentance; that no more gentle means would so well answer the proposed end; that therefore the divine goodness and wisdom have chosen and applied those torments, as the means of good to the damned. But certainly that which is on

* P. 109, 110. †P. 112.

the whole necessary for a person's own good, is to him, on the whole, no real evil, and therefore no curse; but a good, a blessing; a wise man would choose it for himself, as it is, in its connexion, really and properly eligible or desirable. If the torments of hell taken in connexion with repentance and endless happiness be a curse, then repentance and endless happiness taken in connexion with the torments of hell, are a curse too. If some bitter pill, considered as connected with life, be a curse; then life connected with that pill, is a curse too. That and that only is a curse to a person, which taken in its proper connexions and dependences, renders him more miserable, than he would be without it. On the contrary, that is a blessing to a person, which taken in its proper connexions and dependences, renders him more happy than he would be without it. It is just as great a blessing and just as great a privilege, as happiness itself. And with what propriety this can be called a *curse*, I appeal to every man acquainted with propriety of language to determine. To call this a curse is to confound a curse and a blessing.—This being the true idea of a curse and a blessing, it immediately follows on the supposition now under consideration, that the torments of hell are no curse, but a blessing to those on whom they are inflicted; because the very supposition is, that they are necessary to secure and promote their happiness and are inflicted for this end only.

The absurdity then, to which on the whole we are reduced is, that those means, which are the best that infinite wisdom itself could devise and apply, for the salvation of those who die in impenitence, are the curse of the divine law; and that the greatest evil which God can consistently with justice inflict on the greatest and most obdurate enemy of himself, of his Son our glorious Saviour, of his law, of his grace, and of mankind, is, to

put him under the best possible advantages to secure and promote his highest everlasting happiness: which is no more nor less than to say, That the greatest curse which God can consistently with his perfections inflict on the sinner dying in impenitence, is to bestow on him the greatest blessing, which it is in the power of omnipotence and infinite bounty to bestow on him, in his present temper of mind; that the divine law has no curse at all annexed to it; and that the penalty of the law is an inestimable blessing, the blessing of repentance, or of that discipline, which is absolutely necessary, and most wisely adapted to lead to repentance, and to prepare for the greatest happiness.

If on this view of the matter, it should be said, that the punishment of hell is not the greatest blessing which God can bestow on the sinner who dies in impenitence; that it would be a greater blessing, to grant him repentance by immediate efficacious grace, and then receive him to heavenly happiness;—Concerning this I observe, that it gives up the only ground, on which the supposition now under consideration rests, and on which alone it can be supported. The supposition is, that the punishment of hell is inflicted with the sole view of leading the sufferers to repentance, and of promoting their good. But if their good might be as effectually secured and promoted by other means, as is now asserted, then the torments of hell are not inflicted to promote the good of the sufferers. So far as their good is concerned, those torments are needless, nay they are a wanton exercise of cruelty. But as cruelty cannot be ascribed to *the only wise God*, he must, if this objection be valid, inflict the torments of hell, for some other end, than the final happiness of those who are sent to that world of misery.

Beside; Dr. C. and other opposers of endless punishment, are no friends to the doctrine of *efficacious grace*.

According to their system, efficacious grace destroys all liberty and moral agency, and reduces men to mere machines. Therefore in their view, to be led to repentance by efficacious grace, is not a greater blessing, than to be led to repentance by the torments of hell; because it is not a greater blessing to be a watch or a windmill than to be a rational moral agent. Nay, according to their system, there is no possibility of leading by efficacious grace any man to a repentance which is of a holy or of a moral nature: because, according to their system, a necessary holiness is no holiness, and a necessary repentance is no more of a moral nature, than the working of a machine.

2. If all who are saved, be delivered from wrath on account of the merit of Christ in any sense, then that punishment, which leads to repentance, is not the curse of the law, or is not all the punishment which justice admits. They who suffer the curse of the law, satisfy the law, and therefore stand in no need of the merit of Christ to satisfy the law or to deliver them from the curse of it. They can no longer consistently with justice be holden under that curse. To hold such persons still under the curse of the law, unless they can obtain an interest in the merit of Christ, can never be reconciled with the moral perfection of God. Yet this is the very fact, if that punishment which leads to repentance be the curse of the law and at the same time, as Dr. C. abundantly holds, salvation in the deliverance from wrath, as well as in the bestowment of positive happiness, be granted to no man, but on account of the merit of Christ.

3. On this hypothesis, our Lord Jesus Christ will not save all men, nor will all men be saved, whether by Christ, or without him.—Deliverance from the curse of the law is essential to salvation. But if the curse of the law be that punishment, which is necessary to lead to

repentance ; and if, as the advocates for universal salvation hold, a great part of mankind will suffer this punishment; it follows, that a great part of mankind will not be saved. For to be saved, and yet to suffer the curse of the law, is a direct contradiction. To suffer the curse of the law is to be damned, and is all the damnation to which any sinner is exposed, and to which justice, the most strict and rigorous justice, can doom him. If then any man have suffered this damnation, from what is he or can he be saved? Certainly from nothing, because he is exposed to nothing: unless we say, that by the *just* law of the God of *perfect justice*, he is exposed to *unjust* punishment.

If to this argument it be objected, that though all men are not saved from the curse of the law, whether by Christ, or without him; yet all are finally admitted to happiness; those who repent in this life, are admitted to happiness through the merits of Christ; those who die impenitent, are admitted to the same, in consequence of enduring in their own persons, the curse of the law: and that this is all which is intended by the salvation of all men :—with respect to this I observe.

(1) This is no proper *salvation*, which in its primary meaning signifies a deliverance from evil. But according to the case now stated, some men are not delivered from any evil, to which they ever were exposed; but suffer it all. Therefore they are not saved.

(2) That this objection entirely sets aside, with regard to a great part of mankind, salvation in the way of forgiveness of sin, and the free grace of God in the pardon of the sinner, which is contrary to the whole gospel.

But to proceed; as Christ, on the present hypothesis, doth not in fact save all men; so it would be no favour to them, for him to attempt the salvation of all those who die impenitent. An attempt to deliver them from the

curse of the law, would be an attempt to deprive them of the most necessary, wise, desirable and merciful means of grace, on which their eternal happiness depends: an attempt not to deliver them from any thing which on the whole is an evil, a disadvantage even to themselves; but to deprive them of that on which their supreme interest depends; of that which is in fact the greatest good, which they, in their present temper can enjoy, and the greatest blessing which at present God can possibly bestow on them.—Now to deprive them of this, is certainly no favour, nor any fruit of grace, mercy or goodness to them personally. Even to take them to heaven, before they have passed through this discipline would by no means be so great a favour to them, as to cause them to pass through this discipline; as it would be to take them to heaven before they were prepared for it, or could enjoy happiness in it.

Further; if the curse of the law be that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance, then Christ came not to deliver from the curse of the law, all who are to be finally happy, but to inflict that curse on a part of them. Christ is exalted to be a prince and a Saviour to give repentance and forgiveness of sins. It is a part of his office, to bring men to repentance, by all wise and proper means. Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation, suppose, that hell torments are the means, and most wise, proper and necessary means too, by which Christ will execute the work of giving repentance to all the damned. Therefore his work as a saviour, so far as respects *them*, is, on Dr. C's plan, not to deliver them from the curse of the law, but to inflict that curse on them. But who is not struck with the contrariety of this idea, to the constant, uniform declarations of scripture, that Christ came to redeem us from the curse of

the law, to save us from wrath, to deliver us from the wrath to come, &c.

Will it be said in opposition to the last observation, that those who die in impenitence, are not saved in any sense by or through Christ, whether by his atonement, or by him as God's prime minister, in the fulness of times bringing all to repentance; and that therefore Christ is not come to inflict the curse of the law on any who shall be finally happy? Then let it never more be pleaded, that Christ is the saviour of all men; that he gave himself a ransom for all; that he tasted death for every man; that the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto the many, (meaning all men) that by the righteousness of one the free gift shall come upon all men to justification of life; that Christ must reign, till he shall have put all enemies under his feet, in genuine repentance; that peace being made by the blood of the cross, it pleased the father *by Christ* to reconcile all things to himself. For if Christ shall not finally have saved all men by his merit, nor shall have led them to repentance in the execution of the scheme of providence; in what sense can the salvation of all men be ascribed to Christ? In what conceivable sense can he be called the Saviour of all men?—Therefore if any adopt the idea of the objection just stated, let them never more plead in favour of the salvation of all men, any of those passages of scripture referred to above, nor any passage, which relates to salvation by Christ.

Beside; if the damned be led to repentance by the torments of hell, by whom are those torments inflicted? Not by Christ it seems, because that would imply, that Christ came not to deliver all who shall be finally happy, from the curse of the law; but to inflict that curse on a part of them. By whom then will those torments, those

most excellent means of grace, be administered? Is not Christ the judge of all men? The father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the son. We must all stand at his judgment seat and receive according to that which we shall have done in the body whether good or evil: and he will say; Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.

4. If the penalty of the law consist in that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance, then all the damned, if brought to repentance at all, are delivered out of hell, not on the footing of *grace* and *mercy*, or of *favour* and *goodness;* but on the footing of the strictest justice; not on the footing of the gospel, but of the rigour of law.—By the present hypothesis, the damned all suffer that punishment, which is necessary to lead them to repentance, and therein suffer the curse of the law, or all that punishment which the utmost rigour of law and justice denounces or can inflict. If the Deity himself were to proceed in punishing, one step beyond this line, he would exceed the bounds of justice, would rise in opposition to his own perfections, would deny himself; in short, would no longer be God. Therefore as soon as a sinner in hell is brought to repentance, he must be immediately released. Nor is he under obligation to plead for grace or favour; he may demand release on the footing of personal justice. He is under no necessity to have recourse to the gospel, he may insist on his personal right, on the footing of the law. He hath satisfied the law; he hath satisfied the justice of God; it hath taken its course on him; he hath nothing more to fear from it;-and he must be delivered from further punishment or else he is injured, he is oppressed.

Nay; to plead for mercy or favour in order to his deliverance, is not merely needless; it is out of character, it is degrading himself who stands right with respect

to the law, to the place of one who is obnoxious to still further punishment. It implies that he is ignorant of his own character and relation to the Deity and his law. Equally out of character would he act, if on his deliverance, he should render praise or thanks, either to God the father, or to his son Jesus Christ. Surely a man condemned by a civil judge, to receive forty stripes save one, after he has received them, is under no obligation to render praise or thanks for his release, either to the judge or to the executive officer.

But how are these things reconcileable with the scriptures? Surely these consequences fairly deducible from the hypothesis under consideration, are entirely inconsistent with the gospel; and the hypothesis itself cannot consistently be embraced by any believer in the New Testament.

Particularly: This hypothesis precludes all possibility of *forgiveness* of the damned, even, on the supposition that they are finally to be admitted to heavenly happiness.—Forgiveness implies, that the sinner forgiven is not punished in his own person, according to law and ustice. But on the hypothesis under consideration in this chapter, all the damned, are in their own persons punished according to law and justice, in that they suffer that punishment, which is necessary to lead them to repentance. Who would think of telling a man, who has in his own person, received the corporeal punishment, to which he had been condemned, that the crime for which he received that punishment, is freely forgiven him? This would be adding insult to the rigour of justice.—But according to the scriptures, it seems there is no salvation on the footing of the law, or without forgivness. Therefore either it must be made to appear, that the scriptures do admit the idea, that some men will be received to heaven on the footing of law, and without for-

giveness of sins; or the hypothesis, that the punishment, which is sufficient to lead to repentance, is the curse of the law, must be renounced.

5. All men who are by any means brought to repentance, whether by the torment of hell or any other cause, are on the footing of justice entitled to perfect subsequent impunity. By the supposition, the sole just end of all the punishment inflicted by the Deity, is the repentance of the sinner. But this end is already obtained in all who are the subjects of repentance. Therefore to punish them is to inflict pain or misery for no just end whatever. But that the Deity should inflict misery for no just end, is for him to commit injustice and wanton cruelty, which is impossible. What then is become of the curse or penalty of the divine law? The apostle declares, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." This seems to import, that every transgressor is exposed to a curse. But he who transgresses in ever so many instances, and then whether sooner or later repents, whether his repentance be effected by mercies, or by judgments, or by any other cause, is exposed to no curse, no punishment whatever; nor can without injustice be made the subject of any. On this scheme, if there be any curse in the law, it must be *repentance itself*. By the curse of the law, is doubtless meant the ill consequence, to which the sinner is by law and justice subjected, on account of his transgression.—But according to the scheme now before us, repentance, whensoever and by what cause soever it may exist in a sinner, is all the ill consequence (*if* it may be so called) to which he is by law and justice subjected on account of any sin or sins. This therefore with respect to him is the whole curse of the law, and can this be true? "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." But hath Christ redeemed us from

repentance? and did he effect that redemption, by becoming himself a penitent?

6. On the hypothesis, that no man can be justly punished for any other end, than his own personal good; no man commits any sin or moral evil, by any damage which he does, or can do, to any being beside himself; and the whole evil of sin consists in this, that by it a man does more or less damage to himself; but he never does, nor can possibly commit sin, by dishonouring or doing damage to any other being created or divine, only so far as, in the same action, he does damage to himself personally considered.—If God never do nor can justly punish a sinner, for any other end, than to lead him to repentance and to promote his good; and if all just punishment be a mere discipline necessary and wholesome to the recipient; then punishment inflicted for any other end is unjust. It is unjust to punish a sinner on account of any contempt of the Deity, any opposition to his designs, to his cause or kingdom in the world, or on account of any abuses of any man or men, excepting so far as he damages himself at the same time. If it be just to punish a sinner for any of those sins, further, or in any other respect, than as he damages himself; it is just to punish him for other end or ends, than his own personal good; which is contrary to the supposition.—But if it be unjust to punish for actions in any other respect than as in those actions a man damages himself or his own interest; it must be because there is no moral evil in those actions, on any other account, or in any other view of them, than that by them he does a damage to himself, and the whole evil of sin must consist in this, that it is disadvantageous to the sinner's own interest or happiness. The end of all punishment is the removal or prevention of evil: and the evil to be removed or prevented by punishment, and which is the only ground of punishment, is the only

evil of sin. But the hypothesis which we are opposing throughout this chapter is, that the only just ends of punishment, are the repentance and good of the sinner himself; that is, the removal or prevention of personal evil to the sinner, is the only just end of punishing him. Of course this personal evil to the sinner, is the only just ground of punishing him, and is the whole evil of sin.

Now if this be the whole evil of sin, and it deserve punishment on no other account than this; no wonder there is such opposition made to the doctrine of endless punishment. For truly, if the nature and evil of sin be such, as hath been just now stated, not only the *endless* punishment of it is unjust, but any punishment of however short duration is unjust; because sin carries its own full punishment in itself. All that punishment which it deserves, is either contained in sin at the time it is committed, or it follows afterward, as a natural and necessary consequence, without any pain inflicted by the Deity; and to inflict any, the least pain, on the sinner, as a punishment of his sin, is manifestly unjust and absurd. —If a child, in consequence of thrusting its finger into a candle, should suffer great pain, surely it would not, beside that pain, deserve chastisement: because all the evil of its imprudence consists in bringing on itself that pain, and that pain itself is the full punishment of the imprudence. Therefore to inflict any further punishment must be unjust and cruel.—To apply this; all the moral evil of which the sinner is guilty, consists in bringing pain or loss on himself, and to punish him for this, is as absurd, as to punish the child just supposed; or to punish a man because he will walk with pebbles in his shoes, will whip himself, or will bring on himself the pain of hunger, by going without his ordinary meal.

7. On this hypothesis, he that repenteth, shall be saved, from what? from that wise, wholesome and neces-

sary discipline, which cannot be justly inflicted, after he becomes a penitent; or in other words, he shall be saved from a punishment which is entirely unjust.—Therefore the promises of salvation to those who repent, amount to nothing more than assurances, that GOD will not abuse, injure or rob them of their *personal* rights. But do we want so many "exceeding great and precious promises," to assure us of this? Or are these promises so exceeding great and precious, as it seems they were in the judgment of an apostle? Have we not abundant evidence of the same truth, from the moral rectitude of the Deity, without the aid of even a single promise?

8. If the sinner deserve no more punishment, than is necessary to lead to repentance, then he experiences much more of the grace and mercy of GOD, while he is *in hell*, than he does while he is on earth, or than he does in his deliverance *from* hell. In hell he enjoys those means of grace which are far better and more wisely and effectually calculated to secure his everlasting happiness, than those means which he enjoys on earth. In hell he receives real and demonstrative tokens of the divine grace and mercy in that discipline which is so necessary and so happily conducive to his everlasting happiness. But in deliverance from hell on his repentance, he receives *no favour;* his deliverance is a mere act of justice which cannot be denied him.

9. On the same hypothesis, the curse of the law, and the greatest, most necessary and most desirable mean of grace with respect to the impenitent, are one and the same thing. This is so plain, that not a word need be said to elucidate it. Therefore if Christ were to save any man from the curse of the law, he would deprive him of the best mean of grace, which he does or can enjoy; and this salvation itself, so far from a blessing to the sinner, would be an infinitely greater curse, than the curse

of the law; because it would deprive him of a necessary and most excellent mean of grace, the punishment which is necessary to lead him to repentance. Nor would the gift of Christ himself, his incarnation, sufferings, death, atonement, or any thing which he hath done, or can possibly do, to save us from the curse of the law, be any favour or blessing to the person to be saved, but utterly the reverse. It is evidently no blessing to any man personally, but the reverse, that any measures should be taken to deprive him of the best and most necessary mean of grace, without which he would not be prepared for heaven and could not be admitted to it.

10. The doctrine, that the sinner deserves no more punishment, than is necessary to lead to repentance, confutes itself in this respect; that while it holds forth, that no punishment can justly be inflicted on the sinner, but that which is merely *disciplinary*, at the same time it supposes, that such a punishment is in fact inflicted on all the damned, as is to the highest degree *vindictive*. What is a proper vindictive punishment, but that which satisfies the demands of law and *justice?* But that such a punishment is inflicted on all the damned, is supposed by all who espouse the principle, which I am now opposing. Therefore in that very doctrine, in which they mean to oppose all vindictive punishment, they in the fullest sense hold it, by holding that such punishment as is conducive to the good of the sufferer, is all which justice admits.

If they should say, that the punishment of the damned is not *merely* vindictive; but at the same time disciplinary too, and therefore just: though if it were *merely* vindictive, it would be *unjust:* I answer, the present question entirely respects punishment which is *merely* disciplinary. Therefore to allow, that the punishment of the damned is partly vindictive, is to give up this question, and to substitute another.—Beside; if a vindictive punishment

be unjust, how can it become just by being connected with a punishment, which is just? To correct a child, to gratify a malicious temper, is doubtless unjust. Now, if a man correct his child from two motives, partly from malice, and partly from a view to the good of the child; the justice of his conduct, so far as he is influenced by the latter motive, can never render his conduct just, so far as it proceeds from the former.

A vindictive punishment is that which is inflicted with a design to support the authority of a broken law, and of a despised government: And if the punishment be just, it is at the same time according to the conduct or demerit of the transgressor. This is demanded by every law; and if the law be just, it is justly demanded: Or in other words, such a punishment of the transgression of a just law, as is sufficient to support the authority of that law, is a just punishment. At the same time it is a punishment as truly, and to as high a degree vindictive, as justice will admit. Now if that punishment which is necessary to lead the sinner to repentance, be sufficient thus to support the authority and dignity of the divine law and government, and be inflicted for this end; it is to the highest degree vindictive, and designedly vindictive. If it be not sufficient to answer those ends, it is not the whole punishment, which the divine law and justice demand: For as I have before observed, every just and wise law demands that punishment which is necessary to its own support or existence, and justice and wisdom enforce this demand.

Therefore let the advocates for universal salvation make their choice. If they shall choose to hold agreeably to the present supposition, that such punishment as is necessary to lead to repentance, is all that can justly be inflicted on the sinner, and that therefore it is sufficient to support the authority and dignity of the divine

law and government; they stand convicted of holding, that the punishment of the damned is by no means merely disciplinary, but to the highest degree vindictive. If on the other hand, they choose to hold, that the punishment which is necessary to lead the sinner to repentance, is not adequate to the purposes before mentioned; then they must renounce the principle, which we have been so long considering, and allow the divine law does denounce a further punishment, than that which is necessary to lead the sinner to repentance, and is a mere discipline. Because the divine law being perfectly just, does justly, and must necessarily admit of that punishment, which is sufficient to its own support of existence.—Thus on either supposition, they must renounce a very favourite tenet.

11. With what propriety can we talk of satisfying the law by repentance, or by that punishment, which is necessary to lead to repentance; when the law says not a word expressly concerning repentance, either in consequence of punishment, or without it? By the law is the knowledge of sin; but by it we know nothing of any good, to be obtained by repentance, whether in the way of favour, or in the way of justice. The doctrine of any advantage to be obtained by repentance, is a doctrine of the gospel only, not of the law. Yet if it be unjust to punish a sinner with any other view, than to lead him to repentance, this doctrine would undoubtedly be found in the law. The voice of the law is, not cursed is every one that transgresseth, and doth not repent: But cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them.

12. From the principle, that sin deserves no other punishment, than that which is subservient to the good of the sinner, it will follow, that what we call sin, is no *moral evil.*

It seems to be a dictate of reason and the common sense of mankind, that moral evil should be followed, or deserves to be followed, with natural evil or with pain and shame: and that this natural evil be a real evil to the sinner, an evil to him on the whole. But that evil, which is necessary and subservient to a man's personal good, is to him no real evil; but on the whole is, even to him personally, a good, a blessing, and not a curse. Now it is not a dictate of reason and common sense, that moral evil deserves a blessing. That which deserves a blessing and no curse, is no moral evil. Therefore if sin deserve no other punishment than that which is subservient to the personal good of the sinner, it is no moral evil.

If it be said to be no dictate of common sense, that moral evil should be followed with natural evil: it may be answered, that surely it is not a dictate of common sense, that it be followed, with natural good. This would imply, that it deserves a reward.—Nor is it a dictate of common sense, that it be followed with neither natural good nor natural evil. This would imply, that it is worthy of neither praise nor blame, reward nor punishment; and therefore is neither a moral good nor a moral evil. Both which conclusions are absurd. Therefore it remains, that it is a dictate of reason and common sense, that moral evil be followed with natural evil.—Or if it be further urged, that it is a dictate of common sense, that moral evil considering the *infinite goodness and mercy of God*, should be followed with no natural evil; it is to be observed, that this is giving up the ground of justice, and going on that of goodness and mercy, which is entirely foreign to the subject of this chapter. The inquiry of this chapter is, What sin deserves *on the footing of justice*, not what it will actually suffer on the footing of divine infinite *goodness* and *mercy*. This latter

inquiry shall be carefully attended to in its place, chapter VIII.

Again; moral evil is in itself, or in its own nature, odious and the proper object of disapprobation and abhorrence. By its own nature I mean its tendency to evil, the dishonour of the Deity and the misery or diminution of the happiness of the created system. Therefore it is not injurious to the person who perpetrates moral evil, to disapprove, hate and abhor it in itself, aside from all consideration of the consequences of such disapprobation, whether such consequences be to the perpetrator personally good or bad. Hence it follows, that it is not injurious to the perpetrator of moral evil, to manifest disapprobation of his conduct, so far as morally evil, whether such manifestation be subservient to his good or not. And if *sin* be a moral evil, it is not injurious to the sinner, both to disapprove, and to manifest disapprobation of sin, whether such manifestation be subservient to his good or not.—But this directly contradicts the principle, that sin deserves no other punishment, than that which is subservient to the good of the sinner. For what is punishment, but a manifestation of disapprobation, which a person vested with authority has, of the conduct of a subject? And if it be not injurious to the sinner, to disapprove his sin, and to manifest that disapprobation, whether it subserve his good or not; then his sin, or he on account of his sin, deserves both disapprobation, and the manifestation of disapprobation, though that manifestation be not subservient to his personal good: which is the same thing as to say, that the sinner deserves punishment, whether that punishment subserve his own good or not. On the other hand, if it be not just to manifest disapprobation of sin, it is not just to disapprove sin. If it be not just to disapprove or to hate sin, aside from the consideration, that the disap-

probation is conducive to the personal good of the sinner; then sin is not in itself, or in its own nature and tendency, hateful or odious, but becomes odious then only, when the hatred of it conduces to the personal good of the sinner. But if sin be not in itself odious, it is not a moral evil; which was the thing to be proved.

There seems to be no way to avoid this consequence but by holding, that *moral evil* is not in itself odious and abominable, but that it becomes odious then only, when the disapprobation of it subserves the personal good of the perpetrator: which is the same as to hold, that moral evil, as such, is not at all odious, but is odious in this particular case only, when the disapprobation of it subserves the good of the perpetrator: but in all other cases, it is a matter of indifferency at least, if not an object of cordial complacency; and therefore in all other cases is no moral evil.

On the supposition which I am now opposing, when a man sins and immediately repents, he deserves no punishment, because the end of all punishment is already obtained by his repentance, and a tendency of punishment to the repentance of the sinner, which is the only circumstance, on the present hypothesis which can justify his punishment, cannot now be pretended, as a reason for his punishment. Therefore any punishment after repentance, must be undeserved and unjust. But if sin be a moral evil or a crime, it is in its own nature displeasing to GOD, and he may justly both be displeased at it, and manifest his displeasure; that is, he may punish it, whether the sinner repent or not. Repentance, though it is a renunciation of sin in future, makes no alteration in the nature of the sin which is past; nor is it any satisfaction for that sin. If it were, it would be either *the curse of the law*, or such a meritorious act of virtue, as to balance the demerit of sin: Neither of which will be

pretended. But if the only reason why it is, or can be just for God to shew displeasure at sin, be, that the sinner may thereby be led to repentance; then sin itself, or the proper nature of sin, is not a just reason, why God should either be displeased, or show displeasure at it. Impenitence or the repetition of sin or the continuance of the sinner in it, is on this supposition, the only just reason or ground of either displeasure, or of any manifestation of displeasure at sin. Therefore sin in general, or sin as such, deserves no displeasure or manifestation of displeasure; but sin in some particular case only, as when it is persisted in or repeated. If we should hold, that sins committed in the day time, do not deserve punishment; but that those which are committed in the night, do deserve punishment, I think it would be manifest to every man, that we denied, that sin as such, and by the general nature common to all sins, deserves punishment; and that we confined the desert of punishment to something which is merely accidental, and not at all essential to sin. And is it not manifest, that the desert of punishment is as really not extended to the general nature of sin, but is confined to something merely accidental, when it is asserted, that sin deserves no punishment, unless it be followed with impenitence? or unless it be persisted in? or, which is the same thing, that no punishment is just, except that which is designed to lead the sinner to repentance?

If sin do not by its general nature deserve punishment, it does not by its general nature deserve the manifestation of divine displeasure; because all manifestation of divine displeasure at sin, is punishment.—Again, if sin do not by its general nature deserve the manifestation of divine displeasure, it does not by its general nature deserve displeasure itself: and if so, it is not by its general nature a moral evil.

It appears then, that on the hypothesis now under consideration, sin deserves neither punishment nor hatred, and is no moral evil, unless it be followed with impenitence; or unless it be persisted in, for at least some time. The first act of sin is no moral evil. But if the first act be not a moral evil, why is the second, the third, or any subsequent act? Impenitence is nothing but a repetition or perseverance in acts the same or similar to that of which we do not repent. But if the first act, abstracted from the subsequent, be not a moral evil, what reason can be assigned, why the subsequent should be a moral evil? Thus the principle, that sin deserves punishment so far only, as the punishment of it tends to the repentance and good of the sinner, implies, that there is no moral evil in the universe, either in the first sin, or in any which follow; none even in impenitence itself.—On the other hand, if sin in all instances be a moral evil, it is justly to be abhorred by the Deity, whether repentance succeed or not: and if it may justly be abhorred by the Deity, he may justly manifest his abhorrence of it, whether repentance succeed or not. But to allow this, is to give up the principle, that sin deserves no other punishment, than that which is subservient to the repentance and good of the sinner.

Punishment is a proper manifestation of displeasure, made by a person in authority, at some crime or moral evil. If sin, though repented of, be still a moral evil, and the just object of the divine displeasure; why is it not just, that this displeasure should be manifested? But the manifestation of the divine displeasure at moral evil, is punishment.—If on the other hand, it be an injurious treatment of a sinner, that the Deity should, after repentance, manifest his displeasure at him, on account of his sin; then doubtless it is injurious in the Deity to be displeased with him on account of his sin, of which he has

repented. Again; if it be injurious in the Deity to be displeased with a man on account of his sin, after he has desisted from it in repentance, why is it not injurious to be displeased with him, on account of his past sin, though he is still persisting in sin? If one act of murder be not the proper object of the abhorrence of all holy intelligences, creator and creatures, why are two or one hundred acts of murder proper objects of abhorrence. Add nought to itself as often as you please, you can never make it something.—So that by this principle we seem to be necessarily led to this conclusion, that no man on account of any sin whatever, whether repented of or not, can consistently with justice be made the object of divine abhorrence or displeasure, and consequently that sin in no instance whatever is a moral evil.

On the principle which I am now opposing, whenever a man commits any sin, for instance murder, neither God, nor man hath any right to *manifest* displeasure at his conduct, or even to be displeased with it, till two things are fully known; first, whether the murderer do or do not repent; secondly, whether displeasure in this case, or the manifestation of displeasure, will conduce to the happiness of the murderer. If he do repent, no intelligent being hath a right, on the footing of justice, to be displeased; nor even if he be impenitent, unless it be known for a certainty, that the displeasure of the person, who is inquiring whether he have a right to be displeased or not, will conduce to the repentance and good of the murderer. To say otherwise; to say that we have a right in justice to be displeased with the conduct of a murderer, though he does repent, or though such displeasure does not conduce to his repentance and happiness, is to give up the principle in question. For if we may justly be displeased with his conduct, though he is penitent, or though our displeasure does not conduce to his personal

happiness; we may justly manifest our displeasure. But manifestation of displeasure, especially by a ruler, at the misconduct of a subject, is punishment.

Once more; on the supposition that we have no right to be displeased with murder, unless our displeasure conduce to the good of the murderer; if there be any moral evil or turpitude in murder, it consists not in the murder itself, or in the malicious action of murder; but wholly in this circumstance attending it, that displeasure at it, conduces to the personal good of the murderer.

Perhaps it may be objected to the reasoning in the last argument, that if it prove any thing, it proves too much, and therefore really proves nothing; that if sin, or any crime, do in all cases, and on account of its own nature and turpitude, deserve disapprobation and punishment, it will follow, that it deserves the same, even after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice; that after such punishment the nature of the crime is the same which it was before; that the crime therefore is still the proper object of disapprobation, and of the manifestation of disapprobation; and on the ground of the preceding reasoning, deserves an additional punishment, after it has been once punished according to strict distributive justice; which is absurd.

To this it may be answered, that a crime considered in connexion with its just and full punishment, is not that crime considered, *in itself*, or *in its own nature merely*. Water mingled with wine, and thus become a compound substance, is no longer mere water. The preceding reasoning supposes, that a crime in its own nature and tendency deserves disapprobation and the manifestation of disapprobation. But a crime taken with the full punishment of it which is according to strict distributive justice, and considered in this complex view, or that crime and the just punishment of it considered as one

complex object, is not that crime considered *in itself* and *in its own nature merely.* Therefore although the crime considered in itself deserves punishment, yet considered in the complex view just stated, it deserves not additional punishment.—And whereas it is implied in the objection now under consideration, that a crime even after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is still the just object of disapprobation, and therefore that disapprobation may justly be manifested even by the magistrate, or the crime may be punished; it is to be observed, that the whole force of this reasoning depends on the meaning of the expression, *a crime even after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is still the just object of disapprobation.* If the meaning of that expression be, that the crime considered in its own nature and tendency, and as abstracted from the punishment or any thing done to prevent the ill effect of the crime, is a proper object of disapprobation, and is an event most ardently to be deprecated, or it is most ardently to be wished, that it might never have come into existence, and in this sense, it is the just object of disapprobation and of the manifestation of disapprobation: this is undoubtedly true, and no ill consequence to the preceding reasoning will follow. But if the meaning of that expression be, that a crime considered in connexion with its just punishment and the good effects of that punishment, as one complex object, is a proper object of disapprobation, so that it is proper to wish, that this complex object had not come into existence; it is not true that in this sense a crime after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is still the just object of disapprobation. There have doubtless been many instances of crimes in civil society, which taken with the just punishments inflicted on them, have been on the whole the occasion of great good to

society, have established government and preserved the peace of society longer and more effectually, than would have been the case, had no such crimes been committed. Therefore the existence of those crimes taken with the punishments, as one complex object, is no proper object of disapprobation or deprecation, but of acquiescence and joy: because in this connexion they tend not to impair, but establish and promote the general good. In this sense any crime or any sin, after it has been punished according to strict distributive justice, is not the just object of disapprobation, and therefore not of the manifestation of disapprobation or of punishment.—So that the foregoing reasoning will not prove that a sin or crime, once punished according to strict distributive justice, deserves an additional punishment.

The essence of moral evil is, that it tends to impair the good and happiness of the universe: in that the odiousness of sin or of moral evil consists. And a punishment in the distributive sense just, is that punishment inflicted on the person of the sinner, which effectually prevents any ill consequence to the good of the universe, of the sin or crime punished. Now therefore sin taken with the just punishment of it, no more tends to impair the good of the universe, than poison taken with an effectual antidote, tends to destroy the life of him who takes it.

Objection 1. If sin taken with its just punishment, do not tend to impair the good of the universe, and if the essence of moral evil consist in its tendency to impair the good of the universe, it seems that sin taken with its just punishment is no sin at all. *Answer:* It is indeed not *mere* sin. It is no more sin, than poison taken with its antidote, is poison. That poison which is mixed with the antidote, if it were separated from the antidote, would produce the same effects, is of the same tendency, and consequently of the same nature, as before the mix-

ture. Yet the compound made by the mixture, produces no such effects, is of no such tendency, and consequently is of a very different nature. So any sin which is punished according to strict justice, abstracted from the punishment, is of the same tendency and nature, of which it was before the punishment. Yet that sin taken with its full and just punishment, as one complex object, is of a very different tendency and nature, and will be followed with no such effects as would have followed from it, had it not been punished. In this sense, sin taken with its full and just punishment is indeed no sin at all.

Objection 2. If the sinner do not deserve punishment, when the ill consequences of his sin are prevented by his personal punishment; why does he deserve punishment, when the ill consequences are prevented by the sufferings of his substitute?—*Answer:* Desert and ill desert are according to the character of the person himself, and not according to that of his representative or substitute. Now satisfaction for a crime by personal suffering is as really a part of the criminal's personal character, as the crime itself. But satisfaction by the suffering of another, is no part of the personal character of the criminal.

If then on the whole, it be an established point, that on the supposition that no other punishment can be justly inflicted on the sinner, than that which is necessary for his repentance and happiness, sin is no moral evil; this will be attended with many other consequences equally, or if possible, still more absurd:

1. That sin deserves no punishment at all. Surely nothing but moral evil deserves punishment.

2. That neither sin itself, nor we as sinners are the objects of the divine disapprobation.

3. That neither ought we to disapprove it, whether in ourselves or others.

4. That repentance is no duty of any man; yea, it is positively wrong. Shall we repent of an innocent action?

5. That the calamities which God brings on men in this life, are not reconcileable with justice. That these calamities in general are punishments or demonstrations of God's displeasure at the sins of mankind, is manifest from the scriptures. This is especially manifest concerning the most extraordinary and unusual calamities which in scripture are mentioned to have befallen communities or individuals; as the flood of Noah, the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple by the Chaldeans, and afterwards by the Romans, the death of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, of Nadab and Abihu, of Uzzah, &c. &c. But all these punishments were unjust, if sin be no moral evil.

6. That there is no foundation in any human actions or characters, for praise or blame, reward or punishment. If sin be no moral evil, it is not blameable; and if sin or vice do not deserve blame or punishment, virtue which is the opposite, does not deserve praise or reward: and all moral distinctions are groundless, as in a moral view there is no difference between virtue and vice, sin and holiness. Therefore there is no moral government in the universe, nor any foundation for it.

I now appeal to the reader, with regard to the propriety of the preceding remarks, and whether the absurdities before mentioned, be not indeed implied in the hypothesis, that the sinner can, consistently with justice, be made to suffer no other punishment, than that which is disciplinary or conducive to the good of the sufferer, by leading him to repentance and preparing him for happiness. If those absurdities justly follow, not the least doubt can remain, but that the principle from which they follow, is absurd and false.

CHAPTER III.

WHETHER THE DAMNED WILL IN FACT SUFFER ANY OTHER PUNISHMENT, THAN THAT WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO THEIR PERSONAL GOOD.

In the last chapter the subject of inquiry was, whether the damned sinner *deserve*, according to strict justice and the law of God, any other punishment, than that which is necessary to lead to repentance and prepare for happiness. But though it should be granted, that he does indeed deserve a further or greater punishment, than that which is sufficient for the ends just mentioned; yet it may be pleaded, that in fact he never will suffer any other punishment; that in hell the damned are punished with the sole design of leading them to repentance; that when this design shall have been accomplished, whatever further punishment they may deserve, will be graciously remitted, and they immediately received to celestial felicity. Whether this be indeed the truth, is the subject of our present inquiry.—With regard to this subject, I have to propose the following considerations.

1. If the damned do indeed deserve more punishment, than is sufficient barely to lead them to repentance; then they may, consistently with justice, be made in fact to suffer more. That they may consistently with justice be made to suffer according to their demerits, is a self-evident proposition. To punish them so far, is not at all inconsistent with the justice of God, therefore the objection drawn from the justice of God against vindictive punishment as opposed to mere discipline, must be wholly relinquished. A merely disciplinary punishment is one which is suited and designed to lead the sinner to repentance only. A vindictive punishment is one which

is designed to be a testimony of the displeasure of God at the conduct of the sinner, and by that testimony, to support the authority of the divine law, subserve the general good, and thus satisfy justice: and it must be no more than adequate to the demerit of the sinner. I do not find that Dr. C. has in his whole book, given us a definition of a vindictive punishment, as he ought most certainly to have done. According to Chevalier *Ramsay's* definition of divine vindictive justice, vindictive punishment is, "That dispensation of God, by which he pursues vice with all sorts of torments, till it is totally extirpated, destroyed and annihilated."* What then is a disciplinary punishment? This definition perfectly confounds disciplinary and vindictive punishment.

If it be just to punish a sinner according to his demerit; as it certainly is by the very terms; and if such a punishment be greater than is sufficient to lead him to repentance merely; as is now supposed: then all objections drawn from the justice of God, against a vindictive punishment, and all arguments from the same topic, in favour of a punishment merely disciplinary, are perfectly groundless and futile. The sinner lies at mercy; and if he be released on his repentance, it is an act of grace, and not of justice.

2. If the damned *do deserve* more punishment than is sufficient barely to lead them to repentance, they will *in fact* suffer more. As it is just, so justice will be executed. That they will be punished according to their demerits, is capable of clear proof, both by the authority of scripture, and by that of Dr. C.

(1) By the authority of scripture.—This assures us, that God will "render to every man *according to his deeds*: to them that are contentious, and do not obey the

* Principles, Vol. i. p. 434.

truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul that doth evil," Rom. ii. 6, &c. "For the work of a man, shall he render unto him, and cause every man to find according to his ways," Job xxxiv. 2. "Thou renderest to every man according to his work," Psal. lxii. 12. "I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the *fruit* of his doings," Jer. xvii. 10. See also chap. xxxii. 19. "For the son of man shall come in the glory of his father, with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works," Matt. xvi. 27. "For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad," 2 Cor. v. 10. "Behold I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his work shall be," Rev. xxii. 12. "Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art in the way with him: lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing," Mat. v. 25, 26. In the parallel text in Luke, it is thus expressed, "I tell thee, thou shalt not depart thence till thou hast paid the very last mite." James ii. 13, "He shall have judgment without mercy, that hath shewed no mercy." Rev. xiv. 10, "The same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture, into the cup of his indignation? and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb; and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever."

These texts, it is presumed, sufficiently shew, that we have the authority of scripture to prove, that in the

future world, the wicked will be punished according to their demerits, and that no mercy will be shewn them.

(2) The same truth is evidently holden by Dr. C.—He asserts, *that "there will be no salvation for those in the next state, who habitually indulge to lust in this; but they must be unavoidably miserable, notwithstanding the infinite benevolence of the Deity, and to a great degree, God only knows how long, *in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices.*" †That "some of them" [the damned] "shall be tormented for ages of ages, the rest variously, as to time, *in proportion to their deserts:*" That they will suffer ‡"positive torments *in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes:*" That §"there will be a difference in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds:" That ‖"if they" [the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost are not saved till after they have passed through these torments" [of hell] "they have never been forgiven.—The divine *law has taken its course;*" nor has any intervening pardon prevented the *full execution of the threatened penalty.*" Some observations have been already¶ made on these passages concerning the blasphemers of the Holy Ghost, to show, that on Dr. C's plan they equally prove, that all the damned are saved without forgiveness; that the divine law has its course on them all; that they all suffer the full threatened penalty, and of course they suffer all that punishment which they deserve.

The other quotations set this matter in a light equally clear. If the wicked shall be punished in proportion to the number and greatness of their vices; in proportion to the number and greatness of their crimes; according to the nature and number of their evils deeds; in pro-

* P. 10. † P. 307. ‡ P. 350. § P. 320. ‖ P. 336.
¶ P. 2, &c.

portion to their deserts; they will most certainly receive the full punishment due to them according to their demerits, and nothing will be remitted to them.

Thus it appears both by the authority of scripture and also by that of Dr. C. that the damned will actually suffer all that punishment, which they deserve. And as it is now supposed to be proved in the preceding chapter, that the damned deserve a further punishment than that which is conducive to their repentance and personal good; of course it follows, that they will in fact suffer such further punishment.

Objection.—The argument from the scriptural declarations, that the wicked shall be punished according to their works, &c. to prove, that they will suffer all which they justly deserve, is not conclusive; because the same expressions are used concerning the righteous, setting forth, *that they shall be rewarded according to their works*, &c. Yet it is granted on all hands, that their reward is not merely such as they deserve, or is not strictly according to justice.

Answer. The reward of the righteous is indeed not merely such as they deserve, but infinitely exceeds their deserts. It is therefore at least equal to their deserts; or it falls not short of them. If this be allowed concerning the punishment of the wicked, it is sufficient for every purpose of the preceding argument. If the wicked suffer a punishment at least equal to their demerits; then no part of the punishment deserved by them, is remitted to them. Beside; the declarations of scripture are, that the wicked shall pay the uttermost farthing, the very last mite; that they shall have judgment without mercy, wrath without mixture, &c. which are as strong and determinate expressions, to represent that they will be punished to the full extent of justice, as can be conceived.

3. Although Dr. C. is so great an enemy to vindictive punishment; yet he himself, holds that men do even in this life suffer such punishment. "But do those testimonies of his *vengeance* lose their nature as *judgments* on his part, and *real evils* on their's, because they may be an occasion of that repentance, which shall issue in their salvation? When God threatened the Jewish nation, in case they would not do his commandments, with famine, the pestilence, the sword, and a dispersion into all parts of the earth; did he threaten them with a *benefit?* And when those threatenings were for their sins carried into execution, did he inflict a *blessing* on them? When he threatened in particular, that if they were disobedient, they should be *cursed* in the field, Deut. xxviii. 16, did he hereby intend, that the *field* should be cursed; but that he meant thereby *a real benefit* to *them?*" *If vindictive punishment be inflicted even in this life, much more may we conclude that it is inflicted in hell, the proper place of retribution to the wicked.

4. If the punishment of hell be a mere discipline happily conducive to the good of the sufferers, there is no forgiveness in the preservation of a man from it. It is no forgiveness for a parent to give his child a licence to tarry from school; or for a physician to allow his patient to desist from the cold bath, which he had prescribed. Or if a parent, to inure his child to hunger and cold, have kept him for some time on a scanty diet, and have clothed him but thinly; it is no act of forgiveness, to allow the child in future a full diet, or warm clothing. Forgiveness is to remit a *deserved penalty*, or to exempt from *penal* evil; not to deprive of a benefit, or of any thing which is absolutely necessary to our happiness, and which is therefore on the whole no real evil, but a real good. If therefore there be nothing more *penal* or *vin-*

* Five Dissertations, p. 110.

dictive in the punishment of hell, than in the cold bath, or in the scanty diet and thin clothing just mentioned; there is no more of forgiveness in exemption from the former, than in exemption from the latter.—Thus the scheme of disciplinary punishment in hell leads to a conclusion utterly inconsistent with the whole tenor of scripture, and of the writings of Dr. C.

5. All those texts which speak of the divine *vengeance, fury, wrath, indignation, fiery* indignation, &c. hold forth some other punishment, than that which is merely disciplinary. The texts to which I refer are such as these; Deut. xxxii. 41, "If I whet my glittering sword and mine hand take hold on judgment; I will render *vengeance* to mine enemies, and will *reward* them that hate me." Rom. iii. 5, 6, "Is God unrighteous, who taketh *vengeance?*—"God forbid." Chap. xii. 19, "*Vengeance* is mine: I will *repay* saith the Lord." Luke xxi. 22, "These be the days of *vengeance.*" 2 Thes. i. 8, "In flaming fire taking *vengeance* of them, that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ." —Jude 7, "Suffering the *vengeance* of eternal fire."—Job xx. 23. "When he is about to fill his belly, God shall cast the *fury* of his wrath upon him."—Isai. li. 17, "Awake, awake, stand up O Jerusalem, which hast drunk at the hand of the Lord, the cup of his *fury;* thou hast drunken the dregs of the cup of trembling, and wrung them out."—Chap. lix. 18, "According to their deeds, accordingly he will repay *fury* to his adversaries, *recompence* to his enemies" &c. Instances of the denunciation of *wrath* against the wicked, are noted in the margin.*—Rom. ii. 8, 9, "*Indignation* and *wrath*, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doth evil." Heb. x. 27, "A certain fearful looking for of *judgment*,

* Matt. iii. 7. Luke iii. 7. xxi. 23. John iii. 36. Rom. iv. 15. v. 9. ix. 22. 1 Thes. i 10. v. 9.

and *fiery indignation*, which shall devour the adversaries." See also Psal. l. 22. Heb. xii. 29. Luke xii. 46.—Rev. xiv. 10, "Shall drink of the wine of the *wrath* of God poured out *without mixture*, into the cup of his *indignation*." Therefore in the punishment of the wicked there will be no mixture of mercy or forgiveness.

It is of no importance, that in some of the texts now quoted, a reference is not had to the punishments of the future world, but to those of this life. If God can consistently with his perfections inflict a partial vengeance, why not the whole of that which is justly due? If he can and does inflict vengeance in this life, why not in the future too, provided, as is now granted, it be just?

That the passages now quoted, do indeed speak of a punishment more than merely disciplinary, is manifest by the very terms of the passages themselves. To say that *vengeance, wrath, fury, indignation, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture,* mean a mere wholesome, fatherly discipline, designed for the good only of the subjects, is to say that the inspired writers were grossly ignorant of the proper and common use of language; and particularly that they were wholly ignorant of that important distinction between vindictive and disciplinary punishment, on which Dr. C. and other writers of his class so much insist. If vengeance mean fatherly discipline, what is proper vengeance? If it be proper to call fatherly chastisement, vengeance, wrath, fury, fiery indignation, wrath without mixture; by what name is it proper to call a punishment really vindictive?

6. The same may be argued from various other passages of scripture, some of which I shall now cite. 1 Cor. xvi. 22, "If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha." It is absurd to suppose, that this curse means a discipline designed for the good only of the patients. Such a discipline is so

far from a curse, that it is a very great blessing.—Deut. xxvii. 26, compared with Gal. iii. 10, "*Cursed* be he that confirmeth not all the words of this law, to do them." Deut. xxix. 19, "And it come to pass, when he heareth the words of this *curse*, that he bless himself in his heart, saying, I shall have peace, though I walk in the imagination of my heart, to add drunkenness to thirst. The Lord will *not spare* him, but the *anger* of the Lord and his *jealousy* shall *smoke* against that man, and all the *curses that are written in this book*, shall lie upon him, and the Lord will *blot out his name from under heaven*. And the Lord shall separate him *unto evil*, out of all the tribes of Israel, according to *all the curses* of the covenant, that are written in this book of the law."—This text seems to be in several respects inconsistent with the idea, that the future punishment of the sinner is merely disciplinary. It declares, that "the Lord will not *spare* him." But to inflict that punishment only, which is far less than the sinner deserves, and which is not at all vindictive, but wholly conducive to his good, is very greatly to *spare* him. It is further said, that the "*anger* of the Lord and his *jealousy* shall *smoke* against him:" which is not an expression properly and naturally representing the discipline, which proceeds from parental affection seeking the good only of the child. The same may be observed of this expression, "The Lord shall *blot out* his name from under heaven." It is added, "*All the curses* that are written *in this book* shall lie upon him"—"And the Lord shall separate him unto *evil*—according to *all the curses* of the covenant, which are written in this book of the *law*." These last expressions seem to be very determinate. *Curses* are not blessings: but that discipline which is subservient to the good of the subject is a blessing. The curses here mentioned are all the curses written in this book of Moses, or the book of the Law.

Therefore some men will suffer the curse of the law, even the whole curse of the law, or all the curses mentioned in the law; which, by what has come up to our view in the last chapter, appears to be more than a discipline promoting the good of the subject.

Again; Deut. xi. 26—29, "Behold I set before you this day a *blessing* and a *curse*. A blessing, if ye will obey the commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you this day; and a *curse*, if ye will not obey the commandments of the Lord your God."—Prov. iii. 33, "The *curse* of the Lord is in the house of the wicked; but he blesseth the habitation of the just."—Job xxiv. 18, "Their portion is *cursed* in the earth."—Psal. xxxvii. 22, "They that be *cursed* of him, shall be cut off."—Psal. cxix. 21, "Thou hast rebuked the proud, that are *accursed*."—Jer. xi. 3, "*Cursed* be the man that obeyeth not the words of this covenant." Ibid. chap. xvii. 5, "*Cursed*, be the man, that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm." Mal. i. 14, "*Cursed* be the deceiver," &c. Chap. iii. 9, "Ye are *cursed* with a curse." 2 Pet. ii. 14, "*Cursed* children."

By all these texts it appears, that some men do or shall suffer the curse of God. Whether all these texts refer to a curse to be inflicted after death, does not for reasons already given materially affect the present argument. A curse is undoubtedly a punishment which does not promote the good of the subject: otherwise a curse and a blessing are perfectly confounded.

If it shall still be insisted, that the curse so often mentioned, means that punishment only, which is conducive to the good of the subject: it may be answered, then there would be no impropriety in calling the present afflictions of the real disciples of Christ, by the name of a curse. Why then are they not so called in scripture? Why are not the real children of God, even the most

virtuous and pious of them, said to be cursed by God, &c. ? And why are not the curses of the wicked, as well as the afflictions of the righteous, said to work together for their good, and to work out for them a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory? Dr. C. loves to illustrate the punishment of hell by the discipline inflicted by fathers on earth with a sole view to the good of their children. But would it be proper to call the necessary, wise and wholesome discipline of earthly parents, by the name of a *curse?* or is it ever so called, either by God or man ?—Equally absurd is it, to call the punishment of hell by that name, if it be designed for the good only of the patients.

I beseech the reader to consider what a contrast there is between the texts, which have now been quoted, and those in which a punishment really disciplinary is mentioned and described. In the former the punishment is called by the names of *vengeance*, *fury*, *wrath*, *smoaking* wrath, *fiery indignation*, wrath *without mixture*, a *curse*, an *anathema*, *all the curses of the law*, *&c.* Whereas the real discipline of God's children is called a *chastisement;* "If ye be without chastisement, then are ye bastards and not sons :" a *correction;* "I will correct thee in measure, and will not leave thee altogether unpunished." This correction is said to be *mingled with pity.* "Like as a father pitieth his children; so the Lord pitieth them that fear him." "I will visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes, nevertheless, my loving kindness will I not utterly take from him." But where in all the scriptures is the punishment of the future state represented to be designed for the good of the subjects? Where is it in scripture called a fatherly chastisement, correction or discipline, or by any other appellation of the like import? What right then have we to consider it as a mere chastisement? Is not this an

idea formed in the fond imagination of those who would fain support a favourite system?

7. If future punishment be merely disciplinary, the discipline will produce its proper effect on some, sooner than on others. Some who shall in this life have contracted a less degree of depravity and hardness of heart, will be more easily and speedily brought to repentance, than others. This on the hypothesis now made, is both agreeable to the dictates of reason, and is the very doctrine expressly and abundantly taught by Dr. C. But how is this to be reconciled with the account of scripture? That informs us, that all those on the left hand of the judge are to be sentenced to everlasting fire, and shall go away into everlasting punishment. The sentence denounced on all is in the same terms, and not the least intimation is given, that some of them shall be punished longer than others; much less that only *some* shall be punished for ages of ages; others released, in a much shorter time. Dr. C. and other writers of his class suppose, that in hell the wicked are put under those means of grace, which are vastly more advantageous, powerful and conducive to the effect of repentance, than those means which are enjoyed in this life. But the same writers will allow, that in many instances, even the means which are enjoyed in this life are followed with the desired effect of repentance, and this within so short a term as threescore years and ten. Therefore we may reasonably conclude that within the like term, many more will be brought to repentance by the vastly more powerful means to be used with the damned: and so on through every successive period of seventy years. I think then an answer to two questions may justly be demanded of any one in Dr. C's scheme.

(1) With what truth or propriety can a sentence of everlasting punishment be pronounced on the whole

body of sinners, when some of them shall repent and be saved very soon; others in large numbers, in every succeeding age, and even every year? As well might a sentence of exclusion from pardon and the favour of God during this life, be pronounced against the whole of every generation of mankind, because some men do indeed continue in that state during this life. Nay, with much greater truth and propriety might this latter sentence be pronounced, than the former; because it is granted by Dr. C. and others, that the *greater* part of men live and die in impenitence and alienation from God. Whereas, allowing that the punishment of the wicked is a mere discipline, we may presume, that very few indeed of the whole number of the damned, will remain in torment, for that duration, which according to the ideas of our opponents, is intended by *everlasting* and *for ever and ever*, and which is the longest punishment to be inflicted on any of the human race. This is a punishment reserved for a very few, the most depraved, hardened, abandoned sinners, perhaps one in a thousand or ten thousand. The rest less hardened and more easily wrought on by the powerful means of grace used with the damned, will be brought to repentance by a punishment of shorter continuance.

I know Dr. C. says, that though all the damned shall not, yet as some of them shall, suffer that punishment, which in his sense, is everlasting and for ever and ever, therefore everlasting punishment may be truly asserted of them collectively. But the same reason would justify a sentence excluding the whole human race from pardon and the divine favour, during the whole of the present life. God might with the same truth and propriety have said to Adam and all his posterity, even after the revelation of the covenant of grace, I doom you, in righteous judgment, to live and die the objects of my wrath.

This latter sentence would, for the reason before assigned, have been not only equally, but much more conformed to truth and fact, than that which shall be pronounced on the wicked at the end of the world; if they shall be delivered out of hell from time to time in every age and perhaps every year. Yet it is presumed, no man will plead for the truth and propriety of the sentence just supposed.

(2) The other question to which an answer may be expected, is, How has it come to pass, that no intimation of a difference in the duration of the punishment of the wicked, is hinted in any part of the scriptures? The difference between a punishment of a few years, and one which is to last for ages of ages, or for such a duration, as may with propriety be called an *eternity*, is very great, and we should think, well worthy to be noticed in the scriptures. To say, that it is noticed in those texts, which inform us, that the wicked shall be punished *according to their works*, &c. is to beg a point in dispute: because those who believe endless punishment, believe that the works of all sinners deserve an endless punishment; and though they will suffer different punishments according to their different demerits; yet the difference will not consist in duration, but in degree: as the righteous will be rewarded differently according to their works; yet the reward of every individual of the righteous will be of endless duration.

8. If future punishment be designed as a mere discipline, to lead sinners to repentance, it is inflicted without any necessity, and therefore must be a wanton exercise of cruelty.—The repentance of sinners may be easily obtained without those dreadful torments endured for ages of ages. Doubtless that same wisdom and power which leads a goodly number of mankind to repentance in this life, without the help of the torments of hell,

might by the like or superior means, produce the like effect on all. The gospel might have been preached to all the heathens, and all those means of grace, which have been successful on some men, might have been used with all. And who will venture to say, that those means and that grace, which effected the repentance of *Saul* the persecutor, of the thief on the cross, of *Mary Magdalene*, and of the old, idolatrous *Manasseh* who had filled Jerusalem with innocent blood; could not have effected the repentance of any, or at least some of those who have been, or shall be, sent into the future state of punishment? How does it appear, that those means and that grace which were sufficient for the conversion of those noted sinners before mentioned, would not, had they been applied, have been sufficient for the conversion of thousands of others, who in fact have not been converted? And how does it appear, but that similar though more powerful grace and means, which are doubtless within the reach of divine power and knowledge, would have been sufficient for the repentance and conversion of all mankind? If so, the repentance of sinners might have been accomplished, at a cheaper rate, and in a way more demonstrative of the divine goodness, than by the awful means of hell-torments. Those torments therefore are inflicted without any real necessity, unless they be inflicted for some other end, than the repentance of the damned.

I am aware, it will be objected, that if God should bring men to repentance by efficacious grace or means, it would be inconsistent with their moral agency, would destroy their liberty, and reduce them to mere machines. But were *Paul*, *Mary Magdalene*, &c. brought to repentance in such a way as to destroy their liberty? It will not be pretended. Neither can it be pretended, that the same means and grace would have destroyed the

liberty of others. This being granted, it necessarily follows, that if repentance be the only end, hell-torments are arbitrarily inflicted on all those, who might have been, or may in future be brought to repentance by those means, and that grace, by which Paul or any other man hath been brought to repentance in this life.—I ask, does God in this life, apply all those means and all that grace, to all men, to lead them to repentance, which are consistent with their moral agency? And if he apply to any man, more powerful means, or more efficacious grace, than he does apply to him, would he destroy all his liberty and reduce him to a mere machine? If so, then how are the more powerful means of hell-torments consistent with moral agency or liberty? They, it is said, are more powerful and efficacious means of grace, than any employed in this life: and if in this life the utmost is done to lead sinners to repentance, which is consistent with moral agency; hell-torments must entirely destroy moral agency and reduce poor damned souls to mere machines; and of course they will be no more capable of repentance or salvation, than clocks and watches.

If on the other hand it be said, that the utmost which is consistent with moral agency, is not done in this life, to lead men to repentance; it will follow, that God chooses to inflict hell-torments, not merely as a necessary mean to lead sinners to repentance; to grant which, is to give up the whole idea, that they are merely disciplinary.

Those whom I am now opposing, hold, that God cannot, consistently with their moral agency, bring all men to repentance in this life. How then can he, consistently with their moral agency, bring them to repentance in hell? If those means which would be effectual in this life, would be inconsistent with moral agency, why are

not hell-torments equally inconsistent with moral agency, since it is allowed that they will be effectual? Or if those means which are barely effectual in hell, be not inconsistent with moral agency, I wish to have a reason assigned, why those means which would be barely effectual in this life, would be any more inconsistent with moral agency.

Dr. C. and others hold, that to say, that God cannot consistently with moral agency, or in a moral way, bring men to repentance in hell, is to limit his power and wisdom. But to say, that God cannot, consistently with moral agency, bring men to repentance in this life, as really implies a limitation of the divine power and wisdom, as to say, that he cannot, consistently with moral agency, bring them to repentance in hell. How is it any more reconcileable with those divine perfections, that he cannot reduce a sinner to repentance, in threescore years and ten, than that he cannot produce the same effect, throughout eternity? To say, that there is not time in this life, for the sinner to obtain a thorough conviction of the necessity of repentance, affords no relief to the difficulty. For though it should be granted, that there is not time for the sinner to obtain this conviction by experience, which however there seems to be no necessity of granting; yet cannot God exhibit the truth in such a manner, as to produce that conviction? And let a reason be given, why that conviction produced by a clear divine exhibition of truth and a sense of happiness and misery, set in such a light, as to lead to repentance, is more inconsistent with moral agency, than the same conviction obtained by experience, or by the torments of hell.

If hell-torments be necessary to lead sinners to repentance, because they are more painful, than the afflictions or other means used with men in this life; why are not

greater afflictions sent on men in this life? It is manifest, that most men might suffer much greater afflictions, than they really do suffer. And if greater pain be all that is wanting to lead them to repentance, it seems that to inflict that, would be the greatest instance of goodness, and might supercede the necessity of hell-torments.

It is granted by Dr. C. and others, that hell-torments will *certainly* lead to repentance all who suffer them. At the same time he objects to the idea of leading sinners to repentance by the efficacious grace of God, that it destroys moral agency. But if there be a certain established, unfailing connexion between hell-torments continued for a proper time, and repentance; those torments as effectually overthrow moral agency, as efficacious grace. All that need be intended in this instance, by efficacious grace, is such an exhibition or view of the truth and of motives, as will certainly be attended with repentance. But such an exhibition of the truth as this, is supposed by Dr. C. to be made in hell. And why this exhibition made in hell is more consistent with moral agency, than an exhibition which is no more effectual, powerful or overbearing, made in this life, I wish to be informed.

Perhaps it will be further pleaded, that though it be feasible to lead sinners to repentance in this life; yet it is not wise and best. But why is it not as wise and good, to persuade sinners to repent, without the use of hell-torments, as by those torments? If indeed it be fact, that God does not inflict endless but disciplinary misery on sinners, we may thence conclude, that it is wisely so ordered. But this is not to be taken for granted; it ought to be proved before an inference is drawn from it. It is the great question of this dispute.

9. That future punishment is not merely disciplinary, appears from the various declarations of scripture, that

those who die impenitent, are *lost*, are *cast away, perish*, suffer *perdition*, are *destroyed*, suffer everlasting *destruction*, &c. as in these texts; John xvii. 12, "None of them is *lost*, save the son of *perdition*."—Luke ix. 25, "What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and *lose* himself or be *cast away*."—Matt. xiii. 48, "Gathered the good into vessels, but *cast* the bad (σαπρα the dead, rotten fish) *away*." 2 Peter ii. 13, "They shall utterly *perish* in their own corruption."—Heb. x. 39, "We are not of them that draw back unto *perdition;* but of them that believe unto *the saving* of the soul."—2 Peter iii. 7, "But the heavens and the earth which are now, are reserved unto fire, against the day of judgment, and *perdition* of ungodly men."—Matt. x. 28, "Fear him who is able to *destroy* both soul and body in hell"—2 Thess. i. 9, "Who shall be punished with everlasting *destruction* from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power."—But what truth or propriety is there in these expressions, if future punishment be a mere discipline? The damned in hell are no more cast away, lost, destroyed; they no more perish, or suffer perdition, than any of God's elect are cast away, &c. while they are in this world. Hell is no more a place of destruction, than this world. The wicked in hell are no more vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, than the saints are in this world. The damned are under discipline; so are even the most virtuous and holy, while in this life. Yet they are not lost, cast away, rejected as reprobate silver, or destroyed by God; but are kept as the apple of his eye. And as the means of grace, under which the damned are placed, are far more adapted certainly to secure and promote their greatest good, than any means which we enjoy in this state; to consider and to speak of them as lost, cast away, destroyed, &c. because they are under those means, is to the highest de-

gree absurd. They are just as much further removed from a state, which can justly be called destruction, perdition, &c. than they were, while in this world, as the means of grace which they enjoy in hell are more powerful and effectual to prepare them for happiness, than those means which they enjoyed in this world.

Suppose a man seized with some dangerous disease, and a variety of means is used for his recovery, but in vain. Suppose it appears, that if no more effectual means be employed, he will never be recovered. Suppose further, that at length an entirely different course is taken with him, a course which is not only far more likely than the former to be successful; but concerning which there is absolute certainty, that it will be successful: I ask, can the man now under the operation of these most excellent and infallible means, with any truth be said to be *lost*, to be *cast away*, to be *destroyed*, &c.? Or if those terms must be applied to one or other of those situations, in which we have supposed him to be at different times; to which of them are they applied with the least truth and reason? This example may illustrate the subject now under consideration.

10. If it be consistent with the divine perfections, to subject a sinner to misery, for the sake of advancing *his own* good, as is implied in the very idea of disciplinary punishment, why is it not equally consistent with the same perfections, to subject a sinner to misery, for the sake of promoting the good of *the system;* provided that misery do not exceed the demerit of the subject?—I presume no believer in endless punishment, will plead for any degree or duration of punishment, which is not subservient to the glory of the Deity implying the greatest good of the universe. Therefore, all such punishment, as is not subservient to that end, is foreign to the present question. Further, it is now supposed to be

proved, that other punishment than that which is adapted to prepare the sinner for happiness, is justly deserved by the sinner. Now since this is allowed or proved, why is it not consistent with every attribute of the Deity, to inflict that other punishment, provided only it be subservient to the good of the system?

It is holden by our opponents, that the punishment of a sinner may lead him to repentance. So it may lead other sinners to repentance; or it may restrain them from sin, and in a variety of ways may equally subserve the good of those who are not the subjects of the punishment, as it may the good of him who is the subject of it. And that the good of other persons may be of equal worth and importance, nay, of far greater worth to the system, than the good of the transgressor himself, cannot be denied. Therefore, as I said in the beginning of this article, if the personal good of the sinner be a sufficient reason why he should be punished according to justice; why is not the good of others, or the good of the system, a sufficient reason for the same proceeding? And is it not evident, not only that such a punishment is consistent with the perfections of God; but that those perfections, goodness itself not excepted, require it? In this case, to inflict a punishment merely conducive to the good of the person punished, would be no fruit of goodness, but of a contrary principle; and the doctrine of merely disciplinary punishment, if it mean a punishment conducive indeed to the good of the subject, but destructive to the good of the system, is so far from being built on the divine goodness, as some boast; that it is built on a very different foundation. I am aware, that it is holden by the advocates for universal salvation, that the good of the system cannot be promoted by the endless misery of any individual, but requires the final happiness of every one. Merely to assert this however, as

some do very confidently, is perfect impertinence. Let them prove it, and they will do something to the purpose.

11. If none of the damned will be punished for any other end than their own good, and yet they all deserve to be punished more than is subservient to their own good ; then some of them deserve to be punished for a longer term, than that which in scripture, according to Dr. C's sense of it, is said to be *forever and ever*. The punishment, which in the language of scripture is said to be *everlasting*, *forever and ever*, &c. will actually be suffered by some of the damned, as is agreed on all hands. But if none of the damned will suffer any other punishment than that which is conducive to their personal good, then the punishment which in scripture is said to be forever and ever, is conducive to their personal good. They therefore deserve a punishment of greater duration than that which in scripture is said to be *forever and ever:* and of course that more durable punishment is the curse of the divine law, and is threatened in the law. But where in all the law, or in all the scripture, is any punishment threatened, or even hinted at, of greater duration than that which shall last *forever and ever?*—So that this scheme of disciplinary punishment necessarily brings us to this absurdity, that the true and real curse of the divine law, is not contained in the law ; and that the punishment justly deserved by the sinner, is no where revealed or even hinted at, in all the scripture. Yet the scripture assures us, that some sinners will be in fact punished according to their demerits, so as to pay the uttermost farthing, and to receive judgment without mercy. And no man pretends that any sinner will suffer more than that punishment which in scripture is said to be *forever and ever*. The consequence is, that that punishment which is *forever and ever*, is the whole that the

sinner deserves, and therefore is by no means a mere discipline.

12. Our Lord informs us, Matt. x. 33 ; That whosoever shall deny him before men, shall be denied by him before his Father. But on the hypothesis now under consideration, this means only, that Christ will deny him till he repents. In Luke xiii. 25, &c. we read, that when once the master of the house shall have risen and shut the door, some will begin to stand without and to knock, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us, and will urge several arguments in favour of their admission : to whom the master will answer, I know you not, whence you are ; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity. But on the present hypothesis, Christ will deny them in no other sense than he denies every real penitent and believer, during the present life. He will deny the wicked after the general judgment no longer than till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined ; after that, he will know them, will own them, and receive them to eternal and blissful communion with himself. The same is observable of all his most sincere disciples in this life. While here, they are under discipline, though not so merciful and gracious a discipline as that with which the damned are favoured. However, during the continuance of the discipline of this life, Christ denies and refuses to confer on any of his disciples, an entire exemption from pain, distress, or affliction ; and subjects them equally with the rest of the world, to these calamities : so that in this respect all things come alike to all. He does indeed give them assurance of rest and glory after this life. As full assurance of rest and glory after the expiration of the term of their discipline, is, on the present hypothesis, given to all the damned. Also in the prospect of this rest and glory, and in the certain knowledge that they are the objects of his favour, he

affords his disciples much relief and comfort under their present trials. The same sources of relief and comfort are afforded to all the damned. So that Christ denies the damned in no other sense, than that in which he denies his most sincere followers, during this life.

The same observations for substance may be made concerning the application of the damned for admission into heaven, after the general judgment, and the answer and treatment which they shall receive on that occasion. The door shall be shut against them no longer than till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of every real christian in this life.—The master of the house will answer, *I know you not*, (i. e.) I do not as yet own you as my friends and disciples, because you have not yet been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of every real christian in this life.—He will tell them, "Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity." But this means no more, than that they must not be admitted into heaven, till they shall have been sufficiently disciplined. The same is true of all real christians in this life.

13. On the hypothesis now under consideration, what damnation do those in hell suffer, more than real christians suffer in this life? They are kept in a state of most merciful and gracious discipline, till they are prepared, and then they are taken to heaven. The same is true of every real christian in this life. This difference however is worthy of notice, that the discipline of hell is far more advantageous than that of this life, because more effectual, and likely to fit the subject for heaven more speedily and thoroughly; otherwise it would never have been applied. It is also a more merciful and gracious exhibition of the divine goodness. Doubtless that mean of grace, which is most happily and effectually conducive to the speedy repentance and pre-

paration of the sinner for heaven, is to him the most merciful and gracious exhibition and demonstration of the divine goodness.

It is true, the discipline of hell is attended with more pain than that of this life. So the discipline of this life, with respect to some individuals, is attended with more pain, than it is with respect to others. Yet it doth not hence follow, that some christians suffer damnation in this life : nor will it be pretended, that either the scriptures or common sense would justify the calling of those greater pains of some christians in this life, by the name of damnation, in any other sense, than the less pains or afflictions of other christians, may be called by the same name.

On the whole then, when the scripture says, "He that believeth, and is baptized shall be saved ; but he that believeth not shall be damned :" The whole meaning is, he that believeth, shall be admitted to heaven immediately after death : but he that believeth not, shall not immediately be admitted, merely because he is not yet prepared for it by repentance ; but he shall be put under a discipline absolutely necessary for his own good, and the most wise, effectual, merciful and gracious, that divine wisdom and goodness can devise ; and as soon as this discipline shall have prepared him for heaven, he shall be admitted without further delay. When the scriptures say, he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him ; the meaning is, he shall not see life till he is brought to repentance by the merciful discipline just now mentioned ; and not the *wrath* of God abideth on him ; because he shall be made the subject of nothing wrathful or vindictive ; but the *mercy*, or most merciful and benevolent discipline of God abideth on him.

14. If the only end of future punishment be the repentance of the sinner, and if the means used with sin-

ners in hell be so much more powerful and happily adapted to the end, than those used in this life; it is unaccountable, that while so many are led to repentance by the comparatively weak means used with men in this life, and within so short a period as seventy years, the far more powerful means applied in hell, should not be productive of the same effect, in a single instance, within so long a period as a thousand years. That none are to be delivered out of hell, within a thousand years after the general judgment, is explicitly taught by Dr. C. His words are,* "This period" (a thousand years) "must run out, before the wicked dead could *any* of them live as kings and priests with Christ."

We all doubtless believe, that many sinners die impenitent, who are not the subjects of depravity and hardness of heart vastly greater, than are in some, who are brought to repentance in this life. Now put the case of the class of sinners, who are the subjects of a depravity and hardness of heart, the very next in degree to that of the most depraved of those who are brought to repentance in this life. Is it reasonable to believe, that these cannot be brought to repentance, even by the most powerful means of grace enjoyed in hell, within a less time than a thousand years? If it be not reasonable to believe this, then it is not reasonable to believe Dr. C's scheme of disciplinary punishment.

15. The last *enemy* that shall be destroyed is *death.* This death is understood by Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation, to mean the second death. Then the second death is doubtless an *enemy.* But if it consist in a necessary discipline, the most wise and wholesome, the most conducive to the good of the recipients, and to the divine glory, which the wisdom of God can devise; surely it is no enemy either to God or the recipients;

* Page 402.

but is a perfect friend to both. With what truth then could the apostle call it an enemy?

16. The scripture, so far from declaring those who suffer chastisement and disciplinary pains, *accursed*, merely on that account, expressly declares them *blessed*. Psal. xciv. 12; "Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, O Lord, and teachest him out of thy law; that thou mayest give him rest from the days of adversity." But where are the damned ever said to be blessed? They are constantly declared to be accursed.—Heb. xii. 5—9, "Ye have forgotten the exhortation, which speaketh to you, as unto children, my son, despise not thou the chastening of the Lord, nor faint when thou art rebuked of him. For whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you as with sons. For what son is he, whom the Father chasteneth not? But if ye be without chastisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards, and not sons."—This passage evidently considers those who suffer chastisement from the hand of God, as his children, his sons. If therefore the damned suffer a mere chastisement, they are not accursed, but are the blessed sons or children of God. But are they ever so called in scripture?—Beside; this passage evidently supposes, that some men do not suffer fatherly chastisement, of which all the sons or children of God are partakers; and expressly declares, that such as do not suffer it are bastards and not sons; which seems not to agree with the idea, that all the damned, will by fatherly chastisement be brought to final salvation. If no other punishment be inflicted by God, than fatherly chastisement, then there are no bastards in the universe. Yet it is evidently supposed in this text, that there are bastards.

Heb. x. 28, "He that despised Moses' law *died without mercy*—of how much sorer punishment shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the son of God?" &c. But if all who die impenitent, be sent to a state of discipline most excellently adapted to their good and salvation, no man dies without mercy. This discipline itself is the greatest mercy which can, in their state of mind, be bestowed upon them. With respect to the same subject, it is said, Heb. ii. 2; "That every transgression and disobedience, received *a just recompence* of reward."—*A just recompence*, is a punishment adequate to the demands of justice; and this, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, cannot be a mere merciful discipline.

17. If the punishment of hell be a mere wholesome discipline, then what the apostle says of the discipline of christians in this life, may be said with equal truth and propriety of the punishment of the damned: thus, We glory in damnation; knowing that damnation worketh repentance, and repentance salvation.

18. If no other than a disciplinary punishment be consistent with the divine goodness; surely the requirement of an atonement in order to pardon, is unaccountable. The doctrine of atonement, and of the necessity of it to pardon and salvation, is abundantly holden by Dr. C. He says,* "Jesus Christ is the person *upon whose account* happiness is attainable by the human race." He speaks† of the "*sacrifice* of himself," which Christ "offered up to God to put away sin." "The obedience of Christ to death, is the *ground* or *reason* upon which it hath pleased God to make happiness attainable by any of the race of Adam."‡ "By thus submitting to die, he" (Jesus) "made *atonement*, not only for the original lapse, but for all the sins this would be introductory to."§—

* Page 17. † P. 18. ‡ P. 19. § Five Dissertations, p. 245.

"Christ was sent into the world to make way for the *wise*, *just*, and *holy* exercise of mercy towards the sinful sons of men."* "The only begotten Son of God both did and suffered every thing that was necessary, in order to a righteousness *on account of which* God might, in consistency with the *honour of his perfections*, and the *authority of his law*, make the grant of life. Accordingly this meritorious righteousness is that *for the sake of which*, *upon the account of which*, this blessing is conferred."† According to Dr. C. then, Christ hath not only made *atonement* by his obedience and death, but that atonement was necessary to the *wise*, *just*, and *holy* exercise of mercy to the sinner; and without that atonement, saving mercy could not have been exercised toward the sinner, in a consistency with wisdom, justice and holiness, or the honour of the divine perfections, or the authority of the divine law and government. The constitution, therefore, by which salvation can be obtained in no other way, than in consequence and on account of his obedience and death, is not only consistent with wisdom, holiness, justice, yea, all the divine perfections, and the authority of the divine law and government: but it was *required by them all.*

But the sufferings and death of Christ, or his atonement, is no discipline of the sinner. They are as foreign from it as the vindictive punishment of the sinner himself. The atonement, as Dr C. hath explained it, makes way for the wise, just and holy exercise of mercy toward the sinner. It was therefore designed to *satisfy* the divine *wisdom*, *justice* and *holiness*. It was designed to make the grant of life to the sinner *consistent with the honour of the divine perfections*, and *the authority of the divine law and government.* And if our Lord Jesus Christ might, in the behalf of the sinner, be made to suffer in

* Five Dissertations, p. 247. † 12 Sermons, p. 334.

order to *satisfy* divine *justice ;* why may not the sinner himself be made to suffer for the same end ?

If Christ have, on the behalf of sinners, suffered for the end of supporting the authority of the divine law and government ; what reason can be assigned, why it should be inconsistent with any attribute of the Deity, that sinners themselves should be made to suffer for the same end ? But this would be a proper vindictive punishment. Therefore Dr. C. is entirely inconsistent with himself, in allowing the atonement of Christ, in the terms before quoted ; and yet denying the reasonableness of a vindictive punishment, or its consistency with the divine perfections.

19. We are assured, " that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose ;" Rom. viii. 28. But this implies, that all things do not work for good, to them who love not God. Yet all things do work for their good, if they suffer no other than a disciplinary punishment. Concerning those who are Christ's, it is said, that " all things are their's ; whether Paul or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things *to come ;* all are their's ;" 1 Cor. iii. 21, 22. But on the supposition, that all punishment is disciplinary, it is equally true concerning all mankind, that all things present and to come are their's. Yet this is not said, but the contrary is implied in that it is said of those only who are Christ's or are Christians, that all things are their's.

20. I argue from those words of the wise man, Eccl. ix. 10 ; " Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might ; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave whither thou goest." If future punishment be disciplinary, the damned are in a state of probation, and may and will so exercise their rational powers, as shall finally issue in their salvation.

But can this be reconciled with the words of Solomon, that in the future state, there is no work to be done, no device to be invented, no knowledge or wisdom to be exercised by us, to the accomplishment of what we now leave undone? This is manifestly the argument, by which he presses on us the present diligent discharge of our duty; and this argument would be utterly inconclusive, if there were another state, in which what our hand now findeth to do, might be done.

Of similar import is John ix. 4; "I must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day; the night cometh when no man can work. As long as I am *in the world*, I am the light of the world." That our Lord, by *the day*, means this life, is manifest by the last words of the quotation. But if in the future state no man can work, the future state is not a state of probation.

To these I may add, Gen. vi. 3; "My spirit shall not always strive with man—yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years." As if it had been said, my spirit shall not always strive with man; yet he shall strive with him an hundred and twenty years, and no longer; for so long only shall his days be continued. But how is this consistent with the idea, that God will be striving with man, for ages of ages after his days shall have been elapsed?

Objection 1. If to some part of the foregoing reasoning it be objected, that it supposes future punishment to be *merely* disciplinary, and designed to subserve no *other* end, than the repentance of the sinner: whereas it is granted, that God may and will inflict vindictive punishment, but not a punishment *merely* vindictive; that he may take vengeance of the sinner, provided at the same time he aim at the good of the sinner: To this I answer—

1. That in this objection it is granted, that God may and will inflict on the damned a punishment properly vindictive, a punishment over and above that which is conducive to the personal good of the sinner. But this is to grant all which is pleaded for in this chapter, and all which at present is attempted to be proved.

2. If the meaning of this objection be, that God may inflict vengeance, provided he do it with a sole view to the good of the sinner, it confutes itself; it seems to grant something, but in reality it grants nothing. It seems to admit a proper vindictive punishment, but really admits no punishment besides that which is merely disciplinary. For to talk of inflicting vengeance with a sole view to the good of the subject, can mean nothing more, than to inflict *pain* with a sole view to the good of the subject; and this is nothing more than a punishment merely disciplinary: if God show displeasure with a sole view to the good of the sinner, this is mere discipline.

3. If the meaning of this objection be, that God may consistently with his perfections, inflict a proper vindictive punishment, provided at the same time that he is aiming at a proper vindication of his broken law and despised government, he aim at the good of the sinner also; I answer, if it be right and consistent with the perfections of God, to vindicate his law and government, there is no necessity of bringing in the aid of another motive or design, to make it right or consistent with his perfections. If on the other hand, it be not in itself right to vindicate his law and government, no other affections, views or actions, however right and benevolent, co-existing with the supposed vindication, can atone for it, or make it right.

To illustrate this by an example :—A parent has a disobedient child; and it is become necessary both for the

good of the child, and for the support of the parent's authority in his family in general, and over his child in particular, that he be properly punished. Accordingly from both these motives, the good of the child and the support of his own authority, the parent inflicts the proper punishment. This according to the objection now before us, is right. But according to the same objection, if the child be desperate and there be no prospect of effecting his good by punishment, it is not consistent with the character of a good parent to inflict the same punishment, from the motives of supporting his own government and the good of the family only. If this action done from these motives only, be a wrong action, it is still wrong, so far as it proceeds from the same motives, however it may arise in part from the motive of the child's good. To render this still plainer, let us suppose, that a parent inflicts pain on his child merely to afford amusement to his neighbours, as the Romans were wont to exhibit fights of gladiators. It will be agreed on all hands, that this action is abominable. Again, suppose the same pain be inflicted partly from the motive of amusing his neighbours, and partly from a regard to the child's good. I presume all will allow, that so far as the action proceeds from the former motive, it is still abominable, and is not sanctified by the co-existent motive of the child's good.

On the whole, we arrive at this conclusion; that if it be consistent with the divine perfections, that God should inflict punishment from the two motives of vindicating his own law and government and benefiting the sinner; it is equally consistent with the divine perfections to inflict punishment from the former motive only. All the vindictive punishment pleaded for, is that which is deserved by the sinner and is necessary to support the divine law and moral government in proper dignity, and

thus to promote the general good: and this surely is opposed to no attribute of God, whether justice or goodness.

Objection 2. To the argument drawn from the destruction threatened to the wicked, it may be objected, that this destruction means, that they shall be destroyed *as sinners* only, or shall be brought to repentance and a renunciation of sin. To this it may be answered, that in this sense every one who in this life repents and believes, is destroyed, and suffers destruction. Yet this is never said in scripture. This sense of the word *destruction* makes the punishment of hell, and the awful curse of the divine law, to consist in *repentance*, which is no punishment or curse, but an inestimable blessing. Besides, that repentance, on which the sinner is forgiven if it can be called a *destruction* at all, is not an *everlasting* destruction, but an emotion of heart, which is begun and finished in a very short time. Or if by this everlasting destruction be understood the habitual and persevering repentance of the true convert; then the glorified saints in heaven, are constantly suffering that *destruction* which will be everlasting, and which is the curse of the divine law.

Before this subject is dismissed, proper notice ought to be taken of some arguments urged in favour of the sentiment, that the punishment of hell is merely disciplinary.

1. It is urged,* that the various afflictions of *this life* are designed for the good of the patients: therefore probably the same end is designed by the sufferings of hell. —To this it may be answered, It is by no means granted, that all the afflictions of this life are designed for the good of the patients. It does not appear, that men in

* Page 324, 325.

general, who are visited with the loss of children, wives, or other dear friends; or with the loss of eye-sight, of some other sense, or of a limb; or with distressing pains or incurable diseases; are thereby rendered more happy in this life. If men may be allowed to judge by their own experience, they will in most cases decide the question in the negative. Nor does the decision in many cases appear ill founded to those, who have opportunity to observe persons under those afflictions. To say that men are no proper judges, whether they themselves be, in this life, made more happy or not, by the afflictions which they suffer, is to say, that they are no judges of their own happiness or misery. This being once established, we may assert, that hell-torments though endless promote the happiness of the patients: because being no judges of their own happiness or misery they may be extremely happy, at the very time they judge themselves to be perfectly miserable.

In any case in which calamity proves fatal, it is absurd to pretend, that it promotes, in this life, the happiness of the patient, unless calamity itself be happiness. No man has opportunity in this life to derive any good from the pains of death. Therefore at least these pains are not designed for the subject's good during his present life.

Here it may be proper to mention several remarkable instances of grievous calamity recorded in scripture: As the instance of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, of Pharaoh, Saul, the house of Eli, Nadab and Abihu, Hiel, &c. It is presumed, Dr. C. himself would not pretend, that these calamities were intended for "the profit of the sufferers themselves" in this life. What right then had he to argue, as in the following passage?*

* Pages 324, 325, &c.

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"The proper tendency and final cause of evils in the present state, are to do us good. This is the voice of reason confirmed by experience, and scripture concurs herewith." He then quotes Psal. lxxxix. 31—34; and proceeds, "If evil, punishment or misery in the present life is mercifully intended for the good of the patients themselves why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as the father of mercies, and God of pity, confined to this world only?" The force of all this depends entirely on the supposition, that in all instances of suffering in this life, the end is the sufferer's good during this life.

But this supposition, we see by what has been said already, is by no means true. The superstructure therefore built on this foundation falls entirely to the ground. We all grant, that in some instances afflictions are intended for the good of the sufferers. A proof of this, which needed no proof, Dr. C. has produced out of the eighty-ninth psalm. On this foundation extended in his own imagination to comprehend all instances of affliction, he built an argument in which he triumphed.—Now since there are those several instances of calamity before mentioned, which Dr. C. would not pretend were designed for the sufferer's good in this life; I might as well suppose that no other instances of calamity are designed for the sufferers good in this life; and then adopt Dr. C's strain of *ardent declamation*, in manner following: If evil punishment or misery in the present life, be not intended for the good of the patients themselves, but to support the authority of the divine law, and thus subserve the general good; why not in the next life? Is the character of God, as a God of perfect purity and strict justice, limited to this world only? Why should it not be supposed, that the infinitely holy God has the same hatred of sin in the other world which he has in this? and

that he has in the next state the same intention which he has in this, to vindicate, by punishments, his law and government.

The truth is, that as some of the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life and others are as manifestly not intended for his good in this life ; nothing certain can be hence concluded concerning the end of the misery of the damned. Nay ; if it were certain, that all the calamities of this life are intended for the patient's good in this life or that they are not intended for his good in this life ; yet it could not be certainly thence concluded, that the miseries of the damned are intended for the good of the patients, nor that they are not intended for the good of the patients. But this point must be determined by other evidence, the evidence of revelation.

If it should be said, that though some of the sufferings of this life do not, in this life, produce good to the patients ; yet they will produce good to them in the future life ; it will be sufficient to reply, that this wants proof ; that it is a main point in the present dispute ; and that it should be taken for granted, is not to be suffered.

2. It is also urged by our author, "That the whole course of nature, and even the revelations of scripture constantly speak of God, as the universal father, as well as governor of men—What now is the temper and conduct of fathers on earth towards their offspring ? They readily do them good and chastise them for their profit ; but they do not punish their children, having no view to their advantage."—"And shall we say that of our father in heaven, which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father ?" He abounds in pathetic discourse of the same strain, which is much more suited to work on the imaginations and passions of mankind, than on their reason.

The foundation of all this discourse is, that fathers on earth, acting in character, never punish and never can punish their children, but with a design to promote their personal good. But would Dr. C. himself adventure to lay down this position, and to abide by it? Did never a wise and good father find it necessary, to punish, and even to cast out of his family, a desperate child, to prevent his ruining the rest of the children? Was there never, or can there possibly never be, an instance of this? If such an instance ever has, or ever may occur, the appearance of argument in the forecited passage, vanishes at once. Not only do *fathers* find it necessary to punish desperate children, without any prospect of their personal good; but very frequently do *kings*, governors and chief magistrates find this necessary with regard to their subjects. Now in the scripture, God much oftener illustrates his character, by that of a king, a prince, a sovereign lord, than by that of a father. And as kings, &c. often find it necessary to inflict capital and other punishments, without any view to the personal good of the sufferers; we may hence deduce an argument, that God also will punish many of his rebellious subjects, without any view to their personal good; but to support his moral government, to be an example of terror to others, and thus to secure the general good: and this argument would be at least as strong as that of Dr. C. just cited.

3. It may be pleaded, that though calamities in this life do not always issue in the sufferers' good; yet God may compensate them in the future state, for the loss or suffering, of which they are the subjects in this life. Thus our author, "it is possible that the evils which any suffer in this, may be made up to them in a other state."*—It is granted, that God is able to compensate

* Benevolence of the Deity, p. 249.

his creatures for the evils of this life ; but that he in fact will do it in all cases, is to be proved.—Besides ; the very idea of compensation is inconsistent with the idea of disciplinary punishment and that all the evils of both this life and the future are necessary and are intended for the good of those who suffer them. For if this idea be just, what foundation is there for compensation ? Will a father compensate a child for the pain of that discipline which is absolutely necessary for his good and most wisely adapted to it ? No man would ever think of it. Compensation supposes, that the evil for which compensation is made, has been inflicted from other motives, than a regard to the good of the sufferer. And if evil may in one instance be inflicted from other motives than a regard to the good of the sufferer ; it may in any other instance in which justice and wisdom admit of it ; and if in this state, in the future too.—If the evils of life be intended for the good only of the subjects, we may as well talk of compensating a man for the pain of drawing a tooth which is a perpetual torment to him ; or for the disagreeable taste of the dose which cures him of the colic ; as to talk of compensating him for the calamities of life. The saints will indeed be rewarded for their patience under these calamities ; and this part of their holiness is doubtless as amiable, and is as properly as any part of their holiness the object of the complacency of the Deity, and of those rewards which are the fruits of that complacency. But those rewards are not to be considered as compensations of losses or of damages. The very idea of compensation implies, that that for which compensation is made, is on the whole an evil to the person compensated. But the very idea that present evils are necessary and conducive to the good of the subjects, implies, that on the whole they are no evils to the subjects.

It is now submitted to the reader, whether the doctrine, that the damned will in fact suffer no other punishment, than that which is subservient to their personal good, be not in many respects most glaringly inconsistent with the scriptures; and whether it be not equally irreconcilable with their general tenor as with many particular passages; and also with many parts of Dr. C's book.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTAINING AN EXAMINATION OF DR. C'S ARGUMENTS TO PROVE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT INCONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE.

That the endless punishment of the damned is inconsistent with justice, is positively and abundantly asserted by Dr. C. and other advocates for universal salvation. Whether the arguments which the Doctor offers to prove the injustice of endless punishment, be conclusive, is the subject of our inquiry in this chapter.

Before we proceed to this inquiry, it seems necessary, to explain the meaning of the proposition—That the endless punishment of the damned is consistent with *justice.*

I do not find that Dr. C. hath any where given us a definition of his idea of *justice*, or of a just punishment, which is certainly a great omission. The Chevalier *Ramsay* gives the following definition of the divine justice: "Justice is that perfection of God, by which he endeavours continually to make all intelligences just."* But with the same reason he might have defined the divine mercy to be, not that perfection in God, by which

* Principles, Vol. i. p. 432.

he is himself inclined to the exercise of mercy to the miserable; but that by which he endeavours to make all intelligences merciful: and the divine love to be, not that perfection in God, by which he loves his creatures, but that by which he endeavours to make other intelligences exercise love. By this definition of justice a human judge, who wrongs every man, whose cause is brought before him, and yet endeavours to make other men just, is a just judge.

The word *justice* is used in three different senses. Sometimes it means *commutative* justice, sometimes *distributive*, and sometimes *general* or *public* justice. *Commutative* justice respects property only, and the equal exchange and restitution of it. *Distributive* justice is the equal distribution of rewards and punishments, and it respects the *personal* rights and demerit of the person rewarded or punished. *General* or *public* justice respects what are called the rights of a community, whether a city, state, empire, or the universe. This kind of justice requires the public good; and whenever that is violated or neglected, the public is *injured*. This last use of the word justice, though very frequent, yet is an improper use of it; because to practise justice in this sense, is no other than to act from public spirit, or from love to the community, and with respect to the universe, it is the very same with general benevolence.

Now when we inquire, whether the endless punishment of the wicked be consistent with justice, no man will suppose that the word justice means *commutative* justice; because the inquiry has no respect to *property*. Nor is the word to be understood to mean *general* or *public* justice. It is indeed an important inquiry, whether the endless punishment of a man dying in impenitence, be consistent with the general interest of the universe; but this is not the subject to be considered in this chap-

ter. The question to be considered in this and in one or two succeeding chapters, is, Whether to inflict an endless punishment on a man dying in impenitence, be an act of *distributive* justice, or be a treatment of him by his judge, correspondent and no more than correspondent or proportioned to his demerit, to his crimes, or to his moral conduct and personal character. This is a question entirely different from the following; Whether the infliction of an endless punishment on a sinner dying in impenitence, be subservient to the good of the universe? A punishment or calamity inflicted on a person may be subservient to the public good of a community, yet not be deserved by him on account of his personal crimes. It was for the good of the Roman republic, that *Regulus* should return to certain death at Carthage; yet he did not deserve that death; it was not correspondent to his moral character. On the other hand, many a villain has by his atrocious crimes deserved death; yet by reason of his power, his connexions, or the peculiar circumstances of the state, it could not, consistently with the public good be inflicted on him. So that in a variety of instances public justice or the public good is promoted by private or distributive injustice; and distributive justice would be productive of public injury or damage. And in some cases the public good may be promoted by a proceeding, which, though not in the distributive sense unjust, yet is not according to distributive justice. An innocent person may choose to be made the subject of sufferings, in the stead of a criminal. Therefore though the sufferings which he chooses to endure, be inflicted on him, no injustice is done him: nor will it be pretended, that this proceeding is according to strict distributive justice, which requires the criminal to be punished and not his substitute. Yet it may promote the good of the community, or secure it from great detriment by a re-

laxation of its laws and government; as in the well known instance of Zaleucus, who put out one of his own eyes, to support the authority of the law against adultery, which his own son had violated.

On the whole, when we inquire whether the endless punishment of the damned be consistent with justice, the word *justice* means *distributive* justice. This, as has been already observed, respects the personal merit or demerit of the man rewarded or punished. A man suffers distributive injustice when he is not treated as favourably as is correspondent to his personal conduct or character. On the other hand, he has justice done him, when he is treated in a manner correspondent to his personal conduct or character. A just punishment then is that which is proportioned or correspondent to the crime punished. But it may be further inquired, when is a punishment proportioned to the crime punished? To this the answer seems to be, when by the pain or natural evil of the punishment, it exhibits a just idea of the moral evil or ruinous tendency of the crime, and a proper motive to restrain all intelligent beings from the commission of the crime.

Further to elucidate this matter, let it be observed, that any crime, by relaxing the laws and by weakening the government, is a damage to the community; and deserves just so much punishment, as, by restoring the proper tone of the laws, and proper strength to the government, will repair that damage. The chief evil of any crime, on account of which it principally deserves punishment, consists in the relaxation of the laws and government of the community in which the crime is committed. For example, the chief evil of theft is not that a certain person is clandestinely deprived of his property. His property may be restored and he may in this respect suffer no damage. Still the thief deserves pun-

ishment. If a man be defamed, the chief evil is not that the person defamed is injured by the loss of his reputation. His reputation may, by a full confession of the defamer or by other means, be restored. Still the defamer may deserve punishment. If a man be murdered, the chief evil is not that the man is deprived of his life, and his friends and the community are deprived of the benefit of his aid. His life may have been a burden to himself, to his friends and to the community; or he may by divine power be raised from the dead. Still, in either case, the murderer would deserve punishment.

The true reason, why all those criminals would, in all those cases, deserve punishment, is, that by their respective crimes they would weaken the laws and government of the community, thereby would break in upon the public peace, good order, safety and happiness; instead of these would introduce confusion and ruin; and thus would do a very great damage to the community.—Therefore, they would respectively deserve just so much punishment, as by restoring the tone of the laws and government, would re-establish the peace, good order, safety and happiness of the community, and thus would repair the damage done to the community by their crimes.—A punishment adequate to this end exhibits by the natural evil of it, a just idea of the moral evil of the crime, and a proper motive to restrain all from the commission of it: it is therefore duly proportioned to the crime, is correspondent to the conduct of the criminal, and is perfectly just.

The passages in which Dr. C. *declares positively*, that the endless punishment of the wicked would be unjust, are very numerous; but his arguments to prove that it would be unjust, are, so far as I can find, very few. As this is a capital point in the present controversy, it was to be expected, that he would go into a formal conside-

ration of it, and give us his reasons methodically and distinctly. Instead of this, in all the various parts of his book in which he declaims most vehemently on the subject, there are very few in which I find an attempt to argue. These are as follows:—"An eternity of misery swallows up all proportion: or though there should be some difference in the *degree* of pain, it is such a difference, I fear, as will be scarce thought worthy of being brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration is annexed to it."*—"The smallness of the difference between those in this world, to whom the character of *wicked* belongs in the lowest sense, and those to whom the character of *good* is applicable in the like sense, renders it incredible, that such an amazingly great difference should be made between them in the future. The difference between them, according to the common opinion, will be doubly infinite.—For the reward and punishment being both eternal, they must at last become infinite in magnitude. How to reconcile this with the absolutely accurate impartiality of God, is, I confess, beyond me."†—"It does not appear to me, that it would be honourable to the infinitely righteous and benevolent governor of the world, to make wicked men everlastingly miserable. For in what point of light soever we take a view of sin, it is certainly in its nature a finite evil. It is the fault of a finite creature, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites. To say therefore, that the sinner is doomed to infinite misery, for the finite faults of a finite life, looks like a reflection on the infinite justice, as well as goodness of God. I know it has been often urged, that sin is an infinite evil, because committed against an infinite object; for which reason an infinite punishment is no more than its due desert. But this metaphysical nicety proves a great deal

* Page 309. † Page 320.

too much, if it proves any thing at all. For according to this way of arguing, all sinners must suffer the utmost in *degree*, as well as in *duration;* otherwise they will not suffer so much as they might do, and as they ought to do: which is plainly inconsistent with that difference the scripture often declares there shall be in the punishment of wicked men, according to the difference there has been in the nature and number of their evil deeds."*

These, I think, are the passages in which Dr. C. offers his most plausible and strong, if not his only, arguments, to prove, that endless punishment is not consistent with justice; and the arguments here offered are these three only—That endless punishment implies such a different treatment of the smallest sinners and smallest saints, as is out of all proportion to their respective characters; it is therefore incredible, and not reconcileable with the justice and impartiality of God.—That endless punishment is out of all proportion to the demerit of sin, as the latter is finite, the former infinite.—That endless punishment, on account of the infinite evil of sin, as committed against a God of infinite glory, implies, that future punishment is infinite in degree too, and therefore that the punishment of all the damned is equal.

I. That endless punishment implies such a different treatment of the smallest sinner and smallest saint, as is out of all proportion to their respective characters; it is therefore incredible, and not reconcileable with the justice and impartiality of God. On this I observe,

1. That there is an infinite difference between the treatment of two persons, one of whom is sent to endless misery, the other not, is readily granted. But that the one, who is sent to such a punishment, is treated unjustly, is not granted; and to assert, that he is treated unjustly, is to *beg* and not to prove the thing in question.

* Page 361.

2. That of the two persons now supposed, one should be treated according to his demerits, and the other by the "boundless goodness of God," should be exempted from that punishment, to which, by his demerit, he is justly liable, is nothing incredible or unjust. Surely the gracious exemption of one man from that punishment, which he deserves, renders not the punishment of another unjust, which would otherwise be just.

3. As there is no injustice in the case now stated, so neither is there any partiality in it. There is no partiality in the conduct of the Supreme Magistrate, who condemns one criminal according to his demerit, and pardons another criminal equally guilty. But partiality is then practised, when of two real and known criminals, one is condemned by the judge; the other cleared, on the pretence, that he is innocent. So that this whole argument from the incredibly different treatment of the smallest sinner and smallest saint, whose characters are so nearly on a level, so far as it supposes the different treatment to be incredible, on account of the endless punishment of the sinner, is a mere begging of the question. It takes for granted, that the sinner does not deserve an endless punishment. So far as it supposes the different treatment to be incredible, on account of the infinite reward or happiness bestowed on the saint, it supposes, that God in his infinite goodness, cannot bestow an infinite good on a creature, who in his own person is entirely unworthy of it. It also supposes, that if ever God pardon any sinner, he must pardon all, whose demerits are no more than that of the man pardoned; otherwise he is partial: and for the same reason, that if ever he condemn any sinner, he must condemn all those, whose characters are equally sinful with that of the man condemned. But it is presumed, that these sentiments will be avowed by no man.

II. The next argument is, That endless punishment is out of all proportion to the demerit of sin, as the former is infinite, the latter finite.—As this is a matter of great importance in the present dispute, it requires our particular attention.—How then does Dr. C. make it appear, that sin is a finite evil? By these several considerations, that it is the fault of a finite creature,—during a finite life,—and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites; the sum of which is, that it is impossible for a creature, in a finite duration, to commit an infinite crime; or which is the same thing, a crime which shall deserve an endless punishment.—As to this let it be observed,

1. That if it be impossible for a creature, in a finite duration, to commit a crime which shall deserve an endless punishment, it is as really against what Dr. C. holds, as against the opposite system. He says,* "If the next is a state of punishment intended to satisfy the justice of God, 'tis impossible all men should be finally saved:" that is, if in the next state a punishment be inflicted, which satisfies justice, all men will not be saved. But a punishment, which satisfies justice is a perfectly just punishment. It is therefore just, that some men should finally not be saved; or it is just, that on account of their sins, they be without end excluded from salvation. And what is the endless exclusion of a sinner from salvation on account of his sins, but an endless punishment inflicted for the fault of a finite creature, committed in a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites?—This passage of Dr. C. is a plain and full concession both of the justice of endless punishment, and of the infinite evil of sin.

That sin is an infinite evil, or an evil deserving an endless punishment, is implied in all those passages also,

* Page 11.

in which Dr. C. asserts, that the salvation of all men, and even of the damned, after they have suffered all which they ever are to suffer, is the fruit of *boundless and inexhaustible goodness, infinite indulgence and love*, &c. In his argument that the punishment of the damned is disciplinary, he says,* "That God must in the other world, as well as this, be disposed to *make it evident*, that he is a being of *boundless* and *inexhaustible* goodness." It is plain by the connexion, that the Doctor means, that the deliverance of the damned, in consequence of a punishment, which is conducive to their good, is an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness.

But that the goodness of that act of deliverance is not greater than the evil or punishment from which it delivers, will be conceded by all. There is goodness in delivering a man from the toothach; but no man will pretend, that this is an act of *boundless* and *inexhaustible* goodness. To deliver from the misery of a thousand years torment in hell, is an act of far greater goodness. But this is not an act of *boundless* and *inexhaustible* goodness. Nor is any act of deliverance worthy of these epithets, unless it deliver from an evil, which is boundless and inexhaustible. Doubtless the act of God in delivering a sinner from the punishment of hell is called an act of boundless and inexhaustible goodness with respect to the greatness of the benefit conferred by that deliverance, and not with respect to the inherent and essential goodness of God. If the latter be Doctor C's meaning, what he says is no illustration of the divine goodness in delivering a sinner from the pains of hell: he might have said the same concerning the deliverance of any person guilty or innocent, from the toothach, or from the prick of a pin. He says, that God in the other world, as well as this, must be disposed *to*

* Page 326.

make it evident, that he is a being of boundless and inexhaustible goodness. But if the deliverance of a sinner from the pains of hell be not a boundless benefit, it does not make it evident, that God is a being of boundless goodness. If it be a boundless benefit, the evil delivered from is boundless. If therefore the deliverance of the damned from the torments of hell, be an act and a proof of boundless and inexhaustible goodness, as the Doctor holds, the evil from which they are delivered, and to which they are exposed by the divine law, is boundless and inexhaustible. But they are not by the divine law exposed to a greater punishment than they justly deserve : therefore they justly deserve a boundless or inexhaustible punishment : of consequence sin, by which they deserve this punishment, is a boundless and inexhaustible or an infinite evil.

Again, Dr. C. in the words of Mr. *Whiston*, says,* "Many, or all of them," [the damned] "may possibly be recovered and saved at last, by the infinite indulgence and love of their Creator." The same observations, which were made in the preceding paragraph, are applicable here. It cannot be the meaning of Dr. C. that the recovery of the damned is in no other sense a fruit or proof of the infinite indulgence and love of their Creator, than the recovery of a person in this life from the smallest disease, or calamity ; or the deliverance of even an innocent being from some slight evil. A less degree of indulgence and love, than that which is infinite, would be sufficient for these recoveries, or deliverances. And if nothing short of infinite indulgence and love can recover the damned, then their recovery is a proof of infinite love. Now what can be a proof of infinite love, but the bestowment of an infinite benefit ? And no benefit consisting in recovery from evil is infinite, unless the

* Page 405.

evil, from which the recovery is made, be infinite. But if the evil from which the damned are supposed to be recovered, be infinite, sin, by which they are exposed to that evil, must itself be an infinite evil.

If here it should be objected, that the damned are not indeed *delivered from wrath*, by boundless goodness and infinite love; but that boundless goodness and infinite love are exercised in their admission to the positive happiness of heaven only: I entreat the reader to observe, that in the former of the two passages last quoted, Dr. C. is speaking of God's *making evident* his boundless and inexhaustible goodness, by pitying sinners, and punishing them in order to their benefit, or by the *deliverance* of the damned, in consequence of a disciplinary punishment. In the other, he is speaking in the words of Mr. Whiston, concerning the *recovery* of the damned.—But for a more full answer I beg leave to refer the reader to page 24, where this same objection has been stated and considered.

That sin is an infinite evil, is implied in what Dr. C. holds concerning annihilation; he says, "If the foregoing scheme should be found to have no truth in it—the second death ought to be considered as that which will put an end to their existence both in soul and body, so that they shall be no more in the creation of God." By this it appears that the Doctor held, that endless annihilation would be no unjust punishment of sin. But endless annihilation is an *endless* or *infinite* punishment. It is an endless loss of not only all the good which the man at present enjoys; but of all that good which he would have enjoyed throughout eternity, in the state of bliss to which he would have been admitted, if he had never sinned. This in an endless duration would amount to an infinite quantity of good. Annihilation therefore is an infinite punishment both as it is endless, and as the quan-

tity of good lost is infinite : and Dr. C. in allowing that endless annihilation would be no more than a just punishment of sin, allows, that sin deserves an infinite punishment, or that it is an infinite evil, though it is the fault of a finite creature, in a finite life, and the effect of finite principles, passions and appetites. If therefore it be a difficulty hard to be solved, that a finite creature, in a finite life, should commit an infinite evil, meaning a crime which may be justly punished with an endless punishment ; it is a difficulty that equally concerned Dr. C. as myself ; and it was absurd for him to object that to others, which lay equally in his own way.

It may be objected to these observations, that endless annihilation is not an infinite punishment, because it may be inflicted on even an innocent person. God having once communicated existence is under no obligation to perpetuate it ; but for wise ends may without injury suffer even the most holy of his creatures, after the enjoyment of existence and of good for a season, to drop into their original nothing. To this it may be answered ; that this objection equally proves, that annihilation is no punishment at all, as that it is not an *infinite* punishment. When an innocent creature is suffered in sovereign wisdom to drop into non-existence, this is not only not an infinite punishment, but is no punishment at all. A punishment is some evil brought on a person, in testimony that his conduct is disapproved by the author of that evil. This is not the case in the annihilation of the innocent person now supposed. Therefore it equally follows from the possible annihilation of an innocent creature, that the annihilation of the wicked would be no punishment at all, as that it would not be an infinite punishment. Annihilation is an infinite loss, and in that sense, an infinite evil, to an innocent person, as well as to one ever so guilty. But as it is not inflicted on the

innocent, in testimony of disapprobation, it is not a punishment. On the other hand, if it be inflicted at all on the wicked, it is inflicted in express testimony of the divine abhorrence of their conduct, and therefore is a punishment: and any punishment, which is an infinite evil, is an infinite punishment.

To illustrate this, let the following example be taken. A parent having begun the most liberal and advantageous education of his son, may for wise reasons, entirely drop, without any injustice to his son, the course of education, which he had begun, and may suffer him to grow up in comparative ignorance. This would not only not be a very great punishment of his son, but no punishment at all. Whereas, if he should treat his son in the same manner, from the motive of testifying his displeasure at some trifling levity or childish inadvertence, it would be both a real and a very great punishment: and though it would consist in a loss or privation, yet it would be a much greater punishment than the infliction of a very considerable positive pain. In like manner, though annihilation may be inflicted in such a manner, as to be no punishment; yet when it is inflicted with the declared design of exhibiting the divine displeasure at sin; it is a far greater punishment, than a very great and long temporary misery.—That annihilation is an evil, no man will deny, who allows that existence and happiness are good. And if it be an evil, it is an evil equal to the good lost by it, taking into view the continuance of that loss; and as this is infinite, final annihilation is an infinite evil: and whenever it is inflicted in testimony of disapprobation of the conduct of the sinner, it is an infinite punishment.

Doubtless Dr. C. was of the opinion, that annihilation may be a punishment, as it was his belief, that if his scheme of universal salvation be not true, the wicked

are to be annihilated. He would doubtless have allowed, that annihilation will not be brought on them in testimony of the divine approbation of their conduct. Nor can it be supposed to be the fruit of perfect indifference in the divine mind, with respect to their conduct. It must therefore be a testimony of divine disapprobation, which constitutes it a punishment. And as it is an infinite evil, of course it is an infinite punishment.*

Perhaps it may be further said, in opposition to what has been now advanced, that the meaning of those who assert, that sin does not deserve an infinite punishment, is not, that sin does not deserve an endless *privation*, or *negative* punishment; but that it does not deserve an endless *positive* punishment, consisting in *positive pains* or *torments*.—If the objection be thus explained, it comes to this merely, that sin does indeed deserve an endless punishment, and so is truly and properly an infinite evil, in the sense in which any of us hold it to be an infinite evil: but it is not *such* an infinite evil, as to deserve so great an endless punishment, as endless positive pain and torment. But this stating of the objection entirely shifts the ground of the dispute: granting, that an endless punishment is justly deserved by sin, it denies, that so great *a degree* of punishment, as endless positive misery, is deserved by it. Endless annihilation is equally and as truly an endless punishment, as endless torment. Nor is there any ground of objection to the one more than to the other, on account of any difference in duration, or that in which alone the infinity consists. But the ground of

* To prove that sin does not deserve an endless punishment, Dr. Priestly too says, "There is no proportion between finite and infinite." Instit. Vol. ii. p. 383. Neither is there any proportion between this finite life and endless annihilation. Yet Dr. Priestly is of the opinion, that endless annihilation would not be an unjust punishment of sin.

objection to endless misery, rather than to endless annihilation, is, that it is a greater, more dreadful, and more intolerable punishment; or a greater punishment *in degree.*

Besides, not every *degree* of endless *pain* is a greater evil or punishment, than endless annihilation. No man will pretend, that any slight pain continued to eternity, is so great an evil, as endless annihilation and the endless loss of all enjoyment and existence.

On the whole, as the state of the argument before us, is now wholly shifted; as it is granted by the objector, that sin deserves an infinite or endless punishment, but not so great an endless punishment, as is implied in *some degrees* of endless pain; every thing for which we contend, as to the duration of future punishment, is granted. It is not pretended by the advocates for endless punishment, that sin deserves an infinite *degree* of endless punishment. Nor do they pretend to *determine* the *degree* of punishment, which it deserves. It becomes all to leave that to God, who alone is able to determine it. The advocates for temporary punishment will not pretend to determine the degree of temporary punishment, which sin deserves. The *degree* of future punishment is not the subject of the present dispute. I might now therefore fairly dismiss the further discussion of the infinite evil of sin, as on account of the concessions already mentioned, wholly impertinent to the present dispute. But wishing to relieve what difficulties, and to throw what light on the subject, I can, I proceed to observe,

Perhaps it may be yet further pleaded, that the opposers of the infinite evil of sin mean, that sin does not deserve such an endless positive misery, as is worse than non-existence.—As to this, besides that it makes the subject of the dispute to be wholly the *degree* of punishment, and not the *duration* of it; it may be remarked, that it is

granted in this plea, that it would be just, if all the wicked, who die in impenitence, were annihilated. Annihilation therefore is the punishment deserved by the least sinner, who dies in impenitence; and those, whose guilt is more aggravated, deserve a greater punishment; and as some are inconceivably greater sinners than the least, they deserve an inconceivably greater punishment than annihilation. Again, as the least sinner deserves annihilation, so he deserves that degree of positive pain, or that mixture of pain and pleasure, which is equally undesirable, or equally dreadful as non-existence. Therefore those, who are inconceivably greater sinners than the least, deserve that degree of positive endless pain, which is inconceivably worse and more to be dreaded, than non-existence, or than that mixture of pain and pleasure, which is equally to be dreaded as non-existence. Therefore from principles conceded by Dr. C. it clearly follows, not only that all sinners deserve an endless punishment, but that all sinners, except those of the very lowest class, deserve that degree of endless misery, which is worse than non-existence; and which is not only an infinite evil, but an evil doubly infinite, as the loss is infinite, and the positive misery exceeding all the good enjoyed, being endless, is infinite too.

2. The argument of Dr. C. now under consideration, "If it prove any thing, proves a great deal too much," as it supposes, that any crime can justly be punished for no longer time, than was consumed in the perpetration of the crime.—That this is implied in the argument, will appear, if we consider, that if it be once allowed, that a crime may be punished for a longer time than was consumed in the perpetration of it, the whole argument, that a creature cannot, in a finite life, commit such sin, as shall deserve an endless punishment, must be given up. If a man may in one day commit a crime, which deserves

a punishment to be continued for a year, who will say, that he may not in one day commit a crime, which shall deserve a punishment to be continued for *two* years, for *ten* years, or during his life? Therefore in determining the duration of the punishment, no regard at all is had to the time taken up in the perpetration of the crime. And if no regard be had to this, there is no absurdity in supposing, that the crimes of a finite life may deserve an endless punishment. To say, that there is an absurdity in it, supposes, that in adjusting the punishment, a regard is always to be had to the time taken up in the perpetration of the crime; which is contrary to known fact, as well as to the deduction just now made. Nay, it implies, as I before observed, that no just punishment can be continued for a longer time, than was consumed in the perpetration of the crime.—The mere duration of punishment is of no importance or consideration, unless the whole punishment be excessive. Therefore perpetual imprisonment is inflicted for crimes, which are perpetrated in a very short time.

By the same argument, by which Dr. C. undertakes to prove, that sin does not deserve an endless punishment, any man may undertake to prove, that it does not deserve a punishment to continue for ages of ages. The Doctor's argument is, that sin deserves no more than a tempory punishment, because it is committed in a finite duration. With the same strength of argument it may be said: Sin deserves not a punishment of ages of ages, but a punishment of no longer duration, than seventy years, because it is committed in the space of seventy years.—It is manifest, that when a punishment of ages of ages is inflicted on the sinner, no regard is had to the time consumed in the perpetration of sin. And if it be just to inflict a punishment in one case, without regard to the time consumed in the perpetration of sin, why not

in another? If because sin is the fault of a finite life, it does not deserve an infinite punishment; then because it is the fault of a life of less duration, than that of ages of ages, it does not deserve a punishment which is to continue for ages of ages.—Or how will Dr. C. prove, that sin, the fault of a life, which is to continue only seventy years deserves a punishment, which is to continue for ages of ages? I presume he will not pretend to prove it by any proportion between the duration of seventy years and that of ages of ages; but merely by revelation. From the same source of evidence, we undertake to prove both the reality and justice of endless punishment. And it is as ineffectual to object to our proof of endless punishment, the disproportion between an infinite and a finite duration, as it is to object to his proof of a punishment of ages of ages, the disproportion between the duration of ages of ages, and that of seventy years. I grant that the disproportion between infinite and finite duration, is greater, than that between ages of ages and seventy years. But, when the time consumed in the commission of a crime is not at all regarded, let the disproportion be what it may, nothing can be thence concluded.

If it be still pretended, that a regard to the time consumed in the commission of sin is had, in determining the duration of its punishment: I ask what regard is had to it? If the duration of the punishment may at all exceed the time consumed in the commission of sin, how much may the former exceed the latter? To say there is an infinite disproportion between a finite life, and an endless eternity, affords no satisfaction. So there is a very great disproportion between a life of seventy years, and ages of ages. And if on the principles of Dr. C. an endless punishment be more unjust than that of ages of ages, is not the latter on the same principles really unjust? If not, then a punishment, the duration of which is greatly

disproportionate to the time consumed in the commission of the crime, is still just: and who will undertake to fix the degrees of disproportion between the duration of the punishment, and the time consumed in the commission of the crime, which are consistent, and which are inconsistent with justice? And let a reason be given, why it is not as really unjust to inflict a punishment, the duration of which is greatly disproportionate to the time spent in the commission of the crime, as to inflict a punishment, the duration of which bears no proportion to the time spent in the commission of the crime. Why would not the same argument from the disproportion of the duration of the punishment, to the time spent in committing the sin, prove, that Adam was unjustly punished, in that he was condemned to eat bread in the sweat of his face, *all the days of his life*, for the sin of eating the forbidden fruit, which was doubtless finished in a very short time? Also, that David was unjustly punished, in that *the sword never departed from his house*, because of his sin in the matter of Uriah?

If a finite creature, in a finite time, cannot commit an infinite evil, or one which deserves an endless punishment, it will follow, that even our Lord Jesus Christ himself, if he be a real creature, though the first born of every creature,* cannot, if he were disposed, commit an infinite evil. Yet as he created and upholds all things by the word of his power, he doubtless has power to annihilate all things. Now I ask, whether if Christ should annihilate the whole created system, himself only excepted, it would be a finite or an infinite evil? If the answer should be, that it would be a finite evil, I would ask again, whether it would not be as great an evil to

* So far as can be judged from the book of Dr. C. now under examination, and some others of his works, he would not have objected to this character of Christ.

the universe, as the endless misery of one sinner, provided he deserves that misery.—I make this proviso, because we do not plead for endless punishment on any other supposition, than that it is just: And if it should be said, that the endless punishment of a sinner is an infinite evil, because it is unjustly inflicted, this would be a begging of the question: it would also follow, that on the supposition of the justice of the endless punishment of the sinner, it is not an infinite evil, and therefore there is no foundation for the objection now under consideration, that sin a finite moral evil is punished with an infinite natural evil or punishment.—Beside, that the endless annihilation of the created system would be an infinite evil in the very same sense, in which the endless punishment of the damned is an infinite evil, is evident from this consideration, that the punishment of the damned is not pretended to be infinite in any other respect, than in duration. In the very same respect the endless annihilation of which we speak, is infinite.

If the answer to the question just proposed, should be, that the annihilation of the created system would be an infinite evil; the consequence is, that an infinite evil may be caused or committed by a finite creature, in a finite time.

Possibly it may be further objected, that if our Lord Jesus Christ be a mere creature, he had no power in himself to create the universe; but created it by a divine power communicated for that purpose: and that if he should annihilate it, he must do it by the same communicated power. Therefore Christ himself has it not in his power, to effect an infinite evil.—But we are to observe, that if Christ was a proper intelligent moral agent in creation, that work is his work, and properly to be ascribed to him, as properly as any actions of men are to be ascribed to them. It is allowed on all hands, that all

men have received all their powers of action from their Creator; yet no man will dispute, whether these actions be the proper actions of men, or whether the effects produced by these actions be imputable to them, as their proper causes. Therefore with at least as great truth and propriety is Christ, even on the supposition that he is a mere creature, the proper cause of all his works, whether of creation or annihilation, as men in general are the causes of their works. He cannot possibly be more dependent for his powers, than we are for ours. Nor is it of any importance to the subject now under consideration, whether Christ had originally the power of creation and annihilation, or whether it was communicated to him afterwards. A power given by God at one time, is as really given by him, as if it were given at another time.

In the argument against the infinite evil of sin, that a finite creature cannot commit an infinite evil, in a finite time; the finitude of *the time* is either essential to the validity of the argument, or it is not. If it be essential, it implies, as was before observed, that no crime can deserve to be punished for a longer time, than was consumed in the commission of the crime. If the finitude of the time be not essential to the argument, but the meaning be, that a finite creature cannot at all commit an infinite evil, because he is a *finite creature*, it will follow, that if the whole system of intelligent creatures were to revolt from God, and to continue in their revolt to an absolute eternity, it would be but a finite evil.

Objection: The time never can come, at which the system of creatures shall have continued to an absolute eternity, in their revolt from God. Though therefore we suppose that the whole created system should revolt, it is absurd to suppose, that they shall have continued in their revolt to an absolute eternity: and therefore it is impossi-

ble, that the whole created system should have committed an infinite evil. *Answer.*—For the same reason it is impossible, that a creature should have been punished to an absolute eternity. The longest punishment to which any suppose the wicked are doomed, is in no other sense infinite, than that in which the revolt which has been supposed, may be infinite. If then the wicked be not doomed to an infinite or endless punishment; sin is not, on any scheme, punished with an infinite punishment; and then the whole objection of punishing a finite evil, with an infinite punishment, falls to the ground.

But this whole argument, founded on the finitude of the life and of the capacity of the sinner, was virtually given up by Dr. C. in that he believed, that endless annihilation would be a just punishment of sin: though the duration of the punishment in this case, would infinitely exceed the time consumed in the commission of sin.

III. We come at length to consider the third argument of Dr. C. against the justice of endless punishment, which is, that endless punishment, on account of the infinite evil of sin, as committed against a God of infinite glory, implies, that future punishment is infinite or to the utmost in *degree*, as well as *duration*, and therefore that the punishment of all the damned is equal, which is both absurd and contrary to scripture. This I take to be the argument intended in the latter part of the last quotation made in the beginning of this chapter.—On this it is observable, that though a sinner, on account of the infinite evil of sin as committed against a God of infinite glory, deserve and shall suffer an endless punishment; it by no means follows, that he deserves or will suffer that punishment which is infinite in degree too, or which is to the utmost degree in which any sinner is punished. All that follows from the infinite evil of sin is, that it deserves an infinite punishment; and an end-

less punishment is an infinite punishment, though it be not to the utmost in degree. Therefore, when Dr. C. says, "According to this way of arguing, all sinners must suffer to the utmost *in degree*, as well as duration, otherwise, they will not suffer so much as they ought to do;" he merely asserts what he ought to have proved. Therefore he fails in his attempt to fasten on the doctrine of the infinite evil of sin, the absurdity that the punishment of all the damned will be equal. He might as well have argued, that because all saints shall receive an infinite or an endless reward; the reward of every one will be to the utmost in degree, and the reward of all will be equal.

Or if the meaning of this argument be, that the wicked will all be punished equally, not because they will suffer an *endless* punishment, but because they all sin against the same infinitely glorious object, and therefore their sins are all equal: the answer is, that the consequence by no means follows from the premises. Though it be true, that the wicked all sin against the same God, and on that account all deserve endless punishment? yet it no more follows thence, that they all deserve the same punishment in degree, than if a number of subjects should rebel against the same excellent prince, it would follow, that they are equally guilty, and all deserve an equal punishment.

The expression, *infinite evil of sin*, seems to be very offensive to some gentlemen. They seem to conceive that it means as great an evil or crime, as it is possible for a man to commit, the moral turpitude of which can in no respect be increased.—This idea of the infinite evil of sin is very different from that which is entertained by those who hold, that sin is an infinite evil. All they mean is, that sin is in such a sense an infinite evil, that it may be justly followed by an endless punishment.

It no more follows hence, that the moral turpitude of any particular sin cannot be increased, than that the endless punishment of it cannot be increased; or than that the endless happiness of the saints in heaven cannot be increased. Indeed, neither the happiness of heaven, nor the misery of hell can be increased in *duration:* nor can the turpitude of sin be so increased, as to deserve a greater duration of punishment, than that which is endless. But as both the happiness of heaven and the misery of hell, though endless, may be increased *in degree;* so may the turpitude of sin be so increased, as to deserve a greater degree of punishment.

When it is said, that if the evil of sin be infinite, it is as great as possible, and so all sins are equal; it seems to be implied, that all infinities are equal in all respects, than which nothing is more false. An infinite line, an infinite superfices, and an infinite solid, are all infinites, and they are all equal in one respect or dimension, that of *length.* But a line though truly infinite in length, is not in the dimension of breadth equal to an infinite superfices. Nor is a superfices, though truly infinite in the two dimensions of length and breadth, equal in depth to an infinite solid.—To apply this, sin may be infinitely aggravated with respect to the object against whom it is committed, and in that respect it may be incapable of an increase of aggravation. Still it may not be infinite with respect to the degree of opposition, or virulence and malignity to the object, against whom it is committed.

By the infinite evil of sin therefore is meant, that sin truly deserves an endless punishment, as it is committed against an infinitely glorious object, against God himself, his authority, his law, his government; and as it enervates the laws, violates the peace and safety of his kingdom, introduces confusion and ruin, and would actually

ruin entirely that kingdom, and the happiness of all who belong to it, were not measures taken by God to prevent its natural effect. In this respect it is infinitely evil, and in this respect, in which it is infinitely evil, the evil of it cannot be increased, because the object against which it is committed, cannot be greater, more important, or more excellent; and in this respect all sins are equal. But by the infinite evil of sin, is not meant an evil, which deserves an infinite degree of punishment; or an act of opposition to God and his kingdom, which is infinitely virulent or malicious. In this respect the evil of sin may be increased, and in this respect all sins are by no means equal.—The evil of any one sin is not so great, but that on the whole it may be increased, as the happiness of heaven is not so great, but that on the whole that may be increased.

Though the turpitude of sin is infinite with respect to the object opposed, yet it is not infinite as to the degree of opposition. If a subject rebel against the most excellent sovereign on earth, his crime is, in respect to the object, as great as he can commit in rebellion against a temporal prince; because by supposition he cannot be the subject of a better temporal prince, and therefore he cannot rebel against a better. Yet this rebellion may be more aggravated by greater degrees of opposition, abuse or insult to this same excellent prince.

What has been now said concerning the infinite evil of sin, has been in the way of explanation, and in answer to Dr. C's objections. The positive proof, that sin is an infinite evil, has been so largely and ably given by others, that the reader will allow me to refer him to them.*

* President Edwards's sermon on the *Eternity of hell-torments*, and his tract on *Justification*. Dr. Bellamy's *Essay on the Gospel*, Sect. v. Mr. Hopkins on the *Future State*, Sect. iv.

Thus I have particularly attended to the arguments brought by Dr. C. to prove, that the endless punishment of the wicked would not be just.—I shall now proceed to a more general consideration of the justice of endless punishment consisting in misery, and to some arguments in proof of it. The first argument to which I wish to direct the attention of the reader, is, that if endless punishment be the curse of the divine law, or the punishment threatened in the divine law, as the wages of sin, or as the proper punishment of sinners; undoubtedly it is just. It is impossible, that a God of perfect and infinite justice should threaten an unjust punishment.—I am indeed aware, that it is not a conceded point, that endless misery is threatened in the divine law: I therefore purpose to attempt the proof of it.—The curse of the divine law is either endless annihilation, or it is that misery which the wicked in fact suffer in hell, or it is some temporary misery of greater duration than that which is actually suffered in hell, or it is endless misery. These several hypotheses shall come under consideration in the following chapters.

But before I proceed, it may be proper to explain in what sense I use the word *law*, in this inquiry concerning the curse of the divine law.—By the divine law, I mean not merely any positive, revealed law, as that given to Adam concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil: but what Dr. C. calls "the moral law of God," and "the law of works, as requiring perfect, actual, indefectable obedience." The Doctor allows, that "he" [Adam] "was, without all doubt, under strict indispensable obligations to obey every command of God, wherein it should be made known to him—and must have rendered himself obnoxious to the righteous resentments of his God and king, had he expressed any disregard to any of them."*

* Five Dissertations, p. 55.

This he speaks concerning the moral law, as may be seen by the context. And doubtless as Adam was obligated to obey "every command" of the moral law, and in case of disobedience, was "obnoxious to the righteous resentments of God," the same is true of every other man. The righteous resentment of God for disobedience to this law, is that very *curse of the law*, from which Christ hath redeemed his people, and which is the proper object of our present inquiry. By law taken in this sense, Dr. C. abundantly holds, that no man can be justified. "By *law*, the apostle sometimes means law in general, both the law written in men's hearts, and in the books of revelation—sometimes—the Mosaic law in special. But whether he understand by it natural or revealed law, or law including both; works done in conformity to it, when mentioned with reference to justification, he always sets aside as totally insufficient for the procurement of it."* Here the Doctor tells us in what sense he uses the word *law*, which is the same in which I use it, in the present inquiry: and as he asserts in this context, and in very many other passages, that no man, "Jew or Gentile," can be justified on the foot of law taken in the sense just explained; of course all men are condemned by the law, and the punishment to which the law condemns all, is the curse of the law; or the curse of the law is that punishment to which the moral law condemns every man who transgresses it.

* Twelve Sermons, p. 4.

CHAPTER V.

IS ANNIHILATION THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED?

Doctor C's first object was, to prove that all men will be finally happy.—If he should fail in this, his last resort was *annihilation.* "If the foregoing scheme," says he,* "should be found to have no truth in it, and the wicked are sent to hell, as so many *incurables*, the second death ought to be considered, as that which will put an end to their existence, both in soul and body, so as that they shall be no more in the creation of God." Having made the supposition, that the *next* is the *final* state of men, he says,† "It is most peremptorily affirmed, that they" (the wicked) "shall *reap corruption*, *perish*, be *destroyed*, and *die a second time;* which fixes the sense of the word *everlasting*, when joined with the *misery* they shall be doomed to undergo, limiting its meaning to an age, or period of duration only." Corruption, perdition, destruction, and the second death do not limit the meaning of the word everlasting, unless it be on the supposition, that those words themselves mean annihilation. Sometimes by those words Dr. C. seems to have meant a transition from one future state of existence to another; at other times he expressly declares that they mean *misery*, *torment.* Now if those words applied to the wicked mean a transition from the next state of existence to another, they by no means certainly limit their misery. This transition may be from one state of misery to another state of misery; as Dr. C. supposed that they might pass through several future states of misery, before they should arrive at happiness. Nay, from the words used in this sense, no inference can be drawn,

* Page 282. † Page 288.

that they will *ever* arrive at a state of happiness: because a transition from one state of misery to another state of misery, is as truly a transition, as a transition from a state of misery to a state of happiness.—But if those words mean *misery* or *torment*, they certainly do not limit the future misery of the wicked; as will more fully appear presently.

I do not find any proof offered by Dr. C. that the wicked will be annihilated, unless he consider the very meaning of the words *destruction*, *death*, &c. as a proof. But this proof, if it be one, was absolutely given up by himself, as he held, that those words signify not annihilation, but *misery;* as in the following passages; "*Everlasting punishment, everlasting fire, everlasting destruction:* so the words are rendered in our English bibles; but we are *very obviously* led to understand by them MISERY, that must be suffered for a certain period."* "If men continue the servants of sin, the wages they shall receive before the gift through Christ is conferred on them, will be the *second death:* whereas if they become the servants of God, this gift through Christ will issue in their eternal life, without their passing through the *second death.*"† That by the second death he here meant not annihilation, but the misery of hell, is manifest, as it is to be followed with the gift of God through Christ, which is eternal life. "The going away into everlasting punishment, the being cast into the furnace of fire, where there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth, mean the same thing in the sacred dialect, with the *second death.*"‡ "They may be saved without first going through the *torments of hell*, or as the scripture expresses it, without being hurt of the *second death.*"§ How strange then is it, that Dr. C. should urge the literal and original meaning of the words *death*, *destruction*, &c. as an argument

* Page 224. † Page 90. ‡ Page 210. § Page 337.

for annihilation, when he himself supposed that they mean not annihilation, but obviously mean *misery!* and that he should suppose, that they limit the sense of the word *everlasting*, when it is joined to the misery of the damned! As well might he have said, that the word misery limits the sense of the word everlasting, when it is joined to the misery of the damned!

Perhaps some admirers of Dr. C. may attempt to reconcile this inconsistence, by saying, he held that the words *death*, *destruction*, &c. mean and prove annihilation, on the sole supposition, that the next state is final: that on any other supposition he held that they mean misery.—But this would be a vain attempt. For if those words do or may mean misery, they are no proof of annihilation, whether the next state be final or not. They are no more a proof of it, than the words *misery* and *torment;* because by his own concessions. they are at least capable of meaning misery or torment. Therefore though Dr. C's scheme of universal happiness should fail, we should from the application of the words *death*, *destruction*, &c. to the wicked, be under no necessity of supposing that they will be annihilated; everlasting destruction may mean everlasting misery.

The truth appears to be, that Dr. C. was led to adopt, as the last resort, the idea of the annihilation of the wicked, not by the obvious meaning and use of the words *death* and *destruction* in scripture; since he allows they obviously mean misery or torment; but by the preconception, that it is a certain truth, that the endless misery of any of mankind can never exist. To this preconceived opinion the scripture must some way or other be accommodated.

But let us proceed to some considerations to confirm the proposition, that annihilation is not the curse or punishment denounced against sin in the divine law.

The doctrine, that annihilation is the curse of the divine law, may be holden in two different senses, both which I conceive to be entirely opposite to the truth.—It is the sentiment of many, that annihilation is the punishment of sin threatened in the law, and is actually inflicted on those who die impenitent.—Again; it is the sentiment of some, that though annihilation will not be inflicted on any; yet it is the curse which was originally in the law denounced against sin; but that Christ hath absolutely redeemed all from it; and therefore none will suffer it.

I. It is the sentiment of many, and was the sentiment of Dr. C. provided his scheme of universal happiness do not hold; that annihilation is the punishment threatened in the law, and is actually inflicted on those who die impenitent.—Concerning which it is to be remarked;

1. That on this hypothesis, all Dr. C's arguments both from scripture and reason, to prove the salvation of all men, entirely fall to the ground; and it is nothing inconsistent with either the justice or goodness of God, that a great part of mankind should be forever cast off, and suffer an endless punishment; and not only a great part, but the greater part of the whole; as he acknowledges, that but few are saved immediately from this life.* Nor is it at all inconsistent with the design of Christ's undertaking, nor with his honour as the Saviour of mankind, that the greater part of the whole race should not be saved.† All that argument therefore of Dr. C. with his declamation on the supposed absurdity, that Christ should undertake to defeat the devil and destroy his works, and

* Page 8, and 322.

† The reader will take notice, that these observations are made on the sole ground of Dr. C's concession, that but few of mankind are to be saved immediately from this life, and do not imply, that this is the real truth.

yet really be so far baffled by him,* as still to fail of the salvation of the greater part of mankind, comes entirely to nothing.—Nor must it be any more urged as an argument in this dispute, that God is willing that all men should be saved, and not willing that any should perish; or that Christ died for *all* men, &c. &c. At least these propositions must be received with the same limitations and distinctions, with which the despised *orthodox*, *systematic* divines have received them. At the same time, all those texts which speak of the restitution of *all* things; of God's tender mercies over *all* his works; of the free gift coming upon *all* men to justification of life; of the creature delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God; of the destruction of the last enemy, death; of all things gathered together in Christ; of all things reconciled to God by Christ; of every creature saying, blessing and honour, &c. to him that sitteth on the throne and to the Lamb, &c. &c. must be given up, or understood with the like limitations, as are put upon them, by the believers in endless misery.—At the same time, all Dr. C's laboured criticism on αιων, αιωνιος, and εις τους αιωνους των αιωνων, &c. must be acknowledged to be groundless: and all that he hath said against vindictive punishment, and in favour of mere discipline, is nothing to the purpose.

II. The scriptural representations of the punishment of the wicked are inconsistent with the idea that it consists in annihilation. According to the scriptures the wicked depart into everlasting *fire*.—The smoke of their *torment* ascendeth up forever and ever.—They shall *weep* and *wail* and *gnash their teeth*.—They have no rest day nor night.—The rich man in hell lifted up his eyes, being *in torment*.—The damned shall *dwell* with everlasting burnings.—When the master of the house shall have

* See page 322, 323.

risen up and shut the door, they shall stand without, crying Lord, Lord, open to us: to whom the master shall say, I know you not, depart from me.—After they themselves shall have been thrust out, they shall see Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God.—The rich man in hell saw Abraham afar off and Lazarus in his bosom.—The saved shall go forth and look on the carcasses of transgressors, and *they* shall be an abhorring to all flesh.—The beast and false prophet, and by parity of reason, all men dying in wickedness, shall be cast into a lake of *fire* and shall be tormented forever and ever; βασανισθησονται in the plural number, determining, that they, the devil, the beast and the false prophet, shall be *tormented* forever and ever. —The wicked shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, *in the presence* of the angels, and *in the presence* of the Lamb.

But how can those who are annihilated, be said to be cast into *fire*, into a lake of *fire* and *brimstone*, and to be *tormented* there; to have no rest; to *weep*, and *wail* and *gnash their teeth; to dwell* with everlasting *burnings?* —As well might these things be said of them before they were created.—How can they be said *to plead* for admission into heaven, and to *reason* on the subject with the master of the celestial mansions? How can they *see* Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of God? How can they seeing Abraham and Lazarus in that state, *enter into discourse* with the former?—Rev. xiv. 11. The smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever, and they have *no rest day nor night.* But those who are annihilated, so far as they have any thing, have continual rest day and night.

The *different degrees* of the punishment of the wicked in hell prove, that their punishment does not consist in annihilation. Matt. v. 22, "Whosoever shall be angry

with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment: whosoever shall say to his brother, raca, shall be in danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, thou fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire."—The servant who knows not his master's will, and commits things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with *few* stripes, but the servant who knows his master's will, and commits things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with *many* stripes.—It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon and for Sodom, than for Chorazin, Bethsaida and Capernaum.—The wicked shall receive according to their works, according to the fruit of their doings, and according to that which they shall have done in the body. The scribes and Pharisees were to receive the greater damnation, Matt. xxiii. 14.—But if annihilation be the punishment of the wicked, there is no difference between the punishment of the least sinner and the greatest, who die impenitent: which is both absurd in itself and absolutely contradictory to the scriptural account.

If it should be pleaded in answer to this argument, that though all the wicked shall suffer annihilation; yet the punishment of all will not be the same; as the more aggravated sinners will be made the subjects of misery for a while, and then be annihilated: it may be replied, that this supposes the curse of the law to consist in two things, temporary misery and annihilation. But where have we any hint in the scripture, that the curse of the law, as suffered in the future world, is such a heterogeneous compound as this?—After all, it seems, that annihilation is but a small part of that curse; for that alone will be inflicted on the least sinner only, and on account of the least sin; and all that punishment which shall be inflicted on any person, above that which is due to the least sin; is to consist in torment. Why then might not the constitution have been, that the small additional

part of the curse, which is to consist in annihilation, should likewise be inflicted in torment? This was very feasible. He who suffers the punishment of ninety-nine sins in torment, might by a small addition, in degree or duration to his torment, have suffered the punishment of an hundred sins. Add to the torment of every sinner dying impenitent, a degree or duration of misery, equal to that which is deserved by one sin, and that the least, and there would have been no need that any of them be annihilated, but having suffered the whole curse of the law, they would on the foot of strict justice be entitled to exemption from further punishment. And who having by misery satisfied for all the various and most aggravated sins of his life, would not choose to satisfy, in the same way, for the least of all his sins, rather than to be struck out of existence, and to lose inconceivable and endless enjoyment? As therefore this supposed constitution would be so apparently unnecessary and unwise, it cannot be expected to obtain credit, unless it be most clearly revealed in scripture, which is not pretended concerning it.—Besides, this hypothesis places so small a part of the punishment of sinners in annihilation, that it cannot with any propriety be said, that the curse of the law consists in annihilation.

Should it be further objected, that though all the wicked be annihilated, yet their punishment may be of different degrees, as the losses they shall respectively suffer, will be different according to their various degrees of enjoyment or capacities for enjoyment: it may be answered, that the wicked are to be punished according to their several crimes. A man guilty of murder, will, if his other crimes be the same, be punished more than the thief, who steals the value of five shillings. Yet the enjoyment of the latter and his capacity for enjoyment, may be far greater than those of the former.

By annihilation therefore he would suffer a far greater loss.—Not all those who know their master's will, and yet commit things worthy of stripes, possess greater enjoyments or capacities for enjoyment, than those who know not their master's will.

3. The punishment of the fallen angels does not consist in annihilation: and the damned suffer the same kind of punishment with them. That the fallen angels are as yet annihilated, I presume, will be pretended by no believer in divine revelation, and that they are not to be annihilated, will be evident, if we consider, that in expectation of that full punishment, to which they are liable, they asked our Lord, whether he were come to *torment* them before the time. It was *torment* then, not annihilation, which they expected. The present state of the fallen angels is a state of torment to a certain degree. They "believe and *tremble*:" "They are reserved in chains under darkness, to the judgment of the great day," Jude 6: "They are cast down to hell," 2 Peter ii. 4: "The devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet *are*, and [they] shall be *tormented* day and night, forever and ever," Rev. xx. 10. This text proves,

(1) That the devil is now, before the general judgment, in a state of torment, in the lake of fire and brimstone.* And it appears from the question, which he put to our Lord, to which reference was just now had, that he anxiously dreads the removal, which he is to suffer, from this his present state, to that in which he is to be after the general judgment, and to which he and his angels, are reserved in chains. But can we suppose, that he would anxiously dread a deliverance by annihi-

* The scene of which this text displays a part, is manifestly an exhibition of what is to take place before the general judgment. This is evident from the context.

lation, out of the lake of torment by fire and brimstone? This would imply, that endless annihilation is more to be dreaded, than the endless torment which is the subject of this controversy. If so, Dr. C. ought to have dropped all objections to the justice of endless torments, since he allowed that the annihilation of the wicked would be just. And if that be just, then also endless continuance in the lake of fire and brimstone, which is the utmost punishment that any man holds concerning the wicked, and which is now supposed to be a less punishment than annihilation, is just.—But if it be granted, that annihilation is not so great a punishment as endless continuance in the lake of fire and brimstone; it is as absurd to suppose, that the devils should dread or tremble at the prospect of annihilation, as that a man tormented with the gout or stone, should dread or tremble at an assurance, that he should ere long be delivered from his tortures, and in their stead should suffer the prick of a pin.

(2) That text directly proves, that the devil is to be *forever* tormented, and not annihilated. "And *they*," [the nominative to be supplied] "shall be tormented forever and ever."—To say that this means, that the devil will be first tormented for ages of ages, and then be annihilated, leads into the absurdities before noticed.

But to this state of torment, in which the fallen angels are, and are to be, the wicked shall be sent. "Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." "The devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, *where* the beast and the false prophet are." And as the devil is not to be annihilated, but punished with torments, so are the wicked.

4. Rom. ix. 22, affords an argument pertinent to the present subject. The words are, "What if God willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known,

endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." One end it seems of permitting sinners to proceed to such lengths in sin, is to make known the divine power in their destruction. But annihilation is no exertion of power, it is a mere suspension of power.—The words imply further, that the longer God endures with the wicked, the greater will be the manifestation of both his *wrath* and *power* in their destruction. But as annihilation is the same to every person annihilated, it exhibits no greater manifestation of power towards one than towards another. And if it were a manifestation of power, there would be no greater manifestation of power in the annihilation of one, than of another. It is presumed, that no unbiassed judge will say, that the meaning is, that God endures, *with much long-suffering* the vessels of wrath, to display his wrath and power *in their annihilation ;* as the very same display of both would be made, without any long-suffering.

The only consideration urged from scripture in support of the sentiment, which I am opposing, is the application of the words, *death*, *destruction*, *perish*, *corruption*, &c. to the punishment of the wicked.—This however came with a very ill grace from Dr. C. who understood, and was necessitated by his scheme of universal salvation, to understand, those words to mean misery, as I have already shown.—With regard to others, who make not this concession, let them, if they believe in revelation, (and with such only I dispute) reconcile the scriptures with themselves, and understand such like passages as those I have quoted above, representing the punishment of the damned, to consist in misery, in any consistence with the threatening of *death*, *destruction*, &c. otherwise than by allowing that those words do mean positive misery. But to allow this, is to give up the scheme of annihilation; or at least this argument for it.

Besides, the scriptures themselves explain their own meaning in the use of the words *death, destruction*, &c. The second death is expressly said to consist in being cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, and in having a part in that lake; which is not a description of annihilation, nor can be reconciled with it. Rev. xx. 14, chap. xxi. 8.—Mat. xxiv. 51, "And shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with hypocrites, there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." To divide a man into two parts, as determinately expresses annihilation, as the words *death, perdition*, &c. This however the scripture supposes to be consistent with a state of misery, expressed by wailing and gnashing of teeth. Gen. v. 24, "Enoch walked with God, and *was not*, for God took him." In this instance, though the scripture says, Enoch *was not*, which more directly expresses annihilation, than *death, destruction*, &c. yet it explains itself to mean not annihilation; indeed no man pretends that the righteous are annihilated.—When the scriptures say, that men are *dead* in trespasses and sins, no man understands the expression to mean annihilation. The same may be said of the apostle's words in 1 Tim. v. 6, "She that liveth in pleasure is *dead* while she liveth."

Therefore, since the scriptures do often use the word *death*, &c. to signify something entirely different from a cessation of life or of existence; and since we cannot make the scriptures consistent with themselves, unless we understand the same words in the same latitude, when applied to the punishment of the wicked, we are necessitated to understand them in that latitude.

II. As I observed, there is another sense in which annihilation may be holden, and was holden by Dr. C. which is this; that though annihilation will not actually be inflicted on any man, yet it is the curse which was originally in the divine law denounced against sin; but

that Christ hath absolutely redeemed all men from that curse, so that no man is now liable to it. "By Christ—they were *absolutely* and *unconditionally* put into salvable circumstances—Upon this foundation and this *only*, they are become *capable* of a future *immortality*."* "God might upon the first offence he" [Adam] "committed, have immediately *turned him out of existence, as he threatened he would;* the effect whereof would have been the total loss of all his principles bodily and mental, and of all his obligations."† "The same grace through Christ, which continued Adam *in being* after the lapse," &c.‡ "It will further enhance our idea of the greatness of God's grace" [through Christ] "in restoring that *possibility of existence* which had been *forfeited* by Adam's lapse," &c.§ "Death—would have put a period to all possibility of perception or exertion in any shape forever, had it not been for the interposition of grace through Christ."‖ "The term *death* when used with reference to the posterity of Adam, considered simply as such, cannot contain more in its meaning, than is included in it, when used with reference to Adam himself."¶

On this hypothesis, the punishment actually suffered by the damned is no part of the curse of the divine law, but merely a necessary and wholesome discipline designed for the good of the patients. But this scheme of annihilation can, no more than the former, be reconciled with the scripture, which says the wicked shall receive according to their works, shall pay the uttermost farthing, shall have judgment without mercy, wrath without mixture, &c. Nor indeed can it be reconciled with Dr. C's book, which says, The wicked will be punished according to their deserts, according to their sins, according to the nature and number of their crimes and evil

* Page 132. † Five Dissertations, p. 193. ‡ Ibid. p. 243.
§ Ibid. p. 244. ‖ Ibid. p. 140. ¶ Ibid. p. 144.

deeds; and so that the law will have its course, and the threatened penalty will be executed on some of them at least. These expressions certainly declare, that they will suffer the full curse of the divine law. Otherwise the curse of the law is a greater punishment than that which is according to the deserts of the wicked, and greater too than the full penalty threatened in the law; which is absurd and contradictory.

Here I might repeat the various arguments urged in the third chapter, to prove that the punishment of the damned is not a mere salutary discipline. But to avoid repetition, I beg leave to refer the reader to the considerations there suggested; and to proceed to other considerations, which may further show, that the future punishment of the wicked is not disciplinary, and that Christ hath not so redeemed all men from annihilation, that no man is now liable to it, if indeed that be the curse of the law.

1. If annihilation be the curse of the divine law, and the torments of hell be a mere salutary discipline; then there is no forgiveness in exempting a sinner from those torments. To forgive a sinner is to exempt or release him from the curse of the law; not to excuse him from a salutary mean of grace. If a physician excuse his patient from an emetic or from the cold bath, no man will pretend, that he exercises forgiving grace.

2. I wish the reader to attend to Gal. iii. 10; "For as many as are of the works of the law, are under the curse: for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." This proves that all men are not absolutely delivered from the curse of the law, whether that curse consist in annihilation, or misery temporary or endless: because some men are evidently supposed in this text, to be exposed to that curse. "As many as are of

the works of the law," as doubtless many of the Jews of that day were, are expressly said to be "under the curse." They therefore were not *absolutely and unconditionally* delivered from that curse. But if the curse of the law be annihilation, and all men be unconditionally delivered by Christ from that curse, how can any man be under it?

If it should be said, that this text is nothing to the purpose, because the curse here mentioned is the curse, not of the moral, but of the ceremonial law; it may be answered, If this text, with the context say nothing of redemption from the curse of the *moral* law, how is it known, that Christ, according to the hypothesis now under consideration, hath delivered all men unconditionally from annihilation, which is supposed to be the curse of the moral law? It is the 13th verse, which assures us, that "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law." If this mean the ceremonial law, it seems, we have no assurance that Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the moral law, be that annihilation or what it may; but all that Christ hath done or suffered notwithstanding, we are as liable to that curse, as we were before Christ undertook for us.

Besides, the curse of the law here mentioned, is the very curse mentioned in Deut. xxvii. 26, from which it is quoted. But that was not the curse of the ceremonial law, but of the moral, as every precept enumerated in that context, and to which this curse is annexed, is purely moral.—Or if this curse be that to which any man is liable, who transgresses any precept, written in the *book* of the law; it will certainly include the curse of the moral law. For whether the *book* mentioned, be the book of Deuteronomy, or the whole Pentateuch, it contained the whole *moral* law. Therefore the curse here mentioned includes the curse of the *moral* law.

And indeed with respect to us under the gospel, the text must mean the moral law only, because, as the ceremonial law is now repealed, it is no longer in existence, and therefore is no longer contained in the book of the law.—Further, if the redemption of Christ was a redemption from the curse of the ceremonial law only; then it had no respect at all to us Gentiles, who never were under the ceremonial law; nor are we in any respect redeemed by Christ.

It is also to be observed, that this curse is opposed by the apostle, throughout the context, to the blessing of Abraham, as is manifest by inspection. But the blessing of Abraham did not consist in freedom from the ceremonial law. If it consisted in that, the Gentiles originally possessed the blessing of Abraham, since they were as perfectly free from the ceremonial law, as Abraham himself. Whereas the coming of the blessing of Abraham on the Gentiles is spoken of as a new and adventitious blessing, not as one originally possessed by them; see v. 8 and 14. The blessing of Abraham is not only not said to consist in bare freedom from the ceremonial law, but it is positively said to consist in justification by faith; v. 6—10; v. 14 and 29.

This passage throws light on the present question in another point of view. As the curse of the law is set in direct opposition to the blessing of Abraham, all who are not entitled to the blessing of Abraham, are of course under the curse, and are not unconditionally rescued from it by Jesus Christ.—If it should be said, that the blessing of Abraham is common to all mankind, all being justified and exempted from the curse of the law, as he was; let it be observed, that Abraham obtained this blessing in consequence of faith only: and will it be pretended, that all men are now the subjects of the faith of Abraham? The apostle constantly speaks of this bless-

ing as suspended on the condition of faith; v. 7, "They which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham;" v. 8, "The scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith;" v. 9, "They which be of faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham;" v. 14, "That the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the spirit through faith;" v. 29, "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." Now if faith in Christ be necessary to the inheritance of the blessing of Abraham, and all who are not entitled to that blessing, be liable to the curse of the law; then it cannot be true, that all mankind are unconditionally freed by Chirst from the curse of the law, whether that curse be annihilation or any thing else.

3. On the hypothesis now under consideration, what are pardon and justification? They are every where in scripture represented to be conditional, suspended on the conditions of repentance and faith; and the same is abundantly holden by Dr. C. however inconsistently with his other tenet concerning the unconditional exemption of all men from the curse of the law. The language of scripture is, He that believeth shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned. He that believeth not is condemned already—the wrath of God abideth on him, &c. &c. How can those be *condemned*, and how can the *wrath of God abide* on those, who are unconditionally delivered from the curse of the law? Pardon is generally supposed to consist in an acquittance from the curse of the law: but if all men, penitent and impenitent, believing and unbelieving, be acquitted and delivered from that curse, where is the propriety or truth of limiting pardon to the penitent and believing, and of declaring, that all the rest of men are

condemned? To what are they condemned? Not to suffer the curse of the law: From this they are by supposition unconditionally delivered. By what are they condemned? Not by the law: this would imply, that they are under the curse of it.

If to this it be said, that the impenitent are condemned to suffer the curse of the law, in this sense only, that the law declares the punishment to which, according to strict justice, they are liable; but not that punishment to which they are now liable, since the redemption of Christ:—To this it may be answered, In this sense the penitent and believing are equally condemned, as the impenitent and unbelieving; nay, the whole body of the saints in heaven. Nor would there be any truth in saying, in this sense, "He that believeth on Christ, is not condemned."

4. That single text, Gal. v. 2, seems to confute the hypothesis now in question. The words are, "If ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Whereas according to the hypothesis now in question, whether the Galatians were circumcised or not; whether they depended on their circumcision and other conformity to ceremonial institutions or not: still Christ did profit them; still by him was unconditionally secured to them the infinite profit of escape from the curse of the law, and of an endless life of happiness and glory in heaven.—

This argument is equally conclusive, whether it be supposed that Christ has unconditionally rescued all men from annihilation or any other punishment. If salvation be secured to all men by Christ, then he does profit them, however they be circumcised or depend on their circumcision.

Beside the two lights in which the doctrine of annihilation hath been stated above, there is another in

which some seem to hold that doctrine; it is this, That if after God shall have used all proper means for the repentance and salvation of the wicked, they shall still remain impenitent, he will annihilate them from despair of ever bringing them to good.—Concerning this sentiment it may be inquired, what then is the curse of the law? Is it annihilation? If so, then I refer to the arguments already urged in this chapter against that idea; viz. That on that supposition endless punishment is just: That the scripture abundantly represents the punishment of the damned to consist in misery: That the punishment of all who suffer the curse of the law will be equal: That the curse of the law is the same punishment which the devils suffer, which is not annihilation: That the punishment which the finally impenitent shall suffer, will be such, that in it God will display both his wrath and power, and greater degrees of wrath and power in the case of those, with respect to whom he exercises the greatest long-suffering: which cannot be true, if the curse of the law be annihilation, as that is not an exertion of power at all, or a display of greater wrath and power in the case of one sinner than of another. If it be said, that the curse of the law is that discipline which the wicked shall suffer, before they be annihilated, I refer to what has been said, chap. ii. and iii.—If it be granted that the curse of the law is endless misery; either it must be allowed, that endless misery will be suffered by some men; or that though endless misery be the curse of the law, Christ hath redeemed and will save all men from it, by admitting some to endless happiness, and by inflicting on others endless annihilation. With respect to this last sentiment, I beg leave to refer to the considerations already hinted in this chapter: and that the curse of the law, or all that punishment which the wicked justly deserve, whether it consist in endless

misery or any thing else, will actually be inflicted, hath been attempted to be proved in chap. iii.

On the whole; it is left with the candid and judicious to determine, whether annihilation be the curse of the law: and whether that, as the curse of the law, can be reconciled with the scriptures, on either of the forementioned hypotheses.—1. That all who die in impenitence, will be annihilated, as the proper and adequate punishment of their sins in this life.—2. That annihilation was originally the curse of the law; but that Christ hath rescued all from it.—If it shall be found that annihilation in any view of it, is not the curse of the law; it will remain, that that curse consists either in that punishment which sinners actually suffer in hell; or in some temporary misery greater than that which they actually suffer in hell; or in endless misery. In which of these it does consist, shall be farther inquired in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

THE JUSTICE OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT CONSISTING IN MISERY.

According to what was proposed in the close of the last chapter, I am to inquire in the first place, Whether the curse of the law, or the punishment which in the divine law is threatened against transgressors, consist in that punishment which the wicked will actually suffer in hell.—That this cannot be the curse of the law, on the supposition that all men are to be saved, appears at first blush from this consideration, that some men will actually suffer that punishment: and if that punishment be the curse of the law, some men will be damned and

not saved. For salvation consists in deliverance from the curse of the law. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law:" and all who are saved, are saved by the redemption of Christ, which is a redemption from the curse of the law. But since all men are not saved from that punishment which a great part actually suffer in hell; it is absurd to say, that that punishment is the curse of the law from which Christ hath redeemed and will save all men.

I mean not now to enter into any dispute concerning the nature of Christ's redemption. It is sufficient for my present purpose to take for granted no more, than is granted by all christians, that all who are saved, are saved some how by and through Christ. This is abundantly asserted in the various works of Dr. C. But neither has he pretended nor will any other advocate for universal salvation pretend, that the punishment which is actually to be suffered by a great part of mankind in hell, is the curse of the law from which Christ is to save *all men:* because by the very terms a great part of mankind are actually to suffer it.

Beside; if that be the curse of the law; it is all the punishment to which the sinner is justly liable. He having suffered that, cannot consistently with justice be made to suffer any further punishment; and if after that he be exempted from further punishment, he is exempted from it, not in the way of grace, forgiveness or pardon; but entirely on the footing of justice and of his own personal right. It is to be noticed however, that the gospel is ignorant of any salvation of sinners, except in the way of grace and forgiveness.

If the punishment actually to be suffered in hell be the curse of the law, then the damned in their deliverance out of hell, and exemption from further punishment, experience no salvation at all. They are delivered from

nothing to which they are or ever were exposed. We might as well say, that the most innocent citizen in the state *is saved from the gallows*, when he hath neither committed any crime, nor is accused of any.—The very idea of salvation is deliverance from the curse of the law. But if the pains of hell for ages of ages be the curse of the law, they who suffer those pains, are not saved; they are damned to the highest possible degree consistent with law and justice; which is all the damnation for which any man can argue.

On the whole, I conclude, that the idea, that the curse of the law consists in the punishment, which the damned are actually to suffer in hell, is totally irreconcileable with the salvation of all men.

In the next place we are to inquire, whether the curse of the law consist in some temporary punishment, which is of greater duration than that which is supposed to belong to the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer. If the curse of the law be a temporary punishment of greater duration than that which is actually to be suffered by the damned; that more lasting temporary punishment is doubtless threatened in the law. Doubtless the curse of the law is the curse threatened in the law: the very terms imply this. Now, where in all the law, or in all the scripture, is threatened any punishment of greater duration, than that which in the sacred dialect is said to be *everlasting*, *forever*, *forever and ever*, &c.? But all these expressions are on all hands allowed to be applied in scripture to the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer. Unless therefore some longer punishment can be found threatened in scripture, than that which is said to be *forever and ever*, &c. it cannot be pretended, that the curse of the law is a temporary punishment of greater duration, than that which is actually to be suffered by the damned. But no punishment of

greater duration, whether temporary or endless, than that which the damned are constantly declared to suffer, can be pointed out from any part of scripture. Therefore the curse of the law is not a temporary punishment of greater duration, than that which is to be suffered by the damned.

Now, if this train of reasoning be just, if the curse of the divine law be neither annihilation, nor (on the supposition of the salvation of all men) that misery which the damned are actually to suffer; nor a temporary misery of greater duration; the consequence is inevitable, that it is endless misery. No other hypothesis seems to be conceivable. The law certainly threatens some punishment. This punishment must consist either in annihilation, or in something else. If it consist in something else, that something must be either temporary or endless misery. If it be temporary misery, it must be either a misery of shorter duration than that which is to be suffered by the damned; or that very misery which is to be suffered by the damned; or a temporary misery of longer duration. That the curse of the law is a misery of shorter duration than that which is to be suffered by the damned, no man will pretend; as this would imply that the damned will suffer a greater punishment than was ever threatened, and than is just. And that the curse of the law is neither the very misery to be suffered by the damned, nor a temporary misery of longer duration, I have endeavoured to prove, and submit the proof to the candid and judicious. If the proof shall be found to be good, we are driven to the conclusion, that the curse of the divine law is endless misery.

If then it be an established point, that endless misery is the curse of the divine law; the inference is immediate and necessary, that the endless misery of the sinner is a just punishment of his sin. It is impossible that a

God of inviolable and infinite justice should threaten in his law an unjust punishment. A law containing such a threatening, is an unjust law; and an unjust law can never be enacted by a legislator of perfect justice.—It is in vain to say, that God will never execute the law. To make an unjust law, is as really irreconcileable with justice, as to execute it. What should we think of a human prince who should enact a law, that whoever should walk across his neighbour's ground without his consent, should die on the gallows. I presume no man would pretend, that the forbearance of the prince to execute the law, would save his character from abhorrence and contempt.

Again; If all men shall be saved, they will be saved from something, from some punishment. That punishment must be either temporary or endless. If it be temporary, it must be either that punishment, which is to be endured by the damned, or a longer temporary punishment. But for reasons already given, it can be neither of these. Therefore it must be an endless punishment. But if all men be saved from an endless punishment, they were exposed to an endless punishment, and exposed to it by a divine constitution, and therefore an endless punishment is just; otherwise it could not have been appointed by God.

If all men shall be saved, they are redeemed by Christ, and they are redeemed by him from some punishment. That punishment is either temporary or endless. If it be temporary, it is either the punishment which the damned shall actually suffer, or a longer temporary punishment. But for reasons already given it is neither of these. Therefore, it is an endless punishment. Therefore they were exposed to an endless punishment, and that punishment is just. Surely no Christian will pretend, that our Lord Jesus Christ came to redeem and

save us from a punishment to which we never were exposed, and which the very justice of God would never permit him to inflict.

If endless punishment be unjust, it seems that Christ came to save mankind from an unjust punishment; a punishment, to which they were not justly liable, and which could not be inflicted on them consistently with justice. But what an idea does this give us of God? It implies, that he had made an unjust law, denouncing an unjust penalty; that having made this law, he was determined to execute it, till Christ came and prevented him.

If all men shall be saved, and shall be saved in the way of grace, favour, pardon or forgiveness; then it would be just, that they should not be saved. If their deliverance imply grace and forgiveness, then it would be just, that they should not be delivered, and that they should suffer that punishment from which they are delivered. But for reasons already given, if all men shall be saved, they shall be saved from an endless punishment. And to be saved from an endless punishment not on the footing of justice, but by mere grace and forgiveness, implies, that the infliction of endless punishment would be just. Surely to liberate a person from an unjust punishment, is no act of forgiveness.

All the ascriptions of praise, and all hymns of thanksgiving sung by the saved on account of their salvation, prove, that it would have been just, that they should not be saved. If God in delivering all men from endless punishment, be worthy of praise and thanksgiving, it would have been just, if he had not delivered them from it. A mere act of justice, which the object of it may demand on the footing of his personal right, does not infer, an obligation to any great praise or thanksgiving. No man conceives himself bound very much to praise

another for giving him his due, or for not injuring him, or for not punishing him, when he deserves no punishment. But the only punishment, from which God delivers all men, on the supposition, that all are to be saved, is an endless punishment, as was shewn before. Therefore, unless endless punishment be just, there is no foundation for praise and thanksgiving for the salvation of all men.

If endless punishment be unjust, then God was bound in justice to save all men from it, and could no more fail of granting this salvation, than he could deny himself: and he was bound in justice to do whatever was necessary to that salvation, and if that salvation could not be dispensed, but in consequence of the incarnation and death of Christ; then unless God had given his son to become incarnate and to die, he would have committed injustice. So that on this plan, the very gift of Christ, of the gospel, and of all the means of grace, are mere acts of justice, and not of grace or favour; and the revelation of the gospel or of the salvation of all men is no gracious communication, but a communication made entirely on the foundation of justice. For surely it is but an act of justice to tell mankind, if there be any need of telling them, that God will not injure them, and so preserve them from the tormenting fear of injury from the hand of God. To have kept them without the necessary means of knowing this, would have savoured of cruelty.—Yet according to the scriptures the forementioned divine acts and communications are no acts of justice, but of free and infinite grace.

If endless punishment be unjust, it is hard to imagine of what advantage the mediation and redemption of Christ is to all mankind. Dr. C. speaking of his own scheme of universal salvation, says, "Nor is there any scheme that so illustriously sets forth the powerful effi-

cacy and extensive advantage of the mediation of Jesus Christ. If mankind universally are the objects of his concern, if he died for them all, if he ascended up to heaven for them all, if he is there acting on their behalf, and managing all things in the kingdom of grace, with a view to their salvation, and will not give up his ministry in this kingdom, till he has actually accomplished this great design, and instated the whole human kind in eternal glory, what more noble idea can we form of his undertaking for us?" &c.* What is "the powerful efficacy and extensive advantage of the mediation of Christ," with regard to those, who suffer for ages of ages, as Dr. C. allows some men do? Is "the powerful efficacy and extensive advantage of Christ's mediation" "illustriously set forth" in delivering them from an unjust punishment? is the idea, that Christ came to save them from a punishment, which they do not deserve, "the most noble idea we can form of his undertaking?" Those who are saved by Christ, without suffering the torments of hell, do indeed derive some advantage from the mediation of Christ. But this is no greater advantage than is derived from Christ, according to the scheme of those, who believe in endless punishment. They hold, that all who are preserved from hell, are preserved from it by Christ. But what advantage do those men derive from Christ's mediation, who pass through the torments of hell, and are not saved, till they have been punished for ages of ages? To say that they are rescued by Christ from endless misery, is either to give up the present question, and to allow that endless misery is just: or it is to give up the moral rectitude of the divine character, and to hold, that God has threatened, and was about to inflict, an unjust punishment.—To say, that the advantage, which they derive

* Page 14.

from Christ, is that they are rescued from a temporary punishment, which is longer than forever and ever, is to say, that for which there is no foundation, as no such punishment is threatened or mentioned in scripture. So that in any case, if endless punishment be unjust, it is impossible to imagine, of what advantage the mediation and redemption of Christ is to all mankind.

The *hope* of the gospel implies that endless punishment is just. On the plan of universal salvation, all men are encouraged to *hope* that they shall be delivered from some punishment. Dr. C. applies Rom. viii. 20, to all men, and supposes that they are all subjected to vanity *in hope* of "deliverance from the bondage of corruption," and from "the final consequences" of it.* That is, all men have a ground to hope, that they shall be at last delivered from sin and its punishment. This punishment as we have seen, can be no other than an endless punishment. But that God encourages us to hope, that we may escape endless punishment, as clearly implies that endless punishment is just, as his encouraging us to hope, that he will never leave us nor forsake us in this life, implies that it would be just, if he should leave us. If endless punishment be not just, then God encourages us to hope, that he will not injure us, will not rob us of our rights or tyrannize over us! The very idea of hope in this case, implies some danger that God will injure us; however that there is a possibility, and therefore a foundation to *hope*, that he will not injure us.

If endless punishment be unjust, we are as sure, that it will never be inflicted, as we are of the justice of God, or as we are, that the judge of all the earth will do right. But are we ever encouraged in scripture barely to *hope*, that the judge of all the earth will do

* Page 106, 119.

right?—What if a subject who has always entirely conformed to the laws of his prince and is conscious of his own innocence, and also knows that his prince is fully informed of it, should say, that he *hopes* his prince will not order him to be executed as a felon? This would certainly imply great diffidence in the justice of his prince, and would be a high reflection on his character. Much more is it a reflection on the character of God, to express a bare *hope*, that under his government, no man will be punished with an unjust punishment.

The *promises* of the gospel appear to be a further proof of the justice of endless punishment. They are promises of deliverance from some punishment. If there be any promises of the salvation of all men, they are not promises that all shall wholly escape the punishment of hell. Dr. C. and others grant, that some men will suffer that punishment. Nor are they promises of escape from a longer temporary punishment, than that of hell, as there is no mention in all the scripture of such a punishment. Therefore they are promises of deliverance from endless punishment. Therefore endless punishment is just: otherwise the promises that God will save from it, would be absurd. The very idea, that God promises to save from endless punishment, implies that he has a right to inflict it. Do we ever find God promising in scripture, that he will not injure or tyrannize over his creatures? And are the "exceeding great and precious promises," which the apostle Peter mentions, merely assurances that we shall not be treated by God unjustly? There would be nothing at all precious in such promises; because they would give us no greater security from such injury, than we should have without them. If the bare justice of God do not secure us from injury at his hands, neither will his veracity.—What should we think of a prince of good reputation for

justice, if he make proclamation, that he would not punish any of his subjects ten times as much as they deserve; and should call this an exceeding great and precious promise? Whatever we might before have thought of him and of his government, we should doubtless then think that his subjects were not perfectly secure in their rights.

Dr. C. allows that it is our duty to pray for the salvation of all men. This appears especially in his comment on 1 Tim. ii. 4, &c.* But this proves the justice of endless punishment. If we are to pray for the salvation of all men, we are to pray that they may be delivered from the curse of the law; which, as we have seen already, is an endless punishment. Now, to pray that God would save men from endless punishment certainly implies an acknowledgment of just exposure to such punishment. Otherwise there would be as much propriety, that the angels around the throne of God, should pray, that they, perfectly guiltless as they are, may not be punished with the torments of hell. What if an entirely innocent and most dutiful subject of some earthly prince, and one who is by all acknowledged to be such, should prefer a petition to his prince, that he would not order the petitioner to the stake or the gallows?

Hitherto the justice of endless punishment has been considered on the ground of what I suppose to be the truth, that it is deserved by every sinner, on account of the sins which he hath committed in this life only.—There is another ground, on which it may be supported, and which is equally inconsistent with that capital argument in favour of the salvation of all men, that endless punishment is not reconcileable with justice.—Though

* Page 163.

it were not just, to inflict an endless punishment for the sins committed in this life only, which I by no means allow; yet there would be no injustice in suffering the sinner to go on in sin, and to punish him continually and without end as he sins.

That it was no injustice in God, to leave man at first to fall into sin, will doubtless be granted by all, because it is an evident fact. Now if God may without injury permit a creature to fall into sin to-day, and punish him for it, why may he not do the same to-morrow, and so on through every day or period of his existence. And if it be just to leave a sinner to endless sin, it is doubtless just to inflict on him endless punishment for that endless sin. Therefore the endless sin and punishment of a creature is no more inconsistent with divine justice, than the existence of sin and punishment in any instance, and for ever so short a duration. If it be not consistent with justice, that a sinner be left by God to endless impenitence; then the leading of a sinner to repentance is an act of mere justice, the payment of a debt, and not an act of grace, which is utterly irreconcileable with the scriptures.—If it be not consistent with justice to leave a sinner to final impenitence, then God is bound in justice, some time or other to lead every sinner to repentance. But when is this time? How long may God, without injury, permit the sinner to continue impenitent? If he may for one day, why not for two? for four? for eight, &c. to eternity?—Though the damned should, by their sufferings, fully satisfy for all their past sins; yet God would be no more obliged in justice, to lead them to repentance, or to preserve them from sin in future, than he was obliged to preserve them from sin at the time they first fell into it: and consequently he would not be obliged in justice to release them from punishment. I take it to be abundantly conceded by Dr. C.

that the damned may justly be punished till they repent. Therefore if they never repent they may justly be punished without end.

Now, that our advocate for universal salvation, may establish his favourite proposition, that endless punishment is not reconcileable with divine justice; he must show, that it is not consistent with divine justice, to leave a sinner to proceed without end in his own chosen course of sin, and to punish him daily for his daily sins. Till he shall have done this, it will be in vain for him to plead, that those who die in impenitence, will all finally be saved, because endless punishment is not reconcileable with the justice of God.

If after all, any man will insist, that endless punishment is not reconcileable with divine justice? he ought fairly to answer the preceding reasoning, and to show that the curse of the divine law from which Christ hath redeemed us, is either annihilation, or that misery which the damned are actually to suffer; or a longer temporary misery. He ought to show further, that Christ came to deliver all men from some other punishment, than that which is endless; or that it is reconcileable with the character of God to refuse to release man from an unjust punishment, without the mediation of his son: that deliverance from unjust punishment is an act of free grace, pardon, or forgiveness: that deliverance from an unjust punishment is a proper ground of extatic and everlasting praise and thanksgiving to God. That the very mission of Christ, the institution of the gospel and of any means necessary to the deliverance of sinners from endless punishment, can be considered as gracious gifts and institutions, on any other supposition than that endless punishment is just. He ought also to show, of what advantage the mediation of Christ is to those who suffer in hell for ages of ages; and how the *hope* and

the *promises* of the gospel, and how *praying* for the salvation of all men, can be reconciled with the idea, that endless punishment is unjust, and finally, that it is unjust, that God should leave a sinner, to perpetual sin, and to punish him perpetually for that sin.

It seems to be but an act of justice to Dr. C. to repeat here, what I noticed before, that he himself, whether consistently or not, does acknowledge the justice of endless punishment: as in these words: "If the next state is a state of punishment, not intended for the cure of the patients themselves, but to *satisfy the justice of God*, and give warning to others, 'tis impossible all men should be finally saved."* This is a plain declaration, that a state, in which all salvation, and all possibility of salvation, are excluded, no more than satisfies justice, or is no more than just.—The same is confessed in those many passages of this and the other works of Dr. C. wherein he has positively asserted, that man cannot be "justified on the foot of mere law," of "rigid law," &c.† He would not deny, that the law of God is just, perfectly just. If therefore we cannot be justified on the foot of the divine law, we must on that foot be finally condemned, and consequently must be finally condemned on the foot of justice. Therefore the final or endless condemnation of the wicked is entirely just. The just law of God himself condemns them: and if that law, "mere law," "rigid law," be executed, they must be condemned to an endless punishment, and cannot possibly be justified or saved. So long therefore as the divine law is just, so long, according to the concession of Dr. C. the endless condemnation and misery of the wicked are just.—There seems to be no way to avoid this consequence, but by holding that the curse of the law, and the punishment which "satisfies justice," are annihilation, with respect

* Page 11. † Page 34, 36, 43, &c.

to which sentiment, I must refer the reader back to Chap. v. But how inconsistent it is, to hold, that endless punishment, whether consisting in annihilation, or misery, is no more than satisfactory to justice; and at the same time to hold, that the wicked in temporary pains in hell, suffer according to their deserts, and endure the whole penalty of the law, cannot escape the notice of any attentive reader.—Or will it be said, that the Doctor held a *commutation* of punishment? that endless annihilation is *commuted* for temporary misery? If so, then temporary misery is the curse of the divine law now inflicted in *commutation* for endless annihilation; and our author was entirely mistaken in a doctrine abundantly taught in all his writings, that, "by law," "mere law," "rigid law," no man can be justified or saved.

As a corollary from the whole of the preceding reasoning concerning the justice of endless punishment, may I not safely assert, what was most grievous to Dr. C. and is so to all other advocates for universal salvation; that SIN IS AN INFINITE EVIL? If every sinner do, on account of sin, deserve an endless punishment, *sin* is an infinite evil: that is all that is meant by the infinite evil of sin.—Therefore if any man deny the infinite evil of sin, let him prove, that it does not deserve an endless punishment, and let him answer the preceding reasoning to evince the justice of endless punishment.*

Perhaps some may object, that supposing sin do deserve an endless punishment, when it is not repented of; yet how can it deserve so great a punishment, when it

* In this chapter it was often more convenient for me, on several accounts, to use the expression *endless punishment*, than that of *endless misery*. Still the reader will perceive, that the latter is my meaning. The reasons had been given in the preceding chapter, why the endless punishment of the damned cannot be annihilation.

is renounced in real repentance.—But if repentance make atonement for sin; if it satisfy the broken law of God; if it repair the damage done to society by sin; or if it so far atone, that the good of the universe, comprehending the glory of the Deity, though it before required, that sin should be punished with endless punishment, now requires that it be punished with a temporary punishment only: then as repentance is a satisfaction made by the sinner himself, and makes a part of his personal character, sin repented of, does indeed not deserve endless punishment, otherwise it does. And if repentance do make the satisfaction for sin which has been described, then the satisfaction or atonement of Christ is in vain, since repentance would have answered the purpose without the death and atonement of Christ. There was no need that sinners be redeemed by Christ, or as Dr. C. says, that he should be "the person *upon whose account*," and that "his obedience and death should be *the ground or reason* upon which happiness should be attainable by any of the race of Adam." They might have redeemed themselves, and by repentance have made a full satisfaction or atonement for their own sins, and thus might have been saved *on their own account, and on the ground or reason of their repentance.*—But if on the other hand it be granted, that repentance does not make atonement or satisfaction for sin, and it be just to punish a sinner without end, provided he do not repent; it is just to inflict the same punishment, though he do repent.

This chapter shall be closed with a remark on a passage before quoted from Dr. C.* in which he says, that the difference in the *degree* of the pain of the damned will scarce be thought worthy to be brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration, is

* Page 309.

annexed to it.—If the different degrees of the misery of the damned be unworthy of notice, and do not sufficiently distinguish them according to their several degrees of demerit; then the different degrees in the happiness of the saints in heaven do not sufficiently distinguish them, according to their characters. Therefore on the same principle we ought to deny the endless duration of the happiness of heaven, as well as of the misery of hell; and to say, that the difference in the degree of happiness of the blessed in heaven, will scarce be thought worthy to be brought into the account, when the circumstance of endless duration is annexed to it; that if the happiness of heaven be of endless duration, the happiness of all the inhabitants of that world will be equal, which is inconsistent with the declarations of scripture, that all shall be rewarded according to their works; and that therefore the doctrine of the endless happiness of heaven is not true.—But the falsity of this conclusion is evident to all: and equally false is the conclusion from the like premises, that the punishment of the damned is not endless.

CHAPTER VII.

CONTAINING ANOTHER VIEW OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE JUSTICE OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT.

In the preceding chapter, the question concerning the justice of endless punishment was considered in the light in which it is stated by Dr. C. There is another view of the same question, which is not indeed exhibited in his book, but is much talked of by some who in general embrace his scheme. It is this: Whatever the general good requires, is just: Whatever is not subservient to

the general good, is unjust. Now as the endless punishment of the wicked is, in their opinion, not subservient but hurtful to the general good, it is, say they, unjust. The question thus stated seems to be nothing more than a dispute concerning the proper meaning of the word justice. It reduces all justice to the third sense of justice as explained above,* and perfectly confounds justice with goodness as it respects the general system. Therefore the question which comes up to view, according to the sense of justice now proposed, is the very same with this, Whether the endless punishment of the wicked be consistent with the general good of the universe, or with divine goodness; which shall be considered at large in the next chapter, and needs not be anticipated here. However it may be proper to point out the impropriety and absurd consequences of this use of the word *justice*.

It was doubtless subservient to the general good, that our Lord Jesus Christ was crucified by wicked hands, and therefore in the sense of justice now under consideration, his crucifixion was just; they who perpetrated it, performed an act of justice. Yet will any man pretend, that our blessed Lord was not injuriously treated by his wicked crucifiers? If they committed no injury to our Lord, wherein did the wickedness of this action consist? —The truth is, the crucifixion of Christ was no injury to the universe, but an inestimable benefit: yet it was the highest injury that could be done him personally.

Every instance of murder is doubtless made by the overruling hand of divine providence, subservient to the general good and the divine glory. But does a man murdered suffer no injury? The same may be said of all the assaults, thefts, robberies, murders and other crimes that have ever been committed. Though they will in

* Page 106, &c.

the consummation of all things be overruled to subserve the general good, so that the universe will finally suffer no injury by them; yet very great personal injury may be done by them to those who have been robbed, murdered, &c. These observations may show the necessity of distinguishing between the private rights of individuals, and the rights of the universe, and between private, personal injustice, and injustice to the universe. If all the crimes in the world, because they will be finally rendered by the divine hand subservient to the good of the universe, be in every sense entirely just, and the omission of them would be unjust; where shall any injustice be found? No injustice is, ever was, or can possibly be committed by any being in this, or any other world. No injustice can be committed, till some thing shall be done, which God shall not finally render subservient to his own glory and the good of the intellectual system.

According to the principle now under consideration, it would not be just, that any man should escape any calamity, which he does in fact suffer. It was not just that Paul should escape stoning at Lystra, or that John should not be banished to the isle of Patmos: and whenever it is subservient to the public good, that any criminal, a murderer for instance, should be pardoned, or should be suffered to pass with impunity; it is not just to punish him; he does not deserve punishment: Cain did not deserve death for the murder of his brother, nor did Joab, during the life of David, deserve death for the two murders of Abner and Amasa, both better men than himself. And if he did not deserve death, what did he deserve? It appears by the history and by the event, that it was not subservient to the general good, that he should, during the life of David, be punished at all. Therefore on the present supposition, he deserved, dur-

ing that period, no punishment at all for those murders. If so, then during the same period, at least, there was no sin, no moral evil in those murders: for sin or moral evil always deserves hatred and punishment.—But afterwards in the reign of Solomon, the general good required Joab to be punished with death. At that time therefore he deserved death for those murders; and those same actions which for several years after they were perpetrated, had no moral evil in them, grew, by mere length of time, or change of the circumstances of the state, to be very great moral evils.—See then to what consequences the principle now under consideration will lead us! It must therefore be renounced as false, or as a great perversion of language.

When I assert the justice of the endless punishment of the wicked, I mean that it is just in the same sense, in which it was just, that Cain or Joab should be executed as murderers: i. e. it is correspondent to their personal conduct and characters. If those with whom I am now disputing, allow that the endless punishment of the wicked is just in this sense, they allow all for which I at present contend. If they deny, that it is just in this sense, they give up their favourite principle, and dispute against the justice of endless punishment, not merely because it would be inconsistent with the general good, but for the same reasons as those for which Dr. C. disputed against it: and they place the question on the same footing, on which it has been so largely considered in the preceding chapters. The execution of Cain as a murderer would have been correspondent to his personal conduct, and therefore would have been just. If the endless punishment of the wicked be denied to be just in this sense, it is denied to be just, not merely because it would not be subservient to the good of the universe; but because it would not be a punishment correspondent

to their personal conduct; instead of this, it would exceed the demerit of that conduct, and therefore would rob them of their personal rights.

CHAPTER VIII.

IN WHICH IT IS INQUIRED, WHETHER ENDLESS PUNISHMENT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE DIVINE GOODNESS.

That this inquiry is very important, every one must be sensible, who is in the least acquainted with this controversy. No topic is so much insisted on by the advocates for universal salvation; on no subject do they throw out such abundant and fervent declamation; no argument is urged with such an air of triumph. This is their strong hold, in which they feel themselves perfectly secure, and from which they imagine such effectual sallies may be made, as will drive out of the field all believers in endless punishment. Therefore this part of our subject requires particular and close attention.

I propose to begin with stating the question,—then to proceed to some general observations concerning the divine goodness and some concessions made by Dr. C.—then to consider Dr. C's arguments from the divine goodness;—and in the last place, to mention some considerations to show, that the endless punishment of some of mankind, is not inconsistent with the divine goodness.

I. It is a matter of great importance, that the question now to be considered be clearly stated. The question is, Whether it be consistent with the divine goodness, that any of mankind be doomed to endless punishment consisting in misery. This question is not now to be considered with any reference to the atonement of

Christ; or the argument in favour of universal salvation, drawn from the divine goodness, does not depend at all on the atonement. To argue that goodness requires the salvation of all men now since Christ has made a sufficient atonement, implies that without the atonement no such argument could be urged. To argue from the atonement is not to argue from goodness merely, but from fact, from the gospel, from particular texts or from the general nature of the gospel. The argument is this; Christ hath made atonement for all, therefore all will be saved. But that this argument may carry conviction, it must first be made evident that the atonement did respect all mankind; also that it is the intention of God, to apply the virtue of that sufficient atonement, to the actual salvation of all. But these things can be proved from the declarations of scripture only. Now all Dr. C's arguments from scripture shall be considered in their place; but this is not their place.

The question, Whether it be consistent with divine goodness, that any of mankind be punished without end, means, either, Whether it be consistent with the greatest possible exertion or display of goodness in the Deity; or, Whether it be consistent with goodness in general, so that God is in general a good Being, and not *cruel* and *malicious*, though he do inflict endless punishment on some men.—It is not an article of my faith, that in all the works of creation and providence taken together, God displays indeed goodness in general, but not the greatest possible goodness. This distinction is made, to accommodate the discourse, if possible, to the meaning of Dr. C. As he denies that God has adopted the best possible plan of the universe, it seems, that he must have distinguished in his own mind, between the goodness actually exerted and displayed by the Deity in the present system, and the greatest possible display of goodness.

If the former of these be intended by Dr. C. and others, all their strong and frightful declamations on this subject, come to this only, that endless punishment is not the greatest possible display of the divine goodness; or that the system of the universe, if endless punishment make a part of it, is not the wisest and best possible.—But this is no more than is holden by Dr. C. and it is presumed by other advocates in general for universal salvation. Dr. C. abundantly holds, as we shall see presently, that the present system of the universe, according to his own view of it, without endless punishment, is not the wisest and best possible. It is therefore perfect absurdity in him, to object, on this ground, to endless punishment.

But it is manifest, by the vehement and pathetic exclamations of Dr. C. on this subject, that he aimed at something more than this. It is manifest that he supposed and meant to represent, that if the doctrine of endless punishment be true, God is not a good, a benevolent being, but a cruel, malicious one. He says,* that the doctrine of endless punishment "gives occasion for very unworthy reflections on the Deity: That in view of that doctrine †an horror of darkness remains, that is sadly distressing to many a considerate heart." He quotes‡ with approbation those words from Mr. Whiston: "If the common doctrine were certainly true, the *justice* of God must inevitably be given up, and much more his *mercy*.—"This doctrine supposes him," [God] "to delight in *cruelty*." So that the question agitated by Dr. C. is really, Whether, if God inflict endless punishment on any sinner, it be not an act of *cruelty* and *injustice*, as all cruelty is injustice.—But this is the very question, which has been so largely considered in several preceding chapters, and needs not to be reconsidered here. So that

* Page 8. † Page 14. ‡ Page 356.

Dr. C's arguments from goodness are mere arguments from justice; and if endless punishment be reconcileable with divine justice, it is equally reconcileable with divine goodness, in the sense in which he argues from divine goodness.

If after all it be insisted on, that Dr. C. meant to consider the question, or that the question ought to be considered, in the first sense stated above, viz. Whether endless punishment be consistent with the most perfect display of goodness; although if the negative of this question were granted, Dr. C. could not consistently thence draw an argument in favour of universal salvation; yet it may be proper to consider this state of the question, and perhaps sufficient observations upon it will occur in the sequel of this chapter.

II. I am to make some general observations concerning the divine goodness, and take notice of some concessions made by Dr. C.

The goodness of God is that glorious attribute, by which he is disposed to communicate happiness to his creatures. This divine attribute is distinguished from the divine justice in this manner: the divine justice promotes the happiness of the universal system, implying the divine glory, by treating a person strictly according to his own character: the divine goodness promotes the same important object, by treating a person more favourably than is according to his own character or conduct: So that both justice and goodness may and always do, as far as they are exercised, subserve the happiness of the universal system, including the glory of the Deity, or the glory of the Deity, including the happiness of the universal system. As the glory of God, and the greatest happiness of the system of the universe, and even of the created system, mutually imply each other; whenever I mention either of them, I wish to be understood to in-

clude in my meaning the other also. The declarative or the exhibited glory of God, is a most perfect and most happy created system; and a most perfect and most happy created system is the exhibited glory of God; or it is the exhibition, the manifestation of that glory; as a picture is an exhibition of the man.

That infinite goodness is in God, and is essential to his nature, is granted on all hands: *God is* LOVE. This attribute seeks the happiness of creatures, the happiness of the created system in general, and of every individual creature in particular, so far as the happiness of that individual is not inconsistent with the happiness of the system, or with happiness *on the whole.* But if in any case, the happiness of an individual be inconsistent with the happiness of the system, or with the happiness of other individuals, so that by bestowing happiness on the first supposed individual, the quantity of happiness on the whole shall be diminished; in this case, goodness, the divine goodness, which is perfect and infinite, will not consent to bestow happiness on that individual. Indeed to bestow happiness in such a case would be no instance of goodness, but of the want of goodness. It would argue a disposition not to increase happiness, but to diminish and destroy it.

Therefore that Dr. C. might prove, that the endless punishment of any sinner is inconsistent with the goodness of God, he should have shown, that the sum total of happiness enjoyed in the intellectual system will be greater if all be saved, than it will be if any suffer an endless punishment. To show that God by his infinite goodness will be excited to seek and to secure the greatest happiness of *the system*, determines nothing. This is no more than is granted by the believers in endless punishment. It is impertinent therefore to spend time on this. But the great question is, Does the

greatest happiness of the system require the final happiness of every sinner? If Dr. C. have not shown that it does, his argument from divine goodness is entirely inconclusive.

Instead of showing, that the divine goodness or the greatest happiness of the general system, requires the final happiness of every individual; Dr. C. has abundantly shown the contrary. In his book on the *Benevolence of the Deity*,* he expresses himself thus; "It would be injurious to the Deity to complain of him for want of goodness merely because the manifestation of it to our particular system, considered *singly* and *apart from the rest*, is not so great as we may imagine it could be.—No more happiness is required for our system, even from *infinitely perfect benevolence*, than is proper for a part of some *great whole*.—We ought not to consider the displays of divine benevolence, as they affect individual beings only, but as they relate to the particular *system* of which they are parts.—The divine benevolence is to be estimated from its amount to *this whole*, and not its *constituent parts* separately considered.—The only fair way of judging of the divine benevolence with respect to our world, is to consider it not as displayed to *separate individuals*, but to the *whole system*, and to these as its constituent parts."—†"No more good is to be expected from the Deity with respect to any *species* of beings, or any *individuals* in these species, than is reasonably consistent with the good of *the whole* of which they are parts."—‡"It is true, that destruction of life will follow, if some animals are food to others. But it may be true also, that there would not have been so much life, and consequently happiness, in the creation, had it not been for this expedient."—§"As we are only one of the numerous orders which constitute a general system, this quite alters the

* Page 56, &c. † Page 58. ‡ Page 84. § Page 107.

case, making those capacities only an evidence of wise and reasonable benevolence, which are fitted for a particular part sustaining such a place in the constitution of *this whole.*"—*" I proceed to show wherein the unhappiness that is connected in nature, or by positive infliction of the Deity, with the misuse of moral powers, is subservient to the *general good of the rational creation*, which is hereby *more effectually promoted*, than it would have been, if free agents might have acted wrong with impunity."—†" For if they" [future punishments] " are considered—under the notion of a needful moral mean intended to promote, *upon the whole*, *more good in the intelligent creation*, than might otherwise be reasonably expected; they are so far from being the effect of ill will, that they really spring from *benevolence*, and *are a part of it.*"

By these quotations it appears with sufficient clearness, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that there are defects, miseries and punishments of individual creatures, which are consistent with the good of the system, and are therefore consistent with the divine goodness; and that the divine goodness does not seek the happiness of any individual any further, than the happiness of that individual is subservient to the happiness of the system, or to the increase of happiness on the whole. Therefore Dr. C. supposes the miseries of men in this life, and even the punishments of the future world, are not inconsistent with the divine goodness, because they are subservient to the good of the system.—Now the advocates for endless punishment believe the same concerning the endless punishment of those who die impenitent: and for him to suppose without proof, that this punishment is not consistent with the greatest good and happiness of the system, is but begging the question.

* Page 237. † Page 242.

What is the absurdity of supposing, that the endless punishment of some sinners may be subservient to the good of the system? Why may not the general good be promoted, as well by endless misery, as by the miseries of this life? And why may we not be allowed to account for endless misery in the same way, that Dr. C. accounts for the miseries of this life, or for the temporary misery which he allows to be in hell? It is now supposed to have been proved, that endless punishment is just. If then the general good may be promoted by the tortures of the stone endured for a year, by a man who deserves them, why may not the general good be promoted by the same tortures, continued without end, provided the man deserves such a continuance of them? If we were to judge *a priori*, we should probably decide against misery in either case. But fact shows that temporary miseries are consistent with the goodness of God, or with the general good: and why may not endless misery be so too, provided it be just?

If it be asserted, that the endless punishment of a sinner who deserves such punishment, is so great an evil, that it cannot be compensated by any good, which can arise from it to the system; I wish to have a reason given for this assertion. It is granted that the good accruing to the system overbalances the temporary miseries of sinners both here and hereafter. And is the endless misery of an individual, though justly deserved, so great an evil, that it cannot be overbalanced by any endless good, which may thence accrue to the system? Endless misery is doubtless and infinite evil: so is the endless good thence arising, an infinite good.

Nor does it appear, but that all the good ends, which are answered by the temporary punishment of the damned, may be continued to be answered by their continual and endless punishment, if it be just. God may continue

to display his justice, his holiness, his hatred of sin, his love of righteousness, and of the general good, by opposing and punishing those who are obstinately set in the practice of sin, and in the opposition of righteousness, and of the general good. In the same way he may establish his authority, manifest the evil of sin, restrain others from it, and by a contrast of the circumstances of the saved and damned, increase the gratitude and happiness of the former, as well as increase their happiness by the view of the divine holiness, and regard to the general good, manifested in the punishment of the obstinate enemies of holiness and of the general good; and by a view of divine grace in their own salvation, and the salvation of all who shall be saved. These are the principal public ends to be answered by temporary vindictive punishment, on supposition that future punishment is temporary; and if any other good end to the universe shall be answered by it, in the opinion of those who believe it, let it be mentioned, that by a thorough inquiry we may see whether the same good end may not be answered by continual and endless punishment.

Another question concerning the divine goodness proper to be considered here, is, Whether it *secure* and *make certain* the final happiness of every man; or whether it be satisfied with this, that opportunity and means are afforded to every man to obtain happiness, if he will seize the opportunity and use the means.—Concerning this also, Dr. C. hath sufficiently expressed his sentiments; as in the following passages; *"We must not judge of the benevolence of the Deity merely from the *actual good* we see *produced*, but should likewise take into consideration the *tendency* of those general laws conformably to which it is produced. Because the *tendency*

* Benevolence of the Deity, page 60.

of those laws may be obstructed, and less good *actually take place*, than they were naturally *fitted* to produce. In which case, it is no argument of want of goodness in the Deity, that no more good was communicated; though it may be of folly in the creatures."—*"It is impossible we should judge fairly of the Creator's benevolence, from a view only of our world, under its present actual enjoyments. But if we would form right sentiments of it, we must consider the *tendency* of the divine scheme of operation, and what the state of the world would have been, if the rational and moral beings in it had acted up to the laws of their nature and given them full scope for the production of good."—†"All the good suitable for such a system as this, is apparently the *tendency* of nature and the divine administration, and it actually prevails so far as this tendency is not perverted by creatures themselves,—for which he" [God] "is not answerable." The Doctor expresses himself to the same purport in many other passages of the same book.

It is manifest, that in these passages, Dr. C. esteems it a sufficient vindication of the divine goodness, that God hath established good laws, hath benevolently constituted the nature of things and hath given opportunity to men to secure to themselves the enjoyment of good: and that the divine goodness does not imply that every individual creature shall actually enjoy complete good or happiness. If these things be true, then no argument from the divine goodness can prove, that every individual of mankind will be finally happy: the divine goodness though complete and infinite does not secure *actual happiness* to every individual: it secures the opportunity and means only of happiness: or it secures such a divine scheme as has a *tendency* to the happiness of all, and would actually prevail to the communication of happi-

* Benevolence of the Deity, page 69. † Ibid. page 73.

ness to all, if it were not perverted by creatures themselves, for which perversion God is not answerable.

Now that such a divine scheme as this is actually adopted, is undoubted truth, and may be granted by every advocate for endless punishment. Therefore on the same ground on which Dr. C. vindicates the goodness of God, from the objections which arise from present calamities, and from future temporary punishment; may the same goodness be vindicated from the objections which are raised from endless punishment. In the former case it is pleaded, that God is infinitely good, though creatures suffer calamities here and deserved punishment hereafter, because he has given them *opportunity* to obtain happiness, and has adopted a scheme of operation which has a *tendency* to good. Just so God is infinitely good, though some men suffer deserved endless punishment; because he has given mankind opportunity to obtain eternal life and salvation, and has adopted a scheme of providence and of grace, which will actually prevail to the final salvation of all, if it be not neglected or perverted by men themselves; for which neglect or perversion God is not answerable.

It is also conceded by Dr. C.* that "none of the sons of Adam, by the mere exercise of their natural powers, ever yet attained to a perfect knowledge of this rule," [the rule of man's duty, and of God's conduct in rewarding and punishing.] "Most certainly they are unable, after all their reasonings, to say, what punishment as to *kind*, or *degree*, or *duration*, would be their due, in case of sin." This is plainly to give up all arguments against endless punishment, drawn from the goodness of God, or from any other divine perfection. For if "most certainly after all our reasonings" from the divine perfections as well as from other topics of reason, we be "un-

* Twelve Sermons, page 40.

able to say what punishment, as to *kind*, or *degree*, or *duration*, is due in case of sin;" then "*most certainly* we are unable to say," but that an endless punishment, and that consisting in misery too, is due, and is necessary to secure and promote the good of the system. Therefore to have been consistent, Dr. C. ought never to have pretended, that endless misery is not reconcileable with divine goodness.

Dr. C. further grants, that it may be necessary, that the penalty of the divine law be inflicted, and that the infliction of it may be honourable to God, and useful to creatures: yea, he grants, that the full penalty of the law will actually be inflicted on some men. *"Perhaps the reasons of government might make it fit and proper, and therefore morally necessary, that the threatening which God has denounced, should be executed. Would the wisdom of the supreme legislator have guarded his prohibition with a penalty it was not *reasonable* and just he should inflict? And might not the infliction of it, when incurred, be of service, signal service, to the honour of the divine authority, and to secure the obedience of the creature in all after times?"—If it be "fit and proper, and morally necessary," if it be "of signal service to the honour of the divine authority, and to secure the obedience of creatures," to inflict the penalty of the divine law; doubtless the infliction of it is not only consistent with the general good, but subservient to it, and therefore perfectly consistent with the divine goodness. It is not "reasonable," that God should inflict the penalty of his law, unless the infliction be consistent with the general good, and so with the divine goodness. Therefore the question proposed in the last quotation may with equal truth and force be proposed a little differently, thus, Would the wisdom of the supreme

* Five Dissertations, page 231.

legislator have guarded his prohibition with a penalty, which it was not consistent with the general good of the universe, or with the goodness of his own nature, that he should in any one instance inflict?—Thus it appears to be fully granted, that divine goodness does not oppose the infliction of the penalty of the divine law, but requires it.—Nay, as hath been hinted above, Dr. C. expressly asserts, that the penalty of the law will be inflicted on some men; that on those who pass through the torments of hell, the divine law will take its course, and the threatened penalty will be fully executed.*—Now what the penalty of the divine law is, we have before endeavoured to show. Therfore if our reasoning on that head be just, it follows from that reasoning and from Dr. C's concessions in the preceding quotations taken together, that endless punishment is not only reconcileable with divine goodness, but is absolutely required by it. Would divine goodness both denounce and actually inflict a penalty, which that goodness did not require, and which was not even reconcileable with it?

Dr. C. informs us,† that "Christ was sent into the world, and the great design he was sent upon was to *make way* for the WISE, *just* and *holy* exercise of mercy—towards the sinful sons of men." It seems then, that if it had not been for the mediation of Christ, there would have been *no way* for the exercise of mercy towards men, in a consistency not with justice and holiness only, but with wisdom? and if not with wisdom, not with the general good: for wisdom always dictates that which is for the general good. And if it would not have been consistent with the general good, to exercise mercy towards sinners, without the mediation of Christ, neither would it have been consistent with the divine goodness, for that and that only which is subservient to the gene-

* Page 336. † Five Dissertations, page 247.

ral good, is an object to the divine goodness. In this sentiment Dr. C. was very full, as we have already seen. —Therefore without the mediation of Christ, divine goodness required, that all mankind be left in a state of despair under the curse of the law. And if it have been shewn, that this curse is endless misery, it follows, that divine goodness, required that all mankind, if it had not been for the mediation of Christ, should suffer endless misery.

III. As was proposed, we now proceed to consider Dr. C's arguments from the goodness of God, to prove the salvation of all men.—If some of the following quotations be found to be rather positive assertions than arguments; I hope the fault will not be imputed to me, provided I quote those passages which contain as strong arguments from this topic, as any in his book.

*"It is high time, that some generally received doctrines should be renounced, and others embraced in their room that are more honourable to the Father of Mercies, and comfortable to the creatures whom his hands have formed. I doubt not it has been a perplexing difficulty to most persons (I am sure it has been such to me) how to reconcile the doctrine which dooms so great a number of the human race to eternal flames, with the essential, absolutely perfect goodness of the Deity. And perhaps they contain ideas utterly irreconcileable with each other. To be sure, their consistency has never yet been so clearly pointed out, but that a horror of darkness still remains that is sadly distressing to many a considerate tender heart."—In this passage it is implied, that the doctrine of endless misery is not honourable to the Father of Mercies. But what is the proof of this? If there be any, it consists in these several particulars— That this doctrine is uncomfortable to the creatures of

* Page 14.

God—That it has been a perplexing difficulty to some, Dr. C. thinks to most, and "is *sure* it has been such to HIM," to reconcile that doctrine with the goodness of God—That *perhaps* they are irreconcileable—That to be sure (in Dr. C's opinion) they never have been so reconciled, but that a horror of darkness remains.

If these be arguments, they require an answer.—The *first* is, that the doctrine of endless misery is uncomfortable, or rather not so comfortable to God's creatures, as some other doctrines: therefore it is not honourable to the Father of Mercies.—But would Dr. C. dare to say, that every doctrine is dishonourable to God, which is not equally comfortable to sinful creatures, as some other doctrines? and that no doctrine is consistent with the divine goodness, but those which are in the highest degree comfortable to such creatures? What then will follow concerning his doctrine of "torment for ages of ages?"—Or would any man choose that the comparison be dropped and that the argument be expressed thus:—The doctrine of endless misery is uncomfortable to creatures, therefore it is dishonourable to God? This still confutes the doctrine of torment for ages of ages. Beside, if the meaning be, that it is uncomfortable to all creatures, it is a mistake.—To those who believe it to be a just and glorious expression of the divine hatred of sin, and a necessary mean of vindicating the justice of God, of supporting the dignity of his government and of promoting the general good; it is so far from being uncomfortable, that it is necessary to their comfort; and they rejoice in it for the same reasons, that they rejoice in the advancement of the general good. They rejoice in it on the same principles of benevolence and piety, that Dr. C. rejoiced in the prospect, that the divine law would have its course, and the full threatened penalty be executed on some of mankind.

The next particular of the above quotation is, that the doctrine of endless misery has been perplexing to some, or to most men, and to be sure to Dr. C.—Doubtless this is true of many other doctrines, which however have been believed both by Dr. C. and by other Christians: such as the perfect rectitude, goodness and impartiality of all the dispensations of divine providence: the consistence between the existence of sin in the world and the infinite wisdom, power, holiness and goodness of God: the final subserviency of all events to the divine glory and the general good of the system, &c. Therefore, if the argument prove any thing, it proves too much.

The third particular is, Perhaps endless misery is not reconcileable with the goodness of the Deity.—*Answer*, Perhaps it is reconcileable with that divine attribute.

The last particular is, To be sure (in Dr. C's opinion) they never have been so reconciled, but that a horror of darkness remains with respect to the subject.—*Answer*, In the opinion of many other men, they have often been so reconciled, that there was no reason, why a horror of darkness in view of the subject should remain in the mind of any man. They experience no more horror of darkness in the idea, that God inflicts that endless punishment which is perfectly just, is absolutely necessary to satisfy divine justice, and vindicate the despised authority, government and grace of God, and is subservient to the glory of God and the general good; than in the idea of most other doctrines of the gospel.

But let us proceed to another passage of Dr. C.—*"Multitudes are taken off before they have had opportunity to make themselves hardened abandoned sinners: and so far as we are able to judge, had they been continued in life, they might have been formed to a virtu-

* Page 321.

ous temper of mind, by a suitable mixture of correction, instruction, and the like. And can it be supposed with respect to such, that an infinitely benevolent God, without any other trial, in order to effect their reformation, will consign them over to endless and irreversible torment? Would this be to conduct himself like a father on earth? Let the heart of a father speak on this occasion. Nay, it does not appear, that any sinners are so incorrigible in wickedness, as to be beyond recovery by still further methods within the reach of infinite power: And if the infinitely wise God can, in any wise methods, recover them, even in any other state of trial, may we not argue from his infinite benevolence, that he will?"

The first branch of this argument is, that some die before they become incorrigible; therefore the fatherly goodness of God will give them another trial.—But did Dr. C. know when sinners become incorrigible, and when not? Does any man know how long a person must live in sin, to arrive at that state? If not, what right has any man to say, that any sinners die, before God as perfectly knows them to be incorrigible, as if they had lived in sin ever so long?—Beside, were sinners to live in sin ever so long, still this objection might be made; and Dr. C. has in fact made it, not only with regard to those who die prematurely, but with regard to all sinners. He says, "It does not appear, that *any* sinners are so incorrigible, as to be beyond recovery by still further methods." That is, if it do not appear, that sinners are in this world beyond recovery by still further methods to be used for their recovery, we are to believe from God's infinite benevolence, that those further methods will be used for their recovery. But should a sinner go through the torments of hell, and of ten other succeeding states of trial, it is to be presumed, that Dr. C. would not say, but that possibly he might be recovered

by some further methods within the power of God to use, if indeed God should see cause to use those further methods. The ground of this argument is, that goodness requires, that God use means for the recovery of sinners, as long as it is in the power of God to use any further means to that end. But this as much needs to be proved as any one proposition advanced by Dr. C.

The next branch of this argument is, that it would not be acting like a father on earth, if God were to consign sinners to endless torment.—And is it acting like a father on earth, to doom men to the second death, the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, and there torment them for ages of ages? Let the heart of a father on earth speak and declare whether it would be agreeable to him, to inflict on his children these extreme and long continued tortures? or even many of the temporal calamities which God inflicts on mankind; such as poverty, shame, a feeble sickly habit, extreme pain and distress, loss of reason, and death attended with the most afflicting circumstances? Would a father on earth choose to plunge his children in the ocean, and leave them to the mercy of the waves? Would he set his house on fire, while they were buried in soft slumbers, and consume them in the flames?—Such declamatory applications to the passions are a two-edged sword which will wound Dr. C's scheme, as certainly as that of his opponents. But this controversy is not to be settled by an application to the passions.

The last part of the above quotation destroys the whole. It is this; It does not appear that any sinners are so incorrigible, as to be beyond recovery by still further methods within the reach of infinite wisdom. If God have revealed that no sinners shall be recovered after this life, it is doubtless a wise constitution that this life is the only state of probation. Therefore it is not

within the reach of infinite wisdom, to use any further means after this life for the recovery of those who are incorrigible here. So that this whole paragraph is a mere begging of the question : it takes for granted, that this life is not the only state of probation, or that the endless punishment of all who die impenitent is not a doctrine of divine revelation.

Dr. C. elsewhere* argues universal salvation from this, that God speaks of himself, "as the universal Father of Men;" and says, "fathers on earth chastise their children for their *profit*, but do not punish them, having no view to their *advantage*."—But does a father on earth never punish an incorrigible child, when it is necessary for the good of the rest of the family? If he did not, but suffered him to ruin his whole family, or even one of his other children; would he act the part, or deserve the name, of a father? "And shall we say that of our Father in Heaven (who instead of being evil, as all earthly fathers are more or less, is infinitely good) which we cannot suppose of any father on earth, till we have first divested him of the heart of a father?"—The truth is, this and all arguments of the kind take for granted what is by no means granted, that the salvation of all men, is subservient to the good, not of the persons saved only, but of the universal system.

In various passages† Dr. C. has much to say of our *natural notions of God's goodness;* particularly, that the natural notions we entertain of the "goodness and mercy of God, rise up in opposition to the doctrine of never ending torments" I grant that our natural notions of those divine attributes rise up in opposition to endless torments, on the supposition that they are unjust and inconsistent with the general good. But on the supposition that they are both just and subservient to the gene-

* Page 326, 327. † Page 352, &c.

ral good, our natural notions rise up in favour of them. So that this and such like arguments all depend on taking for granted what is no more granted than the main question.

Nearly allied to the argument from the divine goodness, is that by which Dr. C. attempts to prove universal salvation from the end of God in creation. *"As the first cause of all things is infinitely benevolent, 'tis not easy to conceive that he should bring mankind into existence unless he intended to make them finally happy." †"If the only good God knew—that some free agents would make themselves unhappy, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of his wisdom to prevent it, why did he create them? To give them existence knowing at the same time that they would render themselves finally miserable—is scarce reconcileable with supremely and absolutely perfect benevolence."—This argument, as the preceding, entirely depends on the supposition that the final happiness of every individual is necessary to the greatest happiness of the system. Doubtless God is absolutely and perfectly benevolent: but such benevolence seeks the greatest happiness of the system, not of any individual, unless the happiness of that individual be consistent with the greatest happiness of the system. This is the plain dictate not of reason only, but of scripture, and is abundantly conceded by Dr. C. as appears by the quotations already made. There is no difficulty therefore in conceiving, that however the first cause of all things is infinitely benevolent, he should bring mankind into existence, though he never intended to make them all finally happy. He might in perfect consistence with infinite benevolence, bring them into existence, intending that some of them should suffer that endless punishment which they should deserve, and thereby con-

* Page 1. † Page 2, 3.

tribute to the greatest happiness of the system. And if such a punishment be subservient to the greatest happiness of the system, infinite benevolence not only admits of it, but requires it; nor would God be infinitely benevolent, if he should save all men. Therefore this grand argument, on which Dr. C. and other writers in favour of universal salvation, build so much, is a mere begging of the question. Let them show that the greatest good of the system requires the final happiness of every individual, and they will indeed have gone far toward the establishment of their scheme. But until they shall have done this, their argument from this topic is utterly inconclusive. It is no more inconsistent with the goodness of God, that he should create men with a foresight and an intention, that they should suffer that endless punishment which they should deserve, and which is subservient to the general good; than that he should create them with a foresight and intention, that they should subserve the same important end, by suffering the torment of ages of ages, or the pains of the stone or the colic; provided these temporary pains are not subservient to their personal good. And to say that temporary pains cannot consistently with the divine goodness be inflicted on the sinner, unless they be subservient to the personal good of the patient, is to contradict the plain dictates of reason, of scripture, and of Dr. C. himself. But this subject has been largely considered in chap. iii.

These, I think, are Dr. C's principal arguments from the divine goodness, to prove universal salvation: I presume, that in his whole book there are none more forcible than these. His arguments of this kind generally, if not universally, depend on taking for granted, what is as much in dispute as any point in the whole controversy, that endless punishment is not consistent with the greatest good of the universal system, or the greatest

general good. If it be true, that any man will be punished without end, no doubt it is so ordered, because infinite wisdom and goodness saw it to be necessary to the general good. If it be not true, it is equally certain, that infinite wisdom and goodness saw endless punishment to be inconsistent with the general good. But which of these is the truth, is the main question.

IV. That endless punishment is consistent with the divine goodness, not only is implied in various sentiments and tenets of Dr. C. but appears to be a real and demonstrable truth. To evince this, I shall now, as was proposed, mention several considerations.

1. All arguments against endless punishment, drawn from the divine mercy, grace or goodness, imply a concession, that endless punishment is *just.* Were it not just, there would be no occasion to call in the aid of *goodness.* Stern, unrelenting justice would afford relief. Nor is there the least goodness, as distinguished from justice, exercised by a judge, in delivering a man from an unjust punishment, attempted to be brought upon him by a false accuser. If therefore the salvation of sinners, and of every sinner, be an act of goodness, mercy or grace, as Dr. C. abundantly declares; then endless punishment is just. And if it be just, it appears by chap. iii. that it will be inflicted, and inflicted by God too. Therefore it is consistent with divine goodness.

It is hoped it has been made manifest in chap. ii. and iii. that the end of future punishment is not the personal good of the patients, but to satisfy justice, and support the authority and dignity of the divine law and government; as both Dr. C. and the scriptures abundantly hold, that the wicked will be punished to the utmost extent of their demerit. Now if the end of future punishment, whether temporary or endless, be to satisfy justice, and to support government; then the general good is pro-

moted by the satisfaction of justice: otherwise God would not inflict such punishment. And if the proof in chap. vi. that endless punishment is just, be valid, then justice is not satisfied by any punishment short of endless. But by chap. ii. and iii. it appears, that all that punishment, which the wicked deserve, will actually be inflicted upon them by God. Therefore endless punishment is perfectly consistent with divine goodness.

2. If the divine law may be in any one instance executed consistently with divine goodness, endless punishment is consistent with the divine goodness. But the divine law may, in some instances, be executed consistently with divine goodness.—I have before endeavoured to show, that the penalty of the law is endless punishment. If this be true, then when the law is executed, endless punishment is inflicted. And who will dare to say, that God has made a law, which he cannot in any one instance execute consistently with his own perfections: And that if he should execute it in any instance, his goodness and mercy must be inevitably given up? Nay, he delights in *cruelty?* If the law cannot be executed without cruelty, it is a cruel unjust law: and to make a cruel and unjust law, is as irreconcileable with the moral rectitude of God, as to execute that law. If the infliction of endless punishment be cruel, the threatening of it also is cruel. But this runs into the former question, whether endless punishment be *just.*

If it be said, though the law is just, and the execution of it would not be cruel; yet it cannot be executed consistently with the divine goodness, because the divine goodness seeks the greatest possible good of the system: But the greatest possible good of the system requires the final happiness of all:—As to this I observe,

(1) That it is giving up the argument from divine goodness in the light, in which Dr. C. has stated it. It

appears by the quotations already made, that he held endless punishment to be so inconsistent with divine goodness, that if that punishment be inflicted, it will prove God to be destitute of goodness, and to *delight in cruelty*.

(2) That the question as now stated comes to no more than this, Whether endless punishment be consistent with the greatest possible display of divine goodness? For a system, in which there is the greatest possible good, and the greatest possible display of the divine goodness, are one and the same thing. But if it were granted, that endless punishment is, in this sense, inconsistent with the divine goodness, it would by no means follow, on Dr. C's principles, that all men will be saved. Because it is an established principle with him, that divine goodness is not and cannot be displayed, to the highest possible degree, or so but that there is room for higher displays and further communications of it. *"Neither is it to be supposed, because God is infinitely benevolent, that he has in fact made an infinite manifestation of his goodness.—Infinity in benevolence knows no bounds, but there is still room for more and higher displays of it.—This perfection is strictly speaking, inexhaustible, not capable of being displayed to a *ne plus*." Therefore, it would be absurd for Dr. C. or any one, who agrees with him in the sentiment expressed in the last quotation, to state the argument from divine goodness, in the light in which it is exhibited in the objection now under consideration. This stating of the argument runs entirely into the question, whether the present system of the universe be the best possible; which Dr. C. has sufficiently answered in the negative, in the passage last quoted, and in many other passages of his writings. If it be true, that divine goodness does not

* Benevolence of the Deity, page 40.

adopt and prosecute the best possible plan of the universe in general: what reason have we to think, that it will adopt and prosecute the best possible plan with regard to any part of the divine system; for instance the future state of those who die in impenitence?

(3) On the supposition, that God does adopt and prosecute the best possible plan, both with regard to the universe in general, and in every particular dispensation of his providence; still we shall never be able to determine *a priori*, that the final salvation of all men is, in the sense now under consideration, most subservient to the general good. It must be determined either by the event itself, or by revelation: and whether revelation do assure us of the salvation of all men, is not the subject of inquiry in this chapter, but shall be particularly considered in its place.

3. If divine goodness without respect to the atonement of Christ, which is foreign from the subject of this chapter, require the salvation of all men; it either requires that they be saved, whether they repent or not; or it requires, that they be saved on the condition of their repentance only. If it require that they be saved, whether they repent or not, it follows, that they have done no damage to the universe, or have committed no sin. For the very idea of sin is a damage to the universe, a dishonour to God, and an injury to the creature. Now whenever a damage is done to the universe, the good of the universe, or which in the present argument comes to the same thing, the divine goodness requires reparation. But if the good of the universe require, that the sinner be saved without even repentance, the good of the universe requires no reparation, and if it require no reparation it has not been impaired, or there has been no damage done to the good of the universe: and if no damage have been done to the universe, no sin has been

committed. No wonder then, that the divine goodness requires the salvation of those who have committed no sin or no moral evil.

If on the other hand it be allowed, that by sin damage is done to the universe, and yet it be holden, that divine goodness requires the salvation of all men, on the condition of their repentance only; it will follow, that repentance alone makes it consistent with the general good, that the sinner be saved. Repentance then repairs the damage done to the universe by sin; and so makes satisfaction or atonement for sin.—The very essence of atonement is something done to repair the damage done by sin to the universe, so that the sinner can be exempted from punishment, without any disadvantage to the universe. And as repentance is a personal act of the sinner, he does on this supposition make atonement for his own sin by his personal virtue. Therefore, if after this he be saved from wrath, he is but treated according to his personal character, or according to strict justice; not according to goodness or grace. So that while Dr. C. professes and supposes himself to be arguing from the divine goodness, the salvation of all men from the wrath to come; his arguments are really drawn from *the justice of God only.* They imply either that the sinner who is by divine goodness to be saved from the wrath to come, is no sinner, deserves no punishment, and therefore is incapable of being saved from wrath, as he is exposed to none; or that though he be a sinner, he has in his own person, made full satisfaction for his sin, and therefore merits salvation from wrath, and is incapable of it by an act of grace or goodness.

4. To argue the salvation of all men from the goodness of God, without regard to the atonement of Christ; and yet to allow that endless punishment is just, is a direct contradiction.—If it be allowed or proved, that

endless punishment is just, it follows of course that it is consistent with the general good, and which is the same thing, with the divine goodness, and is even required by divine goodness on the supposition on which we now proceed, that no atonement is made for sin. The very idea of a just punishment of any crime is a punishment which in view of the crime only, is requisite to repair the damage done to the system by that crime. Any further punishment than this is unjust, and any punishment short of this, falls short of the demand of justice. At the same time that this is demanded by justice, it is demanded by the general good too: because by the definition of a just punishment, it is neccessary to the general good; neccessary to secure it, or to repair the damage done to it, by the crime punished. So that a just punishment of any crime is not only consistent with the general good, but is absolutely required by it, provided other measures equivalent to this punishment be not taken to repair the damage done by sin, or, which is the same, provided an atonement be not made. And if the endless punishment of sin be just; it is of course, on the proviso just made, perfectly consistent with the general good of the universe, and absolutely required by it, and equally required by the goodness of God. And to say that though it be just, it is not reconcileable with the divine goodness, is the same as to say, that though it be just, it is not reconcileable with justice.

Objection: Divine goodness does not admit of the endless punishment of the apostle Paul; yet his endless punishment would be just.—*Answer:* Divine goodness, or the general good of the universe, considering the sins or the personal character of Paul by itself, does both admit and require his endless punishment. But considering the atonement of Christ, which, as I have repeat-

edly observed, comes not into consideration in the present argument, it does not indeed admit of it.

I beg leave to ask the advocates for universal salvation, whether if Christ had not made atonement, it would have been consistent with the general good of the universe, that sinners be punished without end. If they answer in the affirmative, then endless punishment is in itself reconcileable not with justice only, but with goodness too, as goodness always acquiesces in that which is consistent with the general good. For if only in consequence of the atonement, endless punishment be inconsistent with the divine goodness, it becomes inconsistent with it, not on account of any thing in the endless punishment of sin, or in the divine goodness simply; but wholly on account of something external to them both: and therefore that external something being left out of the account, there is no inconsistency between the endless punishment of sin and the divine goodness in themselves considered. But that they are in themselves inconsistent is implied in Dr. C's argument from divine goodness; and that they are not in themselves inconsistent is all for which I am now pleading.

If the snswer to the question just proposed be, that it would not be consistent with the general good, that a sinner be punished without end, even if Christ had not made atonement; it follows, that such punishment is no just; as the very definition of a just punishment is, one which in view of the sinner's personal character only is necessary to the general good.—Or if this be not a proper definition of a just punishment, let a better be given. Any punishment is just, or is deserved, for no other reason, than that the criminal viewed in himself owes it to the public, or the general good requires it.

5. If divine goodness require, that every sinner be, on his mere repentance, exempted from punishment, it

will follow, that sin is no moral evil.—If divine goodness require that every sinner be, on his mere repentance, exempted from punishment, the general good of the universe requires the same. If the general good do require it, then either the sinner hath in that action of which he repents, done nothing by which the general good hath been impaired; or that impairment is repaired by his repentance. For if he have impaired the general good, and not afterward repaired it, then by the very terms it requires reparation. And this which the general good in these cases requires of the sinner for the reparation of the general good, is his punishment, and not his exemption from punishment. But if the sinner have done nothing which requires that reparation be made to the general good, then he hath committed nothing which hath impaired the general good: or, which is the same, he hath committed no moral evil. For moral evil is a voluntary act impairing the general good consisting in the glory of God and the happiness of the created system.—Or if it be said, that the repentance of the sinner repairs the general good, and prevents the ill effects of his sin; I answer, repentance is no punishment, nor any reparation of damage to the universe by a past action. It is a mere cessation from sin and a sorrow for it. A man who has committed murder, makes by repentance no reparation for the damage which is thereby done to society or to the universe. So that if ever any damage were done to the universe by sin, and if therefore the public good required that reparation be made by the punishment of the sinner, it still requires the same, and therefore does not require his exemption from punishment. Beside; the false and absurd consequences* necessarily following from the principle that

* See these considered at large in Chap. ii.

the penitent deserves no punishment, which is the same with this, that the general good does not require that the penitent, viewed in his own character merely, be punished; plainly point out the falsity and absurdity of the principle itself. Particularly this consequence, that on that supposition the penitent never is nor can be forgiven, as he makes by his repentance full satisfaction in his own person, and thus answers the demand of justice or of the general good.—But if it be true, that repentance does not repair the damage done by sin to the universe; and if as is now asserted, the general good do require that the penitent sinner, without regard to the atonement of Christ, be exempted from punishment; it required the same before he repented; consequently his sin never did impair the good of the universe, and therefore is no moral evil.

Objection 1. The fourth argument seems to imply, that sin consists in damage actually done to the universe; whereas there are many sins, in which no real damage is actually done. As if a man stab another with a design to murder him, and open an abscess, whereby the man is benefitted instead of murdered; and in all acts of malice, which are not executed, no damage is actually done.

Answer. Taking the word damage in a large sense, to mean, not merely loss of property, as it is sometimes taken, but misery, calamity or natural evil; it may be granted, that sin does consist in voluntarily doing damage to the universe. It is a misery, a calamity, or a natural evil to any man, to be the object of the malice of any other person, though his malice be never executed. It exposes him to the execution of that malice: it renders him unsafe: and to be unsafe is a calamity; especially to be the object of the malice of another to such a degree, that the malicious man attempts the life of the

object of his malice. In this case the man who is the object of malice is very unsafe indeed.—And if but one person be in a calamitous situation, so far at least the public good is impaired, or the universe is damaged. Besides, if that one act impairing the public good, be left unpunished, and no proper restraint by the punishment of the act, be laid upon the man himself and upon others, the flood-gate is opened to innumerable more acts of the same, or a like kind. This surely is a further calamity to the universe. So that every sinful volition, though it fail of its object in the attempt, or though it be not attempted to be executed in overt act, is a real calamity or damage to the universe.

Objection 2. The preceding reasoning must needs be fallacious, as it implies, that goodness or grace is never exercised in any case, wherein punishment is deserved; that whatever is admitted by justice, is required by goodness; and that if sin be a moral evil and deserve punishment, it cannot consistently with the general good be forgiven.

Answer. This is not true. The reasoning above does not imply, but that there may be, consistently with the general good, the forgiveness of some sinners. Nor does it imply, but that the general good may *require* the forgiveness of some sinners; as undoubtedly it does require the forgiveness of all who repent and believe in Christ, and so become interested in him according to the Gospel. Nor does *this reasoning* imply, but that some sinners may obtain forgiveness on some other account than the merits of Christ: though I believe it may be clearly shown from scripture, that forgiveness can be obtained on no other account. But this reasoning does assert, that if all penitents *as such*, or merely because they are penitents, or on account of their own repentance and reformation, be required by divine goodness to

be exempted from punishment; then sin deserves no punishment and is no moral evil.

8. The voice of reason is, that divine goodness, or a regard to the general good requires, that sin be punished according to its demerit, in some instances at least: otherwise God would not appear to be what he really is, an enemy to sin, and greatly displeased with it.—It is certainly consistent with divine goodness, that sin exists in the world, otherwise it would never have existed. Now since sin is in the world, if God were never to punish it, it would seem, that he is no enemy to it. Or if he punish it in a far less degree than it deserves, still it would seem, that his displeasure at it is far less than it is and ought to be. Nor can mere words or verbal declarations of the Deity sufficiently exhibit his opposition to sin, so long as he uniformly treats the righteous and the wicked in the same manner. His character in view of intelligent creatures will appear to be what it is holden forth to be in his actions, rather than what he in mere words declares it to be. But will any man say, that it is conducive to the good order and happiness of the intellectual system, that God should appear to be no enemy, but rather a friend to sin?

Objection. God would still appear to be an enemy to sin, though he were not to punish it: because he takes the most effectual measures, to extirpate it by leading sinners to repentance.—*Answer.* The extirpation of sin shows no other hatred of it, than a physician shows to a disease, which he takes the most effectual measures to abolish, by the restoration of health. But these measures of the physician do not show, that he views his patient as blameable. Sickness is no moral evil, and all the pains of the physician to remove sickness, are no testimony of his abhorrence of moral evil. But sin is a moral evil, and it is subservient to the general good,

that the great Governor of the universe should testify his abhorrence of it, as a moral evil, or as justly blameable. To this end he must do something further than is done by the physician, who heals his patient: he must either in the person of the sinner, or in his substitute, punish sin, and that according to its demerit; otherwise he will not show himself displeased at it as a moral evil.

Hatred of sin is as essential to the Deity as love of holiness; and it is as honourable to him and as necessary to the general good, that he express the former as the latter. Indeed the latter is no further expressed, than the former is expressed: and so far as the former is doubtful, the latter is doubtful too. The question then comes to this, whether it be consistent with the general good, that God should in actions, as well as words, express his abhorrence of sin as blameable, or as a moral evil; and express this abhorrence to a just degree. If this be consistent with the general good, it is also consistent with the general good, that sin be punished according to its demerit: and if it deserve an endless punishment it is consistent with the general good and with divine goodness, that such a punishment be inflicted.

7. That endless punishment is inconsistent with divine goodness, and that all men are saved by free grace, is a direct contradiction. To be saved is to be delivered from the curse of the law, which we have before endeavoured to show to be an endless punishment. But to be saved, from this by free grace, implies, that the person so saved, deserves endless punishment, and that such punishment is with respect to him just. But whatever punishment is just with respect to any man, provided no atonement be made by a substitute, is necessary to the public good; and unless it be necessary to the public good, it is unjust. If it be necessary to the public good, the public good requires it: and if the public good re-

quire it, divine goodness requires it. Therefore to apply this reasoning to the endless punishment of the sinner:—The salvation of the sinner consists in deliverance from the curse of the law: the curse of the law is endless punishment; and to be delivered from this by free grace, implies, that the endless punishment of the sinner is just. If the endless punishment of the sinner be just, and no atonement be made by a substitute, the public good requires his endless punishment, and the divine goodness of course requires it. So that if the sinner can be saved by free grace only, and no atonement be made by a substitute, the endless punishment of the sinner is not at all inconsistent with divine goodness; and to say that it is inconsistent with the divine goodness, and yet to say that all men are saved by free grace, and can be saved in no other way, implies, as I said, a direct contradiction. It implies, that endless punishment is just, as the deliverance from it is the fruit of grace only: it also implies, that it is not just, as the public good or the divine goodness does not require it, but is inconsistent with it.

CHAPTER IX.

IN WHICH IS CONSIDERED DR. CHAUNCY'S ARGUMENT FROM ROM. V. 12, &c.

HAVING in the preceding chapters considered Dr. C's arguments from reason and from the divine perfections, I proceed now to consider those which are drawn from particular passages of scripture. The first of those passages which demands our attention is Rom. v. 12, &c. "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world,

and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned: For until the law, sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed, when there is no law. Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned, after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come. But not as the offence, so also is the free gift. For if through the offence of one, many be dead; much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift: for the judgment was by one to condemnation; but the free gift is of many offences unto justification. For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ: Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous. Morever, the law entered, that the offence might abound: But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound: That as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord."

The Doctor's argument from this passage depends wholly on the supposition, that the apostle considers "Adam and Christ as the respective opposite sources of death and life to mankind universally:" Or that Christ is the source of life and eternal salvation to all men without exception, as Adam was the source of death to all men without exception. The Doctor's reasons to support this proposition are,—(1) That in the 15th verse it is said, "If through the offence of one many be

dead, much more hath the grace of God abounded unto many:" and as by *many* in the former part of this verse is meant all men, therefore he concludes that the same word is used in the same extensive sense, in the latter part of the verse: "the antithesis," he says, "will otherwise be lost."—(2) The word *many*, πολλοι, means *all men*, because the article is prefixed to it, οι πολλοι.—(3) That in the 18th verse it is expressly asserted, "As by the offence of one, the judgment came upon *all men*, εις παντας ανθρωπους, to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon *all men*, εις παντας ανθρωπους, unto justification of life." Whence the Doctor concludes, that the words *all men* in both parts of the comparison, are used in the same extent.—(4) That the advantage by Christ *exceeds*, *abounds beyond*, the disadvantage by Adam; but this, unless all men be saved, would be so far from the truth, that the former would "sink below the latter."—Let us attend to these distinctly.

1. The word *many* in the former part of the 15th and 19th verses, means *all men:* therefore it means the same in the latter part of those verses: the antithesis will otherwise be lost."* Now how does the truth of this proposition appear? It must certainly be supported by proper proof, to obtain credit. But in the very many instances in which the Doctor is pleased to repeat this proposition, in his long commentary on Rom. v. 12, &c. I do not find one reason offered to prove it, beside that quoted above, "The antithesis will otherwise be lost."* This therefore is now to be considered.—In the rebellion in Great Britain, 1745, large numbers of men were engaged in the rebellion, and were led away by the Pretender. After the Pretender was defeated, large numbers, by the influence of some particular person, we will

* Page 32, 60, &c.

suppose, returned to their allegiance, and took the proper oaths to the King: yet not all who were drawn into the rebellion by the Pretender. Now would there be any impropriety in saying in this case, As by the Pretender *many* had been drawn into the rebellion, so by that other person *many* were brought back to their allegiance? The former *many* is allowed to be more extensive, than the latter; yet there is a manifest antithesis in the propositon; an antithesis as manifest as there would have been, if the men who returned to their allegiance, had been just as numerous as those who engaged in the rebellion, and had been the same individuals. Equally manifest it is, that though the *many*, who died in Adam, be more numerous than the *many* who are the subjects of saving grace by Christ; yet there is a proper antithesis in this proposition,—"If through the offence of one, many be dead; much more the grace of God by Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many."

2. The word *many*, πολλοι, means all men, because the article is joined with it, οι πολλοι, *the many*.*—If this be evident at all, it must be evident either from the general use of the adjective πολλοι, when connected with the article, or from the circumstances of the particular case in which it is used in this passage, Rom. v. 15 and 19. If the validity of the argument now under consideration, be evident from the general use of πολυς in the plural with the article; then generally when used by good authors, and especially by the authors of the New Testament, it means a strict universality. Let us therefore attend to particular instances.—Acts xxvi. 24. "Much learning doth make thee mad;" Τα πολλα γραμματα. But no man will say, that this expression means all learning. The use of the article however is very proper, and the expression means the much learning of which the apostle

* Page 60.

was possessed.—2 Cor. ii. 17; "For we are not as *many*, οι πολλοι, which corrupt the word of God." If οι πολλοι here mean *all* men, the apostle in direct contradiction to himself in this very expression, means that he himself, and all the other apostles, as well as the rest of mankind, did corrupt the word of God.—Rev. xvii. 1: "I will show unto thee the judgment of the great whore, that sitteth upon *many* waters," των υδατων των πολλων. *All* waters, or *all people* cannot be meant, because by far the greater part of the nations of the world never were under the influence of the great whore.—The only other instances in the whole New Testament, in which πολυς in the plural is used with the article, are Mat. xxiv. 12; Rom. xii. 5; ch. xv. 22; 1 Cor. x. 17 and 33, which the reader may examine for himself, and it is presumed, he will find, that in no one of them is a strict universality clearly intended. If this be so, it is by no means evident from the general use of πολυς in the plural with the article, that οι πολλοι, *many*, in Rom. v. 15 and 19, means *all* men.

Nor is this more evident from the circumstances of the particular case, in which *many* οι πολλοι, is used in Rom. v. 15. Let it be translated as Dr. C. chooses to translate it, thus: If through the offence of one, *the many* be dead, much more the grace of God, by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto *the many*. Nothing appears from the expression, but that the meaning of the apostle may be, what it has generally been understood to be, that *the many* who were connected with Adam, and whose life or death depended on his standing or falling, became dead through his offence: and *the many* who are connected with Christ, and with a particular design to save whom, He died, shall be made the subjects of the abounding grace of God in their most glorious salvation.—I say, nothing appears, either from the general use of οι πολλοι, or from the particular use of it in this case, but that this

and this only is the real sense of it, in this instance. And for Dr. C. to wish his readers, before he has given them a reason, to give up this sense in favour of his own, is for him to come to them in the humble character of a suppliant, and not in the dignified character of a cogent reasoner.

3. In the 18th verse, it is expressly asserted, As by the offence of one, judgment came upon *all men*, εις παντας ανθρωπους, to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon *all men*, εις παντας ανθρωπους, to justification of life: whence Dr. C. concludes, that the words *all men*, in both parts of the comparison are used in the same extent; and says, "It can be no other than a flat contradiction to the express words of the apostle to say, that in the latter part of this comparison not *all men* are meant, but *believers only*; that is, a few of them."* It is indeed a flat contradiction to Dr. C's sense of the apostle's words; but that it is a contradiction to the true sense of those words, does not appear. If it should be further granted to be a contradiction to the most *literal* sense of those words taken by themselves, it would not thence follow, that it is a contradiction to the true and real sense of the words. The real sense of words in all authors, is in thousands of instances to be known, not from the words themselves merely, but from their connexion and other circumstances.

The Dr. rightly asserts, that the words *all* men in verse 18th, mean the same with *the many* in verse 15th. And as it has been shown, that there is no evidence given by the Doctor, that *the many*, to whom grace abounds through Christ, mean *all* men; so all men in the 18th verse meaning, by his own consent, the same with *the many* in verse 15th, must, until we have evidence to the contrary, be understood with the same restriction.

* Page 32.

To carry on the comparison, and maintain the antithesis, there is no more necessity of understanding the words *all men*, when applied to the saved by Christ in the 18th verse, to mean the whole human race; than there is of understanding in that extent, *the many* in the latter part of verse 15th.

Beside; the meaning of those words is abundantly restricted by the context: as verse 17th, "For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign by one, Jesus Christ." The 18th verse is an inference drawn from the 17th, and is introduced by ἄρα οὖν, *therefore*. But the 18th verse would be no just inference at all from the 17th, unless the words *all men* in the latter part of the 18th verse be equally restricted as the words *they which receive abundance of grace*, in the 17th verse. Let us make trial of understanding those phrases in a sense differently extensive, thus; For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more true believers in this life, who are the subjects of the peculiar and abundant grace of God, shall reign in eternal life by one, Jesus Christ. Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men universally to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men universally unto justification of life, whether in this world they believe or not. The whole force of this reasoning is more briefly expressed thus; Those who believe in this life, shall reign in life eternal: therefore also *all* men, whether they believe in this life or not, shall in like manner reign in life eternal. But who does not see, that this consequence by no means follows from the premises?

Although Dr. C. supposes "this *therefore*" [in verse 18th,] "is the same which began the 12th verse:"—yet

he allows, "it will make no essential difference in the apostle's reasoning, if we should suppose, that the 18th and 19th verses introduced by αρα ουν, are a conclusion from the three foregoing verses:"* And it is evident by the Doctor's own discourse, that he himself was full in the opinion, that the 18th and 19th verses, are a conclusion from the three preceding verses, though he was of the opinion that those three verses, are an "INTERPOSED parenthesis." Let the reader notice the following passage; "The view of the apostle in interposing these verses" [the 15th, 16th, and 17th,] "was that he might argue from the gift in this abounding sense, when he came to prosecute the comparison between Adam and Christ—And if the gift through Christ might be supposed to abound beyond the lapse, in the 15th, 16th, and 17th verses, why not in the 18th and 19th?"†

Indeed the Doctor himself allows, that the *all* men in the latter part of the 18th verse, is no more extensive, than *they which receive abundance of grace* in the 17th verse. But he supposes that the latter expression is equally extended with the former, and that the former extends to all mankind. I say, he *supposes* this: but his opponents in this controversy suppose the contrary; and how does it appear, but that their supposition is as good as his? If the Doctor wished that we should give the preference to his supposition, he ought to have given us some reason.

The Doctor with the help of a "learned friend" has given us a long dissertation on the 17th verse, and on the Greek verb λαμβανω, with a design to prove, that οι λαμβανοντες, *they who receive*, mean not those who receive the grace of God *actively*, *voluntarily* and *with a heart to improve it;* but those who are the "objects of this grace,"

* Page 67. † Page 68.

"or the persons upon whom it is bestowed." But this is altogether immaterial in the present dispute. By the abundance of grace Dr. C. understands *the abounding advantage by Christ, terminating in a reign in life.*—Now it will be granted on all hands, that they on whom this grace is bestowed, will be saved. Indeed the very expression, *reigning in life*, implies salvation. Those therefore on whom this grace is bestowed, will as certainly and as confessedly be saved, as those who cheerfully receive and improve the grace of God. All the question is, and a very important one it is, whether this abounding grace terminating in a reign in life, be bestowed on all men. That it is preached or offered to all men, is granted. But that it is so communicated to all, as to secure their reign in life, is a different idea, and is the main subject of this controversy.

So that all the labours of Dr. C. and his "ingenious friend," to settle the meaning of *receive* λαμβανω, contribute nothing to establish this point, That *all men* in the latter part of verse 18th, mean the whole human race. So long as the Doctor grants, that the words *all men*, verse 18th, are not more extensive than they which receive abundance of grace, verse 17th; and so long as he has not proved, that they which receive abundance of grace, so as to reign in eternal life, mean the whole human race; so long nothing is done to prove universal salvation, from the use of the words *all men*, verse 18th. To say, that *they which receive abundance of grace* mean all mankind, because that expression is equally extensive as the words *all men* in the 18th verse, is a mere begging of the question. It is in the first place to suppose and not to prove, that the words *all men* mean all mankind; and then by them to prove, that also *they which receive abundance of grace*, mean all mankind.

The universal term *all men*, verse 18th, is by the former part of the chapter limited to those who are justified by faith, who have peace with God, and who joy in God, through Christ, as having received reconciliation. Dr. C's opinion was, that the 18th verse is but the full expression of the sentence left imperfect in the 12th verse, and that the *therefore* in the beginning of the 18th verse "is the same which began the 12th verse."* The 18th verse then is an immediate conclusion from the verses preceding the 12th, especially from the 11th. Now the believers in endless punishment hold, that in all that part of the chapter, from the beginning to the 12th verse, the apostle had been speaking of the privileges of believers only, and not those privileges which belong to all mankind. And to infer from those privileges which are peculiar to believers, that all mankind will be saved, is to infer a consequence, which is by no means contained in the premises: and such reasoning ought never to be imputed to any man of Paul's sound judgment, much less to *him*, an inspired apostle.

To illustrate this matter, permit me to descend to particulars. Verse 1st, believers are said to be justified by faith and to have peace with God: verse 2d, to have access by faith into the grace of the gospel and to rejoice (or glory) in the hope of the glory of God: verse 3d, to glory in tribulations: verse 5th, to have the love of God shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost: verse 8th, it is said that God commendeth his love towards believers, in that Christ died for *them*: verse 9th, that believers are justified by Christ's blood, and saved from wrath through him: verse 10th, that believers are reconciled to God by the death of Christ and saved by his life: verse 11th, that believers glory in God through Christ, by whom they have received the

* Page 67.

atonement or reconciliation.—Now what is the consequence really following from these premises, ascribing to believers these peculiar and exclusive privileges? Is it that by the righteousness of Christ the free gift unto justification of life, is come upon all mankind, believers and unbelievers? By no means: any man, without the aid of inspiration, would be ashamed to draw such a consequence from such premises. The only just consequence of these premises, is that which has been generally taken to be the meaning of the 18th verse; viz. That as by the offence of one, Adam, judgment to condemnation came upon all mankind who were his seed; even so by the righteousness of one, Jesus Christ, the free gift unto justification of life, came upon all *his* seed, who are believers only, and who are the only persons of whom the apostle had been speaking in the premises.—May I not now adopt the same bold language which Dr. C. often uses concerning his comments on scripture, that no other sense than this, can be put on this 18th verse without making the apostle argue inconclusively?

I know very well that the Doctor understood differently the whole passage from the beginning of this chapter to the 12th verse. But as his whole argument from Rom. v. 12, to the end, in the present view of it, depends on his different construction of verse 1—12; it is not sufficient to say, that the Doctor *understood* that passage differently, or that it is *capable* of a different construction. It must be shown that it is not capable of the construction which is given above; and that the Doctor's construction must be the true one. Let us therefore attend to his construction and his reasons in support of it.

The construction is, that the last verse of the preceding chapter, the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, verses, and the

latter part of the 11th verse of this chapter, are spoken of all mankind. The reasons which he assign, for such an understanding of those verses, are

(1) That in the 6th verse Christ is said to die for *the ungodly.** But if we should assert, that by the ungodly here are meant those only, who afterward and during this life become godly or believers, though Christ died for them while ungodly or considering them as ungodly, the Doctor has given no confutation of such a construction. Therefore he had no right to expect, that it would be rejected by any one who should choose to adopt it.—Or if we allow, that Christ did die for all men in this sense, that he died to introduce a dispensation of grace which should offer salvation to all, and invite all to it, and to use Dr. C's own expression, *to put all into salvable circumstances;* nothing will hence follow favorable to the actual salvation of all men, or to the Doctor's argument from Rom. v. 12, &c. It will not follow, that all will accept the invitations to salvation and act upon them. Still the *we* and *us*, which occur so often from the 1st to the 12th verse, and particularly in verse 6th, may mean believers only.

(2) "It is a gross mistake to think, that the apostle in this 9th verse is speaking of that justification he had in the 1st verse connected with faith; and for this decisive reason, because—as salvation from wrath is one thing essentially included in that justification which is the result of true faith; it would be ridiculous to argue, *much more* being justified, meaning hereby this justification we shall be saved from wrath."†—But did Dr. C. entertain the opinion, that justification and salvation are one and the same? Abraham believed God and it was counted to him for righteousness: he was then justified:

* Page 35. † Page 37.

but he did not then receive complete salvation. Believers being in this life justified by faith, have peace with God, according to the 1st verse of this chapter, as Dr. C. allows. Yet they are not in this life saved from wrath in the sense they will be, at the day of judgment. Therefore, however Dr. C. *asserts* it, it does not *appear* to be ridiculous to argue, that believers being in this life justified by faith in the blood of Christ, shall at the day of judgment, much more be saved from wrath through him. Is it ridiculous to argue, that Abraham being justified by faith here, will much more be saved from wrath hereafter?

(3) "The particle νυν, now, connected with the justification here treated of, is emphatical, making it clear, that the apostle is not to be understood of justification at the great day; but of justification that had at that time been completed."* No body pretends, that the apostle means a justification at the great day. It is allowed on all hands, that he means a justification, which had at that present time been completed. But what follows hence? Did Dr. C. imagine, that believers are not in a proper sense completely justified in this life? And that the justification of Abraham, Rahab, &c. was in no proper sense completed before their death, or before the great day? Concerning the former, it is expressly said, that he believed God, and it *was* counted to him for righteousness—that faith *was* reckoned to Abraham for righteousness, &c. and concerning the latter, *was* not Rahab the harlot justified, &c.? Nor is it material to the present purpose, whether this justification of Rahab mean a justification by God, or a manifestative justification, proving, that she was justified in the sight of God; because the latter, equally as the former, implies that she was then justified in the sight of God.

* Page 37.

That believers are in this life justified in a peculiar sense, is further taught in 1 Cor. vi. 11, "And such were some of you: but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye *are justified* in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the spirit of our God."—I presume it will be granted, that pardon or forgiveness is an essential part of justification, and that when a man is forgiven by God, he is justified by God. But that believers are forgiven in this life, is evident from the following texts, Mat. ix. 2, "Son, thy sins be forgiven thee." See also, Mark ii. 5, and Luke v. 20—Col. ii. 13, "And you being dead in your sins, and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him, *having forgiven* you all trespasses." 1 John ii. 12, "I write unto you, little children, because your sins are forgiven you, for his name's sake."

But why need I produce proofs of what Dr. C. grants, though it seems in his comment on the 9th verse, he had forgotten it? In his comment on the 1st verse, &c. he speaks of "the justified by faith, as glorying in hope of the glory of God—and in their sufferings—because they knew that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope." The Doctor, as the apostle did before him, evidently considers these things as taking place in this life. Indeed the contrary cannot be pretended without the grossest absurdity. He also considers these views and affections as peculiar to the *justified by faith.* Therefore some men are completely justified by faith in this life: at least so completely, as to render the 9th verse properly applicable to them. Therefore his argument from *νυν*, *now*, that the justification spoken of in the 9th verse, is not peculiar to believers, proves nothing.

Beside, Dr. C. could not, without the most glaring absurdity and inconsistency, understand this 9th verse

of all mankind: because the persons here referred to, shall be *saved from wrath.* But according to the Doctor some men will not be saved from wrath, they will suffer all that wrath to which they are liable on the footing of strict justice: they will suffer according their sins, according to their crimes, and their deserts, and so that the whole threatened penalty will be executed on them.

(4) Doctor C. argues, that because it is said in verse 10th, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God; by the *we* here, we must understand, not believers only, but all mankind: or because, as the Doctor paraphrases the words, *while* they were enemies, they were reconciled; therefore this reconciliation cannot mean the cordial reconciliation of true believers.* The force of this argument wholly depends on this supposition, that the persons here intended, were reconciled, and yet after the reconciliation was effected, they still remained enemies. But what necessity of this gloss of the text? Why may it not mean this merely, that when the persons here intended were going on in their enmity, they were arrested by the grace of God, reclaimed from their enmity, and reconciled to God? There appears to be nothing absurd or unusual in this expression understood in this sense. If it should be said, When a subject was waging war against his sovereign, and was in actual battle with the troops of his sovereign, he was reconciled to him; the expression would not naturally imply, and no man would understand it to mean, that notwithstanding the reconciliation, he still continued a fixed and malicious enemy to his sovereign. No man would understand the expression in any other sense than this, that in the midst of the war and battle, he was struck with conviction of his wickedness, and became cordially reconciled to his sovereign.

* Page 38.

If the Doctor depended on the original words εχθροι οντες καταλλαγημεν, to make out that the reconciliation here intended took place, while the persons spoken of remained enemies; he might as conclusively have argued, that the person mentioned in John ix. 25, (τυφλος ων βλεπω) had his sight restored to him, while he remained perfectly blind; and that Saul went to Damascus, with the expectation of bringing certain persons to Jerusalem, who at the same time should still remain at Damascus, (αξων τους εκειστε οντας) Acts xxii. 5.

At length we come to the Doctor's exposition of the 11th verse, to which his criticism, on all the preceding verses refers. He tells us, The meaning plainly and briefly is, "We believers glory in God of our interest, and relation to him, as our covenant God, through Jesus Christ, by whom we were so changed in our state, *while enemies*—in common with the rest of mankind, as to be capable of—final justification upon the foot of faith." On this it may be remarked, That if by "interest in and covenant relation to God," Dr. C. meant any thing different from that state of reconciliation, which is obtained by Christ, and which is mentioned in the latter part of this verse, it does not appear, that the text gives him any warrant to insert that interest, &c. in his comment, as a ground of rejoicing or glorying. I appeal to the reader whether the most natural sense of the text be not this, We believers glory in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, as having by Christ received reconciliation; or *for this reason*, that of God's rich grace through Christ, we have obtained reconciliation with God. Otherwise, why is the circumstance of our receiving the reconciliation by Christ mentioned in this connexion with our glorying in God? Beside, to glory in God as our covenant God, and to glory in him on account of our reconciliation with him, is one and the same thing.

The glorying of which the apostle speaks, is through Christ; and this implies, that it is on account of some benefit or blessing received through Christ: and what this blessing is, which the apostle had in view, and which he considered as the ground of glorying to believers, he immediately explains in these words, *by whom we have received the reconciliation*, that reconciliation of which he had been speaking in the 10th verse.—But if the reconciliation, which the apostle makes, the great ground of rejoicing or glorying to believers, be, as Dr. C. holds, common to believers and unbelievers; then the great ground of glorying to believers is not any blessing peculiar to believers; but something common to all mankind; and therefore unbelievers have just the same reason to glory in that blessing as believers; which is no more credible than the doctrine of universal salvation, and wants as much proof as that doctrine; and therefore cannot be admitted as any evidence of the truth of that doctrine.

I beg the reader's patience, while I make a few other remarks on Dr. C's construction of the passage from Rom. iv. 25, to chap. v. 12; and I wish the reader to keep before him the passage itself, while he follows me in these remarks.

This whole passage is expressed in the first person, and is manifestly one continued discourse. Yet Dr. C. was of the opinion, that in this short passage of only twelve verses, the persons, or the *we*, *us* and *our*, which occur in almost every sentence, are shifted no less than four times. In the last verse of chap. iv. it was his opinion, that all men are intended: that from the first to the sixth verse of chapter v. only believers are intended: that from the 6th to the 11th verse all men are intended: that in the former part of the 11th verse believers only are intended: that in the latter part of the

11th verse all men are again intended. I beg leave to set down this whole passage, according to the Doctor's explanation, together with the text itself:—Thus

TEXT.	DR. C'S EXPLANATION.
Chap. iv. 25.	Who was delivered to put *all men* into a *capacity* to obtain the pardon of their offences, and was raised again to put them into a *capacity* of being justified at the great day.
Who was delivered for our offences and raised again for our justification.	
Chap. v. 1.	Therefore *believers* being justified by faith, have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ. By whom also *believers* have access by faith into this grace wherein they stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.
Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ.	
2. *By whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.*	
3. *And not only so, but we glory in tribulations also, knowing that tribulation worketh patience;*	And not only so, but *believers* glory in tribulations also, knowing that tribulation worketh patience; and patience experience and experience hope: and hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in the hearts of *believers*, by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto *them.*
4. *And patience experience; and experience hope;*	
5. *And hope maketh not ashamed, because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us.*	

TEXT.	DR. C'S EXPLANATION.
6. *For when* we *were without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly.*	For when *all men* were without strengh, in due time Christ died for them *all*, while they were ungodly.
7. *For scarcely for a righteous man will one die: Yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die.*	For scarcely for a righteous man would one die: Yet peradventure for a good man, some would even dare to die.
8. *But God commendeth his love towards* us, *in that while* we *were yet sinners, Christ died for us.*	But God commendeth his love towards *all* men, in that while they were yet sinners, Christ died for them *all.*
9. *Much more then being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him.*	Much more then *all* men being now by the blood of Christ brought into a *capacity* or *possibility* of salvation, shall *in fact* be saved from wrath through Christ.
10. *For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son: much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life.*	For if when *all men* were enemies, they were by the death of Christ brought into a *possibility* of salvation; much more being brought into a *possibility* of salvation, those *all men* shall be *actually* saved by the life of Christ.
11. *And not only so; but we also joy in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the atonement,* [*or the reconciliation.*]	And not only so; but *believers* also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom *all men* have received the *possibility* of salvation.

How strange, that in a continued discourse all in the first person plural, the *we* and *us* should be changed backward and forward *four times !* What torturing of the scripture is here ! At this rate, what discourse in the world will be intelligible ? How will it be possible for any man, and especially for the common people, for whom as well as for the learned, the scriptures were written, to understand them ?

But this is not all. By this various reference of the pronouns *we* and *us*, the reasoning of the apostle is rendered utterly inconclusive, in almost every step of it. Thus the first verse of the fifth Chapter is manifestly brought in by the apostle, as a consequence drawn from the last verse of the preceding Chapter. But from the consideration, that Christ died and rose to put all men into a capacity of obtaining justification at the great day, it by no means follows, that *believers are now* justified by faith, and have peace with God. Verse 9th, if it be ever so true, that all men are put into a *possibility* of salvation, it by no means follows, that all men will be *actually saved.* It no more follows, than from the opportunity given all men, of obtaining salvation immediately after this life, it follows, that all will actually be saved immediately after this life: Or than from the opportunity of entering the land of Canaan, given all that generation, which came out of Egypt, it followed, that all that generation would in fact enter that land: Or than from the opportunity given any man to become rich or honorable, it follows, that he will in fact become rich or honorable. The same observation is equally applicable to the 10th verse. What was before observed concerning the 11th verse, understood in Dr. C's sense, needs not to be repeated.

But what is of chief importance is, that according to the Doctor's construction, there is no argumentative

connexion between the 11th and the 12th, or which is the same thing, between the 11th and the 18th verses. If the Doctor's sense of the 11th and 18th verses be true, the latter is no just consequence from the former. The Doctor's sense of the 11th verse is, that all men through Christ have received a possibility of final salvation; and his sense of the 18th verse is, that all men will actually be saved. But if it be ever so true, that all men have received a possibility or opportunity of final salvation, it does not follow, that all will actually be saved. Yet as the 12th or 18th verse, (the intermediate verses being a parenthesis) is a deduction from the 11th, the last of the propositions just expressed, should justly follow from the other; otherwise the apostle argues inconclusively. And as the Doctor's gloss of these two verses makes the apostle reason inconclusively, we may be sure, that he has not given the true sense of them.—But according to the common understanding of these verses, the reasoning is clear and certain. For if believers have obtained through Christ a cordial reconciliation and peace with God, then certainly those same believers will, in the same way, obtain eternal life and salvation.

That the 12th, and therefore the 18th verse, is an inference from the 11th, is, I think, manifest from a careful perusal of the passage, and it is at least implicitly granted by Dr. C. He expressly says, that the *therefore* in the beginning of the 18th verse, "is the same which began the 12th verse. The protasis or first part of the comparison was there entered upon, but left unfinished. 'Tis here resumed, I say, therefore, as by the offence of one man," &c.* And his paraphrase of the 18th verse is in these words: "I say, therefore, (to resume now and pursue the comparison I began in the 12th verse) as it was by the lapse of the one man, Adam," &c.† The

* Page 67. † Page 26.

Doctor also quotes Dr. Doddridge's assertion, that "the 12th verse is an inference from the 11th," and does not contradict that assertion, though he labours through a number of pages, to affix a different sense from that of Dr. Doddridge, to the 11th verse, that thus he may evade the construction of the 18th verse, which Dr. Doddridge had given, and establish his own. But all this was needless, if indeed the 12th and 18th verses are not an inference from the 11th.—Nor is there any inconsistence in the opinion, that the 18th verse may be at the same time an inference from the 11th and from the 15th, 16th and 17th verses. True and sufficient premises or reasons of the proposition of the 18th verse, may be contained in the 11th verse. Those reasons may be explained, and even others added in the 15th, 16th and 17th verses, which fall into a parenthesis; and the 18th verse may contain an inference justly deducible from either, or from both.

I am indeed sensible, that Dr. C. in his paraphrase of the 12th verse, does not consider it as an inference from the 11th; but the 11th as deducible by way of inference from the 12th, in this manner: Because sin and death came upon all men by Adam, therefore all men have obtained a possibility of salvation by Christ. His words are, "For this cause or reason, we have received reconciliation by Jesus Christ, namely, because as sin entered into the world by the one man, Adam,"* &c. But this is as surprising as any part of Dr. C's truly surprising exposition of this chapter. In the first place, it is a mere conjecture, unsupported by any thing, but pure imagination. In the second place, to apply this paraphrase to the 18th verse, which is but the full expression of the 12th, it will stand thus: For this cause or reason all men have received a possibility of salvation, namely, that as

* Page 23.

by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to actual salvation. Or more briefly thus: The reason, why all men have obtained a *possibility* of salvation, is, that salvation is *actually* come upon all men: Or to place the sentence in its proper arrangement, Salvation is actually come upon all men; therefore all men have received a possibility of salvation.—On this reasoning I need make no remark.—It is not however probable, that the Doctor was sensible, that his paraphrase of the 12th verse, applied to the 18th, would come to this. Nor is the reason just expressed, that which the Doctor believed to be the true one, why we have received the reconciliation. But that which in the Doctor's opinion was the true reason, he expressly declares to be, "That it was in such a way, viz. by the offence of one, that judgment came upon all men to condemnation."*—Who is answerable for this inconsistency, I need not inform the reader.

Before I dismiss this part of Dr. C's book, I cannot but observe, that he speaks of a double justification,† the one meaning absolution at the great day; the other meaning the advantageous state, or the possibility of the salvation of all mankind through Christ. It seems then that the Doctor had forgotten, that he had but a few pages before made out a threefold justification: The first kind consisting in the introduction to a capacity or possibility of salvation through Christ: The second in the justification of believers, who have peace with God while in this life; such was the justification of Abraham: The third in absolution at the great day.—But when any thing is abundantly multiplied, no wonder if the author himself of that multiplication forgets the number of units contained in his own product.

* Page 30. † Page 38.

Dr. C. says,* It can be no other than a flat contradiction to the express words of the Apostle himself, to say that in the latter part of the comparison in the 18th verse, the words *all men* are not used in the same extensive sense, as in the former part of that verse. This is indeed a strong, positive assertion, but where is the reason to support it? Beside; he thought it no flat contradiction to the express words of the Apostle, to say that *we* in the former part of the 11th verse, is not used in the same extensive sense as in the latter part of that verse: nor any flat contradiction to the words of our Saviour, to say, that the word *everlasting* is not used in the same extensive sense in the former part, as in the latter part of Matt. xxv. 46, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into everlasting life."

But it is time we should proceed to the other argument of Dr. C. to prove that universal salvation is taught in Rom. v. 12, &c. viz.

4. The advantage by Christ *exceeds*, abounds beyond, the disadvantage by Adam. But unless all men be saved, the former "sinks below" the latter.†—It is granted, that the advantage by Christ, to those who obtain salvation by Christ, exceeds, and abounds beyond, the disadvantage by Adam. But the question is, whether this saving advantage extend to all those, to whom the disadvantage by Adam extended. That it does extend to all the same subjects to whom the disadvantage by Adam extended, is holden by Dr. C. But how does he prove it? By no other arguments than those which we have already particularly considered; and whether they be conclusive, is submitted to the reader.—Dr. C. did not imagine, that the advantage by Christ was more extensive, or extended to a greater number of persons, than

* Page 32. † Page 32 and 81, &c.

the disadvantage by Adam. He believed, that they both extended to all mankind.—Therefore, the superabounding, the excess, or surplusage of the advantage by Christ, does not consist in the extent of it, but in something else, and that something else may exist, though the extent as to the number of persons be the same, or even less than the extent of the disadvantage by Adam.

If the glory of God, and the happiness of the created system, be more advanced by the salvation of a part of the human race, and by the rejection of the rest, than they would have been, if Adam had never fallen; then surely the advantage by Christ on the general scale, does not "sink below" the disadvantage by Adam: and to assert, that the divine glory and the happiness of the created system would be most advanced by the salvation of all men, is to beg material points in question.—But if Dr. C. mean, that if all be not saved by Christ, then the advantage by Christ to those who shall be finally miserable, "sinks below" the disadvantage by Adam to the same persons; I grant it, and apprehend no disadvantage to my cause by the concession. For it is granting no more than is implied in the very proposition, which I endeavour to defend, that all men will not be saved.

I have now finished my remarks on Dr. C's argument from Rom. v. 12, &c.—If the reader think I have been prolix in these remarks, I hope he will remember how prolix the Doctor was in his argument from this passage; and I presume he will not think it unreasonable to take up twenty-four pages in answering sixty-nine.

It is now left to the reader to judge, whether it be certain, that because the word *many* in the former part of the 15th and 19th verses means *all* men, it means the same in the latter part of those verses:—Whether it be certain, that the word *many* means all men, because

the article is joined with it, οι πολλοι, *the many*:—Whether because the words *all* men in the former part of the 18th verse, mean all mankind, they certainly mean the same in the latter part of that verse:—Whether because the advantage by Christ exceeds the disadvantage by Adam, it certainly follow, that the advantage to every individual man, will exceed the disadvantage to that man.

CHAPTER X.

IN WHICH IS CONSIDERED DR. C'S ARGUMENT FROM ROMANS VIII. 19—24.

THE text is, "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body."—The words of chief importance are those of the 21st verse; "The creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God:" which are supposed by Dr. C. to hold forth the salvation of all men. But the main question here is, what is the meaning of the word *creature*. Dr. C. supposes it means *the human race*. Others suppose it means the whole of the creation which was made for the sake of men, and is subject-

ed to their use.—Beside the word *creature*, the following words and expressions, "manifestation of the sons of God"—"vanity"—"willingly"—"bondage of corruption"—are all understood differently by Dr. C. and by those who believe in endless punishment. Let us therefore attend to them respectively.

I. The meaning of the word κτισις, *creature* or *creation*, is to be sought. It may not be impertinent to inform the reader who is unacquainted with the original, that the word translated creature in the 19th, 20th and 21st verses, is the very same which in the 22d verse is translated *creation;* and doubtless whatever be the meaning of it, it ought to have been translated uniformly throughout this passage.—Dr. C. was of opinion that it means all mankind or the rational creation of this world. His reasons for this opinion are, that "*earnest expectation*, *groaning*, *travailing together in pain*, are more naturally and obviously applicable to the rational, than the inanimate" [and brutal] "creation"—"that πασα κτισις, the *whole creation*, is never used (one disputed text only excepted, Col. i. 15.) to signify more than the whole moral creation, or all mankind"—that "it would be highly incongruous, to give this style" [the whole creation] "to the inferior or less valuable part, wholly leaving out the most excellent" part, mankind.

1. "*Earnest expectation*, *groaning*, *travailing together in pain*, are more naturally applicable to the rational, than the inanimate" [and brutal] "creation."*—If this prove any thing, it will prove too much: it will prove, that when in Psal. cxiv. it is said "The sea saw it and fled; Jordan was driven back; the mountains skipped like rams, and the little hills like lambs;" the meaning is, that *men* saw it and fled; that men were driven back; that men skipped like rams and like lambs. It will

* Page 93.

prove, that Jer. xlvii. 6, "O thou sword of the Lord, how long will it be ere thou be quiet? put up thyself into thy scabbard, rest and be still;" means that *men* should put up themselves into a scabbard, and there rest and be still. It will prove that Hos. xiii. 14, "I will ransom them from the power of the grave: I will redeem them from death. O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction;" means that God will be the plagues and destruction of *men:* and when once it is established, that death and the grave mean men, as men are to be ransomed from the grave and redeemed from death, it will follow that men are to be ransomed from themselves, and redeemed from themselves.—But there is no end to the absurdities which will follow from this mode of construing the scriptures.

The truth is, that the figure of speech, whereby inanimate things are represented as living, sensible and rational persons, and are addressed as such, is very common in scripture. Beside the instances already mentioned, I beg leave to refer to the following: Deut. xxxii. 1, "Give ear, O ye heavens, and I will speak; hear, O earth, the words of my mouth;" Psal. lxv. 12, 13, "The little hills rejoice on every side. The pastures—the valleys—shout for joy: they also sing;" Isai. lv. 12, "The mountains and the hills shall break forth before you into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands;" Hab. ii. 11, "For the stone shall cry out of the wall, and the beam out of the timber shall answer it;" Psal. lxxxix. 12, "Tabor and Hermon shall rejoice in thy name;" Psal. xcvii. 1, "The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice; let the multitude of the isles be glad thereof;" Isai. xxiv. 4, "The earth mourneth and fadeth away, the world mourneth, languisheth and fadeth away." See also Psal. xcviii. 8; Isai. xvi. 8; xxxv. 1, 2; xlix. 13; Lev. xviii. 28, &c. &c.

Now rejoicing, shouting for joy, singing, breaking forth into singing, clapping of hands, crying out, answering, mourning, languishing, &c. are certainly in these passages applied to inanimate creatures. But they are applicable to such creatures, not more naturally and obviously, than earnest expectation, groaning and travailing in pain.

Though the Doctor thinks these expressions not properly applicable to any other creatures than mankind; yet he himself applies them to mankind in no other sense, than that in which they are applicable to the brutal creation. The sense in which he supposes all mankind *long* and *wait* for the manifestation of the sons of God, is, that they "groan under the afflictions of this world, sensible of its imperfections, and consequently desire something better." Now the calamities of the world fall not on the rational part of it only, but on all the animal, sensitive parts, and consequently they, as well as mankind, "desire something better." From these calamities and miseries the animal parts of the world will be delivered, at the manifestation of the sons of God.

Further, the inanimate parts of the world, once personified, as they are in innumerable instances throughout the scriptures, may as properly have the particular personal affections, actions and sufferings, of *expectation*, *waiting*, *groaning*, *travailing*, &c. ascribed to them, as any other personal affections, actions or sufferings.

If any should think it impossible for brutes and inanimate matter to enjoy the liberty of the children of God, and therefore that it is absurd to represent, that they shall be delivered into that liberty: let it be observed, that though this would be absurd, while they are represented to be still brutes and inanimate matter; yet as soon as they are represented to be intelligent beings,

the absurdity ceases. There is in this case no more absurdity in representing them, as brought into the glorious liberty of the children of God after the resurrection, than in representing, that they rejoice in the manifestation of the divine perfections and in the prevalence of true religion in this world; as is done in the passages before quoted.

Objection. Though there would be no absurdity in figuratively representing brutes and inanimate creatures, in this world, as rejoicing in the manifestations of divine power, wisdom and goodness, yet there is an absurdity in the representation, that they shall be brought into the liberty of the children of God, after the end of the world; because then they will be annihilated; and to represent that after they shall be annihilated, they still enjoy glorious liberty, is a gross inconsistency. This is the objection in its full strength.—Let us attend to it.

It is not agreed by all writers, that the liberty of the children of God mentioned in the 21st verse, means that liberty and blessedness which they shall enjoy after the resurrection and general judgment; some are of the opinion, that it means that liberty which they shall enjoy on earth in the latter days, when Christ shall reign on earth for a thousand years.* If this be the true sense of the apostle, the objection vanishes at once, as the brutal and inanimate creation will then be in as real existence, as they are now.

Nor is it agreed among writers, that this world will, after the general judgment be annihilated. It is the opinion of many, and of great authority too, that after a purification by fire, it will be restored to a far more glorious state, than that in which it is at present, and will

* See Guise's Paraphrase in Loc. and Hopkins's Inquiry concerning the Future State of the Wicked. Page 101.

forever be the place of the residence of holy and happy beings.—If this be true, the objection again vanishes.

Finally, if it be the real truth, that the brutal and material creation will be annihilated, after the general judgment, yet there is no absurdity in representing, that it shall be brought into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Wherein does the liberty of the children of God consist? Doubtless in a great measure in deliverance from sin, and from the influence of it in themselves and others. So the brutal and material creation, even if it be annihilated, shall be delivered from the power, abuse and abominable perversion of wicked men, to which it had been long subjected, and under which it had long groaned. Therefore this creation introduced as a rational person, may, without impropriety be represented as earnestly wishing for that deliverance. And as the deliverance from sin in themselves and from the effects of sin in others, is at least a great part of the liberty which the children of God shall obtain after the general judgment; so the aforesaid deliverance of the creation may not improperly be called a deliverance into the liberty of the children of God, into a similar liberty, a like freedom from the tyranny, abuses and perversions of wicked men. Or the sense may be a deliverance *in*, *at*, or *on occasion of*, the glorious liberty of the children of God. The preposition εις, is capable of this sense, and then the construction of this passage will be, That the creation itself will be delivered from the bondage of corruption, at the time, or on occasion, of the glorious liberty or deliverance of the children of God.

2. Doctor C. further pleads, "That πασα κτισις, *the whole creation*, is never used (one disputed text only excepted, Col. i. 15,) to signify more than the whole moral

creation, or all mankind."*—This is a matter of importance, and requires particular attention.—The phrase πασα κτισις is used four times only in all the New Testament, beside the instance which is now under consideration. The places are, Mark xvi. 15, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to *every creature*;" Col. i. 15, "The first born of *every creature*;" v. 23, "The gospel which ye have heard, which is preached to every creature, which is under heaven;" 1 Pet. ii. 13, "Submit yourselves to *every ordinance of man* for the Lord's sake."

As to Mark xvi. 15, it is granted, that in that text *every creature* means *human* creature.—Though Dr. C. says, that Col. i. 15, is disputed; yet he pretends not, that every creature here means mankind merely: nor does it appear, that the text is in this respect disputed. It is indeed disputed, whether πασης κτισεως, *every creature*, or rather, *all the creation*, refer to the new creation, i. e. the church, or to the old creation, which was made at the beginning of the world. It is also disputed, whether Christ be so the first born of all the creation, as to be a creature himself; or whether he be the first born in this sense only, that he is the heir, the head and Lord of all the creation. Πρωτοτοκος, in our version rendered first-born, is by some rendered *first creator* or *producer*, which gives a still different sense to the passage. But it does not appear, that it has ever been contended, that πασης κτισεως "signifies no more than all mankind." For in whatever sense Christ is the first-born of all the creation, he is the first-born not only of the human race, but of all the creation absolutely. If it be said, that Christ is the first-born of all the creation, as he is the first creature which was made; this implies, that he was made not

* Page 99.

before all men only, but before all creatures. If it be said, that he is the first-born of all the creation, as he was begotten from eternity, and so begotten before all the creation; still he was in this sense begotten not before all men only, but before all creatures. If it be said, that he is the first-born of all the creation, as he is the heir, the head, the Lord of all; still in this sense he is the first-born not of mankind only, but of all creatures.—What right then had Dr. C. to suggest, that it is disputed, whether πασης κτισεως in this text "signify more than the whole moral creation of this world, or all mankind?"

The next passage, in which πασα κτισις occurs, is Col. i. 23, "The gospel, which was preached to every creature under heaven" The Doctor, who was well acquainted with the original, doubtless recollected, or at least, he ought to have examined, and then he would have seen, that in the original it is, "εν παση τη κτισει, *in* all the creation under heaven," or in all the world. Surely the Doctor did not imagine, that the gospel was preached *within* every man.

The other passage is 1 Pet. ii. 13, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of men;" παση ανθρωπινη κτισει, *every human creature.* The question is whether these words signify *all mankind:* and the very proposing of the question, I presume, suggests the answer. Will any man say, that every Christian is required, either by reason or revelation, to submit to every indiv dual of the human race, whether man, woman or child; and whether the Christian be a lord or a tenant, a king or a subject?—Besides; allowing that the phrase as it stands, means the human race; the addition of ανθρωπινη to παση κτισει shows that παση κτισει without ανθρωπινη, would not signify the human race; otherwise why is it added? If the words in our language, *every creature*, mean always every human creature, it would be needless in any case to insert the

adjective *human;* and the very insertion of it would imply, that the writer or speaker was of the opinion, that the bare words *every creature*, were not certainly limited to human creatures, but would most obviously be taken in a greater extent.—This text therefore is so far from a proof, that "πασα κτισις, *every creature*, is never used in all the New Testament (except in one disputed text) to signify more than all mankind;" that it is a clear proof, that it does naturally "signify more than all mankind," and to make it signify no more, must be limited by ανθρωπινη, *human.*

After all, the very drift of the apostle shows, that in 1 Pet. ii. 13, he was so far from meaning all mankind by the expression πασῃ ανθρωπινῃ κτισει, that he meant either not one of the human race, or at most but very few; that he meant either human laws and constitutions, or human magistrates, the king as supreme, governors who are sent by him, &c.

Now let the reader judge, whether πασα κτισις be never used in all the New Testament to signify more or less than all mankind; and whether of the four instances in which it occurs, beside this of Rom. viii. it do not in every one signify either more or less than all mankind; excepting Mark xvi. 15. And it is equally against Dr. C's argument from Rom. viii. whether it be used in other places to signify more, or to signify less than all mankind. If it signify more in other places, it may signify more in Rom. viii. If it signify less in other places, it may signify less in Rom. viii.: and when the apostle says, "the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God," he may mean that only believers and true Christians, or the true church in all ages, as distinguished from the apostle, and first converts, who had the first fruits of the Spirit, are thus waiting, &c.

It is further to be observed, that κτισις, *creature* or *creation*, without πασα, is in the whole New Testament used ten times, beside the use of it in Rom. viii.; in no one of which does it mean mankind. The places in which it is used are all noted in the margin, that the reader may examine them for his own satisfaction.*

In the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, κτισις occurs but three times: 2 Chron. xiv. 15, where it is translated *cattle:* Ezra viii. 21; where it is translated *substance:* and Psal. civ. 24, where it is translated *riches.* —In the Apocrypha it is used nine times; and not once to signify all mankind and not more or less.†

But it is time we attend to Dr. C's other reason for understanding the *creature* to mean all mankind; or at least to include all mankind, if it mean any thing more. The reason is,

3. That "it would be highly incongruous, to give this style" [the whole creation] "to the inferior or less valuable part, wholly leaving out the most excellent" part, mankind.‡—But is there more propriety in calling a small part, though it be the most excellent part, *the whole creation;* than in calling by far the greater part *the whole creation*, though it be not so excellent? The learned men in any nation, are, in some respects, the most excellent part of the nation. But would it be more proper to call them, to the exclusion of all the unlearned, the whole nation, than to call all the unlearned, to the exclusion of the few learned, the whole nation? The few truly virtuous and holy persons who love God supremely and their neighbour as themselves, and who find the

* Mark x. 6; xiii. 19; Rom. i. 20, 25; 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15; Heb. iv. 13; ix. 11; 2 Pet. iii. 4; Rev. iii. 14.

† The places are, Judith ix. 12; xvi. 14; Wisd. ii. 6; v. 17; xvi. 24; xix. 6 Eccl. xvi. 17; xliii. 25; xlix. 16.

‡ Page 98.

strait gate, are undoubtedly the most excellent part of any nation. But would it be more proper to call them alone the whole nation, than to call the rest alone, the whole nation? Those of the apostolic age, who had the first fruits of the Spirit, were, without doubt the most excellent of that generation. But would it therefore be more proper to call them as distinguished from the rest of men, that whole generation; than to call the rest of men as distinguished from them, that whole generation? —Beside; propriety or congruity of language depends wholly on use. If the words *creature*, *creation* and *whole creation* be frequently in scripture used without any reference to mankind; then there is no incongruity in the same use of the same words, in this eighth chapter of Romans: and that this is the use, I appeal to the texts before quoted, which are all the texts in which the words here translated *creature*, and the *whole creation*, are to be found in all the scriptures.

II. We are to inquire into the meaning of the expression, "manifestation of the sons of God."—These words, "The earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God;" are thus paraphrased by Dr. C. "The creature, the rational creature, mankind in general, waits for the time when it shall be revealed, that they are the sons of God."* He here takes it for granted, that the word *creature* means *mankind*. Whether this be a supposition justly founded, is now submitted to the reader who has perused what has been offered on this subject.

But even on the supposition that the *creature* does mean *mankind*, how strange it is that the waiting of this creature for the manifestation of the sons of God, should mean that this creature is waiting to be *itself* manifested to be

* Page 92.

the sons of God! Would it not be strange arguing, to say, that because the Jews waited for the manifestation of the Messiah, therefore they waited to have it manifested, that they were the Messiah! or that because Simeon waited for the manifestation of the consolation of Israel; therefore he waited to have it made apparent, that he was the consolation of Israel! Yet either of these expressions as naturally imports the sense which I have now given, as the expression, *the creature waiteth* for the manifestation of the sons of God, imports, that the "creature" or race of creatures is waiting to have it "revealed that they are the sons of God."

III. The meaning of the word "vanity" next requires our attention.—By this word Dr. C. understands "*mortality* and all other unavoidable *unhappiness* and *imperfection* of this present weak, frail, mortal state."* Again, mankind were subjected to vanity or *mortality*."† "God subjected mankind to vanity, i. e. the *infelicities* of this life."‡ According to Dr. C. then, the vanity here spoken of is a *natural* evil. But it may at least be made a question, whether he be not mistaken, and whether it be not a *moral* evil. The same word, ματαιότης, is used twice more in the New Testament; Eph. iv. 17, "That ye henceforth walk, not as other gentiles walk in the *vanity* of their mind, having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God," &c.; and 2 Pet. ii. 18, "For when they speak great swelling words of *vanity*." In these two, the only instances of its use in the New Testament, beside the text under consideration, it manifestly means not a natural but a moral evil, either positive wickedness or at least a sinful deficiency. Is not this a ground of presumption at least, that also in Rom. viii. 20, it means a moral evil?

* Page 104. † Page 106. ‡ Ibid.

In the same sense ματαιος the adjective from which ματαιοτης is derived, is used Jam. i. 26, "This man's religion is vain:" and 1 Pet. i. 18, "Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things—from your *vain* conversation." Ματαιοομαι is also used in the same sense, Rom. i. 21; "Became *vain* in their imaginations and their foolish heart was darkened." *Vain* and *vanity* in none of these instances signify "mortality" or "infelicity;" but either positive sin or sinful deficiency.

Besides; the very nature of the case shows, that vanity in this instance was not used by the apostle, in Dr. C's sense. According to his sense of *vanity*, the apostle under the influence of the Holy Ghost, advances this proposition; The human race was made subject to "mortality, unavoidable unhappiness and imperfection," not willingly. But who ever supposed that the human race was made subject to these things willingly? or that any man, or any intelligent being, ever chose to be subject to mortality and unhappiness? This is a proposition too insignificant to be advanced by so sensible and grave a writer as Paul, and under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost too.—The Doctor seems to have been aware of this objection to his construction of *vanity*, and therefore supposes the word *willingly* means, not what is naturally understood by it, *a voluntary consent of the heart;* but that it means, "through some fault," "by a criminal choice." Therefore

IV. We are to inquire into the meaning of the word *willingly*.—Is it not at first blush a little extraordinary, that willingness must certainly mean a fault, a criminal choice? Suppose an historian should say, that *Hugh Peters* and others who were executed at the restoration of *Charles* the second, were executed not *willingly;* must we understand him to mean, that they were not executed in consequence of any fault of their own?—The ori-

ginal word εκων is used once more only in all the New Testament, 1 Cor. ix. 17, "If I do this thing" (i. e. preach the gospel) "*willingly*, εκων, I have a reward: but if *against my will*, ακων, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me." According to Dr. C's construction of *willingly* in Rom. viii. the meaning of the apostle is, If I preach the gospel "through some fault of my own," or "by my own criminal choice," I have a reward; but if I do it without any fault or criminal choice of my own, a dispensation of the gospel is committed unto me.

Εκουσιος derived from εκων, and of the same signification, is in the New Testament used in Philem. 14, only; "That thy benefit should not be of necessity, but *willingly*:" which I presume even Dr. C. would not expound thus; That thy benefit should not be of necessity, but through some fault of thine own.—The adverb, εκουσιως, is used twice in the New Testament, Heb. x. 26, "If we sin *wilfully*, after we have received the knowledge of the truth:" and 1 Pet. v. 2, "Taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint but *willingly*." To the first of these the Doctor in a quotation from *Taylor*, refers, as an authority, to confirm his sense of *willingly* in Rom. viii. But surely both he and Taylor made this reference with little consideration; for according to them the sense of the verse in Hebrews is this; If after we have received the knowledge of the truth, we sin "through our own fault," or "by our own criminal choice." Did Dr. C. or Dr. T. indeed believe, that we ever sin without any fault of our own, or without our own criminal choice?—It is plain, that the meaning of Heb. x. 26, is what is well expressed in the translation; If we sin *wilfully*, not through some inattention, but pertinaciously, after we know the truth, know our duty and the proper motives to it; there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin.

Thus the construction, which Dr. C. gives of *willingly*, as meaning, "through our own fault," or "by our own criminal choice," appears to be wholly unsupported by any authority; to be a mere invention to help over the difficulty of the supposition, that the inspired apostle should advance so trifling a proposition as this; that mankind do not choose misery: and also appears to be attended with many absurdities.

The error of that construction further appears from this, that if what comes upon us not through our own fault, be properly expressed by saying, that we are subjected to it, *not willingly;* then what does come upon us through our own fault, may be properly expressed, by saying, it comes upon us *willingly.* At this rate the inhabitants of the old world were drowned *willingly:* Sodom and Gomorrah were burnt up *willingly:* Pharaoh was first plagued, and then destroyed in the Red Sea *willingly:* Korah, Dathan and Abiram were swallowed up in the earth *willingly:* Those whom Dr. C. supposes to be punished in hell for ages of ages, are punished *willingly.*

Neither is it true, in Dr. C's sense, that mankind are made subject to vanity, *not willingly:* i. e. "Not through any fault of theirs;" "not by their own criminal choice."—By *vanity* he understands "mortality," "and the infelicities of this vain mortal life." Therefore according to him, men are not made subject to mortality, and the infelicities of this life, through any fault of their own. And if so, then death and the various infelicities of life are not any evidence, that the subjects of death and those infelicities are themselves sinners, or the objects of God's displeasure. But this is contrary to the whole current of scriptural representations; particularly to Ps. xc. 3, &c. "Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return ye children of men.—Thou carriest them

away, as with a flood; they are as a sleep. In the morning they are like grass, which groweth up; in the evening it is cut down and withereth. For they are consumed *by thine anger*, and by thy *wrath* they are troubled. Thou hast set our *iniquities* before thee, our secret *sins* in the light of thy countenance. For our days are passed away in thy *wrath*: we spend our days as a tale that is told. The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labour and sorrow: for it is soon cut off, and we fly away. Who knoweth the power of thine *anger*, according to thy fear, so is thy *wrath*. So teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts to wisdom." "How plain and full is this testimony, that the general mortality of mankind is an evidence of God's *anger for the sin* of those, who are the subjects of such a dispensation?"*

But if mortality and the calamities of life be an evidence of God's anger at the sin of those, who suffer death and those calamities; then it is not true, that men in general are subjected to death and those calamities, without any fault of their own; but the truth is, that they are subjected to them on account of their own sin, as this is the very cause of the divine anger, of which calamity and death are the effects and tokens.

If it should be objected, that to be made subject to vanity, in this passage, does not mean, to be made actually to suffer death and infelicity, or does not include the *infliction* of death and infelicity; but implies mortality only, or that constitution whereby men are made mortal or *liable* to death and infelicity: this objection grants,

* For further proof that temporal death and infelicities came on men, on account of their own sins, I beg leave to refer the reader to President Edwards's book on Original Sin, Part I. Chap. ii.

that death and infelicity are actually inflicted on men on account of their own fault or sin; but holds, that the *sentence* of mortality and *liableness* to infelicity took place in consequence of Adam's sin only. So that according to this, the sense of the apostle will be, That the human race was put under a sentence of mortality, without any fault of their own; yet this sentence was never to be executed, but on account of their own fault. And the consideration that mankind are put under the sentence of mortality, without any fault of their own, is a ground of hope, that they will be delivered from that sentence of mortality. But as the *actual infliction* of death is on account of their own fault, there is no such ground of hope, that they will be delivered from death and infelicity themselves.—A mighty privilege this (were it possible) to be delivered from the *sentence* of death, and from mortality, but not from *death itself!* To be delivered from *liableness* to infelicity, but not from infelicity itself!

I am not insensible of the absurdity and impossibility of such a supposition. But who is answerable for this absurdity? Doubtless the objector himself, who is of the opinion, that to be made subject to vanity, is to be under the sentence of death, and to be made liable to infelicity, but not to suffer death or infelicity.

The idea, that to be made subject to vanity, ὑποταγη, means not the *state* of subjection to vanity, but the *act* by which the creature was subjected: and that διὰ τον ὑποταξαντα means, as Dr. C. says,* by or through him, who subjected it; implies this further absurdity, that the act, by which the creature was made subject to vanity, was by him who subjected it; or that act was really the act of him whose act it was; that he who subjected the creature to vanity, really did subject it to vanity.—But

* Page 105.

who will dare to impute such identical propositions to the inspired apostle?

V. We at length come to consider Dr. C's sense of the phrase *bondage of corruption*.—This according to him is synonymous with *vanity*: Therefore the same observations for substance, which were made concerning his sense of *vanity*, are applicable to his sense of *the bondage of corruption*. But a few things in particular are worthy of remark. Dr. C. says, that in consequence of the subjection of man "to a frail, mortal, corruptible condition —he is upon the foot of *mere law*, and without the supposition of *grace* or *gospel*, in bondage to bodily or animal appetites and inclinations."* It seems then, that since all christianized nations are under not *mere law*, but *grace* and *gospel*, they are not in bondage to bodily or animal appetites and inclinations, and doubtless for the same reason, are not in bondage to any principle of depravity. But is this indeed so, that men under *mere law* are so depraved, as to be in bondage to animal appetites; but as soon as they are placed under the gospel, in the mere external dispensation of it, they are no longer the subjects of any depravity? It seems then, that the natural depravity of men depends on their mere external circumstances; that while they are without the gospel their hearts are in bondage to animal appetites: but as soon as they are placed under the gospel, however they disregard it, they are free from that bondage. But all those nations, to whom Christianity is published, are under the gospel; therefore they are already free from bondage to animal appetites; and it is absurd for them to *hope*, that they *shall* be delivered from this part of the bondage of corruption.

Beside; Dr. C. says, that "both these senses of bondage" [i. e. bondage to death and bondage to animal

* Page 109.

appetites] "are certainly included in that vanity the creature is subjected to."* Then by the creature Dr. C. must mean, not the whole moral creation, or all mankind including those nations and individuals to whom the gospel is made known: because they are not under *mere law*, and therefore according to him are not subjected to that part of vanity which consists in bondage to animal appetites. Yet he abundantly holds, that all men are subjected to *vanity*, which certainly includes, according to him, bondage to animal appetites.

According to Dr. C. vanity includes bondage to bodily or animal appetites. Yet mankind are subjected to vanity not through any fault or crime of their own. But is it not a fault or crime in any man, to be governed by his bodily appetites, or to be in bondage to them? With what truth or consistency then could he hold, that men are subjected to vanity not through any fault or crime of their own, and that therefore their subjection to vanity is a ground of hope of deliverance from it; when the very state of subjection to vanity is a very great fault or crime? Can a fault or crime be a ground of hope of impunity, or of the divine favour?

But perhaps it may be pleaded, that though the *state* of subjection, or the being subject to vanity, implies a fault; yet the *act of subjecting*, or the act by which mankind were subjected, to vanity, is not through, or on account of any previous fault of mankind in general; and this is the ground of hope that they shall be delivered. If this be the meaning of Dr. C. it comes to this. That because mankind are, in consequence of Adam's sin, not their own personal sin, subjected by God to frailty, mortality, bodily appetites and sin; therefore they do not deserve to be left without hope of deliverance: the

* Page 109.

divine perfections do not admit of it: it would not be just: at least it would be a hard case. Otherwise where is the ground of hope of deliverance? No promise is pleaded as the ground of this hope. The only pretended ground of hope in this argument is, that mankind were subjected to vanity, not through any fault of their own: as in the following passage; "For if mankind were subjected to a state of suffering, not through any wilful disobedience which they themselves had been personally guilty of, it is congruous to reason to think, that they should be subjected to it not finally—but with room for hope that they should be delivered from it: and was it not for this hope, it cannot be supposed—it would be a reflection on the—benevolence of the Deity to suppose, that they would have been subjected to it."* But if this subjection to vanity by God be perfectly just, what right have we to expect, that God will deliver *all* men from the consequences of it? Have we a right, without a divine promise to expect, that God will suffer none of the sinful race of men, to bear the consequences of a just and wise constitution? And would it be a reflection on the Deity, not to expect this?

So that this whole argument of Dr. C. implies that God in subjecting mankind, on account of Adam's sin, "to a state of suffering," made an unjust constitution. Yet Dr. C. himself abundantly holds, that this is a real constitution of God.

At the same time, it is implied in all this, that if mankind had been thus subjected to vanity, in consequence of their own personal sin; they might justly have been left without hope. Thus it is really granted by Dr. C. after all his labour to prove the contrary, that the personal sins of men, deserve a hopeless state of suffering. And the whole question in the present view of it, comes

* Page 102.

to this, Whether the personal actual sins of mankind, under the present divine constitution, be real sins, and deserve the punishment justly due to sin: or whether these sins be not excusable, because they are the established consequence of Adam's transgression ,and not the consequence of their own voluntary act. Or in other words, whether the moral evil of any action consist in the nature of the action itself, or in its cause or antecedents. Of this question I should be very willing to enter into the discussion, were it necessary: but as it has been so particularly considered by another author, I beg leave to refer to him."* I beg the reader's patience however, while I make only one or two brief observations.

If the present actions of mankind be excusable, because they are the consequence of Adam's transgression and not of their own previous sinful actions or volitions, in the first instance; it will follow that there is no sin or moral evil in the world, nor ever has been. All the present actions of men, if they be excusable, are no moral evil. The same is true of all the actions of men ever since the fall of Adam. And even Adam's transgression itself is no moral evil; for this did not take place in consequence of any previous criminal choice or action; because by supposition, that transgression was the first sin committed by man. Whatever transgression he first committed, is the very transgression of which we are speaking: and it is absurd to talk of a sin previous to the first sin.

Concerning Dr. C's idea, that mankind are subjected to mortality, infirmity, and the influence of bodily appetites, on account of Adam's sin only, without any regard to their personal sins; and that this subjection was the cause and occasion of all the actual transgressions and

* President Edwards's Enquiry into Freedom of Will throughout; particularly Part iv. Sect. i.

temporal calamities of the posterity of Adam; it may be observed;

1. That for reasons already given,* it appears not to be true, that mortality and the calamities of life are brought on men on account of Adam's sin merely, without regard to the personal demerit of those who suffer them.

2. That the human race was indeed, in the sentence of God on Adam, subjected to infirmity and mortality: but it was no more subjected to these, than it was to depravity and sin. At least to assert the contrary would be to beg an important point in dispute: and to be sure, Dr. C. could not with any consistency assert the contrary. He holds throughout this, and all his other works, that the human race is subjected to infirmity on account of Adam's sin, and the Doctor's idea of this infirmity amounts to a proper moral depravity of nature. All that is meant, or that needs to be meant, by the moral depravity natural to mankind, in this fallen state, so far as that depravity is distinct from *actual* sin, is something in our nature, which universally leads to actual sin. Whether this something exist primarily in the body and bodily appetites, or primarily in the soul, is perfectly immaterial, so long as it is an unfailing source of actual sin, as Dr. C. manifestly considers it.† In his *Five Dissertations* he is very explicit and abundant in this matter. His words are, "In consequence of the operation of appetites and inclinations seated in our mortal bodies, we *certainly shall*, without the interposition of grace—do that—the doing of which will denominate us the *captives of sin* and the *servants of corruption*."‡ "He" [the apostle] "ascribes it to *the flesh*, by means of the *overbearing influence* of its propensities in this our present mortal state, that—we do that which our minds disapprove;"§ and in many other passages to the same effect.

* See page 190. † See page 45, &c. ‡ Page 277. § Ibid.

—So that Dr. C. really, though it seems undesignedly, held, that moral depravity of nature comes upon all mankind, on account of Adam's sin: and his favourite construction of Rom. v. 12; "And so death passed upon all men, *for that*" (or as he will have it, *whereupon, in consequence of which*) "all have sinned;" comes to this only; that on account of Adam's sin, a divine sentence was denounced on the whole human race, dooming it to a state of moral depravity; in consequence of which moral depravity all men commit actual sin. What then has the Doctor gained by the construction of this passage, which he has laboured so hardly in this and his other works to establish; and in which he claims to be an orginal; and which perhaps is the only particular in his whole book, with respect to which he has a right to set up this claim? It is also curious to see a gentleman of Dr. C's abilities, both opposing and defending with all his might, the native moral depravity of human nature!

Reasons have been already given, why *willingly* ought to be understood not to mean *through the fault of a person;* but in its original proper sense, *with the consent of a person.* If those reasons be sufficient, there is a further difficulty in Dr. C's construction of this passage, especially of the 20th verse. According to his construction of κτισις, *creature*, the apostle declares, that mankind are subject to their bodily appetites, and so to sin, not willingly, not with their own consent. But is it possible, that men should be subject to bodily appetites, and should commit actual, personal sin, without their own consent?—If, to evade this observation, it be said, that they are however by the act of God, without any previous consent of their own, subjected to frailty, mortality, bodily appetites, and so to sin; this would be mere trifling. Who ever imagined, that God first waited for the consent of mankind, and having obtained their con-

sent, established the constitution, by which they became mortal, frail, subject to the influence of their bodily appetites and so to sin?

After all, Dr. C's exposition of this paragraph in Rom. viii. is by no means, even on his own principles, a proof of universal salvation. His translation of those most important words in the 20th and 21st verses, is this, "The creature was subjected to vanity, not willingly; but by the judicial sentence of him, who subjected it, *in consequence of a previous hope*, that even this very creature should be delivered from its slavery of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." So that the utmost, which this passage teaches, according to his own account, is, that mankind may now *hope*, that they shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. But what if there be a foundation to *hope* that this will be the case? Does it thence follow, that this hope will certainly be fulfilled? In consequence of the death of Christ and the proclamation of the gospel, there is a door of hope set open to all men. But does it hence follow, that all men will certainly enter in at this door, and secure the blessings for which there is a foundation to hope? Dr. C, would doubtless grant, that there is a door of *hope* opened to mankind in general, that they may be saved immediately after death. Yet he would not pretend, that this hope is realized. God delivered the Israelites out of Egypt in such a manner, as gave *hope* that even that generation would enter the promised land. Yet this hope was not fulfilled.—Therefore, though it should be granted, that God hath subjected mankind to vanity *in hope*, that they shall be delivered from it, into the glorious liberty of the children of God, it would by no means follow, that all men will be saved: and Dr. C. is entirely mistaken, when he says, "Mankind universally is ex-

pressly made, in the 21st verse, the subject of this glorious immortality."* No such thing is expressly said, and in these words he contradicts his own paraphrase of that verse, in which he pretends no more, than that there is a foundation for *hope*, that mankind shall attain to a glorious immortality.

In the preceding remarks on Dr. C's construction of this passage, the sense, which I suppose to be the true one, hath been sufficiently expressed. Yet it may be proper here briefly to repeat it.—The earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creation is subject to that use to which it is applied by sinful men, which, as to the end of its existence, the divine glory, is in its own natural tendency, vain and unprofitable, and in many respects positively sinful; I say, to this it is subject not voluntarily, but on account of him, for the sake of his glory (διὰ governing the accusative) or for the accomplishment of the mysterious, but wise and glorious purposes of him, who subjected the same in hope, that this same creation shall be delivered from this unprofitable and sinful use, which may justly be considered as a state of bondage to it, into a liberty, in several important respects, similar to that of the children of God; or at least shall be delivered at the time, when the children of God shall be admitted to the enjoyment of their most glorious liberty. For we know, that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now, by reason of that vile abuse and perversion, which is made of it by sinful men, and through desire of that deliverance just mentioned, and in due time to be granted it.

Beside the observations on particular parts of Dr. C's construction of Rom. viii. some more general remarks occur.—One is, that his construction implies, that the

* Page 102.

divine law is unjust, and cannot be executed consistently with justice. He says,* that man on the foot of *mere law*, without grace, is in bondage to bodily appetites: therefore on the foot of mere law, without grace, there is no hope for him. And he speaks† of the case of mankind as remediless, without the grace manifested in Jesus Christ. Yet in the same page he says, "It is the thought, that mankind were subjected to suffering, not remedilessly, but with an intention of mercy," and "it is this thought only, that can reconcile the unavoidable sufferings of the race of men, as occasioned by the lapse of Adam, with the perfections of God." So that God made a law, which could not be executed, consistently with his perfections, and he was obligated in justice to shew mercy through Christ, to mankind. By mere law men were remediless, and if they had been suffered to remain in that remediless state, as they would have remained in it without Christ and the gospel, such a dispensation could not have been reconciled with the perfections of God. Therefore the divine law cannot be reconciled with justice, or with the perfections of God.

According to Dr. C. vanity included in it *bondage* to bodily appetites, as well as *bondage* to death.‡ Therefore, as God could not consistently with his perfections, subject mankind to vanity, without an intention of mercy;§ and as it would be a reflection on the Deity, to suppose, that he has subjected mankind to vanity, without hope of deliverance:‖ therefore on these principles, God could not consistently with his perfections and character, avoid giving mankind a ground of hope of deliverance from sin, or he could not withhold the grace of the gospel: but he was obliged in justice to his own character, to deliver men from both sin and the sufferings of this

* Page 109. † Page 122. ‡ Page 109. § Page 122. ‖ Page 103.

life, and it may be presumed, that Dr. C. would have consented to add, and from the sufferings of hell too. Where then is the grace of the gospel, and of the gift of Christ? In the gift of Christ, in the institution of the gospel, and in every thing pertaining to it, so far as was necessary to our deliverance from sin and punishment, God has done no more than was necessary to save his own character from reflections and reproach.

It may be further remarked, that Dr. C.* argues, that because men are subjected to a state of suffering, not through their own personal disobedience; "it is congruous to reason to think, that they should be subjected to it, not *finally*." But why does he say, "not finally?" He might with the same strength of argument have said, *not at all*. The calamities of this life, with temporal death, are inflicted on mankind, either as a punishment, or as sovereign and wise dispensations of Providence. If they be inflicted as a punishment, without any sin, by which the subjects deserve them, they are as real an injury as endless misery would be, if it were inflicted as a punishment, in like manner without any sin, by which it should be deserved. And if God do indeed injure his creatures in a less degree, he is an injurious being: and what security have we concerning such a being, that he will not injure them in the highest possible degree?—So that if God be a just being, as it is agreed on all hands, that he is, it is equally "congruous to reason to think," that he would not subject his creatures to a temporary state of suffering, as a punishment, without any sin, by which they deserved it, as that he would not subject them to a state of final suffering.

If it be said, that death and the calamities of life are not a punishment of mankind, but mere sovereign, wise dispensations of Providence; this supposition opens a

* Page 103.

door for endless misery. For how do we know, that the same sovereign wisdom, which is now supposed to inflict temporary evils on mankind, may not also see fit to inflict on them endless evils?

According to Dr. C. men are by a divine constitution subjected to vanity including mortality, infelicity and bondage to bodily appetites. But why was this constitution made? Was it made for the greater happiness of every individual, or of the system, or of both? Which ever of these answers be given, it will follow, that evil, both natural and moral is subservient to good; and is introduced, if not in the first instance of Adam's transgression, yet in every other instance, by the positive design and constitution of God. Evil therefore both natural and moral, makes a part of the scheme of God, takes place by his constitution, and is subject to his control? What then becomes of the scheme of self-determining power, for which Dr. C. is so zealous an advocate? And here how justly may many passages in Dr. C's writings be retorted? Particularly the following; "If men's volitions and their consequent effects, are the result of invariable necessity in virtue of some *exterior causes* so inviolably connected, as that they will and must come to pass, the author of this connexion, which according to this plan is God, is the only efficient and real author of whatever has been, or shall hereafter be brought into event; not excluding any of the most complicated villanies that have been, or may be perpetrated by any of the sons of Adam. Is this a scheme of thoughts fit to be embraced by intelligent creatures?"*

Beside, if this constitution were made for the greater happiness of every individual, then every individual is more happy than he would have been, if he had not been subjected to vanity; and then there is no such thing as

* Benevolence of the Deity, page 136.

punishment in the subjection to vanity, or in any of its consequences; nor any foundation, with a view to the private interest of any man, to regret any of the evils of this life, or of that which is to come.

It does not however appear to be fact, that every individual is in this life rendered more happy, by the evils which he suffers here: and to say that he will be rendered by them more happy on the whole hereafter, neither appears to be fact, nor to be capable of proof. How will any man prove, that the Sodomites will on the whole be more happy, than Enoch and Elijah, who never tasted death?

If all men be subjected to vanity, to promote not their personal good, but the good of the system, and the good of individuals be given up to this end; why may we not in the same way account for endless punishment?—If it be not consistent with the divine perfections to subject men to suffering, unless it issue in their personal good; then it is not consistent with the divine perfections to punish at all, either in this world, or the future.

CHAPTER XI.

CONTAINING REMARKS ON DR. C'S ARGUMENTS FROM COL. I. 19, 20; EPH. I. 10, AND 1 TIM. II. 4.

THE first of those texts is: "For it pleased the Father, that in him all fullness should dwell. And having made peace by the blood of the cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself: by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven."—Dr. C's sense of this passage is this: *"It pleased the Father—by Jesus

* Page 127.

Christ—to change back all things to himself—to change the state of this lower world, of the men and of the things, whether they be on earth, or in the aerial heaven, that encompasses it." It was his opinion, that to reconcile all these things, is to rechange their state, or bring them back to that state they were originally in.* With reference to mankind, he says,† "By Christ their state was changed back, they were absolutely brought back to the condition they would have been in, had it not been for the lapse; what I mean is, that they were absolutely and unconditionally put into salvable circumstances."—But what follows from all this? One would think Dr. C. had forgotten himself Supposing all this were granted, would it follow, that all men will be saved? That because they are in salvable circumstances, therefore their actual salvation will be effected? No, no more than from the original state of Adam, it followed that he would never fall. He was indued with a power to stand: he was in such circumstances, that he might have continued in his original innocence. Yet he fell. So, though it be granted, that all men are by Christ put into salvable circumstances, yet through their obstinate impenitence and unbelief they may fail of this great salvation.—Doubtless Dr. C. believed, that by Christ the state of mankind is so changed, that they are all salvable, or may be saved, immediately after the end of this world. But this notwithstanding, he believed also, that a great part of mankind would die impenitent, and that none of *them* would be saved within a thousand years of the end of this world, and some of them not till after ages of ages.

But in aid of his argument from this passage, the Doctor brings in again, Rom. v. 10, "For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his son; *much more* being reconciled, we shall be saved, by

* Page 129. † Page 132.

his life." I have formerly remarked on the Doctor's use of this passage; and need not repeat those remarks. It may be observed, however, that the manner of his applying this passage to strengthen his argument from Col. i. 20, really implies, that this last text taken by itself, contains no argument at all, and therefore ought never to have been introduced as a proof. Whatever force there is in it, to prove universal salvation, depends entirely, according to Dr. C's stating of the matter, on Rom. v. 10, which has been considered already.—So that if his sense of Col. i. 20, be true, it does nothing towards proving the salvation of all men.

I do not however mean to suggest, that Dr. C's sense is, in my opinion, the true one. It is impossible, that all things should be brought back, in all respects, to their original state. All mankind cannot now live in the garden of Eden. It cannot be again fact, that all the knowledge of God possessed by men, should be such as is derived from either the works of creation and providence, or from immediate intercourse of God and angels with men. Nor can it be ever again true, that God is propitious to men immediately, without a mediator. In these, and perhaps many other respects, mankind cannot be changed back to their original state. But if once the advocates for universal salvation admit of limitations, and say, that all things will however be brought to their original state in many respects, the believers in endless punishment too must be allowed to apply their limitations; and they will allow, that as the original state was a state of order, regularity and due subordination, wherein every person and thing were in their proper places; so in this sense all things will finally be brought back to their original state, and order will be again restored to the universe.

Nor does the verb αποκαλλαττω signify in general to change any thing back to its former state. For instance, if two men had been long and habitual enemies to each other; and if having for a while become friends, they should return to their former enmity; I believe no critic in the Greek language would think this return to their enmity, would be properly expressed by αποκαλλαττω, *reconcile*. When the Jews were brought home from the Babylonish captivity, they were changed back to their former state. But is this change ever expressed by αποκαλλαττω, *reconcile?*

This verb is never used in the New Testament, but to signify a change, whereby those who were at enmity, become friends. This observation is true of all those words of the same derivation, on which Dr. C. criticises so abundantly from page 128, to 142. It is therefore not applicable to *all* the things on this earth, and in the aerial heaven, unless it be by the figure *prosopopoeia*. By that figure indeed every thing animate and inanimate may be said to be alienated from man, in consequence of his sin; and to be reconciled to him in consequence of the blood of the cross, and of the return of man to God through Christ. But if this were the idea of Dr. C. he should have given up his objection to the sense of Rom. viii. 19, &c. given by the believers in endless punishment; and at the same time he would have virtually given up his own sense of that passage.

It is strange, that Dr. C. as well as the translators of the Bible, should render the words εις αυτον in Col. i. 20, *unto himself*. In the preceding verse we have εν αυτω; in the 20th verse we have δι' αυτου, σταυρου αυτου, and again, δι' αυτου. Now it seems very odd, that in this multiplied use of αυτος in its various cases, one instance only should be selected from the rest, and rendered *himself*, meaning the Father, and in all the other instances it should

be referred to Christ. No person without prepossession, construing this passage, would render it in that manner. It is altogether unnatural to suppose; but that αὐτος refers to the same person in all these instances, and ought to be rendered accordingly.

It is further to be observed concerning ἀποκαταλλαττω and καταλλασσω, that in all instances in which they occur in the New Testament, in the Septuagint and in the Apocrypha, the person to whom the subject of the proposition is said to be reconciled, is never once expressed in the accusative case governed by the preposition εις; but is always expressed in the dative case. Hence it may be inferred that εις αὐτον in Col. i. 20, does not mean the person to whom all things in heaven and earth are reconciled: but that it means, that all things in heaven and earth are reconciled to each other, into him: i. e. so as to be brought into Christ, to be united under him as their head, and be interested in the common advantages and blessings of his glorious kingdom.

To *be in Christ* is a common phrase of the New Testament to express subjection to Christ, and an interest in the blessings of his kingdom; and *to be reconciled into Christ*, may mean to become united to him by faith, to become subject to him in obedience, and to be interested in all the blessings of his kingdom.*

By sin angels and men, Jews and Gentiles, became alienated from each other; and men in general, by the predominancy of self-love, became virtually enemies to each other. Now it pleased the Father to reconcile by Jesus Christ, angels and men, Jews and Gentiles to each other, and to diffuse by his grace a spirit of benevolence among them, whereby they should love their neighbour as themselves. And as to the universal term *all things*,

* Whether this criticism on the words εις αὐτον, be just or not, it affects not the main question of the salvation of all men.

we cannot take it in its literal and utmost extent, unless by the figure before mentioned, which Dr. C. cannot admit, without giving up what he most earnestly contends for, in his comment on Rom. viii. 19, &c. But if we once admit a limitation of that universal term, every one must be allowed to propose his own limitation, and some doubtless will insist, that it extends to angels and to believers only from among men: as it is said, that *all* Judea, and *all* the region round about Jordan, were baptized by John: *all* men counted John that he was a prophet: *all* men came to Christ, John iii. 26.

But if we should allow, that *all* things in heaven and earth include all mankind; still even in this extent it is true, that it pleased the Father to reconcile all things; but in such a sense, as not to imply the salvation of all men. This is true in the same sense, in which God hath no pleasure in the death of the wicked, Ezek. xxxiii. 11; or in the death of him that dieth, chap. xviii. 32; in the same sense in which God was unwilling to give up Ephraim, Hos. xi. 8; and in the same sense in which Christ was unwilling to give up the inhabitants of Jerusalem, and would have gathered them together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; though they would not.—The destruction of the sinner is not in itself agreeable to God; as the punishment of a child is not in itself agreeable to a good parent. Yet as a good parent may, to secure the general good of his family, punish a disobedient child; so God, to secure the general good of his kingdom, may punish a rebellious creature. As the good parent who, to prevent that punishment to which his disobedient and apostate child must, going on in his disobedience, be subjected, uses all proper means to reclaim him; may be said to be pleased with the idea of his impunity; so the Deity who uses all proper means to reclaim all mankind, and to reconcile them to

one another, may be said to be well pleased with the idea of this reconciliation, or to choose to reconcile all men to one another, and to bring them into Christ. In itself it is the object of his choice and complacency.—In this sense it pleased the Father to reconcile all things: it was what pleased him.

On the whole it appears, that if Dr. C's sense of this passage be the true one, it affords no proof at all of universal salvation;—That his construction of it is far less favourable to that doctrine, than that which seems to be holden forth by our translation;—That if this last construction be adopted, still it would be no real proof of universal salvation, for two reasons; (1) That the universal term must be limited, and therefore may be so limited as to comprehend angels and believers only of all nations. (2) That even if the universal term be extended to all mankind, still the text is capable of a construction both rational and analogous to other passages of scripture, which yet does by no means imply universal salvation. And the sequel of the apostle's discourse favours this last construction, implying, that it pleased the Father, or was in itself pleasing to the Father, to reconcile all men, *on the terms of the gospel*, and not *absolutely*, as Dr. C. supposes. The sequel is, "And you that were sometime alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled—to present you holy and unblameable and unreprovable in his sight: if ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and be not moved away from the hope of the gospel."—Will any man pretend, but that this implies, that if they did not continue in the faith, they would not be presented unblameable in the sight of God?—But this is far from the doctrine which teaches, that all mankind, whether believers or unbelievers, whether they continue in the faith or not, shall be saved.

Before I quit this part of the Doctor's book, I shall add one remark more. In his comment on this, Col. i. 20, and on Rom. v. 10, he takes great pains to make out a double reconciliation to be taught by the apostle *Paul*. "The one," he says, "means that change of state all men are absolutely brought into by the death of Christ; and is opposed to the condemnation through the lapse of the one man Adam. The other is that change of state, which is connected with an actual meetness for, and present interest in, eternal life."* But these two reconciliations are really but one; for the definition which the Doctor himself gives of the latter, perfectly agrees with the former. He abundantly holds, that "that change of state, into which all men are brought by the death of Christ," "is connected with an actual meetness for, and present interest in, eternal life;" and his whole scheme implies this: otherwise there is no certainty, that all men will be saved, in consequence of the death of Christ. The Doctor himself, in the very next sentence to that just quoted, allows, that the former reconciliation is *connected* in the scheme of God, with the latter, and *will finally issue in it*. Now, if his first kind of reconciliation be connected with that kind, which is connected with actual meetness for, and present interest in, eternal life; then that first kind of reconciliation is itself connected with actual meetness for, and present interest in, eternal life. If Jacob be connected with Isaac, and Isaac be connected with Abraham, then Jacob too is connected with Abraham.

Let us now attend to the Doctor's argument from Eph. i. 10; "That in the dispensation of the fullness of times, he might gather together in one, all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth, even in him."—On this text the Doctor says, "By

* Page 135.

means of the lapse, and what has been consequent thereupon, all things in heaven and on earth, were got into a broken, disjointed, disorderly state; and the good pleasure of God to reduce them from their present separated, disorderly state, into one duly-subjected and well subordinated whole, may very fitly be signified by the phrase, ανακεφαλαιωσασθαι τα παντα, to gather together in one all things. And this I take to be the thing intended here."* But what is this to the purpose of the salvation of all men? It is granted on all hands, that by the lapse, all things relating to men, got into a broken, disjointed, disorderly state; and that it is the good pleasure of God to reduce them from their present separated, disorderly state, into one duly-subjected, well subordinated whole, under Christ as their head; and that this is the thing intended by the apostle in this passage. But if the Doctor supposed, that this implied the repentance and salvation of all men, it was but a mere supposition without proof.

Suppose a rebellion be excited in the kingdom of a most wise and good prince, and this rebellion extend far and wide, so as to throw the whole kingdom into confusion. At length the king's son, at the head of his armies, subdues the rebels, pardons the generality, sentences the leaders, some to the gallows, others to perpetual imprisonment: and thus restores peace, tranquillity, good order and government. Is not a well subjected and duly subordinated state of things in that kingdom now restored and established, although these rebels who are confined in prison, still retain their rebellious tempers, and are not in a state of happiness?

Nor does Dr. C. pretend to point out how a well subordinated state of things proves the salvation of all men; unless it be in the following and other passages

* Page 144.

not more conclusive: "If God created all men—by Jesus Christ, we may easily collect hence, how he comes to be their common Father—and if they are his children, how fit, proper and reasonable it is, that they should be fellow-heirs to, and joint partakers in, that happy state, which he has proposed shall take place," &c.* It seems then that Eph. i. 10, proves that all men will be saved, not by any thing contained in the text itself, but because all men are the creatures of God. The argument is this: All men are the creatures of God, therefore that well subjected and duly subordinated state of things, which is to be effected by Jesus Christ, implies the salvation of all men. It seems then that that well subjected and duly subordinated state of things, does not of itself imply the final salvation of all men, and therefore this text is introduced with no force of argument. Dr. C. might have argued just as forcibly thus, All men are the creatures of God, therefore all men will be saved. But as to this argument it is entirely different from Eph. i. 10, and hath been already considered.

We are, in the last place, to attend to Dr. C's argument from 1 Tim. ii. 4; "Who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth."—The questions concerning the meaning of this text, are, as Dr. C. justly observes, two; (1) Who are meant by all men; whether all men individually, or generically. (2) Is there a certain connexion between God's willing, that all men should be saved, and their actual salvation.

1. Who are meant by *all* men, whether all men individually, or generically.—Dr. C. gives two reasons, why this expression should be understood of all men individually.

(1) "That God's willingness that all men should be saved, is brought in as an argument to enforce the duty

* Page 160.

of praying for all men,"* mentioned in the first and second verses. The Doctor takes for granted, that it is our duty to pray for all men individually; and then concludes, that all men individually are those, whom God wills should be saved. But it is by no means true, that we are to pray for all men without exception. The apostle John expressly mentions a sin unto death, and for those who commit that sin we are not to pray; 1 John v. 16, 17. Our blessed Saviour not only did not in fact pray for the world, but openly and in the most solemn manner avowed the omission; John xvii. 9. And the prophet *Jeremiah* was forbidden by God, to pray for the Jews, for their good; Jer. xiv. 11. So that when the apostle in the first verse of the context now under consideration, exhorts to pray for all men, we must of necessity, as we would not set the scripture at variance with itself, understand him to mean not all individuals without exception.

Beside, if it were our duty to pray for all individuals, it may not have been the design of the apostle in this passage to inculcate this duty. The Jewish converts to christianity were full of prejudices against the Gentiles, and above all, against the Gentile kings, and those, under whose authority they were; and who, in their opinion, had no right to exercise authority over their nation. Therefore with the utmost propriety does the apostle give the exhortation contained in the first and second verses of this context, though he meant no more, than that Christians should pray for the Gentiles of every nation, as well as for the Jews, and especially for kings and rulers among the Gentiles.

(2) The other reason given by Dr. C. why *all men* should be understood of all men *individually*, is the reason given, why God desires the salvation of all men, viz. that there is one God, and one mediator between God

* Page 164.

and men. "This," he says, "is a reason, which extends to all men" individually, "without limitation." Very true; and it is a reason, which extends to all men generically too: and therefore is a very good reason, why we should pray for the salvation of men of all nations; nor is there any thing in this reason, which proves, that the apostle meant, that all men individually would be saved.

As to Dr. C's reasoning in the following passage;* "God is as truly the God of one man, as of another; and there is therefore the same reason to think, that he should be desirous of the salvation of every man, as of any man;" it is by no means allowed to be conclusive. It depends on this postulate, which is a begging of the question: That God cannot give existence and other common benefits to a man, and not save him. I might with the same force argue thus; God is as truly the God of one man, as of another; therefore there is the same reason to think, that he should be desirous of the temporal prosperity of every man, as of some men. It is no more granted, and therefore ought no more to be asserted, without proof, that salvation is connected with this circumstance, that God is a God to every man, in the sense in which it is granted, that he is a God to every man, than that temporal prosperity is connected with that circumstance.

Further, that all men individually are intended, Dr. C. argues from this, that the apostle says, "There is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus." The Doctor says, that the man Jesus mediates between God and men universally. If by the mediation of Jesus, the Doctor meant such a mediation as will certainly issue in the salvation of all men; this again is a mere humble begging of the question. But if he meant a

* Page 164.

mediation of the following description, that Christ hath made atonement sufficient for all men; is now offering the virtue of that atonement to all men; and is using a variety of means to persuade all men to accept and trust in that atonement, and to return to God, seeking his favour and eternal life, for the sake of Christ alone; it follows not at all from such a mediation of Christ, that all individuals will be saved. It no more follows, than from the facts, that God led the Israelites out of Egypt by the hand of a mediator; that he gave them opportunity to enter the land of promise; and that that mediator was the mediator of that whole generation individually; it followed, that that whole generation individually, would certainly enter the land of promise.

Dr. C. says,* "No good reason can be assigned, why the man, Christ Jesus, should mediate between God and "*some men only, to the exclusion of others.*" Can a good reason be assigned, why Christ leads to repentance in this life, some men only, to the exclusion or dereliction of others? When such a reason shall be assigned, doubtless we shall be supplied with a reason, why Christ should effectually and savingly mediate in behalf of some men only.

2. The other question concerning the meaning of this text, which also Dr. C. notices,† is, Whether there be a certain connexion between God's willing in the sense of this text, that all men should be saved, and their actual salvation.—Dr. C. grants that men as free agents have *power* to oppose those means which God uses with them for their salvation; and yet holds that God has a power to counteract, in a moral way, this opposition of men.‡ Of this and other remarkable things in Dr. C. on the subject of *free agency*, particular notice will be taken hereafter.—In the mean time it may be observed, that it

* Page 165. † Page 166. ‡ Page 166, 167.

appears from various passages of scripture, that God is frequently said to *will* things which do not in fact come into existence, or with respect to which his will is not efficacious: as in the following passages: Matt. xxiii. 37, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them which are sent unto thee; how often *would I*, ηθελησα, have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; and ye *would not!*" Hos. xi. 8; "How shall I give thee up Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together." Deut. v. 28, 29; "They have well said all that they have spoken. O that there were such an heart in them, that they would fear me and keep my commandments always!" chap. xxxii. 28, 29; "For they are a nation void of counsel, neither is there any understanding in them. O that they were wise, that they understood this, that they would consider their latter end!" Psal. lxxxi. 13; "O that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways!" Isai. xlviii. 18; "O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandments! Then had thy peace been as a river, and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea." Luke xii. 47; "And that servant which knew his Lord's *will*, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his *will*." &c. Matt. xxi. 31; "Whether of them twain did the *will* of his Father? They say unto him, the first."

Now what right had Dr. C. to suppose, that the *will of God* in 1 Tim. ii. 4, is not used in the same sense as in the passages just quoted? And if it be used in the same sense, there is no more absurdity in supposing that the will of God should be resisted in the one case, than in the other: no more absurdity in the supposition, that God should will the salvation of all men, and yet all

should not be saved: than that he should will to gather together the inhabitants of Jerusalem, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings; and yet that they should not be thus gathered.

Beside the texts quoted above, I may further refer to Ezek. xviii. 32; "I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God." Yet his death did, by the words of this text, take place in fact. So that here is a most plain instance of an event which takes place contrary, in some sense, to the pleasure or will of God.—Dr. C's reasoning is this; Whatever God wills, will come to pass. God wills the salvation of all men; therefore this will come to pass. To apply this reasoning to the text last quoted, it will stand thus; Whatever God wills, comes to pass. But God wills the continued life of him that dieth; therefore it comes to pass, that he who dieth, does not die.

The truth is, God wills the salvation of all men, in the same sense that he wills the immediate repentance and sanctification of all men; or as he wills them to be as perfect, in this life, as their heavenly Father is perfect. He now commands all men every where to repent, to believe the gospel and to comply with the necessary conditions of salvation: and complying with those conditions, they shall be saved immediately after the present state.—So that God's willing that all men should be saved, no more proves that all men will be saved, than his willing that all men should immediately repent, proves, that all will immediately repent; or than his willing that all men should be perfect in this world, and comply with his law as perfectly as the angels do in heaven, proves that these things will actually take place in this world.

It is presumed, that Dr. C. would not have denied, that it is the will of God in some sense, and that a proper

sense too, that all men be brought to repentance in this state, and that they be saved immediately after this state. Yet God does not *efficaciously* will either of these things. —Was it not in a proper sense the will of God, that our first parents should retain their original innocence, and not by their apostacy deluge the world in sin and misery? I presume this will not be denied. It was his will, if it was his command. But if it was the will of God, that Adam should stand and not fall; the will of God in this case was not efficacious. And if it was not efficacious to prevent the entrance of sin into the world, how can we know, that it will be efficacious to extirpate it out of the world, or from among the human race? If God was not in any proper sense willing that sin and misery should enter and predominate in the world; then it seems, that infinite power and wisdom were in this instance baffled. And if these divine perfections have been baffled once, they may be baffled a second time, and notwithstanding all their attempts, sin and misery may continue without end, in some of the human race. If on the other hand, although God commanded and in a proper sense willed, that man should stand; still in another sense he consented, or willed, that he should fall: in the same sense God may consent, that some men shall be the subjects of sin and misery to an endless duration.

Dr. C. "readily owns, that men, as free agents, have the power of *resisting* and *opposing* those means, which God from his desire of their salvation, may see fit to use with them."* "Yet it appears" to him "a gross reflection on that Being, who is infinitely perfect, to suppose him unable finally to *counteract*, and in a moral way too, the weakness, folly and obstinacy of such poor inferior creatures, as men are."† How these two propositions, which in the Doctor's book occur within a page, can be

* Page 166. † Page 167.

reconciled with each other; how man can have a power to resist all the means which God uses to effect his salvation, and at the same time God can have a power to counteract, in a moral way, this obstinate resistance of man, must certainly be set down among *the things hard to be understood* in Dr. C.

But perhaps the word *finally* in the second quotation is emphatical, and Dr. C's meaning is, that though the power of resisting in man cannot consistently with free agency be counteracted even by God, at *once*, or in a *short time;* yet it may be counteracted in a very long time. This however will not agree with Dr. C's own language. He says,* "The power in men of resisting the means, which God from desire of their salvation sees fit to use with them, ought not to be overruled, nor indeed can be in consistence with moral agency." Now to counteract or overrule in a long time this power of resisting, is as really to overrule it, as to overrule it in a short time. But according to Dr. C. it cannot be overruled in consistency with moral agency. It seems then, that if the damned shall be finally brought to repentance by God counteracting their obstinacy, they are stripped of their moral agency.

Or if it be pleaded, that this counteracting is not an *effectual* overruling; but such an influence of means and motives, as is consistent with moral agency: still this gives no satisfaction. Is it such a counteracting, as will *certainly* and "*infallibly*" be followed by the repentance and salvation of the sinner? This is holden by Dr. C.† If this be so, what moral power of still resisting has the sinner at the time of his repentance? And if he have at that time no moral power of further resistance, then this power is overruled *effectually*, and of course, according to Dr. C's scheme, the sinner is deprived of his moral agency.

* Page 166. † Page 167.

If on the other hand it be said, that the counteracting be not such as will certainly and "infallibly" be followed by the repentance of the sinner; then there is no certainty that the sinner will ever under the most powerful means which God shall use with him, be brought to repentance and be saved. Thus the certainty of universal salvation at once comes to nothing. There is no certainty, no ground of assurance, that all will be saved; and all the truth is, that God will use means with sinners hereafter, as he does in this state, to prepare them for salvation; but as in this state, so in the future, sinners may, or may not, comply with those means.

To Dr. C. "it appeared a gross reflection on that being who is infinitely perfect, to suppose him unable *finally* to counteract, and in a moral way too, the obstinacy of men."* But is it no reflection on God, to suppose him not to have been able in a moral way, to prevent the entrance of sin into the world? Is it no reflection on him to suppose, that he is not able in a moral way to counteract the obstinacy of men in this life? Is it no reflection to suppose, that he is not able, by the powerful means used in hell, to counteract it, in a single instance, for the space of a thousand years?† How long must God be unable to counteract human obstinacy, before the imputation of such inability becomes a reflection on him? How long may he consistently with his perfections be unable to counteract that obstinacy? and what duration of that inability may be imputed to him, without a reflection on him, and what duration of it cannot be imputed to him without a reflection? If it be no reflection on God, to say, that he is unable to counteract that obstinacy within a thousand years; is it a reflection to say, that he is unable to counteract it in two thousand, in ten thousand, or in an hundred thousand years? If

* Page 167. † See pages 402. 403.

not, why does it become a reflection to say, that he is unable *finally* to counteract it?—Let any believer in Dr. C's scheme answer these questions.

Doctor C's reasoning in the following passage, is worthy of notice; *"If God desires the salvation of all, and Christ died that this desire of God might be complied with, is it credible that a small portion of men only should be saved in event?"—This reasoning may be retorted thus: If God desires that all men be saved immediately after this life, and Christ died that this desire might be complied with; is it credible, that a small portion of men only should be then saved?

The advocates for universal salvation, one and all, bring in the text now under consideration, "Who will have all men to be saved," as a proof of their doctrine. Therefore I wish to ask them, from what they believe all men are, according to these words, to be saved? From an endless punishment? Then they were by a divine constitution exposed to an endless punishment; then an endless punishment is just; then sin deserves an endless punishment; then sin is an infinite evil; which to them is an infinitely horrible doctrine. But let them, if they can, avoid it, once allowing that all men are to be saved from an endless punishment. Or are all men, according to these words, to be saved from a temporary punishment? What temporary punishment? Not that which is to continue for ages of ages: some will suffer that. Not from a longer temporary punishment; because none such is threatened; and sinners are not exposed to a punishment greater than that which is threatened in the divine law.—On the whole, according to universalism, these words mean, that all men shall be saved indeed, but shall be saved from—NOTHING.

* Page 168.

CHAPTER XII.

DOCTOR C'S ARGUMENTS FROM PSAL. VIII. 5, 6; HEB. II. 6—9; PHIL. II. 9, 10, 11; 1 COR. XV. 24—29; AND REV. V. 13; CONSIDERED.

His argument from Psal. viii. 5, 6, and Heb. ii. 6—9, is built on those words, "Thou hast put all things under his feet." He was of the opinion, that those words mean, by the universality of the terms, that even *sin itself* shall be subjected to Christ; and that sin cannot be subjected to Christ in any other way, than by the destruction of it.* But this is to suppose what is by no means granted, and ought not to have been asserted without proof. An enemy may be overpowered, taken, imprisoned, and put entirely under the power, or under the feet of the conqueror; and yet not be put to death or annihilated. When it is said Christ's *enemies shall be made his footstool*, Psal. cx. 1; Heb. x. 13; no one will pretend, that this means either a cordial submission to Christ, or an annihilation. When the captains of Israel put their feet on the necks of the Canaanitish kings, Josh. x. 24, as this was no token of cordial submission or reconciliation; so it is certain, that those kings were not then annihilated. The same idea is naturally suggested by that expression, *Put under his feet.* Not any of these phrases is allowed to be used in scripture, to express either a cordial submission, or annihilation. Sin is such an enemy, as never can in its nature be reduced to a cordial submission to Christ. Nor needs it to be annihilated, to answer the expression of being put under the feet of Christ: nor indeed does that expression naturally suggest the idea of annihilation; but naturally, if not

* Page 179.

necessarily implies the contrary. An enemy may be under the feet of his conqueror before he is annihilated, but after he is annihilated, he is neither under his feet, nor in any other place. To be under the feet therefore implies existence: and sin may properly be said to be put under the feet of Christ, when it is so restrained and exemplarily punished, that on the whole no dishonour is done by it to Christ, or to the Deity; no evil results from it to the universe, or to any of Christ's real followers: but on the other had it is made, contrary to its own tendency, the instrument of promoting the glory of God and of the Saviour, and of increasing the happiness of his universal kingdom, and of all his true subjects.

Dr. C. makes a distinction between God's government of *power* and his *moral* government; by which it is supposed, that he meant to show, that sin cannot be brought into subjection to Christ, but by the willing submission of the sinner. * "Men by sinning oppose the government of God; not his government of *power;* for this ever was, and ever will, and ever must be, submitted to; but his *moral* government which he exercises over intelligent and free agents. Here is room for opposition. Men may resist that will of God, which requires their obedience," &c. It may be presumed, that the passage now quoted was entirely out of the Doctor's mind, when he wrote the following; "'Tis readily acknowledged, the glory of Christ's *power*, as head of the government of God, will be *illustriously displayed*, if *by force only* he finally subdues obstinate sinners." By this it appears, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that men do oppose the *power* of Christ, and the power of Christ *as the head of the government of God* too; and that his power may be illustriously displayed, if it be employed to subdue *by force* their

* Page 179.

obstinate opposition. But to say, that power and force are employed to subdue obstinate opposition, and yet that this opposition is no opposition to that power and force, is as absurd, as to say, that a prince exerts his power and force to subdue the opposition of an army of rebels, and yet that those rebels do not at all oppose his power; or it is as absurd as to say, that opposition can be subdued where there is no opposition.

It is by no means clear what Dr. C. meant by God's government of *power*, as opposed to his *moral* government. Can there be any government without power? It is plain by the last quotation, that Dr. C. did not imagine, that God's moral government is without either *power* or *force*, and that both power and force may be employed to subdue sinners, who as sinners are subjects of God's moral government only.—But let the Doctor have meant by this distinction what he will, it is by no means true, that sinners are always so far restrained and subjected by God's moral government, that in the present state of things, and if all things were to remain as they now are, no dishonour would be done to God, no injury to his kingdom, to his chosen people, or to the intellectual system. There is room therefore for sin and sinners, in this sense, to be subjected and restrained by the government of God. When "the wrath of men shall praise God, and the remainder of wrath shall be restrained," then will sinners be brought to that subjection to Christ, of which I am speaking. But Dr. C. would not pretend, that in this sense, sinners *ever* have been, *ever* will be, and ever *must* be subject to God.—In one word, to be subjected to Christ is to be made either actively or passively subservient to his purposes and to his glory.

When the enemies of a prince are overcome, and in chains and prisons are restrained from interrupting the

peace and happiness of his faithful subjects; then they are put under his feet and are subjected to him, and all their "rule, authority and power, are put down or abolished." So when all the enemies of Christ, all "obstinate sinners" shall be, to use Dr. C's own words, "by force finally subdued," shut up in prison, bound with chains, and prevented from doing the least mischief to the disciples and kingdom of Christ; then those enemies will be put under the feet of Christ; then "an end will be put to the dominion of sin;" then the works of the devil will be destroyed; then the serpent's head will be bruised, and the devil's kingdom will be overthrown, as really and effectually, as the power of a rebel can be overthrown by an entire conquest of him and his adherents, by his perpetual imprisonment and other proper punishments according to the laws of the kingdom, though he and some of his partizans be permitted to live, and though they retain a rebellious spirit.—The verb υποτασσω in Rom. viii. 20, signifies, as Dr. C. holds, an involuntary subjection. It may therefore mean the same in Heb. ii. 8, and 1 Cor. xv. 27, &c.

Doctor C. insists on the words in 1 John iii. 8, "For this purpose was the Son of God manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil." By the works of the devil, he understands *all sin:* by destroying he understands an entire abolition. On the other hand, by destroying the works of the devil, some understand a perfect defeat of every attempt in opposition to the peace, happiness and glory of God's kingdom: "The devil will be most effectually subdued, his works will be destroyed and his head bruised in the highest sense and degree, when he shall be perfectly defeated and disappointed in all his designs, and every thing he has attempted against Christ and his interest, shall be turned against himself, to answer those ends which he constantly sought to de-

feat by all his attempts; and Christ shall be more honoured, and his kingdom more happy and glorious forever, than it could have been, if Satan had never opposed him, or seduced and destroyed any of mankind."*—As the text now under consideration is capable of the sense just given; until it shall be proved, that the Doctor's is the true sense, it proves nothing to his purpose.

Doctor C. grants,† That by destruction the scriptures mean the misery and punishment of sinners. Therefore sinners are in the sense and language of scripture destroyed, when they are sent to the place of restraint, imprisonment and misery prepared for them. And as sinners will be destroyed without *annihilation*, so may *sin* and the works of the devil.

That God has always power to subdue or to subject to himself his enemies, is one thing: actually to subject them, by restraining them from doing any damage to his kingdom or his subjects, is another. In the present state, the enemies of Christ tempt his subjects, obstruct his cause, and do many things, which if they were to remain as they now are, would be an everlasting dishonour to Christ. But they shall be made his footstool, they shall no more do any of those things.

When Christ puts his enemies under his feet, he treads them down in his anger and tramples them in his fury, agreeably to Isai. lxiii. 3. But this surely is not to bring them to a cordial reconciliation.

Therefore, as Psal. viii. 5, 6; Heb. ii. 6—9, are fairly capable of a construction entirely different from that on which Dr. C's whole argument from them depends; they prove nothing to his purpose: especially as they are not naturally capable of his construction.

We are now to attend to Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11; "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a

*Hopkins's Inquiry into the Future State. † Page 224.

name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."—The question concerning this text is the same as that concerning the text last under consideration; What are we to understand by that subjection, to which Christ in consequence of his exaltation, was to reduce mankind? Is it a free and voluntary subjection in all men? Or in some men a subjection to which they shall be reduced by the power and authority of Christ, in opposition to their own inclinations? Dr. C. asserts that the former is the most plain and natural sense, and that the latter is evidently too low and restrained an interpretation. But positive assertions prove nothing.

As to the Doctor's *reasons* to prove that the subjection in question is a free and voluntary one, they are as follows; That Christ is now endeavouring to reduce mankind to a voluntary subjection to himself.*—That though Christ do not in this state, prevail on all men voluntarily to subject themselves to him, yet he may prevail on them in the next state.†—That if Christ was exalted for this end, that every knee should bow to him, &c. he will fail of his end unless all men be reduced to a voluntary subjection.‡—That the genuflection in this Phil. ii. 10, evidently means a voluntary act.§—That a compelled subjection is a poor, low kind of subjection in comparison with that which is voluntary; therefore the reward of Christ's humiliation, unless it imply an universal voluntary subjection of mankind, is low and small in comparison with what it would have been, had it implied a voluntary subjection.‖

* Page 190. † Page 191. ‡ Page 192. § Ibid. ‖ Page 192, 193.

1. Christ is now endeavouring to bring all men to a voluntary subjection to himself; and these endeavours will sooner or later be successful: therefore Phil. ii. 9, &c. means a voluntary subjection.—*Answer:* Christ is now in no other sense endeavouring to bring all to a voluntary subjection, than in the days of his incarnation he endeavoured to gather the inhabitants of Jerusalem together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings: or than he always has endeavoured to prevent the death of him that dieth. But as those endeavours have not been efficacious; so his endeavours to bring all men to a voluntary subjection, may not be. Therefore this argument proves nothing.

2. Though Christ do not in this state prevail on all men voluntarily to subject themselves to him; yet he may prevail on them in the next state: therefore in the next state all *will in fact* be brought to a voluntary subjection: therefore Phil. ii. 9, &c. means voluntary subjection.—*Answer:* It does not follow from the *power* of Christ to reduce all men to a voluntary subjection, that he *will in fact*, reduce them to that subjection.

3. If Christ were exalted for this end, that every knee should bow to him, &c. he will fail of the end of his exaltation, unless all be reduced to a voluntary subjection. —*Answer:* The consequence by no means follows from the antecedent. For though it be allowed that Christ was exalted for the end, that every knee should bow to him; yet it is not allowed that this bowing of the knee is a voluntary subjection. So that Christ may obtain the whole end of his exaltation, without effecting a voluntary subjection of all men. This argument takes for granted, that the bowing of the knee mentioned in Phil. ii. 10, is a voluntary submission.

4. The genuflection in Phil. ii. 10, evidently means a voluntary act.—*Answer:* It does not evidently mean a

voluntary act.—A mere contradiction is a sufficient answer to a mere assertion.

5. A compelled subjection is a poor, low kind of subjection in comparison with that which is voluntary. Therefore the reward of Christ's humiliation, unless it imply a voluntary subjection of all mankind, is low and small in comparison with what it would have been, had it implied a voluntary subjection. Therefore it does imply a voluntary subjection; therefore a voluntary subjection is intended in Phil. ii. 10.

Answer: We are very improper persons to determine *a priori* what is the proper reward of Christ, or what reward is the greatest, and most honourable to Christ. Some may imagine it would be most honourable to Christ, to reduce all men to a voluntary submission in this life; as in that case they would be saved from *all* future punishment; and thus might the grace, power and wisdom of Christ in their opinion be more glorified. Hence they might argue just as forcibly as Dr. C. does in the other case, That undoubtedly Christ will in this life reduce all men to a voluntary subjection to himself. On the same principle it might also have been proved, before the fact shewed the contrary, that all men would be reduced to a voluntary subjection to Christ, in a very short time, long before the time of their ordinary departure out of life. On the same principle too it might have been proved, that God would never permit sin and misery to enter the world.—Thus it appears, that Dr. C's argument, if it prove any thing, proves too much, therefore proves nothing.

The Doctor was not insensible, that the same words are quoted by the apostle Paul, and applied to the general judgment; at which time Dr. C. does not pretend, that all men will be voluntarily subject to Christ.*

* Page 196.

See Rom. xiv. 10, 11, 12; "For we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ. For it is written, as I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God. So then every one of us shall give account of himself to God." Therefore we have clear evidence, that these words do sometimes mean that subjection which is not voluntary. And that in Phil. ii. 10, they mean a voluntary subjection and that only, we must have good evidence, before we are obliged to believe it. The utmost evidence which Dr. C. gives us, respecting that matter, I have exhibited above; and concerning the sufficiency of it, the reader will judge.

Doctor C. acknowledges,* that the words are pertinently applied by the Apostle, to that subjection which shall take place as to all, at the general judgment: but says that his thus applying them is no argument that they mean nothing more. To which it may be answered, that it is an argument that they mean nothing more in Phil. ii. 10, unless good reason can be given to show, that in this passage they do mean more: and whether the reasons which Dr. C. gives, be good and satisfactory, is submitted as before.

We come at length to the consideration of that passage of scripture, which Dr. C. "considers as *decisive of itself*, "were there no other text in the Bible of the like import." It is 1 Cor. xv. 24—29, "Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. For he hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith all things are put under him, it is manifest, that he is excepted which did put all things under him. And when

* Page 196.

all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him, that put all things under him, that God may be all in all."

The Doctor prefaces his criticism on this text, with some observations on the previous context, which demand our first attention.—He quotes the 21st and 22d verses; "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive:" and adds, "It is with me beyond all controversy evident, that the apostle is speaking here, not of a partial, but universal resurrection, not of the resurrection of the righteous only, but of the whole race of Adam.—The same all who suffer death through Adam, shall through Christ be made alive. The comparison between the damage by Adam and the advantage by Christ, lies in this very thing."* Here we have the Doctor's opinion, and his reason for it. His opinion is, that in the 22d verse the apostle is speaking of all mankind: his reason for this opinion is, that otherwise there would be no proper comparison of Adam and Christ. But the truth of this observation is by no means conceded. The reader may have seen my ideas of this case in the remarks made above, on Rom. v. 12, &c.—If an army under one general be all killed or taken, and afterwards the surviving part of the same army, now liberated, and under the command of another general, return every one in safety from a dangerous battle; it may be justly said, As under the former general all the army was killed or taken, so under the latter general all the army returned from the battle in safety. There would in this case be a true and proper comparison. Yet the very same all would not be intended in both parts of the comparison. Dr. C's reason therefore is not sufficient to support his con-

* Page 201.

struction. There is a proper comparison of Adam and Christ, if the apostle say, and intended to say, As in Adam all his seed die, even so in Christ all his seed shall be made alive.

It is indeed a truth granted on all hands, that all mankind will be raised at the last day; but it does not hence follow, that the apostle in this verse is speaking of such an universal resurrection.

Beside, if it should be granted, that the 22d verse refers to the resurrection of all men, it would not follow, that all will be saved. For Dr. C. grants, that had the apostle "no where else opened his mind more fully and particularly upon this matter, the utmost we could have argued from his words, would have been, that as all men die in Adam, so in Christ they should all be delivered from this death, by a resurrection to life."* How then does this text prove universal salvation? And especially how is this verse, or even the whole passage "of itself *decisive?*" Although Dr. C. in page 197, declares his opinion, that this passage is "decisive of itself, was there no other text in all the Bible of the like import;" yet he himself in page 207, gives it up as decisive, in the following words; "This parenthesis, comprehended within the 24th and 29th verses, was purposely interposed to bring us to a pause—and give us opportunity—to reflect upon—the truths—here revealed; pursuing them in their just tendency, necessary connexion and final result: In the doing of which, we should *virtually continue* the discourse, and finish it with respect to the wicked, as the apostle had done—with respect to the righteous." Thus it appears by the authority of Dr. C. that this portion of scripture does not contain any thing plain, or positive concerning the salvation of those who die in wickedness; but to investigate that which to him

* Page 201.

was so important and favourite a doctrine, we must *virtually* continue and finish the discourse ourselves. How then is this passage decisive of itself? Unless we virtually continue and finish the discourse ourselves with respect to the wicked, as the apostle had done with respect to the righteous, we shall never, even in Dr. C's opinion, come to the same conclusion concerning the wicked, to which the apostle came concerning the righteous, that they shall be saved.

The chief thing, which Dr. C. endeavours by this passage to prove, with a final view to the establishment of universal salvation, is, that the mediatory scheme will not be finished at the second coming of Christ; but a great deal will then remain to be done before the plan of God, for the accomplishment of which the mediatory kingdom is entrusted to the Son, shall be completed.* By the "finishing," "the completing," &c. of "the mediatory scheme," the mediatorial kingdom, &c. Dr. C. must have meant the finishing of the work of salvation, or of delivering sinners from sin and misery: otherwise he meant nothing to the purpose of proving the salvation of all men. What if the mediatorial kingdom be not finished at Christ's second coming? Yet if after that period, Christ will never more deliver any of mankind from sin and from wrath; those who shall at that time remain in sin, and under the wrath of God, will never be saved.

That in the sense now explained, the mediatorial scheme will not be finished at the second coming of Christ, is indeed a point in dispute, and the Doctor's proofs of this point are to be candidly weighed. They are these two—(1) This passage of scripture teaches, that an universal subjection to Christ is to be effected

* Page 208.

before the finishing of the mediatory scheme; but this universal subjection to Christ is not effected at the second coming of Christ.—(2) The reward of the good and faithful subjects of Christ is to be bestowed on them in the kingdom of Christ, and therefore Christ's kingdom will not be at an end, till after they shall have enjoyed that reward for some time at least.—I think these two are all the reasons which Dr. C. has given to support the proposition in question. He has indeed divided his long and complicated discourse on the text now before us, into five heads: but for what reason is not manifest.

I. It was the opinion of Dr. C. that 1 Cor. xv. 24—29, teaches us, that an universal subjection to Christ is to be effected before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme, which is not effected at Christ's second coming.—By subjection to Christ Dr. C. meant with respect to intelligent creatures, a cordial, willing subjection. By subjection to Christ, with respect to sin and death the first and second, he seems to have meant *abolition*. But though it is agreed on all hands, that there will be an universal subjection to Christ effected, before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme; yet it is not agreed that this subjection, with reference to all intelligent creatures, will be a willing subjection or submission. Concerning this particular, some observations have been made in the former part of this chapter. That the text now under consideration does teach a willing subjection, must be shown, or the text will not appear to be to the purpose.—Now to show, that all intelligent creatures will be cordially subjected to Christ, and will be saved, the Doctor insists, that both sin and the second death will be destroyed.

1. That sin will be destroyed. With reference to those words, "he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet"—"All things shall be subdued unto him"—

The Doctor asks, "Is *sin* an *enemy?*"—Supposing it is an enemy, what follows? Not what the Doctor asserts, "Then it will be *destroyed*," meaning abolished, extirpated by universal obedience and virtue. For the apostle does not say, that all enemies shall be *destroyed*, abolished, extirpated or annihilated: but that all enemies shall be *subdued* and *put under Christ's feet.* So that the true and only consequence from the supposition, that sin is an enemy, is, that it shall be subdued, restrained and put under Christ's feet; which may be done in a sense true, proper, and as Dr. C. grants,* glorious to Christ, without the abolition of it.

Indeed the apostle says, that "the last enemy, death, shall be destroyed;" which by no means implies, that all other enemies shall be destroyed. It may mean, what our translators evidently understood by it, that the last instance which we shall have of the destruction of any enemy, will be in the destruction of death.—The words literally, and according to the order of the original, are thus translated; the last enemy is destroyed death; and they may mean, and may very properly be rendered thus, Death is destroyed the last enemy. Now suppose an historian, in the account of a battle, should say, The general was killed the last enemy: must we necessarily understand him to mean, that all the enemies of the whole army were killed, and the general was killed after all the rest? Might not his words be justly taken in this sense, that the general was the last enemy who fell, and many others might escape?

Or death may by the apostle be called the last enemy proverbially and with respect to this life only; as it is now sometimes called the last debt due to nature. Since the expression, "the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death," is capable of this sense; and since it does

* Page 193.

not appear, that it implies, that all other enemies will be destroyed; therefore it is no proof of universal salvation; as both sin and misery may still be allowed to be enemies, and yet may be in existence, after the destruction of death.

But it may be asserted in a true and proper sense, that sin, in the damned, is not an enemy. It does no damage to Christ, to his kingdom, or to the peace and happiness of his subjects. It is to be sure, an enemy in no other sense, than the damned themselves are enemies: and if from that expression, "the last enemy that is *destroyed*, *abolished*, καταργειται, is death," it follow, that all Christ's enemies will be abolished or annihilated; it will also follow, that all the damned will be annihilated. So that if this argument prove any thing, it proves too much; so much that it entirely overthrows universal salvation.

But sin in the damned, and the damned themselves, instead of doing any damage to Christ or his subjects, will be the means of increasing the glory of the former and the happiness of the latter, to eternity.

It is observable, that the verb καταργεω is never in all the New Testament, applied to express the destruction of all wicked men, of the enemies of God in general, or of all sin. Therefore as neither sin itself, nor all the enemies of God, are said καταργεισθαι, to be *abolished*, we have no right, even on the supposition that sin is an enemy in every sense, to say that it will be *abolished*, or extirpated from the universe.—The peculiar phraseology of the passage now under consideration, is worthy of particular notice. In the 24th verse it is said, that Christ will "*abolish*, καταργησκ, all rule and all authority and power." But he is said to put all his enemies under his feet, θη υπο τους ποδας αυτου, verse 25th, and to put all things under his feet, υπεταξεν υπο τους ποδας αυτου, verse

72th. Although therefore all the *rule*, and all the *authority* and *power* of Christ's enemies shall be abolished, and the apostle is careful to inform us of that; yet he is equally careful to inform us, that his enemies themselves shall be only *subjected* to him, and put under his feet; as it seems, designedly shifting the phraseology and avoiding the application of the verb καταργεω to them. What right then have we to apply it to them? Is not the application of words to persons or things, to which the apostle designedly did not apply them, a gross perversion of scripture?

Doctor C's argument that sin will be destroyed, depends wholly on this general proposition, That all Christ's enemies will be destroyed. Now the word destroyed in this case, doubtless means either *abolition*, or *restraint* and *punishment*. If it mean *abolition, extirpation, annihilation;* then as was before observed, all the enemies of Christ will be annihilated, and the doctrine of universal salvation falls to the ground at once. If it mean *restraint, punishment, preventing from doing mischief*, &c. then sin may be said to be destroyed, and yet have an endless existence in the universe.

If then these words, "The last enemy death shall be destroyed," do certainly imply, that all Christ's enemies shall be destroyed? and if it be also certain, that sin *in the damned* is, in every proper sense, an enemy, those words are equally inconsistent with Dr. C's scheme, as with the opposite. They either imply an universal annihilation of all Christ's enemies; and so are equally inconsistent with universal salvation, as with endless torment; or they are not at all inconsistent with it, and therefore are no argument against it. If they imply an universal annihilation of the enemies of Christ, as they are equally against Dr. C's scheme, as against the opposite; it equally concerns him, as his opponents, to pro-

vide an answer to them, and it is absurd in him to object them to the doctrine of his opponents.

The sum of what has been said on this head of the destruction of sin is (1) That it does not appear, that sin in the damned is properly an enemy to Christ and his kingdom; as it does no harm to that kingdom. (2) If it be determined that sin in the damned is an enemy to Christ, it will not follow, that it will be *destroyed*, meaning by destruction *annihilation* or *abolition;* because it is no where said, that all Christ's enemies will be destroyed, καταργεισθαι.—Or even if this were asserted concerning all Christ's enemies, and the verb καταργεω were applied to them all, it would not certainly determine, that they will all be annihilated, as that verb is capable of another sense, and is doubtless used in another sense, Heb. ii. 14; "That through death he might *destroy*, καταργηση, him that had the power of death, that is the devil." Dr. C. did not believe, that the devil will be annihilated. Therefore if that verb were applied to all Christ's enemies, and sin in the damned were allowed to be an enemy to Christ; still it might mean something else beside annihilation: nay, it must necessarily mean something else, or it would equally disprove universal salvation, as endless misery.

In Dr. C's discourse on this subject, it is implied, that when a sinner is brought to repentance and cordial reconciliation to Christ, he is *destroyed.* His words are,* "Christ shall continue vested with regal power, till he has brought all enemies into *subjection* to him—Christ will continue head of the kingdom of God—till he has actually *subdued* all enemies—Is sin an enemy?—then it shall be *destroyed*—for Christ must *destroy* all enemies." By these several expressions it appears, that it was Dr. C's opinion, that all Christ's enemies will be *subjected* to

* Page 214, 215.

him, that they all will be *subdued* under him, and that they will all be *destroyed* by him. Now it is abundantly evident, that by *subjection*, *subduing*, &c. when applied to those who die in impenitence, Dr. C. meant a cordial reconciliation to Christ: and he by no means held, that these enemies thus reconciled, will be destroyed by annihilation. It follows therefore, that as all Christ's enemies are to be destroyed, to be *destroyed*, and to be *reconciled to Christ in true repentance*, are, according to Dr. C. one and the same thing. Therefore, when Paul was converted, he was *destroyed;* and as he will eternally be the subject of repentance, he will suffer an eternal destruction. The punishment of God's enemies is, that they shall be destroyed; they shall be punished with everlasting destruction. But what punishment are everlasting repentance and complacency in God? they are among the greatest blessings which Deity himself can confer on a creature: Endless destruction and endless salvation are throughout the scriptures opposed to each other. But according to Dr. C's scheme, they perfectly harmonize and mutually imply each other.—Now whether this scheme harmonize with the scriptures is submitted to the reader.

Whether this scheme harmonize with the scriptures or not, it does not harmonize with other parts of Dr. C's book. He says,* that by the destruction of the wicked, mentioned in 2 Thes. i. 9, and in various other texts, "we are very obviously led to understand *misery*." Surely conversion from sin to holiness, and especially the everlasting holiness of the saints in heaven, is not *misery*.

Dr. C. holds, that all enemies will be subdued and subjected to Christ, and that sin will be subjected to him, when it is abolished or annihilated. But if sin be subjected to Christ, when it is annihilated, then the sin-

* Page 224.

ner would be subjected to Christ were he annihilated. But this kind of subjection, is no more a cordial subjection than that which is effected by mere power, and which consists in restraint and punishment.—Beside, according to Dr. C. there are two ways of subjecting to Christ intended in this passage ; one is by cordial reconciliation, the other is by annihilation. This then will keep in countenance the opponents of Dr. C. who believe, that there are two ways of subjecting to Christ; one by cordial reconciliation, which respects the elect only; the other by restraint and punishment, which respects the reprobate.

On the whole, whether this passage be sufficient to prove an universal abolition of sin, is now left to the judgment of the reader.

2. Doctor C. was of the opinion, that 1 Cor. xv. 24—29, teaches, that before the finishing of the mediatorial scheme, the *second death* will be destroyed.—He says,* "The second death may with as much propriety be called an enemy, as the first death.—Let any sense be assigned, in which the first death can be properly spoken of as an enemy, and it will at once be easy to make it appear, that the second death is, in the same sense, as truly an enemy, and much more so."—"Is† death, the second death, an enemy? Then this enemy shall be destroyed; for Christ must destroy *all* enemies" This is the Doctor's argument; in answer to which two observations may be made—That the second death is not an enemy, in the sense which the Doctor's argument implies—That if it were in every sense an enemy, it would not follow, that it shall be destroyed, i. e. *abolished.*

The reader hath seen the observations made above, concerning sin as an enemy and concerning the destruc-

* Page 210. † Page 215.

tion of sin: similar observations may be made concerning the second death.

(1) The second death is not an enemy in the sense which Dr. C's argument implies and requires.—If the Doctor meant, that the second death is an enemy to those who are the subjects of it, as it destroys their happiness and prevents their admission to a glorious immortality; this is granted. But it is not granted, that therefore it will be destroyed: and for the Doctor to take it for granted, that therefore it will be destroyed, is the same thing as to take for granted that all mankind will finally be admitted to a glorious immortality, which is the grand subject of the present controversy.—But if the Doctor meant, that the second death is an enemy to Christ, as it prevents the brightest display of his glory, the greatest prosperity of his kingdom, and the greatest happiness of his subjects; in this sense it is denied to be an enemy.—This is a sense in which the first death is an enemy, and notwithstanding what Dr. C. says, it does not seem "easy to make it appear, that the second death is, in the same sense, as truly an enemy." The first death, while it continues, prevents the brightest display of the glory of Christ, the greatest prosperity of his kingdom, and the greatest happiness of his subjects: if it should continue, it would be inconsistent with the promises of Christ, with the complete salvation of the elect, and would defeat the gospel. Now to make it appear, that in this sense the second death is an enemy, it may be presumed, is not a more easy task than to prove the salvation of all men.—The second death is no more an enemy to Christ, to his kingdom, or to his faithful subjects, than the execution of some most atrocious and ungrateful rebels, whose lives cannot be spared consistently with the glory of their king, the prosperity of his kingdom, or the happiness of

his faithful subjects; is an enemy to the king, to his kingdom, or to his faithful subjects.

Doctor C. further urges, that "the second death is the last enemy, and the only one that is so."* If it be no enemy, it is neither the *last* nor the *first* enemy. Therefore, "it seems" *not* "reasonable, when the apostle says, *the last enemy which is death, shall be destroyed*, to understand him to mean by *death*, the *second death*." The first death is in the sense before given, the last enemy; the last who prevents the complete display of Christ's glory, the last who prevents the perfection of his kingdom, the last who has power to hurt the saints. After the destruction of this death, they immediately receive the adoption of sons. Although the devils and those who have been persecutors in this world, will still be in existence after the destruction of the first death, they will no more have it in their power to dishonour Christ, or to interrupt the happiness of his subjects, than if they were annihilated.

(2) If the second death were in every sense an enemy, it would not follow, that it shall be *destroyed*, meaning *abolished*. All the enemies of God or of Christ, are no where said to be *abolished* καταργεισθαι, meaning *annihilation*. To be *subdued*, *subjected*, *put under feet*, is by no means the same as to be *annihilated*. If therefore the second death be ever so truly and properly an enemy, the utmost that would thence follow, is, that it would be so restrained and subjected to Christ, as to be prevented from doing mischief, and to be made an instrument of promoting the glory of God, and the happiness of his kingdom. In this sense it may be granted, that the second death will be destroyed; yet the salvation of all men would no more be implied in the concession, than it is implied in the destruction of the devil, mentioned,

* Page 210.

Heb. ii. 14, that he will be annihilated. Nor can we hold, that all Christ's enemies will be *destroyed* in the sense now opposed, without holding the annihilation of the wicked, and giving up universal salvation.

Dr. C. endeavours to make out, that if death, the last enemy, do mean temporal death, still the destruction of this death implies universal salvation. "Simple restoration to life," says he,* "is not the thing the scripture means by death destroyed. To be sure the apostle Paul had quite another notion of it.—What is the idea he leads us to entertain of it? Plainly not a bare return to life, but such an one as is connected with a glorious immortality." That in this chapter the apostle speaks of such a return to life, as is connected with a glorious immortality, is granted; because in this chapter he is speaking of the resurrection of the saints only. The Doctor indeed tells us, that it was *with him* "beyond all controversy evident, that the apostle is speaking here, not of a partial, but universal resurrection." To others however it is beyond all controversy evident, that the apostle is speaking here of the resurrection of the righteous only. Even the Doctor acknowledges, that after the 28th verse the apostle "confines his discourse to the righteous, without saying any thing of the wicked."† Now this affords some ground of presumption at least, that in the former part of the chapter too, he confines his discourse to the resurrection of the righteous. Nor has Dr. C. given any reason, beside that which has been already examined, viz. That the comparison between the damage by Adam, and the advantage by Christ, lies in this very thing, that the same *all men* are meant in both parts of that expression, "as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." So that Dr. C's argument,‡ that from the resurrection of all mankind, it

* Page 211, &c. † Page 207. ‡ Page 211.

follows, that all will be saved, depends on principles, which are neither granted nor proved, and therefore is utterly inconclusive.

He further says, *"This *second* death, strictly and properly speaking, is THE LAST ENEMY, and THE ONLY ONE, that is so." Then surely there will not be a *third*, a *fourth* death, &c. &c. for ages of ages. Yet this is taught in other parts of his book; as in the following passage, †"They may all—be doomed—to a state of misery, which shall last for an age: in which state *some*—may be wrought upon to submit themselves to God—others may *die* in this state stupid—and those who thus died in their obstinacy may again—be put into a place of suffering for another age; in which *some* may be reduced—and others stand it out still. These others may, in yet another form of existence, be sent into a place of discipline for another age; and so on, till there has been torment for ages of ages." Here the Doctor distinctly mentions three future states of suffering, and supposes there may be others continued in succession for ages of ages, which are so many distinct deaths, as really as the first state of suffering after this life, is the second death, with respect to temporal death. What right then had the doctor to say, and with what consistency could he say, that the *second death* is the *last* enemy, and the *only one* that is so?

II. The other argument of Dr. C. is, that the reward of the good and faithful subjects of Christ is to be bestowed on them in the kingdom of Christ; and therefore Christ's kingdom will not be at an end, till after they shall have enjoyed that reward for some time at least; and therefore will not be at an end, at the second coming of Christ, or immediately after the general judgment."‡—This argument wholly depends on the supposition, that at the

* Page 210, 211. † Page 309, 310. ‡ Page 222, 223.

time at which the work of salvation shall be completed by Christ he will entirely abdicate all government or superintendency over those who shall be saved by him. If otherwise; if he shall still retain a superintendency over those who shall be saved by him; if he shall still be their immediate head or ruler, and the source of their happiness; though he shall not be the supreme ruler of the universe, nor even of the redeemed; but in this respect he shall resign the kingdom to the Father: he may be said yet to have a kingdom, and to sit on his throne; and to reign, &c. Before the resignation of the mediatorial kingdom, the government of *all things*, is in the hands of Christ, being delegated by the Father to this government. Or as Dr. C. expresses it, "he will be head over all; he will govern all; he will be all unto all."* Christ during that period acts as the supreme head of the universe. But when he shall have resigned the mediatorial kingdom, the Father will act as supreme head. Still Christ may, under the Father, be the head and governor of his redeemed and saved people. The Father will be supreme ruler, and Christ with his Church united to him, and dependent on him, will receive the benefits of his government. This does not imply, but that Christ himself, in subordination to the Father, will have a government over his saints.

Nor does it imply, but that the Son as one with the Father, as being in the Father, and the Father in him, shall reign after the resignation of the delegated sovereignty over all things. It may be presumed, that no man will say, that the Father does not reign now while the administration of universal government is in the hands of the Son. If he did not now reign, there would be no propriety in speaking as the scripture often does,

* Page 217.

" of him that sitteth on the throne, and the Lamb;" nor any propriety in the promise, John xv. 16; " That whatsoever ye shall ask of the *Father* in my name, he may give it you;" nor in those words of James, chap. i. 17; " Every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the *Father* of lights." But I need not add texts, to prove this.—For the same reason therefore that the Father now reigns in and with the Son; so after the resignation of the general delegated administration, the Son will still reign in and with the Father. Now the government is conducted in the name and by the immediate agency of the Son: then it will be conducted in the name and by the immediate agency of the Father. Yet as now the Father reigns in and with the Son; so then will the Son reign in and with the Father. Christ now reigns with supreme sovereignty by delegation from the Father. After the resignation of this sovereignty, he will still reign over the saints by delegation from the Father, but with dominion, which shall be subordinate to that of the Father. He will also at the same time reign in and with the Father, in the exercise of a dominion, which shall not be delegated, but which is essential to him as a divine person, and one with the Father; as the Father, by virtue of his divinity, now necessarily reigns in and with the Son.—So that although Christ shall immediately after the general judgment, resign the supreme delegated sovereignty, which he now possesses; still he will reign in these two respects, by a delegated subordinate authority over his saints; and by an undelegated, essential authority, which by virtue of his divinity, he possesses necessarily with the Father.

But whether the true idea of Christ's delivering up the kingdom to the Father, concerning which Divines have greatly differed, have been now precisely exhibited or not; still the scriptures necessitate us to believe,

that in some sense Christ will reign to an absolute eternity. Heb. i. 8; "Unto the Son, he saith, Thy throne, O God, is *forever and ever*." Rev. xxii. 5; "They" [the saints] "shall reign *forever and ever*." 1 Pet. v. 4; "When the chief shepherd shall appear, ye shall receive a crown of glory that *fadeth not away*." 1 Cor. ix. 25; "We do it to obtain an *incorruptible crown*." Heb. xii. 28; "We receiving a kingdom *that cannot be moved*." Both these last texts are quoted by Dr. C.* to prove that the righteous shall live and be happy without end: and they equally prove that they shall *reign without end*.—But the saints are to sit down with Christ on his throne and reign with him: and it is absurd to imagine, that *they* are to reign after the cessation of his reign; that they are to wear crowns which are incorruptible and fade not away; but that his crown is corruptible and fadeth away. Beside; the kingdom which the apostles and primitive christians received, according to Heb. xii. 28, was not the kingdom of the Father, as distinguished from that of the Son, but was the kingdom of the Son, which he himself had then lately set up. *This* kingdom is said to be incapable of being shaken or dissolved; and therefore is endless, as Dr. C. himself believed: otherwise it was absurd for him to quote that text to prove, that the righteous will live and be happy without end.—Dan. vii. 14, "His" [the Son of man's] "dominion is an *everlasting* dominion, which *shall not pass away*, and his kingdom that which *shall not be destroyed*." Isai. ix. 7: "Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be *no end*." Luke i. 33, "He shall reign over the house of Jacob *forever*, and of his kingdom there *shall be no end*."—More determinate language could not be used, to express the endless continuance of Christ's kingdom.

* Page 287.

It is therefore granted, that the kingdom of Christ will continue, after the general judgment, and even without end. Yet it does not thence follow, that he will not at that time have finished the mediatorial work, or rather the work of saving sinners. I make this distinction, because though Christ will at the general judgment, have finished the work of saving sinners from wrath; yet he will without end be the mediator between the Father and the saints, and will be the medium of all divine communications to them, whether of knowledge, of happiness or of honour. It by no means follows from the circumstance, that Christ will, after the general judgment, retain a kingly power and dominion, that he will exert that power in delivering sinners from sin and misery.

The whole of Dr. C's discourse on this subject implies, that the kingdom of the Father, in which he shall be all in all, will not begin immediately after the general judgment. But how can this be reconciled with Matt. xiii. 40—44, "As therefore the tares are gathered and burnt in the fire; so shall it be *in the end of this world.* The Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them that do iniquity; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth. *Then*, τότε, *at that very time*, shall the righteous shine forth as the sun *in the kingdom of their* FATHER." This single text proves that the kingdom becomes the Father's immediately after the end of this world, and therefore entirely overthrows all Dr. C's labour to prove, that the kingdom does not become the Father's till ages of ages after the end of this world; and equally overthrows his great labour to fix a construction on 1 Cor. xv. 24, consistent with his scheme.

Beside; the Doctor's construction of the last passage mentioned seems to be absurd in itself. For he "con-

nects the end," as to the time of it, "with Christ's delivery of the kingdom to the Father."* And by the *end* he in the same page explains himself to mean the "shutting up of the scene of Providence with respect to the sons of Adam:" which is and can be no other than the end of Christ's mediatorial kingdom. According to Dr. C. therefore, the apostle, under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, gravely tells us, that the end of Christ's kingdom will be, when he shall deliver up his kingdom to the Father: or the end of it shall be at the very time, at which the end of it shall be! But what is this, but the most childish tautology! Who ever imagined, that Christ would still retain his kingdom, after he should have delivered it up? Surely that scheme must be in distress indeed, which requires such construction as this to be put on the sacred scripture!

Doctor C. says, "The reward promised, under the administration of Christ's kingdom, *in this present state*, in order to persuade men to become his good and faithful subjects is not the final happiness God intends to bestow upon them, but the happiness of that state which intervenes between the resurrection and God's being all in all."† But all the promises of the Bible are given *in this present state;* therefore there are no promises in all the Bible of *final* happiness. How then does Dr. C. know that *all* men, or even *any* man will be finally happy? This is at once giving up his favourite doctrine, to establish which he wrote his whole book.

Doctor C. calls out,‡ "What a poor, low, lean idea the common explanation of this text gives us of the final effects of Christ's reign—in comparison with that, the above interpretation lets us into!" Such exclamations occur in almost every argument of his book. I observe

* Page 198. † Page 222. ‡ Page 225.

therefore concerning them once for all, that they seem better suited to work on the passions and imagination, than on the reason; that at least they are attempts to determine what is most for the general good and the glory of the Deity, not from revelation or from fact; but *a priori*, by our own imagination concerning what is best and most eligible. Now that we are in this way utterly incapable of determining what is most eligible, and most for the divine glory, in a thousand instances; every man of reflection must grant.

I have now finished my remarks on Dr. C's "decisive" argument from 1 Cor. xv. 24, &c. Whether it be indeed "decisive;" whether it be "unanswerably strong,"* is submitted to the reader.

We are next to consider the Doctor's argument from Rev. v. 13; "And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I, saying, Blessing and honor, and glory and power be unto him, that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb forever and ever."—The main question concerning these words is, whether they "look forward to a completion of the scheme of God," and assert a fact which is not to take place, till that scheme shall be completed. This is Dr. C's idea: he says, "they evidently look forward to the completion of that scheme;" he says it merely; he gives no reason to *prove* it. The context gives no suggestions of such an idea. It may be presumed, that Dr. C. himself did not imagine, that the song of the four beasts and four and twenty elders, contained in verse 9th, &c. looked forward to the completion of the scheme of God. It was evidently sung on occasion of the Lamb's taking the book sealed with seven seals, and before any of these seals were opened. Nor is there the least hint,

* Page 211.

but that what is described in the 13th verse, took place on the same occasion: but the narration naturally implies that it did then take place. The 14th verse confirms the construction now given. "And the four beasts said, Amen. And the four and twenty elders fell down and worshipped him that liveth forever and ever." These words are evidently a part of the song mentioned in the 9th verse, as it was sung by the same four beasts and four and twenty elders. Whereas according to Dr. C's construction of the 13th verse, they are either a song which is to be sung after the completion of the scheme of God; or though they are a part of the song mentioned in the 9th verse, the apostle's account of that song is interrupted by inserting in the midst of it, a song to be sung by all mankind, after the completion of the scheme of God.—To assert therefore, that the fact of the 13th verse did not take place on the occasion of the Lamb's taking the book; but is to take place ages of ages after the end of this world; and to support this assertion by no proof or reason, is to act an unreasonable part: especially considering the context and the difficulties attending that construction.

These words appear to contain a figurative representation of all creatures joining in joy and praise to the Father and the Lamb on occasion of Christ's taking and being about to open the seals of the book sealed with the seven seals; the book of Providence toward the church. That such representations are common in scripture, we have already seen, while we were considering Rom. viii. 19, &c. Therefore no argument in favor of universal salvation is afforded by this passage.

Dr. C. mentions several other texts as favouring his scheme; but says himself, that he does not "depend on them as proofs," or as "conclusive in themselves." We need not therefore spend time to remark upon them.

The reader of himself will easily conceive from the answers given to those on which he does depend as conclusive, what answers would be given to the rest.

Toward the close of that part of his book, which contains the direct evidence of universal salvation, Dr. C. comes down wonderfully, seems to relent, and to be scared at the result of his own reasoning. He owns, that after all, he may be mistaken; that concerning the state which he supposes will succeed the next state, neither the prophets, Jesus Christ, nor the apostles, have spoken in plain and explicit language, leaving no room for doubt.* How these mild concessions are reconcileable with his many previous declarations, that his arguments are at least in his opinion, "*evident*," "*decisive*," "*unanswerably strong*;" that it is "*positively* affirmed" (in Rom. viii. 19, &c.) "that they—shall be instated in immortal glory;" that "it is *absolutely* declared in this passage of scripture," (Rom. v. 12, &c.) "that they" (mankind universally) "shall be made righteous," &c. &c. remains to be pointed out.

CHAPTER XIII.

IN WHICH DR. C'S SCHEME IS CONSIDERED, WITH A REFERENCE TO HIS IDEAS OF HUMAN LIBERTY AND MORAL AGENCY.

It is an essential part of the system of Dr. C. and of the generality of the advocates for universal salvation, that all fixed certainty of any actions of men, whether external or internal, is inconsistent with liberty and moral agency in those actions.—That this is really a tenet of the Doctor may appear from the following quotations.

* Page 252, 253.

He says,* "Such exertions of the Deity, as shall be *certainly effectual* to restrain them" [free agents] "from perverting their faculties, look like a *moral impossibility*, or a method of conducting towards free agents, which is unfit, in the reason of things, as not being suited to the nature of such kind of beings." He considers it as †"*inconsistent with the powers bestowed*" on free agents, if by any extrinsic power, their faculties are unavoidably put into exercise *in one certain* way only." He asks, "If motives should in all cases be set in such a strong and powerful light, as that no wrong choice could be made—how could such a method of operation *consist with the proper powers* of free agents? It does not appear to the human mind, a thing fit, that they" [free agents] "should be thus irresistibly guided by any *extrinsic* power, though it were even divine." And much more to the same effect is to be found in various parts of our author's writings. Indeed it is indisputably his scheme of liberty and moral agency, that if any power or cause extrinsic to the will itself, should either *certainly* and *effectually* restrain free agents from perverting their faculties to sin and vice; or *certainly* and *effectually* influence them to exercise their faculties in repentance and virtue, or in any one way; it would be entirely inconsistent with liberty and moral agency.

That Doctor C. also held, that the future repentance and salvation of all men, is certain, and that this certainty is caused and established by a cause extrinsic to the will of all men, is evident in the following passages out of many,‡ "God—really meant—an *engagement*, that mankind *universally* should, in due time—resemble Abraham in his moral temper—which is the same thing with their being blessed in Christ, or being *reduced* BY HIM

* Benevolence of the Deity, page 219. † Ibid. ‡ Page 244.

under moral subjection to the government of God."* "They" (all men) "will be *wrought upon* sooner or later in a moral way, such an one as is adjusted to moral agents, to become righteous persons."† "It is absolutely declared in this passage of scripture, that they shall be *made* righteous,"—"Unless they are thus *made* righteous" &c.—"God—has *absolutely* and *unconditionally determined*—that all men, the whole race of lapsed Adam shall finally reign in life, and be prepared for that state, by being *formed into* righteous persons."‡ "It is the purpose of God—that mankind *universally*—shall *certainly* and finally be saved." He speaks§ of some persons as "*infallibly* selected for salvation."—In these passages it is manifest, that Dr. C. held, not only *an absolute infallible certainty* of the salvation of some, yea of all men; but that this certainty is established by God, and is the effect of his determination, and also, that all men will finally be brought to repentance, to "the moral temper of Abraham," "to a moral subjection to the government of God;" and that they shall be "*made* righteous," and "*formed into* righteous persons:" all which expressions imply a cause extrinsic to the will of man, which cause effectually and certainly operates to lead him to repentance, or to an "exercise in one certain way only." How these things can be reconciled with the Doctor's avowed principles of liberty and moral agency, is hard to be conceived.

Nor was it through inattention, that the Doctor held an extrinsic cause certainly operating on the minds of men. It is a doctrine essential and important in his scheme, that all the damned will be finally and certainly brought to repentance, and brought to repentance by the torments of hell too. Are not those torments a cause extrinsic to the human will? If that cause be certainly

* Page 85. † Page 86. ‡ Page 22. § Page 231.

effectual to lead the damned to repentance, what, on the Doctor's plan, becomes of their moral agency? If that cause be not certainly effectual to lead them all to repentance; it is not certain that all men will be saved.—So that on the plan of the Doctor's book, either his grand doctrine of the final certain salvation of all men, by a disciplinary punishment, must be given up, or it must be supposed, that all who are in that way saved, are divested of their moral agency and are reduced to mere machines.

Indeed if the salvation of all men be certain, and it be certain that all men will repent; it is by some cause or other *made certain.* That which is now a certain futurity, was a certain futurity from the beginning; yea from eternity. As it is now a certain futurity, that Christ will come to judgment, so it was certain from the beginning. Therefore if it be now a certain futurity, that all men will repent and be saved, it was a certain futurity from the beginning; and that certainty was established by some cause: and that cause must have been extrinsic to the wills of men; because both the certainty and the cause of it existed before the existence of men or their wills.—So that if it be a real and certain truth, that all men will be saved, to prove which, Dr. C. wrote his whole book, it is equally certain on his plan, that all men are divested of their moral agency.

Should it be still pleaded, that this certainty of the salvation of all men, is not effected by any cause extrinsic to the wills of those, who are to be saved, but by their wills themselves; the absurdity of this supposition must be glaring to every man on the slightest reflection. A great part of those who are to be saved, are not as yet in existence: and it will not be pretended that their wills can have produced an effect, or established a cer-

tainty, before they exist. And doubtless Dr. C. and other universalists would allow, that the salvation of those who are in existence, was as certain before their existence, as the salvation of those is, who are in future to come into existence. But that certainty could not, for the reason already mentioned, be the effect of any exertion of their own wills.

Beside; if it were not for this absurdity, a certainty established by the will of man with respect to the will itself, as effectually binds that will, and is equally inconsistent with its liberty, as if that certainty were established by any other cause. Suppose the will of any man shall establish in itself a *certain* and *unfailing* bias to any particular action or series of actions; it cannot be pretended that this fixed bias already established, is any more consistent with liberty and moral agency, in the man in whom the bias exists, than if it had been established by any other cause. If a man were to cut off his own leg, though he might be more blameable for the act of cutting it off, than he would be for the same act performed by another; yet the effect, as to his subsequent inability to walk, would be the very same.

Therefore whatever be the cause of the certainty and fixed futurity of the repentance and salvation of all men; the doctrine of the certain salvation of all men, is on Dr. C's plan of liberty, wholly inconsistent with human liberty, and implies that all men are, and ever have been, mere machines.

In vain does Dr. C. endeavour to relieve this difficulty, by observing in various passages, as in one of the quotations above, That this repentance is brought about "in a moral way, such an one as is adjusted to moral agents." For he has told us that such exertions of the Deity, as shall be *certainly effectual* to restrain free agents from perverting their faculties, and such an influ-

ence of any extrinsic power, motives or whatever, as shall unavoidably put their faculties into exercise in one way only, are not adjusted to moral agents; but are inconsistent with their proper powers. Therefore, according to the Doctor, it is not in the power of the Deity himself, certainly and infallibly to lead all men, in a moral way, to repentance. It is a direct contradiction. And though he observes,* That that Being who is infinitely perfect will be able, in a moral way, finally to counteract human obstinacy; he is utterly mistaken, if there be any truth in his idea of liberty. If God were to overcome human obstinacy, an extrinsic cause would effectually and certainly incline the human faculties to an exercise in one way; which the Doctor says is inconsistent with moral agency.

The Doctor tells us,† that to "represent hell to the view of sinners in such a striking light, as that they should be irresistibly stopped in their wicked pursuits, would not comport with their free agency." Yet he supposes, that to be in hell, and to feel its torments so strikingly as to be *certainly and infallibly* stopped in wicked pursuits, and thus to be brought to repentance, is to be brought to repentance in a moral way, entirely comporting with free agency.

Upon Dr. C's plan of liberty, there not only is not, and cannot be, any certainty, that *all* men will be saved; but there is not, and cannot be, any certainty that *any one* man will be saved. The Divine Being himself cannot make it certain, without destroying moral agency. Not any of the promises of the gospel give us assurance of the salvation of any man: nor is it in the power of God to give a promise of salvation which shall insure the event, so long as men remain moral agents. Therefore

* Page 167. † Page 344, 345.

it was to no purpose that Dr. C. quoted so many promises and scriptural declarations to prove the salvation of all men.

On the same hypothesis concerning liberty, even though all men were delivered from hell and admitted to heaven, there would be no certainty that they would continue there. They would be constantly liable to sin anew, and bring on themselves a second damnation. To deny this, would be, to allow that their faculties might consistently with moral agency, be *certainly* and *fixedly* inclined to "exercise themselves in one way only."

That the inhabitants of heaven are liable to sin and damnation, is actually allowed by honest Bishop Newton. "This life is indeed a state of trial,* but not a trial to fix our fate forever, without any possibility of changing for better or for worse, in the world to come. For if the righteous can be but righteous, and the wicked can be but wicked, and cannot act otherwise; there is an utter end of all freedom of will and morality of action. Their virtue ceases to be virtue, and their sin is no longer sin."—"The scripture †assures us, that in the next life men will be made (Luke xx. 36,) equal unto the angels; but angels, we know, have apostatized and fallen; and why may not men, even when made equal unto the angels?—If righteousness‡ should degenerate and become wickedness; or if wickedness should amend and become righteousness; the tables would then be turned, and with the change of their nature, their state and condition would be changed too." How then s it certain that all men will be finally holy and happy? It neither is, nor can possibly be certain; because certainty in this case would imply that "the righteous can be but righteous;" and so "there would be an utter end of all freedom of will and morality of action."

What then becomes of the boasted evidence of the

*See Newton's works, vol. vi. p. 361. † Page 362. ‡ Page 360.

final salvation of all men? There is no certain evidence of it. There is not, nor can be, on this scheme of liberty, any certain evidence but that all men will finally apostatize, and of course be doomed to misery correspondent to their wickedness.

It is true, the Bishop abundantly contradicts this sentiment concerning liberty, and holds that the damned must repent, and cannot but repent, as in the following passages; "It is *impossible* for any creature to live in eternal torments—If nothing else yet his own sensations and feelings *must* bring him one time or other, to an acknowledgment of his sin and of his duty."*—"The fire *must* in time purge away and consume the dross and leave only the gold behind. No creature *can be* so totally depraved and abandoned, as to hold out under the most exquisite tortures, obstinate and obdurate to all eternity. —In short, if they have any sense or feeling, any reason or understanding, any choice or free-will, they *must* one time or other, sooner or later, *be brought to repentance.*"† "Tortures upon tortures, tortures without end, no creatures of the least sense or feeling *can support;* but *must* all be *brought to submission* at last: and they had much better make a virtue of *necessity*"‡—Virtue then is consistent with necessity. How is this idea consistent with what has been before quoted from this same author? But inconsistence and self contradiction relieve no difficulty.

From the same hypothesis it follows that God himself does not and cannot possibly govern mankind with certainty; that there is no foundation to pray for any event which depends on the volitions of our own minds, or those of other men; that there is no ground for confidence in the divine providence; and that it is impossible that any future free actions of men, or any events depending on those actions, should be certainly foretold, or

* Page 362. † Page 364. ‡ Page 366.

even foreknown by God himself; because what is absolutely uncertain, cannot be certainly known, and what is certainly known is certainly fixed and determined. But it is not consistent with my design to enlarge on the endless absurdities of this scheme of human liberty, absurdities from which, though long since pointed out to belong to that scheme, the ablest advocates for it, have not been able, and it is presumed never will be able, to clear it.

CHAPTER XIV.

A REPLY TO DR. C'S ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT, DRAWN FROM THOSE TEXTS, WHICH DECLARE THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED TO BE EVERLASTING, FOREVER, FOREVER AND EVER, AND THE FIRE OF HELL TO BE UNQUENCHABLE.

Doctor C. says,* that the misery of the damned is said to be *eternal* or *everlasting*, in five texts only in all the New Testament. Whatever was intended by this ambiguous proposition, the fact doubtless is, that many of his readers have been grossly deceived by it, as they have been led to believe, that the doctrine of endless punishment is apparently taught, in no more than five texts in all the New Testament; or that no more than five texts can be produced, the words of which seem to import an endless punishment. Whereas, all that Dr. C. or any man can pretend is, that the punishment of the damned is in five texts only, in the New Testament, asserted to be *eternal* by the use of the adjective αἰώνιος, commonly translated *eternal* or *everlasting*. It cannot be pretended, but that the texts in which the punishment of the damned

* Page 258.

is in some manner or other declared to be eternal, and in words as determinate, as the adjective, αιωνιος, eternal, far exceed the number *five*. The five texts now referred to, do not comprise any of those, in which the damned are said to be punished forever, forever and ever; to be punished by a worm that dieth not, and a fire that is not quenched; to be confined by an impassable gulf; to be shut out from the kingdom of heaven; not to see life, &c. &c. &c.

Now what follows from this circumstance, that the punishment of the damned is in five texts only, in the New-Testament, declared to be eternal, by the application of the Greek adjective, αιωνιος? It may still be declared to be eternal, by other words equally determinate, in above five hundred texts.

Or if there were no other texts, expressing in other words, endless punishment; are not five divine asseverations of any truth, sufficient to bind our faith? If five be not sufficient for this end, neither are five thousand.

Besides; all that Dr. C. says on this head, may be justly retorted: and if his observations in page 259, 260, be of any force to show, that the doctrine of endless punishment is not taught in the scriptures; just as forcibly may it be proved, that the damned will not be punished for an age. Supposing, as Dr. C. does, that the words αιων, αιωνιος, &c. do not mean an endless duration, but the duration of *an age*; I might say, "The misery of the wicked is said to be *for an age*, in only five texts, in all the New Testament: Upon which I cannot help making a pause to express my surprize to find the sacred writers so very sparing in the use of this word *age*, as referring to future torments. It is used but three times by Matthew; but once by Mark; but once by Paul; and not once by the other writers of the New Testament. All which is very extraordinary, if it be a doctrine of Chris-

tianity, that the wicked are to b punished *for an age.*— And the omissions of the sacred writers upon this head, are a strong presumptive argument, that they knew nothing of this doctrine, which has been so vehemently pleaded for in these latter days," by Dr. C. and some others. Therefore, whenever it shall be proved, that notwithstanding the rare use of the word *age*, with a reference to the punishment of the wicked, that punishment will really last *for an age;* it is presumed, that it can be proved from the same topics, that it will last *without end.*—If a word, signifying an age, applied five times to future punishment, prove that punishment to continue for an age; why will not a word signifying an endless duration, applied five times to that punishment, prove it to be without end? Nothing therefore can be concluded from the number of times, *αιωνιος*, *eternal*, is applied to future punishment. The whole question, in this state of it, depends on the proper meaning of the word; not at all on the frequency of its use.

Dr. C. says,* "That *αιων* and *αιωνιος may* signify a limited duration;" and that "from this remark it follows, that the preceding evidence in favour of universal salvation, remains strong and valid." It is acknowledged, that if those words *may* signify, and all things considered, do *as probably* signify, a limited, as an unlimited duration, when applied to the punishment of the wicked; nothing either for or against endless punishment, can be concluded from the use of those words. It is also, on the same suppositions, acknowledged, that by that application of those words, the evidence which Dr. C. has exhibited in favour of the salvation of all men, is not at all impaired. But it is not granted, that those words, when applied to the punishment of the wicked, do as probably signify a limited as unlimited duration. Nor is it granted that Dr.

* Page 260.

C's evidence of universal salvation is valid. Though we should grant that it remains unimpaired by the words αιων and αιωνιος, *eternity* and *eternal*; yet it may be utterly invalidated by other considerations: and that this is in fact the case, I have endeavoured already, and shall further endeavour to show; how successfully, is submitted to the reader.

The Doctor manifestly argues, on this head from possibility to probability, and even to fact. He says,* "If αιωνιος *may* signify a period of time only, there is not a shadow of an interference between its connection with the punishment of wicked men, and their being finally saved:" i. e. If it may possibly signify a period of time only, it is absolutely certain, that when it is applied to future punishment, it does signify a period of time only. The inconclusiveness of such argumentation must be manifest to every reader. In the same manner it is easy to prove, "that there is not the shadow of an interference between the connection of αιωνιος, eternal," with the life and happiness of the righteous, and their final damnation.

The Doctor says,† "These words, αιων and αιωνιος are evidently more loose and general in their meaning, than the English words *eternity*, *everlasting*—If it were not so, how comes it to pass, that αιων and αιωνιος will not always bear being translated eternity, everlasting?" By the same argument it may be proved, that the words *eternity* and *everlasting* in our language, are more loose and general in their meaning, than the Greek αιων and αιωνιος. We frequently say, such a man is an everlasting talker, or he talks eternally; he is eternally slandering and quarrelling with his neighbours. But according to Dr. C's sense of the Greek words αιων and αιωνιος, the English phrases just mentioned cannot be properly translated, by the use of those Greek words. The Doctor says, they properly

* Page 261. † Ibid.

mean the duration of an age. But when it is said, a man talks eternally, the meaning is not, that he talks *for an age*.—The truth is, there are idioms in all languages, which will not bear a literal translation into any other language.—The circumstance that αιων, αιωνιος, will not always bear to be rendered *eternity* and *eternal*, no more proves, that they do not properly signify the same with our words *eternity* and *eternal*, than the circumstance that they will not always bear to be rendered *an age*, and *during an age*, proves that they do not properly signify the duration of an age. It is said Rom. xvi. 26, "According to the commandment of the *everlasting God*, αιωνιου Θεου;" but no man would render this, according to the commandment of the God *who lives for an age*.

The Doctor thinks that "before *eternal times* is an impropriety in English," and hence infers, that προ Χρονων αιωνιων, Tit. i. 2, means a limited duration. It is presumed, that the Doctor would not have objected to the propriety of expressing a proper eternity, by saying, *From eternity*, *from everlasting*, *from eternal ages*. Yet in reality there is as great an impropriety in these expressions, as in that which the Doctor pronounces an impropriety. Understood strictly and literally they imply, that there is a point at which eternity began, and *from eternity* is from that point. The very use of the preposition *from* implies this. It implies, that the computation is made *from* something, at which eternity began. This something must strictly be some time, or some point in endless duration. So that *from eternity* taken strictly, is as real and as great an impropriety as *before eternity* or *before eternal times*. The same is observable of *to eternity*. Yet *from eternity* and *to eternity*, are in fact used among us to express an absolute eternity: and how does it appear absurd, that the apostle should express the same idea by a phrase, in which no greater impropriety

is naturally implied, and which may as well, and in the same way, as the phrases *from eternity* and *to eternity*, be made properly to signify an absolute eternity? The impropriety supposed to be in the expression, *Before eternal times*, is, that it implies a beginning to eternity. The same is implied in the expression *from eternity:* and in the phrase *to eternity* it is implied that there is an end to eternity. But I mean not to insist on this: I do but just mention it, to show, that Dr. C's most favourite proof, that αιωνιος means a temporary duration, is not demonstrative.

The Doctor further observes,* "The particles εἰς and επεκεινα, are sometimes added in the Septuagint, to the word αιων. Whereas, should we add the English words answerable to those Greek particles, to the term *eternity*, it would make evident nonsense." The Doctor was mistaken: we do say forever *more*, forever *and ever*, forever and *for aye*. Yet no man will hence infer, that in our language the words *for ever* do not properly mean an endless duration, or that *forever and ever* implies an addition to eternity.

Doctor C. insists,† that "αιων and αιωνιος signify nothing more than *an age*, *dispensation*, *period* of continuance, either longer or shorter;" That "it is certain, this is the sense in which they are commonly, if not always used in the sacred pages;" That this is "the frequent and almost perpetual use of the words—in the sacred writings." It is by no means granted, nor has the Doctor made it evident, that this is almost the perpetual use of those words, especially in the New Testament. Αιων reckoning the reduplications of it, as οι αιωνες των αιωνων, to be but single instances of its use, occurs in the New Testament in one hundred and four instances; in thirty-two

* Page 263. † Page 264 and 267.

of which, it means a temporary duration.* In seven, it may be taken in either the temporary or endless sense.† In sixty-five, including six instances in which it is applied to future punishment, it plainly signifies an endless duration.‡ How then could Dr. C. say, that it is *commonly* if not *always* used in the sacred pages, to signify an age or dispensation only? and that this is *almost the perpetual* use of it?

But if αιων used absolutely did generally signify a mere temporary duration; it would not thence follow, that it has the same restricted signification, when governed by the preposition εις. It is never applied to future punishment, but in this construction. In the whole New Testament, it is used in this construction, sixty-one times, in six of which it is applied to future punishment.§ That in

*The places are, Matt. xii. 32; xiii. 22, 39, 40, 49; xxiv. 3; xxviii. 20; Mark iv. 19; Luke i. 70; xvi. 8; xx. 34, 35; Acts iii. 21; Rom. xii. 2; 1 Cor. i. 20; ii. 6, twice, 7, 8; iii. 18; x. 11; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Gal. i. 4; Eph. i. 21; ii. 2; vi. 12; 1 Tim. vi. 17; 2 Tim. iv. 10; Tit. ii. 12; Heb. i. 2; ix. 26; xi. 3.

†The places are, Mark x. 30; Luke xviii. 30; John ix. 32; Eph. ii. 7; iii. 9; Col. i. 26; Heb. vi. 5.

‡The places are as follows; Matt. vi. 13; xxi. 19; Mark xi. 14; Luke i. 33, 55; John iv. 14; vi. 51, 58; viii. 35, twice, 51, 52; x. 28; xi. 26; xii. 34; xiii. 8; xiv. 16; Acts xv. 18; Rom. i. 25; ix. 5; xi. 36; xvi. 27; 1 Cor. viii. 13; 2 Cor. ix. 9; xi. 31; Gal. i. 5; Eph. iii. 11, 21; Phil. iv. 20; 1 Tim. i. 17, twice; 2 Tim. iv. 18; Heb. i. 8; v. 6; vi. 20; vii. 17, 21, 24, 28; xiii. 8, 21; 1 Pet. i. 23, 25; iv. 11; v. 11; 2 Pet. iii. 18; 1 John ii. 17; 2 John 2; Rev. i. 6, 18; iv. 9, 10; v. 13, 14; vii. 12; x. 6; xi. 15; xv. 7; xxii 5.—The six instances in which it is applied to future punishment, are, Mark iii. 29; 2 Pet. ii. 17; Jud. 13; Rev. xiv. 11; xix. 3; xx. 10.

§In this construction it is found in all the texts mentioned in the last marginal note, except Acts xv. 18; Eph. iii. 11, 21; Once in 1 Tim. i. 17, and 2 Pet. iii. 18.

I have been thus particular in noting all the texts, in which αιων occurs in the New Testament, that the reader may examine them and judge for himself, whether I have given a just representation of the use of that word by the inspired writers.

all the remaining fifty-five it is used in the endless sense, I appeal to the reader. If in those fifty-five instances it be used in the endless sense; this surely is a ground of strong presumption, that in the six instances, in which it is applied to future punishment, it is used in the same sense.

The adjective αιωνιος is still more unfavourable to Dr. C's system, than the substantive αιων. It is found in seventy-one places in the whole New Testament; sixty-six, beside the five in which Dr. C. allows it is applied to future punishment.* In every one of the sixty-six instances, except two, 2 Tim. i. 9; and Tit. i. 2; it may, to say the least, be understood in the endless sense. If beside the two instances just mentioned, Rom. xvi. 25; Philem. 15; Heb. vi. 2; and Jude 7, should be pleaded, which I think are all that any universalist will pretend do contain a limited sense; it may be observed concerning Rom. xvi. 25, that μυστηριου Χρονοις αιωνιοις σεσιγημενου may, with at least as great truth and propriety, be rendered "mystery kept secret during the eternal or unlimited past ages, or from eternity," as, "mystery kept secret since the world began."—The literal construction of Philem. 15, 16, is, "That thou mightest receive him eternal, no longer as a servant, but above a servant, a brother;" or more briefly thus; "That thou mightest

* The places are, Matt. xix. 16, 29; xxv. 46; Mark x. 17, 30; Luke x. 25; xvi. 9; xviii. 18, 30; John iii. 15, 16, 36; iv. 14, 36; v. 24, 39; vi. 27, 40, 47, 54, 68; x. 28; xii. 25, 50; xvii. 2, 3; Acts xiii. 46, 48; Rom. ii. 7; v. 21; vi. 22, 23; xvi. 25, 26; 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18; v. 1; Gal. vi. 8; 2 Thess. ii. 16; 1 Tim. i. 16; vi. 12, 16, 19; 2 Tim. i. 9; ii. 10; Tit. i. 2, twice; iii. 7; Philem. 15; Heb. v. 9; vi. 2; ix. 12, 14, 15; xiii. 20; 1 Pet. v. 10; 2 Pet. i. 11; 1 John i. 2; ii. 25; iii. 15; v. 11, 13, 20; Jud. 7, 21; Rev. xiv. 6.—The five texts in which Dr. C allows αιωνιος to be applied to future punishment are, Matt. xviii. 8; xxv. 41, 46; Mark iii. 29; 2 Thess. i. 9; To which is to be added, Jude 7.

receive him as an eternal brother." That Onesimus was, in the endless sense, become an eternal brother to Philemon, and that as such he ought to be received by Philemon, cannot be disputed, provided they both were, as the apostle supposed them to be, real Christians.—The final judgment intended in Heb. vi. 2, may with the same propriety be called an *endless* judgment, because it refers to an endless duration to follow; as it may be called the judgment *of an age* or *dispensation*, because it refers to an age or dispensation which shall then have been past.—As to the fire suffered by the Sodomites, if the text mean the fire of hell, then Jude 7, is to be added to the five texts, in which it is acknowledged αιωνιος refers to future punishment. If it mean the fire in which they and their city were consumed in this world, it can be called eternal, or αιωνιος, with respect to the effect only: and to say that this effect is to last for a limited time only, is the same as to say, that the Sodomites are finally to be saved; which is to beg the grand question.

As to 2 Tim. i. 9, and Tit. i. 2, without insisting on what has been observed in page 319, 320, 321, if it should be granted, that in these two instances αιωνιος is used in a limited sense, I conceive no injury would result to the doctrine for which I plead. It will not be disputed that the words *eternal* and *everlasting* in our language, are sometimes used in a limited sense: and perhaps no book written in the English language, especially written by so many different authors, and at such distant times, as the New Testament, can be found, in which the word *eternal* is used seventy times, and not twice at least in the limited sense.

As the proper meaning of the word αιωνιος is so much insisted on by Dr. C. and as he triumphs in the idea, that it is almost perpetually, by the sacred writers, used

in the limited sense, I must beg the patience of the reader, while I descend to the consideration of the particular texts, in which it occurs. In forty-four of the forementioned sixty-six texts, αιωνιος is applied to the future life of the righteous, and therefore is used in the endless sense. If this be not allowed, it will follow, that there is no promise, no security of an endless life to the righteous, or to any of mankind, and of course universal salvation must be given up; as shall be more particularly shown presently. In Luke xvi. 9, it is applied to the celestial habitations of the righteous: in 2 Cor. iv. 17, to the future glory of the righteous: in 2 Cor. v. 1, to their house in heaven: in 2 Thess. ii. 16, to their consolation: in 2 Tim. ii. 10, to their future glory: in Heb. v. 9, to their salvation: in Heb. ix. 15, to their future inheritance. That in these seven instances it is used in the endless sense, will doubtless be granted, by all those who allow this to be the sense of it in the preceding forty-four. In Heb. ix. 12, it is applied to the redemption of Christ: in Heb. xiii. 20, to the covenant of grace: in Rev. xiv. 6, to the gospel. That in these three instances, it is used in the endless sense, it is presumed, there can be no dispute among Christians. The sense is still more determinate, when it is applied to the Deity or his perfections, as it is to God himself, in Rom. xvi. 9: to the divine power, in 2 Tim. vi. 16: to the divine glory, in 1 Pet. v. 10: to the Holy Ghost, in Heb. ix. 14—In 2 Cor. iv. 18, it is applied to things unseen, as opposed to things seen: and to suppose, that in this instance it means the duration of an age or dispensation only, would destroy all opposition between things seen and things unseen; because many of the former continue for an age or dispensation, as well as the latter. The bare writing of this passage, so as to express a limited duration, sufficiently confutes that sense: thus, "The

things which are seen, are temporal; but the things which are unseen, continue for an age or dispensation."—In 2 Pet. i. 11, αιωνιος, is applied to the kingdom of Christ. I am aware, that the believers in Dr. C's book, will hold, that in this instance, it is used in the limited sense, because according to that book, the kingdom of Christ is of mere temporary continuance. To assert this however is a mere begging of a question in dispute. That this kingdom is not of mere temporary continuance, some reasons have been urged to show.* How forcible those reasons are, is submitted to the reader.—Now these texts, together with 2 Tim. i. 9; Tit. i. 2; Rom. xvi. 25; Philem. 15; Heb. vi. 2, and Jude 7, which were before considered, make up the whole sixty-six.

For the truth of this account of the use of αιωνιος in the New Testament, I appeal to all who are acquainted with the Greek Testament, or are capable of examining it. And if αιωνιος be used seventy-one times in the whole; sixty-six times besides those instances, in which it is allowed to be applied to future punishment: and if in all those sixty-six instances, except two, it certainly mean, or at least may fairly and most naturally be understood to mean, an endless duration; if in all, except six, it must necessarily be understood in the endless sense; what are we hence naturally, and may I not say, necessarily, led to conclude, concerning those instances, in which it is applied to the punishment of the wicked? Doubtless that in those instances too it is used in the endless sense.

But what are we to think of Dr. C's saying, that this word is, in the sacred pages, *most frequently* and *almost perpetually*, used in the limited sense? With all his parade of Greek learning, and of a thorough acquaintance with the Greek Testament, was he in reality so little

* See Chap. xii. page 234, &c.

acquainted with it, as to fall into such an egregious mistake? If it should be here pleaded in defence of Dr. C. that he supposed αιωνιος to be used in the limited sense, in all those instances in which it is applied to the future life of the righteous; and that on this supposition, it is almost perpetually used in the limited sense: it may be observed, that Dr. C. did indeed *suppose* this; and he might as well have *supposed*, that the same word applied to future punishment is used in the limited sense. This latter supposition would have been no more a begging of the question than the former. But of this more presently.

Dr. C.* thinks "it is evident from the very texts that are brought to prove the strict eternity of hell-torments, that they contain no such doctrine." This proposition is supported by the following considerations—That in two texts the word *everlasting* is applied to the fire of hell, not to the punishment or misery of the wicked—That fire in its own nature tends to an end, and will by the laws of nature necessarily in time come to an end—That fire powerfully tends to bring on a dissolution of those bodies that are cast into it.

1. That the word *everlasting* is applied, in two texts, to the *fire*, not to the *punishment*, of hell; hence the Doctor infers, in words which he quotes with approbation from *Nichol Scot*, that though "the fire be without end, it will not follow, that every individual subject, which is cast into it, must be so too."† Did the Doctor then believe, that some of the subjects of hell-fire will not exist without end, but will be annihilated? This is to give up the salvation of all men.—Besides; that the fire of hell will be kept up without end, and therefore eternal ages after all the subjects shall be either annihilated or delivered out of it, is a mere conjecture, unsup-

* Page 272. † Ibid.

ported by any evidence from scripture or reason. As well might the Doctor have said, The saints will indeed be received to everlasting habitations; the *habitations* will be strictly without end; but the *saints* will, after a while, be all either annihilated or sent to hell.—What if the word everlasting be in *two* instances applied to the *fire* of hell? In other instances it is applied to the *punishment*, to the *destruction*, to the *smoke of the torment*, and to the *torment* itself of the damned, Rev. xx. 10, "And" [they] "shall be *tormented*, day and night, forever and ever." And if, when applied to the *fire*, it prove that to be without end, doubtless when applied to the *punishment*, to the *destruction*, to the *torment*, it equally proves them to be without end.

2. That "fire as such naturally tends to an end, and will, in time," by the laws of nature, "actually come to an end."*—This, like many other of Dr. C's arguments, if it prove any thing, proves too much, and therefore really proves nothing. It depends on this very false principle, that whatever, according to the laws of nature, established in this world, would, without an immediate divine interposition, come to an end, will certainly come to an end in the future world. Now according to this principle, all the bodies of both sinners and saints, in the future world, as well as this, will be dissolved. Nay, as their souls too are constantly upholden in existence by the agency of God, and would in their own nature immediately cease to exist, were it not for that continued agency; it follows, according to the principle now under consideration, that all the souls of both sinners and saints will actually come to an end, in the future world. But as this consequence will be rejected, and as it will be granted, that the souls of all men will, by the agency of God, be upholden without end; so the same agency will

* Page 273.

be sufficient, to continue the fire of hell without end; and that whether it be material fire or not. If it be not material fire, it does not, in its own nature, more tend to an end, than the souls of men, or the faculties of those souls. If it be material fire, still it may, as was just now observed, be perpetuated to an absolute eternity.

If this argument from the tendency of fire to an end, be of any force, it will overthrow Dr. C's scheme, equally as the contrary. For it is equally the tendency of all the fire, of which we have any experience, to come to an end, in a short time, as to come to an end at all. No fire in this world will, without new supplies of fuel, last for ages of ages, or even for one age. But with a proper supply of fuel, any fire may be kept up without end. If therefore we are to conclude, that the fire of hell will come to an end, because the fire of which we have knowledge, will without a new and constant supply of fuel, come to an end; we are also to conclude, that the fire of hell will come to an end, before the expiration of one age.—Indeed God can make the fire of hell last for an age: and he can with equal ease make it last without end. Nay, he can make our common fire last without end. The same power which shall make our bodies immortal, can make our common fire strictly eternal. To this end the nature of that fire needs no greater alteration, than the nature of our bodies needs, to render them immortal.

The Doctor informs us,* that he "sees not but an age, dispensation or period, for the continuance of this fire, will very well answer the full import of the word αἰώνιον, *everlasting;* especially, if we suppose this age to last till the fire has accomplished the end, for which it was enkindled."—But it is not allowed by the opponents of the Doctor, that the fire will ever have accomplished

* Page 274.

the end, for which it was enkindled; and to argue on that supposition, is to take for granted, what is as much in dispute, as any subject of this whole controversy.—He adds, The words concerning Sodom and Gomorrah, "They are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire," "import no more than this, that this fire lasted till it had accomplished the design of heaven, in the destruction of those cities, for a standing example of the divine *vengeance** to after ages. And the fire of hell is doubtless called everlasting for the like reason." According to this then, the word *everlasting*, &c. applied to future punishment, gives no evidence, that that punishment is to last longer, than the time, during which the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were in consuming, or longer than one day: and the flood of Noah, as it lasted till it had accomplished the design of heaven in the destruction of the old world, for a standing public example of the divine vengeance to after ages, was an eternal flood: The deaths of Korah, Dathan and Abiram, of Nadab and Abihu, of Zimri and Cosbi, &c. &c. were for the same reasons *eternal deaths*.—But how is this sense of everlasting consistent with that for which Dr. C. abundantly contends, that it signifies the duration of an age? And if "the fire of hell be doubtless called everlasting," in the former sense, how does it appear, that it ever is, or that it can consistently be, called everlasting in the latter sense?

3. "Fire powerfully tends to bring on a solution of continuity, in those bodies, that are cast into it;" therefore the punishment of hell is not endless.† So fire tends to bring on a dissolution of the human body in a very short time, in one hour, or in a much shorter time:

* Let it be remembered, that Dr. C. is a bitter enemy to *vindictive* punishment.

† Page 276.

therefore the punishment of hell will not last for ages of ages, or for one age, or even for one day. This argument is just as conclusive, as that now quoted from Dr. C. He who can make an human body endure the fire of hell for an age, can make it endure the same fire, for an endless succession of ages. Therefore though fire does powerfully tend to bring on a dissolution of those bodies, which are cast into it, it by no means thence follows, either that such dissolution will be effected in the wicked; or that their torment will ever come to an end.

The Doctor proceeds* to argue, that future punishment will not be endless, because "the wicked are not said *to live always in torment without dying;* or that their bodies shall be immortal, or incorruptible, or indissoluble: but that they shall reap corruption, be destroyed, perish, undergo death." On this passage it may be remarked,

1. That by *dying*, *corruption*, *destruction*, *perishing*, *the second death*, he evidently means something different from torment; as he sets those terms in opposition to torment or misery. Yet he tells us in the very same page, that "the second death, which wicked men shall pass through, and their being cast into the lake of fire, mean—one and the same thing." In other parts of his book, he declares, that everlasting destruction evidently means *misery*,†—that "the being cast into the furnace of fire, where there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth, means the same thing, in the sacred dialect, with the second death,"‡—that the scripture expresses going through the torments "of hell, by being hurt of the second death."§

2. If by *death*, *destruction*, &c. Dr. C. mean any thing different from the torment of the damned, it seems he must mean, either annihilation, or a dissolution of the

* Page 277. † Page 224. ‡ Page 210. § Page 337.

connexion of the souls and bodies of the damned, and their transition from the state, in which they are to be immediately after this life, to the next succeeding state. If he mean the former, it is indeed opposed to their endless misery, and equally opposed to their final salvation. If he mean a transition of the damned to some other state, this is no proof against endless misery; because the Doctor himself supposes, that the damned, or some of them at least, will pass through several succeeding states of misery. And let them pass through ever so many succeeding states, there is no evidence arising from this bare transition, that they will ever be saved. So that let the Doctor mean, in this case, what he will, by *death*, *destruction*, &c. those words are either not at all opposed to the endless misery of the wicked, or they are equally opposed to their endless happiness. Whether they do mean annihilation or not, has been already considered in chap. v. The truth undoubtedly is, what Dr. C. himself abundantly holds, though in writing this passage, he seems to have forgotten it; that the death, destruction, corruption, second death of the damned, is their misery or torment, the smoke of which shall ascend forever and ever, and in which in Rev. xx. 10, they are expressly said to be tormented forever and ever.

3. If the express words "The wicked shall *always live in torment, without dying*," be not written in scripture, yet it is there written, that "they shall go into everlasting punishment;" that "the smoke of their torment shall ascend forever and ever," "that they shall be *tormented* forever and ever," &c. In Rev. xx. 10, it is said, "The devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and *they shall be tormented* day and night forever and ever;" βασανισθησονται, in the plural number. Now so long as a person is tormented, he lives in tor-

ment without dying: and to be tormented forever and ever, is to live always in torment without dying. What right then had Dr. C. to say, that the wicked are not said to live always in torment without dying? And if the very words just quoted from Dr. C. had been inserted in the sacred volume, they might have been explained away as easily as the expressions just now quoted from scripture, and as the many other declarations of endless torment which are there to be found. It might have been said, The wicked, while such, shall indeed always live in torment; but no sooner shall they repent and become righteous, than they shall be delivered from their torment, into endless bliss. The righteous are no more in the very words said to be immortal in happiness, than the wicked are said to be immortal in misery; and shall we therefore deny, that they are to be immortal in happiness? If it had been said, that the wicked shall be incorruptible or indissoluble in misery, it might have been pleaded, with as much plausibility, as attends many of Dr. C's pleas, that this meant, that while they are in misery, they are incorruptible, &c. not that they shall without end remain in misery.

The Doctor tells us,* that "the texts which join αἰώνιος, *everlasting*, with the misery of the wicked, are very few in comparison with those, which join with it a dissolution, destruction, or death." That this observation may be at all to the purpose, it ought to be shown—1. That destruction, death, &c. as applied in scripture to the damned, are inconsistent with their endless misery, and are not at the same time, equally inconsistent with their final salvation.—2. That whenever there is a seeming inconsistency between several passages of scripture, and to relieve the difficulty, we are necessitated to under-

* Page 279.

stand some of them in a figurative sense; we are to determine, that the truth is according to the literal tenor of the greater number, and that the minority, as in popular assemblies, is always to give way to the majority, and complaisantly submit to a figurative construction.

A view has now been taken of Dr. C's arguments to prove that αιων *eternity* and αιωνιος, *eternal* do not in the sacred writings properly mean an endless duration. Concerning the validity of those arguments, it is the province of the reader to judge.

We are next to attend to the Doctor's answer to the argument drawn from the circumstance, that the same word in scripture is used to express the duration of the misery of the wicked, as is used to express the duration of the happiness of the righteous, and that in the same text; as Matt. xxv. 46; "These shall go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life."

The Doctor's first answer to this argument is, that the state next succeeding the present, is not final, either with respect to the wicked or the righteous: and therefore the word *eternal*, even when applied to the life of the righteous, means not an endless duration.* For this hypothesis he gives no new reasons, but refers us to what he had said before, which we have already considered,† and the sum of which is, that Christ's kingdom is not to continue without end, but is at last to be delivered up to the Father; that the reward promised in scripture to the righteous is to be bestowed upon them in this kingdom of Christ; that that reward therefore cannot be without end.—In opposition to this, it has been shown, that the scriptures abundantly assure us, that the kingdom of Christ is to be without end; and that whatever is said in scripture concerning Christ's resignation of the kingdom

* Page 282. † Page 300, &c.

to the Father, must be understood in a consistency with the endless duration of Christ's kingdom: and an attempt was made, to show in what sense of resigning the kingdom, a consistency can be preserved.

Further; the idea now advanced by Dr. C. cannot be admitted, in a consistency either with the scriptures, nor with Dr. C. himself.

1. Not with the scriptures. For if Matt. xxv. 46, and the many other texts, which promise *eternal* life to the righteous, do not promise them an endless life and happiness, there is no promise of such happiness to the righteous in all the scripture: and with at least as much plausibility, as the Doctor evades the force of Matt. xxv. 46: may the force of any text be evaded, which can be brought to prove the endless life of the righteous. Let us consider those, which the Doctor supposes *determine* the future life and happiness of the righteous to be endless.* Luke xx. 36; "Neither can they die any more." This may be evaded two ways; it may be said to mean no more, than that they shall not die during the continuance of Christ's kingdom; and the original happily favours this construction, Ουτε αποθανειν ετι δυνανται. Neither can they die *as yet;* their death will be deferred till the end of Christ's kingdom.—It may also be evaded thus, If they cannot *die* any more they may *live in misery.*—1 Cor. ix. 25; "But we an incorruptible crown." True, the *crown* may be incorruptible indeed! but the possessor may be very corruptible: as Dr. C. supposes the *fire* of hell may be endless, though the wicked shall all be delivered out of it in time.—And when the bodies of the saints are said to be raised *incorruptible*, to put on *incorruption*, *immortality*, &c. this may mean indeed, that they shall exist and live, but not that they shall be happy

* Page 286.

without end.—"We receiving a kingdom, which cannot be moved," Heb. xii. 28; the *kingdom* may indeed be immoveable; yet a great part of the *subjects* may be removed.—1 Pet. i. 4; "He hath begotten us—to an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away." All this may be true concerning the *inheritance*, yet all the heirs from among men, of that inheritance, may be removed from the possession of it, and in that sense, may fade away.—Rev. ii. 11; "He that overcometh, shall not be hurt of the second death." He may however be hurt of the third, fourth or fifth death.—Chap. xxi. 4; "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death." Here also I avail myself of the original: it may be literally rendered, "The death shall not be *as yet*."—1 Thess. iv. 17; "So shall we be *ever* with the Lord." The word *ever*, παντοτε, properly signifies not *endlessly*, but *constantly*, *continually*, *uninterruptedly*. In this sense it is manifestly used in every other instance in the New Testament. Nor is it in any instance, beside this 1 Thess. iv. 17, applied at all to the future state. Therefore 1 Thess. iv. 17, means no more, than that the saints, while they are in heaven, shall be uninterruptedly with Christ; as John xii. 8, means, that while we are in the world, we uninterruptedly have the poor with us.

Thus by admitting Dr. C's sense of Matt. xxv. 46, we erase from the scriptures every promise of endless life and happiness to the righteous, and overthrow the gospel.—Indeed Dr. C. expressly holds, that there is no promise in the gospel of endless happiness to any man; how consistently with himself, the reader will judge.* "The reward promised, under the administration of Christ's kingdom, in the present state, in order to per-

* Page 222.

suade men to become his good and faithful subjects, is not the final happiness God intends to bestow upon them; but the happiness of that state, which intervenes between the resurrection and God's being all in all." Yet* he quotes the texts remarked on in the last paragraph, and says they *determine*, that the happiness of the righteous is to be endless: and were not those texts supposed by Dr. C. to be promises, given under the administration of Christ's kingdom, in this present state, in order to persuade men to become his good and faithful subjects?

2. Nor is Dr. C's construction of Matt. xxv. 46, any more consistent with his own scheme, than it is with the Bible. His whole scheme supposes, that all men will be finally happy: and he believed that the doctrine of final happiness is taught in scripture. He professes to ground his whole book immediately on scripture. But if there be no promise in scripture, of endless happiness, as is implied in his construction of Matt. xxv. 46; and as he expressly holds, in page 222; his whole scheme falls to the ground.

That Dr. C. does in other parts of his book, hold that there are promises of endless happiness, does not relieve the matter. To be inconsistent and to contradict one's self, clears up no difficulty. Who is answerable for that inconsistence, I need not inform the reader. It is manifest, the Doctor was driven into this inconsistence, by the pressure of the argument from Matt. xxv. 46, That the punishment of the wicked is of the same duration with the happiness of the righteous, because in the very same sentence it is said, The wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment, and the righteous into everlasting life.

If there be no promise in scripture, of final happiness, then all those texts from which the Doctor argues uni-

* Page 286, &c.

versal salvation, are altogether impertinent, and prove nothing to the purpose for which they are brought. A promise is an assurance of the bestowment of some future good. If therefore, Rom. v. 12, &c. Chap. viii. 19, &c. 1 Cor. xv. 24, &c. &c. be no promises of endless happiness, they afford no assurance nor evidence, that all will be finally saved.

In the same manner in which Dr. C. restricts Matt. xxv. 46, to a limited duration, may every text from which he argues universal salvation, be restricted. If the life promised in the last quoted text, be a limited life; a life to be enjoyed before the kingdom is delivered up to the Father; what reason can be given why, in Rom. v. 18, "The free gift came upon all men to justification of *life*," the life promised is not the same, and of the same limited duration?—If life for a limited duration only be promised in Matt. xxv. 46; then the destruction of death for a limited duration only, is of course all that is promised in the same text. And if the destruction of death for a limited duration only be all that is promised in Matt. xxv. 46; how does it appear, that a destruction of death for any more than a limited duration, is promised in 1 Cor. xv. 26, "the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death?"—And how strange is it, that Dr. C. should from Rom. viii. 21, "The creature shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God," argue the certain salvation of all men, when he himself holds, that the glorious liberty promised the children of God, does not mean final salvation.

The Doctor's second answer to the argument from Matt. xxv. 46, is founded on the supposition, that the next is the final state with respect to both the righteous and the wicked.*—If the next state of the wicked be final,

* Page 283.

the Doctor abundantly declares, that all men will not be saved.*—"If the next state is a state of punishment not intended for the cure of the patients themselves,—it is impossible all men should be finally saved."† "If—the wicked are sent to hell as so many absolute incurables, the second death ought to be considered as that which will put an end to their existence, both in soul and body." Thus this second answer of Dr. C. wholly depends on the supposition, that the wicked are to be annihilated; and to evade the argument from Matt. xxv. 46, to prove endless punishment, he is necessitated to adopt the scheme of annihilation, and thus to give up his whole system of universal salvation.

The Doctor gives us three reasons to show, that even on the supposition, that the next is the final state, it will not follow, from the endless happiness of the righteous, that the wicked will suffer endless misery. The first reason is, That the word *everlasting*, αιωνιος, when applied to the righteous, is mostly joined with the word *life*: whereas this word, when applied to the wicked, is never connected with their *life*, but always with the *fire*, or with their *damnation*, *punishment*, or *destruction*.‡—Now this observation is wholly impertinent, on any other supposition, than that the wicked are to be annihilated: for Dr. C. himself makes this observation, supposing that the next state of the wicked will be final. And if it be final, the wicked must be without end in that state, which is allowed by all to be a state of misery; or they must not exist at all.—Thus still the Doctor is obliged to give up his favourite scheme of the salvation of all men.

His second reason is, that it perfectly falls in with our natural notions of the infinite benevolence of the Deity,

* Page 11. † Page 282. ‡ Page 284.

that he should reward the righteous with endless life; but not that he should punish the wicked with endless misery.* But our notions of the benevolence of the Deity, are to be conformed to divine revelation; and only when they are conformed to that standard, are they right. And to suppose, that the endless misery of those, who live and die in wickedness, is not agreeable to scriptural representations of the benevolence of the Deity, is a mere begging of the question.—This subject has already been largely considered in chap. viii.

The Doctor's last reason is, "That we are naturally and obviously led to interpret αιωνιος, *everlasting*, when joined with the happiness of the righteous, in the endless sense, from other texts which determine this to be its meaning."—"This" adds the Doctor, "I call a decisive answer to this branch of the objection, upon supposition, that the next is the final state of man."† Now all those his determinate texts have been already considered in page 335, &c.; and in view of the observations there made, the reader will judge, whether those texts do any more decisively, than the word αιωνιος, *everlasting*, prove the future happiness of the righteous, to be without end.

To confirm his construction of Matt. xxv. 46, Dr C. mentions two texts in which he supposes the word αιωνιος, *everlasting*, is in the same sentence used both in the limited and endless sense. One is Rom. xvi. 25, 26; "According to the mystery which was kept secret [χρονοις αιωνιοις] *since the world began*—but is now made manifest —according to the commandment [του αιωνιου Θεου] of the everlasting God." Concerning this text it was before observed, that χρονοις αιωνιοις is perfectly capable of the endless sense. The mystery was kept secret from all

* Page 285. † Page 287, 288.

eternity, or during the eternal ages which preceded creation; or through the eternity *a parte ante*, as some call it. So that this text answers not the Doctor's purpose.—The other text produced by the Doctor, is Tit. i. 2, "In hope [ζωης αιωνιου] of eternal life, which God that cannot lie, promised [προ Χρονων αιωνιων] before the world began." On this text, it has been observed,* that there is no absolute certainty, that it means a limited duration. But supposing that this indeed is an instance to the Doctor's purpose: when it shall be made as evident from the very nature of the case, or from any other source of evidence, that the wicked cannot be punished without end, as it is, that God could not give a promise before eternity; doubtless we shall all give up the Doctrine of endless punishment.

At length we come to the Doctor's criticism on the expression *forever and ever*.—He seems to suppose, that expression in scripture does not refer to the future punishment of all the wicked, but only of "the worshippers of the beast," and to a certain "rabble rout of men," as he calls them. Be this as it may, it equally overthrows the Doctor's scheme, as if it ever so confessedly referred to the punishment of *all* the wicked.—But on the supposition, that *forever and ever* refers to the punishment of the wicked in common, the Doctor thinks that that "phrase is obviously capable of being understood of a limited duration."† His reasons are, That αιων in the singular number almost perpetually signifies an age, or a limited duration,‡—That though this word in the plural is to be met with in several places in the Septuagint, yet in them all it signifies a limited duration,§—In like manner the plural of αιων is most commonly, if not always, used, in the New Testament, to point out a

* Page 319. † Page 295. ‡ Ibid. § Page 296.

limited duration ;* That εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων is applied in Rev. xi. 15, to the kingdom of Christ, and therefore must mean a limited duration ;†—That εις αιωνα αιωνος, and εις τον αιωνα και εις τον αιωνα του αιωνος are always in the Septuagint, to be understood in the limited sense.‡

1. Αιων in the singular number almost perpetually signifies a limited duration.—*Answer:* It is by no means granted, that αιων in the singular almost perpetually signifies a limited duration; especially when governed by the preposition εις. In p. 321, &c. the use of αιων, in the New Testament, was traced, both in the singular and plural, and it was found, that it is much more frequently used in the endless, than in the limited sense. If the use of the singular number only be traced, in even this number it is still most frequently used in the endless sense, as the learned reader may see, by examining the texts, in which it is used in the Greek Testament, all which have been already noted. Dr. C's assertion therefore, that it almost perpetually signifies a limited duration, is a *mere* assertion, and stands for nothing until it shall be proved: and to make a mere assertion a ground of an important consequence, is not warrantable by the laws of reasoning and philosophy.

But if the assertion were ever so true, the consequence, which Dr. C. thence draws, would by no means follow.—If αιων in the singular did almost perpetually signify a limited duration, it would not follow, that οι αιωνες των αιωνων too signifies a limited duration. Language is not made metaphysically by philosophers, but by the vulgar, without metaphysical reasoning: and the meaning of particular phrases is wholly determined by use, not by metaphysical reasoning on the natural force of the words. If therefore use have determined οι αιωνες των αιωνων to mean generally or universally an endless

* Page 297. † Page 298. ‡ Page 301.

duration, this is enough to settle the present question, let αιων mean in the singular what it may.

Or if we must reason metaphysically on this subject, it may be asserted, that ο αιων των αιωνων or οι αιωνες των αιωνων is no absurd or unintelligible mode of expressing an endless duration. If αιων signify *an age*, and the phrases just mentioned be rendered, *the age of the ages* and *the ages of the ages*, the strictest philosophy will justify those phrases, as applied to eternity. We have no idea of eternity, but as an endless succession of ages. Therefore, that age, those ages, or that duration, which comprehends all those successive ages, is a proper eternity. The Doctor undertakes to reason metaphysically on this subject,* and observes, that "a duration for eternities of eternities, is a very uncouth mode of expression."—But it is not more uncouth, than the expression of *An eternity added to an eternity*, or *an eternity and an eternity*. Yet this is the strict analysis of *forever and ever*, an expression rendered abundantly proper by use.

One thing more ought to be observed, that αιων, whether in the singular or plural, governed by the preposition εις, invariably in the New Testament, signifies an endless duration. But in the phrase in question, εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων it is governed by that preposition.

2. That though αιωνες, the plural, is met with in several places in the Septuagint, yet in them all it signifies a limited duration.†—*Answer* 1. It does not appear, that αιωνες in the Septuagint always signifies a limited duration; nor is it used in this sense in all the instances, which Dr. C. produces to prove, that it always means a limited duration: as Psal. cxlv. 13, "Thy kingdom is an everlasting kingdom: βασιλεια παντων των αιωνων." Dan. ii. 44; "In the days of these kings, the God of heaven

* Page 297, 298. † Page 296.

shall set up a kingdom—and it shall stand forever, εις τους αιωνας." Though the Doctor endeavours to prove, that in these texts a limited duration must be intended, because in 1 Cor. xv. 28, Christ is represented as delivering up his kingdom to the Father; yet it is at least as clearly proved by Luke i. 33, "Of his kingdom there is no end," and the other texts before quoted,* that the texts now in question are to be taken in the endless sense.—Besides, how does it appear, that Psal. cxlv. 13, refers to the kingdom of Christ, as distinguished from the kingdom of the Father? And the kingdom of the Father Dr. C. allows, is without end.

There are other texts, in which αιωνες seems beyond dispute to be used in the endless sense; as Psal. lxxvii. 7, "Will the Lord cast off forever, εις τους αιωνας? and will he be favourable *no more*?" The latter expression explains the former to mean an endless duration. The next verses further confirm this idea.—Dan. iv. 34; "I praised and honoured him, that liveth *forever*, εις τους αιωνας." Chap. vi. 26; "For he is the living God, and stedfast *forever*, εις τους αιωνας." If αιωνες be not in these instances used in the endless sense, it is in vain to search for instances, in which it is used in that sense; and it may be presumed, that it is incapable of any application, by which it shall appear to be used in that sense.

Ans. 2. But if it were ever so true, that αιωνες is never used in the Septuagint, but in a limited sense; it by no means thence follows, that εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων is in general, or at all, *in the New Testament*, used in a limited sense.

3. In like manner the plural of αιων, is commonly, if not always, used in the New Testament to point out a limited duration.† The answers to this argument are the

* Page 235, &c. † Page 297.

very same, with those given to the preceding.—(1) The plural of αιων, in the New Testament, even when it is not redoubled, is not commonly, much less always, used to point out a limited duration; but is generally used to point out an endless duration, as the reader may see by the texts in which it occurs, all which are noted in the margin.* Dr. C. quotes Luke i. 33, "He shall reign over the house of Jacob forever," as an instance, that αιωνες means a limited duration. But if he had quoted the whole verse, the latter part would have effectually confuted his sense of the former part. The words are, "and of his kingdom there shall be no end."—(2) If αιωνες by itself did commonly point out a limited duration, it would not follow, that the same limited sense belongs to εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων.

4. Εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων is applied to the kingdom of Christ, in Rev. xi. 15; and therefore must mean a limited duration.†—*Answer:* The application of that phrase to the kingdom of Christ, is no proof at all, that it is ever used in the limited sense: because it appears by Luke i. 33, Dan. vii. 14, Isai. ix. 7, and more largely by what was said, page 302, &c. that Christ's kingdom is without end.

5. The phrases εις αιωνα αιωνος, and εις τον αιωνα και εις τον αιωνα του αιωνος are always in the Septuagint, to be understood in the limited sense.‡

Answer 1. It is by no means a conceded point, that those phrases in the Septuagint are always to be understood in a limited sense. The contrary appears even from the instances quoted by Dr. C. to prove that they

* In the endless sense, Matt. vi. 13; Luke i. 33; Rom. i. 25; ix. 5; xi. 36; xvi. 27; 2 Cor. xi. 31; Eph. iii. 11, 21; 1 Tim. i. 17; and Heb. xiii. 8.—In the limited sense, 1 Cor. ii. 7: x. 11; Eph. ii. 7; Heb. i. 2; ix 26; xi. 3.—In Eph. iii. 9; and Col. i. 26, it is capable of either sense.

† Page 298. ‡ Page 301.

are used in the limited sense; as Psal. cxix. 44, "So shall I keep thy law continually forever and ever." Psal. cxlv. 2, "I will praise thy name forever and ever." To suppose, that these texts contain no more, than a professed intention of the psalmist, to obey and to praise God, as long as he should live in this world, is as arbitrary a supposition, as to suppose, that when the scriptures speak of God as living forever and ever, they mean no more, than that God will live as long as men live in this world.

Answer 2. But if those phrases in the Septuagint did ever so certainly mean a limited duration, it would not follow, that also the very different phrase εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων in the New Testament, means a limited duration. The truth is, this last phrase is not to be found in the Septuagint, though it frequently occurs in the New Testament. Be it so therefore, that those phrases in the Septuagint, mean a limited duration; is it not very singular argumentation, thence to infer, that a very different phrase found in the New Testament, means a limited duration too? This is just as if Dr. C. had argued, that because the word *lion* in the Septuagint means a four-footed beast, therefore the word *man* in the New Testament means a four-footed beast too.

The Doctor* holds, that "it is of no significancy, that this phrase is sometimes applied to God:" because, if from this application merely, we argue the absolute eternity of God; we may argue the absolute eternity of the land of Canaan, and of the successive generations of men, from the application to them, of the same or an equivalent phrase.—But the same phrase is never applied, either to the land of Canaan, or to the successive generations of men: and whatever other phrase is applied to them, is by that very application proved not to be equiv-

* Page 303.

alent: Because we have no other possible way to know, that any phrase is equivalent, than by its application to those subjects alone, which are of equal duration with those, to which alone the phrase in question is applied.—The Doctor proceeds; "Reason assures us, that the duration of God will have no end"—for this cause, "not from the force of this phrase, we interpret it when applied to God, as meaning a duration without end." But is not the eternity of God revealed in scripture, as well as known by reason? If so, where and in what words is it expressed? Let any more determinate expression of it be pointed out in the scriptures. If the divine eternity be clearly revealed in scripture, and this phrase be as determinately expressive of it, as any in the bible, doubtless it determines the future punishment of the wicked also, to be without end, because it is repeatedly applied to that.

Finally, the Doctor observes,* "That it is as certain, that the phrase εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων, ought to be construed *for ages of ages*, as that the wicked in the resurrection state, will not be incorruptible, but shall die a second time." That the wicked shall reap corruption, and shall suffer the second death, is not in the least inconsistent with their endless misery, unless corruption and the second death mean either annihilation or final happiness. If they mean the same with the destruction of the wicked, they mean misery, as Doctor C. himself allows;† and no man will say, that the declarations of scripture, that the wicked shall reap *misery*, or suffer misery, are a proof, that that misery is not endless. Or if corruption and the second death mean a transition from the resurrection state, to the next succeeding state, if any such there be, still that succeeding state, or the

* Page 304. † Page 224.

final state of the wicked, may be a state of misery. But if corruption and the second death mean annihilation they overthrow the salvation of all men. Is it not therefore surprizing, that Dr. C. should over and over again, insist on an argument, as fully demonstrative of his scheme, which argument either wholly overthrows his scheme, or is utterly impertinent to the subject?

On the whole, it is left with the reader to determine, whether the reasons offered by Dr. C. prove, that εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων means a limited duration.—That the reader may judge concerning the true force of that expression, every place, in which it is used by the inspired writers, is noted in the margin.*

Next occurs Dr. C's answer to the argument from Mark ix. 43; "The fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched."—The Doctor's answer consists of these particulars —That the *fire* of hell may never be quenched; yet the wicked may not live in it endlessly†—That *in hell*, or while the wicked are in the next state of existence, their worm indeed shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched; but their torment shall be continued during their existence in that state.‡—As to the first observation, That the fire of hell may never be quenched, though the wicked shall be delivered out of it in time, by either salvation or annihilation; it has been observed to be a mere wild conjecture, and probably would never have been thought of, had not the scheme been in distress, and must be relieved by some means or other. Other remarks have been made on this conjecture, to which I

* Gal. i. 5; Phil. iv. 20; 1 Tim. i. 17; 2 Tim. iv. 18; Heb. xiii. 21; 1 Pet. iv. 11; v. 11; Rev. i. 6, 18; iv. 9, 10; v. 13, 14; vii. 12; x. 6; xi. 15: xiv. 11; xv. 7; xix 3; xx. 10; xxii. 5.

† Page 311. ‡ Ibid.

refer the reader.—Nor does the latter observation, especially as connected with the former, appear to be more rational or pertinent. According to these two observations, the sense of Mark ix. 43, 44, is merely this; It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands, to go into the fire which never shall be quenched, though thou mayest soon be delivered out of it: and in which while thou continuest, thy torments will not cease. But where is the evidence of the truth of this proposition? How does it appear to be better for a man to cut off his right hand, and be forever after maimed, than to go into a fire which is indeed endless, and in which while he continues, he will be uneasy, and even feel torment; though he may not continue in it two minutes or two seconds? Who would not choose to suffer even a very painful torment, for a few seconds, or minutes, rather than to lose an hand or an eye? Thus the sense which Dr. C. puts on Mark ix. 43, &c. utterly frustrates the manifest design of our Lord, which was in that passage to exhibit a most powerful motive to the greatest self-denial. But according to the Doctor's construction, the passage contains no powerful motive to self-denial, or any thing else.

Besides; is it not flat and insipid, to tell a man, that he shall go into a fire which never shall be quenched, though he may be immediately taken out again?—Yet this is the sense which Dr. C. puts on those words of our Saviour! But how is it to the purpose? or how does it concern any man, if he be not in the fire of hell, that that fire shall never be quenched?—Suppose a man is to be burnt at the stake. It would be a matter of indifference to him, whether the fire, in which he should be put to death, be continued burning for five hundred years, after his death, or be extinguished immediately; and to tell him by way of threatening, that that fire

shall be kept up five hundred years after his death; or to threaten a criminal who is about to be executed on the gallows, that the gallows on which he shall die, shall stand a thousand years after his execution; would be perfect impertinence.

Doctor C. seems to insist much on this, That in Mark ix. 43, &c. a reference is had to the punishment of those whose bodies were either burnt in the valley of Hinnom, or permitted to lie upon the ground, to be fed upon by worms. But it does not thence follow, as Dr. C. supposes, that as the fire of the valley of Hinnom went out, when the bodies were consumed, and the worm died, when the bodies were eaten up; so the fire and worm of hell shall cease. The sense may be, that as those bodies in the valley of Hinnom, were consumed by fire and worms, which after a while ceased; so the wicked in hell shall be tormented by fire and worms, which shall not cease.—Indeed this is expressly asserted: and as Mr. Hopkins justly observes, "It cannot be granted, that our Saviour, by those words, "Where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched," means a worm that *dieth*, and a fire that *is quenched* very soon. For this would be to suppose, he *means* directly contrary to what he *says*."*

The Doctor argues against endless punishment from the smallness of the number of those who are saved in the next state.† That "only a few of mankind" should be saved finally, and "the greater part eternally perish". he thinks not reconcileable with the great mercy of the Christian dispensation; or with the glad tidings of great joy, and the divine good will celebrated at the birth of our Saviour. This argument is built on the supposition, that it would not be dishonorary to Christ, that a minority

* Future state of those who die in their sins. † Page 322.

of mankind be lost. But this would be equally inconsistent with Dr. C's scheme, as that a majority be lost. This argument, as it grants that some will not be saved, gives up the grand question, and disputes concerning the number only, which is to be saved. But this is no subject of dispute in this controversy.

Is it then no instance of great and glorious mercy, to institute a scheme, by which salvation may be offered to every creature; by which whosoever will, may take the water of life freely, and no man shall perish, but in consequence of his own voluntary rejection of that institution? Is not the certain information of this institution indeed glad tidings of great joy to all people? Is not the institution a clear proof of the abundant good will of God to men, even though sinners, through their voluntary opposition, obtain no good by it? It certainly is, if we may believe Dr. C. for it is a maxim with him, "that we must not judge of the divine goodness, by the *actual good*, which we see *produced*, but must take into view the tendency of the divine administration," &c. see the quotations made page 181.

The Doctor says, "It is incredible, that God should constitute his Son the Saviour of men, and the *bulk* of them be finally damned."* But why is it incredible? Is it not an undertaking worthy of Christ, in a way most honorary to God, to open a door of mercy and salvation to all mankind, though by the wicked and ungrateful rejection of Christ by the majority, a minority only will actually be saved? If it be not credible, that God should constitute his Son the Saviour of men, and "the *bulk*" of them be finally damned, is it credible, that Christ should be constituted the Saviour, and a bare majority of mankind be saved? If not, how large must the majority be?

* Page 323.

As to the observation, "That it is a gross reflection on the Saviour, whose proper business it is, to destroy the works of the devil, and rescue mankind out of his hands; to suppose, that the devil should finally get the better of Christ, by effecting the everlasting damnation of the greater part of men;"* there are some particulars in it, which want explanation. First; what is meant by destroying the works of the devil? If this mean to abolish all sin, and all the misery consequent on sin to any of the human race; it is not granted, that this is *the proper business* of our Saviour, nor is this the proper meaning of the original in 1 John iii. 8, the text to which Dr. C. refers. The verb is λυση, *dissolve, take to pieces*, and thus prevent the ill effect of the works of the devil. But if destroying the works of the devil mean, to defeat and to prevent the ill consequences of those works, so that no final damage shall thence arise to the interest of God's kingdom, or of the universe; it is granted, that this is the proper business of Christ. But it is not granted, but that this may be effected, without the salvation of all men.—Again, what is meant by "the devil's getting the better of Christ?" This doubtless means, that he defeats Christ more or less, as to some object of his mediatorial undertaking. But Dr. C. has no more made it appear, that the final salvation of only a part, and a small part of the human race, implies such a defeat; or that it was not the original intention of Christ to save a small part only; than he has made it appear, that it was the intention of Christ to save all men.

Dr. C. seems not to have reflected, while he was urging this argument, that it equally militates against his own last resort, annihilation. For if an "end be put to the existence, both in soul and body," of all who die im-

* Page 323.

penitent, as the Doctor allows will be the case, if universal salvation be not true;* then on his principles, the devil will not be vanquished by Christ; the works of the devil will not be destroyed, but "he will get the better of Christ, by effecting the everlasting destruction of the greater part of those whom Christ came from heaven to save."†—So that when this objection shall be answered, so far as it lies against Dr. C's last resort, doubtless an answer will be supplied to those who believe in endless misery.

After all, it is not an article of my faith, that only a small part of the human race will be finally saved. But my faith in this particular is not built on abstract reasonings from the divine goodness and the mission of Christ. That divine goodness which suffered *all* the apostate angels to perish finally, might have suffered all, or a greater part of the apostate race of men, to perish in like manner. My faith is built on several representations and prophecies of scripture, particularly concerning the millennium, and the general and long prevalence of virtue and piety in that period. Therefore in this view, the foundation of the objection from the smallness of the number saved, is taken away.

* Page 282. † Page 324.

CHAPTER XV.

IN WHICH ARE CONSIDERED DR. C'S ANSWERS TO THE ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM WHAT IS SAID CONCERNING JUDAS, MARK XIV. 21;—FROM THE UNPARDONABLE SIN;—AND FROM THE TENDENCY OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION TO LICENTIOUSNESS.

THE Doctor answers to the arguments from Mark xiv. 21, "Wo to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed. Good were it for that man, if he had never been born;" That perhaps it may be a proverbial expression, not literally true;*—That if the literal sense were the most reasonable, considering this text by itself; yet considering the many passages brought by Dr. C. which declare the final salvation of all men, we must not understand this passage in the literal sense, as in that case we shall set the scripture at variance with itself:†—That the real meaning of this passage may be prophetical, as if our Lord had said, "The man who shall betray me "shall practically declare, that in his apprehension, it were good had he not been brought into being."‡—As to the first of these answers, it is a mere unsupported conjecture, and therefore is to be set down for nothing.—As to the second, it is not allowed that the Doctor has produced any one passage of scripture which declares the final salvation of all men: but this in view of what has been said on the passages produced by the Doctor, is submitted to the reader.—As the Doctor contends that this passage cannot be understood in the literal sense, without setting the scripture at variance with itself; so it is contended by the advo-

* Page 329. † Page 330. ‡ Page 331.

cates for endless punishment, that it can be understood in the literal sense, without setting the scripture at variance with itself in the least degree; and that the general tenor of the scripture points out the literal sense to be the true sense.—As to Dr. C's third answer, it is, in the first place, a mere unsupported conjecture: secondly, it may be noticed, that it is manifest, that the text pronounces the proper wo or curse, which should fall on the man who should betray our Lord. "The Son of Man indeed goeth, as it is written of him; but wo to that man, by whom the Son of Man is betrayed: good were it for that man, if he had never been born."—But according to Dr. C. all the curse which this text denounces, is such a weariness of life and impatience of existence, as has sometimes befallen even true saints; as in the instance of Job. And is it credible that this was the proper and full curse of betraying the Lord of life and glory? Or that if this be but a very small part of the curse of that abominable wickedness, our Lord would have mentioned it in such a manner, as naturally to communicate the idea, that it is the proper and full curse of it?

After all the ingenuity of Dr. C. and other universalists, in torturing this passage to a meaning consistent with their scheme; it remains a plain, direct, and positive testimony against it.

Next follows Dr. C's answer to the argument from what is said concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost, Matt. xii. 32; "Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come." Mark iii. 29; "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation." Luke xii. 10, "Unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven."

The Doctor's first answer to this argument is taken from *Grotius*—he tell us that *Grotius* "looks upon the words as an Hebraism intended to signify, *not so much* the pardonableness of some sins, and the unpardonableness of others; as the greater difficulty of obtaining pardon for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, than for any other blasphemy." It is wholly immaterial whether the words were intended to signify *not so much* the unpardonableness of some sins. If they were intended to signify *at all* the unpardonableness of some sins, that is sufficient for the present purpose. So that both Dr. C. and his favourite author *Grotius*, virtually concede all that is demanded in this instance.

Concerning this construction of *Grotius*, which is but a mere conjecture, brought in to help over an argument which crowds hardly on Dr. C's scheme; the Doctor says, "Whoever goes about to prove, that there is no truth in it, will perhaps find, that he has undertaken a very hard task." The same may be said of any man, who should undertake to prove, that there are not a dozen primary planets belonging to the solar system; or who should undertake to disprove any one of a thousand other conjectures.

After all, the Doctor does not depend much on this construction of *Grotius*, and proceeds to give us his own sense of the passages above quoted; which is, That it is indeed true, that "the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is absolute unpardonable;"* that the divine law shall take its course on those who are guilty of that blasphemy, and no intervening pardon will prevent the full execution of the threatened penalty on them; and forgiveness strictly and literally speaking will not be granted to them; †yet that they will be finally saved, and admitted to heaven,

* Page 334. †Page 336.

after they shall have suffered the full penalty threatened in the law.—On this idea of Dr. C. some remarks have been already made in Chapter i. Nor can it escape the notice of the attentive reader, that it implies, that some men are saved, not only without forgiveness; without the exercise of divine grace, in the scriptural sense of grace; without any aid from the merit or atonement of Christ; and therefore not "on the account, on the ground, or for the reason of Christ's obedience and death;"* but wholly on the footing of the law. But the idea that any of mankind are to be saved without forgiveness, is wholly foreign from the scriptures, nor can it be pointed out to be contained in any part of scripture. Every chapter of the gospel is inconsistent with it; to refer to particular texts would be endless and needless.—And what divine grace is there exercised in the salvation of one, who has by suffering the whole threatened penalty of the law, made full satisfaction for his own sins?—There is manifestly no more *grace* in saving such a man, than there is in saving one who has never sinned. Nor is he who has suffered the full penalty of the law, saved on account of the death or obedience of Christ. On the account of Christ's obedience or death he is released from no punishment: and to suppose, that God has not goodness enough, without an atonement, to take a creature to heaven, who in the eye of the law is perfectly innocent, is a supposition utterly inconsistent with the divine goodness.—Lastly, he who is saved in consequence of suffering the whole penalty threatened in the law, is saved on the foot of law. Yet it is utterly and abundantly denied by Dr. C. to be possible, that any sinner should be saved on the foot of law.

* Page 20.

In view of these observations, the reader will judge, whether Dr. C's construction of the passages, which speak of the sin against the Holy Ghost, be admissible: and whether those passages and the argument deduced from them, do not remain in full force against universal salvation.

We come at length to Dr. C's answer to the last argument of those in the opposite scheme which he considers, which is drawn from the tendency of Dr. C's system to licentiousness and vice.

On this the Doctor observes; "To disprove the final salvation of all men, it must be plainly shown, that this doctrine does naturally and directly tend to encourage men in vicious practice."* In this it is implicitly granted, that if the doctrine of universal salvation do indeed naturally and directly tend to encourage men to persist in vicious practice, it is not true. On this we may join issue with him. That that doctrine does comparatively encourage men to persist in vice, will appear perhaps from the following considerations.—It will not be denied that if there were no punishment threatened to the wicked, it would naturally and directly encourage them to persist in vice. This is granted by Dr. C.—"Had we attempted† to introduce mankind universally into a state of happiness, upon their leaving this world, whatever their moral conduct had been in it, the argument," that Dr. C's scheme tends to licentiousnes, "would then have held strong." But if the argument holds strong, provided there be no future punishment, it holds proportionably, if that punishment be very small and far less than is deserved by the wicked; and especially if at the same time that punishment be suited to their personal good. Now that the future punishment of the wicked is, on Dr.

* Page 341. † Page 342.

C's scheme, very small, compared with what it is on the opposite scheme, is manifest at first sight; it is infinitely less. And that it is far less, nay infinitely less than the wicked deserve, is manifest by what Doctor C. as well as his oponents, allows, that all who are saved, are saved by *unbounded grace*. Therefore, if the damned be finally saved, as they are saved by unbounded grace, they are punished infinitely less than they deserve. Also, that according to Dr. C's scheme, the wicked are to be punished with a disciplinary punishment suited to the good of the subjects, is manifest from his whole book.—Now that this punishment of the wicked does comparatively encourage vice, may be illustrated by an example. It is generally agreed that murder deserves death. But suppose a law should be made, by which no murderer should be punished with death, or with any other punishment to be continued longer, than till he should repent. Would not such a law as this, compared with the law as it now stands, naturally and directly tend to encourage murder? I need not make the application.

Doctor C. seems to think that his doctrine of future punishment even more powerfully restrains from sin, than the doctrine of endless punishment, because his doctrine is more credible to men in general. But are we to inquire what is most likely or most easy to be believed by men in general, to determine what is most likely to restrain from sin or to be the real truth of God? Then certainly the doctrines of the divine character and mission of Christ, of his miracles, resurrection, ascension, &c. &c. in short the doctrines of christianity in general, are not so likely to restrain men from sin as the doctrines of mere natural religion. Or if it be said that those doctrines are capable of such proof, as will satisfy and convince all candid inquirers; the same is said of the doctrine of endless punishment.

I have now finished my reply to Dr. C's answers to the arguments in favour of endless punishment; and having before considered his arguments in favour of his own scheme; I shall proceed to some arguments in confirmation of the doctrine of endless punishment.

CHAPTER XVI.

IN WHICH SOME DIRECT ARGUMENTS ARE PROPOSED, TO PROVE THE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT OF THE WICKED.

I AM sensible that my book is already protracted to a considerable length. Therefore to relieve the patience of the reader, I shall endeavour to crowd this part into as narrow a compass as possible. Indeed if the answers already given to the objections to endless punishment, be sufficient, the less needs be said in way of direct proof.

The various texts always brought in discourses on this subject, come now with full force, in proof of this doctrine. As Matt. xviii. 8; "It is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet, to be cast into *everlasting fire.*" Chap. xxv. 41; "Then shall he say unto them on the left hand, depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels." Verse 46th; "These shall go away into *everlasting punishment.*" 2 Thess. i. 9; "Who shall be punished with *everlasting* destruction from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power." 2 Pet. ii. 17; "To whom the mist of darkness is reserved *forever.*" Jude 13; "To whom is reserved the blackness of darkness *forever.*" Rev. xiv. 10, 11; "And he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, in

the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb: And the smoke of their torment ascendeth up *forever and ever.*" Chap. xix. 3; "And again they said, Alleluia: and her smoke rose up *forever and ever.*" Chap. xx. 10; "And the devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and the false prophet are, and [they] shall be tormented day and night, *forever and ever.*"

The evasions of these texts have been particularly considered, and it is hoped, sufficiently answered.

The Greek words used in these texts are, αιωνιος, εις αιωνα and εις τους αιωνους των αιωνων. From an inspection of every text in which these words and phrases are used in the New Testament, it has been found, with regard to the first, that quite contrary to Dr. C's account, it "is almost perpetually," i. e. in the proportion of 66 to 2, used in the endless sense; setting aside the places in which it is applied to the punishment of the wicked. With regard to the other two phrases, it has been found, that they are without exception used in the endless sense. Nor does the Greek language furnish any word more determinately expressive of endless duration: and notwithstanding what Dr. C. says to the contrary, it appears that they do as properly and determinately express an endless duration, as the English words *eternal* and *eternity.* If therefore these words be explained away to mean a mere temporary duration, it is impossible that any words be used, which would not suffer the same treatment from the same hands.

The texts concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost still remain a clear proof of endless punishment. They are Matt. xii. 31, 32, "The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, shall not be forgiven unto men—Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world neither in the world to come."

Mark iii. 29; "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, hath never forgiveness; but is in danger of eternal damnation." Luke xii. 10; "Unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven."

So long as the gospel rejects every idea of the salvation of men without forgiveness, so long will these texts confute the salvation of all men.

To these I may add the following texts; 1 John v. 16; "If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life, for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin *unto death. I do not say that he shall pray for it.*" So that we are not to pray for those who sin unto death. Why not? evidently because their salvation is impossible. If their salvation be possible, I presume no sufficient reason can be given, why we should not pray for it. If it should be said that we are not to pray that the salvation of such should be immediately accomplished, but that it may be accomplished in due time: the answer is at hand, that we are not at liberty to pray that any man may be saved *out of* due time; and in this sense we are prohibited to pray for the salvation of any man.

Heb. vi. 4—6; "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come; if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance." Since it is impossible to renew such to repentance, it is according to Dr. C. as well as the scripture, impossible that they be saved. Of like import is chapter x. 26, 27; "For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indig-

nation, which shall devour the adversaries." If there remain *no more or no longer* a sacrifice for sins; then neither will the man whose character is here described, be able by his own sufferings to make a sacrifice or satisfaction for his sins, nor will the sacrifice of Christ be longer of any avail to him. And if the judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries, remain for him; he must suffer them without a possibility of escape, either by the sacrifice of Christ or in consequence of his own sufferings.

The wo denounced by Christ on Judas also seems to remain a demonstrative proof of endless punishment. Matt. xxvi. 24, and Mark xiv. 21; "Wo to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed: good were it for that man if he had never been born." Let Judas suffer a temporary misery of ever so great duration, it must be infinitely less than an endless duration of happiness. So that if Judas were finally to enjoy endless happiness, he would be an infinite gainer by his existence, let the duration of his previous misery be what it might. It was therefore on the supposition of his final salvation, not only good, but infinitely good, that he had been born: which is a direct contradiction to the declaration of our Saviour.

In connexion with this passage, I shall introduce the following; Luke vi. 24; "Wo unto you that are rich: for ye have received your *consolation*." On the supposition of the salvation of all men, the rich do by no means receive in this life their consolation; but they are to receive infinitely the greatest consolation in the future life.—Psalm xvii. 14; "From men of the world, who have their *portion* in this life;" Plainly implying that they are to have no portion in the future life. Luke xvi. 25; "Son, remember that thou in thy life time receivedst thy good things." If all shall be saved, the

rich and the men of the world in no other sense have their portion in this life, than the rest of men.—They have some good things in this world, but infinitely the greatest part of their happiness is to be enjoyed in the world to come, and what they enjoy here, is nothing in comparison with what they are to enjoy hereafter. More than this, cannot be said of any man.

Mark ix. 43—49; "If thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee, to enter into life maimed, than having two hands, to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet, to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God, with one eye, than having two eyes, to be cast into hell-fire: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Matt. iii. 12; "Whose fan is in his hand, and he shall thoroughly purge his floor; and gather his wheat into the garner; but he will burn up the chaff with *unquenchable fire*."

John iii. 36, "He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." If all are to be saved, then all will see life and enjoy it. Should it be said, that the meaning of this text is barely, that he that believeth not, shall not see life, while he remains an unbeliever; it may be observed, that this sense of the text will admit the idea, that unbelievers may all become believers, at death, or at some future time in life; as it holds forth no more, than that a man while an unbeliever, shall not be admitted to life; and says nothing but that all unbelievers may become be-

lievers in this life, or at death; and therefore may attain to life and salvation in heaven, just as soon as those, who are now believers. But can any man bring himself to believe, that this text was not designed to teach us, but that unbelievers will attain to the life and salvation of heaven as soon as believers? If that be the true sense, this text teaches us no more concerning unbelievers, than is true concerning all saints in this state of imperfection. It may on this supposition be said, with equal truth, and in the same sense, that no imperfect saint shall see life, as that no unbeliever shall see life. It is plain, that this text was meant to exhibit some privilege of the believer above the unbeliever. But if the construction, now under consideration, be the true one, and universal salvation be true, what is that privilege? The believer has the promise of an endless life; so has the unbeliever in common with all mankind. The believer cannot perhaps be admitted to the inheritance of that promise, within less than ten or twenty years. Within the same time the unbeliever may be admitted to the same inheritance, whether he be admitted to it at death, or in consequence of some discipline in hell, by which he is led to repentance and faith. The believer has the present comfort of anticipating his future happiness; there is on the plan of universal salvation, abundant foundation for the same anticipation to the unbeliever. It is true, the unbeliever is not yet prepared for the possession of heavenly happiness: neither is the believer during his present imperfection.

Luke xvi. 26; "And besides all this, between us and you, there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you, cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence." Matt. vi. 15; "If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. Chap. xxiii. 34,

35; "And his Lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due unto him. So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses." Heb. vi. 8; "That which beareth thorns and briers, is *rejected*, and is nigh unto *cursing;* whose *end* is to be burned."—How is the end of any man to be burned, if all shall finally be saved? Luke xiv. 24; "For I say unto you, that none of those men who were bidden, shall taste of my supper." Chap. xiii. 25, 26, 27; "When once the master of the house is risen up, and hath shut to the door, and ye begin to stand without, and to knock at the door, saying, Lord, Lord, open unto us, and he shall answer and say unto you, I know you not, whence you are—I tell you, I know you not, whence you are, depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity."—Rev. xxii. 11, 12; "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still: and he that is holy, let him be holy still. And behold, I come quickly; and my reward is with me, to give to every man according as his work shall be."—These last words, with verse 10th, determine this text to refer to the general judgment.—The words of the tenth verse are, "Seal not the sayings of the prophecy of this book; for the time is at hand." But a period ages of ages after the general judgment cannot be said to come quickly, and to be at hand.

If to these texts it should be said, that they mean no more, than that they cannot *as yet* be saved, though they will be saved in proper time; I answer, (1) That there is no appearance in the texts themselves, of such a sense (2) That if that were the true sense, they would mean no more, than might be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of all real saints, who are not about to die immediately; (3) That

that sense would imply, either that the future punishment of the wicked is a mere wholesome discipline, or that those who die impenitent do not deserve endless punishment. If they pass the great gulf as soon as they repent, their punishment is a mere wholesome discipline: but that it is not a mere wholesome discipline, I have endeavoured to show in Chap. ii. and iii. If they suffer the full punishment, which they deserve, and then come out, they are saved without forgiveness, and they never deserved an endless punishment, the contrary to which I have endeavoured to prove in Chap. vi. To those chapters I beg leave to refer the reader, for what might be said here in further answer to this objection.—If because the damned cannot pass the great gulf at present, it be said, There is a great gulf fixed, so that they cannot pass thence to heaven, then because a saint is not about to die at present, it might with propriety be said, there is a great gulf fixed between him and heaven, so that he cannot pass it.—If those scriptural expressions, "Let him be unjust still,"—"Great gulf fixed, so that they cannot pass,"—"Depart, I know you not," "Shall not taste of my supper,"—&c. mean no more, than that they shall remain unjust, &c. for the present: why may not the following expressions—"Shall not come into condemnation,"—"Are justified from all things,"—"Is passed from death unto life,"—&c. mean no more, than that the saints shall not come into condemnation for the present, or for some time to come?—Are for the present justified from all things? Is for the present passed from death unto life?

Rev. iii. 5; "He that overcometh, the same shall be clothed in white raiment; and I will not *blot out his name out of the book of life;* but I will *confess his name* before my Father, and before his angels." Does not this text plainly hold forth, that the names of all who do not overcome, shall be blotted out of the book of life; and

that Christ will not confess their names before the Father, and before his angels? Chap. xiii. 8; "And all that dwell upon the earth shall worship him, *whose names are written in the book of life of the Lamb*, slain from the foundation of the world," Chap. xxi. 27; "And there shall in no wise enter into it any thing that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie; but they which are *written in the Lamb's book of life*." Psal. lxix. 27, 28; "Add iniquity to their iniquity, and let them not come into thy righteousness. Let them *be blotted out of the book of the living*, and *not be written with the righteous*." Now will any be saved, whose names are not written in the Lamb's book of life? In the quotation from Rev. xxi. 27, it is expressly asserted, that no one who defileth, worketh abomination, or maketh a lie, shall enter the heavenly city; but they only who are written in the Lamb's book of life. Therefore not only will not all men be saved, as some will be excluded the heavenly city; but some men have not their names written in the Lamb's book of life, and this is a further evidence, that all will not be saved.

It is said, that "sinners shall not stand in the congregation of the righteous," (Psal. i. 5,) and the representation in the parables of our Lord, is, that after the general judgment, the tares and chaff shall be no more mixed with the wheat; nor the good with the bad fish. Nor is there any intimation that the tares or the chaff will become wheat, or the bad putrid fish become good; but the contrary is plainly implied in the parables themselves. Besides, the judgment is said to be *eternal*, αιωνιον,* doubtless with respect to the endless and unchangeable

* Which word, I hope, from what has been already discovered, in the investigation of its true sense, I have a right to consider as used in the endless sense.

consequences. But if the judgment be strictly eternal with respect to its consequences, the punishment of the damned will be without end.

The parables before mentioned further prove endless punishment, as they represent, that the bad fish are *cast away;* that the tares and chaff are *burnt up*. How is this consistent with their final salvation and happiness?

All those texts which declare, that those who die impenitent shall *perish*, shall *be cast away*, shall *be rejected*, *be destroyed*, *be lost*, &c. disprove universal salvation; as 1 Cor. i. 18; "The preaching of the cross is to them that *perish*, foolishness; but unto us who are *saved*, it is the power of God." 2 Pet. ii. 12; "These shall *utterly perish* in their own corruption." Luke ix. 25; "For what is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and *lose* himself, or be *cast away*." Heb. vi. 8; "That which beareth thorns and briers is *rejected*." 2 Cor. iv. 3; "If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are *lost*." 2 Thess. i. 8; "Who shall be punished with everlasting *destruction*." Matt. xxi. 44; "On whomsoever it shall fall, it shall *grind* him *to powder;*" &c. &c. Now with what truth or propriety can those be said to *perish*, be *cast away*, be *rejected*, *destroyed*, *lost;* who are all finally saved? Perdition, destruction, &c. are ever in scripture set in opposition to salvation, and are represented to be inconsistent with it. But where is the opposition, if those who perish, be saved too?

Acts iii. 21; "Whom the heaven must receive until the times of the restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." This text which has been often quoted as a proof of universal salvation, is, I conceive, a clear proof of the contrary. The heaven will receive and retain our Lord Jesus Christ, until the time shall come when all those things shall be restored, which God, by

the mouths of all his prophets, hath declared, πανΤων ων ελαλησεν, shall be restored, which things doubtless comprehend all things which ever shall be restored. But our Lord Jesus Christ will not be retained in heaven longer than till the general judgment. After that time therefore, nothing will be restored. But it is granted on all hands, that after that time the wicked will be in misery. Therefore theys hall never be recovered from that misery.

2 Pet. iii. 9; "The Lord is not slack concerning his promise (as some men count slackness) but is long-suffering to us ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance," also hath been quoted to prove universal salvation. It is however impertinent to that purpose, but upon the supposition that the word *perish* means *endless perdition.* Not even any universalist will say, that God is unwilling that those who die in impenitence should perish *for a while*, until they are brought to repentance, or until they shall have suffered the just punishment of their sins. But if *perish* in this passage mean endless perdition, it doubtless means the same in all those texts in which the wicked are positively said to perish, as 1 Cor. i. 18, "For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness."

Luke xx. 35; "But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage."—Some then will not obtain that world, and therefore will not be saved. John xvii. 9; "I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me, for they are thine." But are any to be saved, for whom our Lord does not make intercession? Heb. xii. 15; "Looking diligently lest any man fail of the grace of God." Some then will fail of that grace.

Prov. i. 26—29; "I also will laugh at your calamity and mock when your fear cometh: when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind: when distress and anguish come upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but *I will not answer;* they shall seek me early but they *shall not find me.*" If God shall never answer their calls, and they shall never find God; they will never be saved.—Psalm cxii. 10; "The desire of the wicked shall perish."—Job viii. 13, 14; "The hypocrite's hope shall perish: whose hope shall be cut off, and whose trust shall be a spider's web."—Prov. x. 28; "The expectation of the wicked shall perish." Chap. xi. 7; "When a wicked man *dieth*, his expectation shall perish, and the hope of unjust men perisheth." Chap. xxix. 1; "He that being often reproved hardeneth his neck, shall suddenly be destroyed, and that without *remedy.*" If all men are to be saved, the hope and expectation of the wicked are not cut off, do not perish, in any other sense than that in which the hope and expectation of the righteous perish and are cut off. The wicked may expect to obtain happiness before they are sufficiently disciplined, or before a certain period. So may the righteous expect to make their transition to heaven before it will come. This expectation of both will be cut off. But the expectation which the wicked have of final happiness, will never, according to Dr. C's system, be cut off. Nor, according to the same system, can it be true, that the wicked shall be destroyed *without remedy.*—Prov. xiv. 32; "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness; but the righteous hath hope in his death." But according to the universal system, the wicked hath in his death as real and well founded a hope as the hope of the righteous. Job xi. 20; "Their hope shall be as the giving up of the ghost." Chap. xxvii. 8; "For what is the hope of the hypocrite,

though he hath gained, when God taketh away his soul?" Phil. iii. 19; "Whose *end* is destruction." But if all men be finally saved, the *end* of no man is destruction. Heb. vi. 8; "Whose *end* is to be burned."—2 Cor. xi. 15; "Whose *end* is according to their works." This is said of the ministers of satan, whose works are certainly evil. Their end therefore being according to their works must be evil too. How then can they be FINALLY saved? If it should be said, that these texts do not mean the *last* end of the wicked; this would be a mere assertion. As well might we say that Rom. vi. 22; "Ye have your fruit unto holiness and the end everlasting life," means not the last end of the righteous.

The scripture represents, that at the end of this world, all things are brought to *an end*. 1 Pet. iv. 7; "But the end of all things is *at hand*," ἤγγικε. Surely this cannot mean that the end of all things will take place after *ages of ages* to succeed the end of this world. A period so distant is never in scripture said to be *at hand*; nor could this with propriety, be said of such a period.—Matt. xxiv. 14; "This gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world, for a witness to all nations: and *then*, τότε, shall the end come."—But when all things shall have come to their *end*, they will be in a fixed, unalterable state, and after that, there can be no passing from hell to heaven. Nor can there be any such passing after Christ shall have delivered up the kingdom to the Father. To this Dr. C. agrees. But I have already given my reasons for believing that Christ will deliver up the kingdom to the Father, at the end of this world; and for believing that 1 Cor. xv. 24, must be understood in this sense, and that according to Dr. C's explanation of that text, it cannot be reconciled with Matt. xiii. 40—44, and other passages of scripture.

2 Cor. vi. 2; "Behold, *now* is the accepted time; behold, *now* is the day of salvation." Heb. iii. 7; "*To-day*, if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts." But if the greater part of mankind shall be saved out of hell, and the means of repentance in hell be far more conducive to the end, than the best means used in this world, it should have been said, In the future state is the accepted time, and in hell will be the day of salvation.

2 Cor. iv. 18; "The things which are seen, are temporal; but the things which are not seen, are *eternal*." If all the unseen things of the future state be eternal, the punishment of the damned is eternal. And eternal, *αιωνια*, must in this instance mean endless: otherwise all opposition with regard to duration, between things seen, and things unseen, is lost; and things unseen are as truly temporal, as things seen. At most, on Dr. C's principle of construing scripture; the apostle's proposition comes to this merely: The things which are seen, are temporal, but the things which are unseen are to continue for an age. But this is true of many present seen things.

The promises of the gospel in general afford an argument in favour of endless punishment.—Rev. ii. 11; "He that overcometh, shall not be hurt of the second death." I presume all will grant, that this promise implies, that all who do not overcome, shall be hurt of the second death. Therefore, by parity of reason, when it is promised in the same chapter, "To him that overcometh, I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God;" it implies, that those who do not overcome, shall never eat of that tree. "To him that overcometh, will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone," &c. implies, that he who does not overcome, shall never eat of

the hidden manna, shall never receive the white stone, &c. "Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out," implies, that he who does not overcome, shall not be a pillar in the temple of God. "To him that overcometh, will I grant to sit with me in my throne," implies, that he who does not overcome, shall never sit in Christ's throne. These I give as a specimen only of the promises, and of the argument which they afford.

Finally, if all shall be saved, why have not Christ, and those who wrote by the inspiration of his spirit, been explicit in the matter? Why have they used so many expressions, which in the literal sense assert the contrary doctrine? and which apparently obscure the truth, and blind the eyes of the readers of the New Testament? Especially, if, as Dr. C. holds, universal salvation be so glorious to God, the main subject of the gospel, and so necessary to vindicate the divine character? Surely this of all doctrines ought to have been indisputably revealed, and not one hint given to the contrary.

Besides these arguments drawn directly from texts of scripture; I shall mention one drawn from the general nature of the gospel, or from the particular doctrines of the gospel, acknowledged by both parties in this controversy.

Those who die impenitent, deserve an endless punishment. The proof of this hath been attempted, chap. vi. It is briefly this: If endless punishment be not the penalty threatened in the law, and justly deserved by the sinner, no account can possibly be given of the penalty of the law. It cannot be the temporary punishment actually suffered by the damned; because then the damned would be finally saved without forgiveness. It cannot be a temporary punishment of less duration, than that which is suffered by the damned; because on that sup-

position the damned are punished more than they deserve. It cannot be a temporary punishment of longer duration, than that which the scriptures abundantly declare the damned shall suffer; because no such punishment is threatened in the law, or in any part of scripture. It must therefore be an endless punishment.—This endless punishment threatened in the law, is not annihilation, but endless misery; because if it were annihilation, none of the damned, on supposition, that they are all finally saved, will be punished with the curse of the law, or which is the same, with the punishment which they justly deserve. But both the scripture and Dr. C. abundantly hold, that the damned will be punished as much as they deserve, as hath been shewn chap. iii. But for the full proof, that the punishment of hell is not annihilation, I must refer the reader to chap. v. If the endless punishment threatened in the law, and deserved by the wicked, be not annihilation, it must be endless misery. But whatever punishment the wicked justly deserve, they will in fact suffer; they will have to pay the uttermost farthing; they will suffer judgment without mercy. Therefore, they will suffer not only an endless punishment, but an endless misery, or torment.

The same argument is a little differently stated thus; Dr. C. allows, that if the punishment of the damned be intended to satisfy justice, it is impossible all men should be saved.* He also holds abundantly, that it is impossible, that any sinner should be justified or saved "on the foot of law." He equally holds this with regard to the moral law, "the law written in men's hearts," "the natural law," and the law as promulgated in the gospel by Jesus Christ and his apostles, as with regard to the "Mosaic law."† He also holds, that "the law of God is

* Page 11. † See Twelve Sermons, page 4, &c.

a perfect rule of righteousness." Now if it be impossible that any sinner be justified by the moral law, then every sinner is, and must be condemned by it, and from that condemnation he can never be acquitted by the law. If it be impossible that any sinner be saved by that law, then on the footing of that law, every sinner must be excluded from salvation.

But this law is "a perfect rule of righteousness." Therefore perfect righteousness, or strict distributive justice, will never admit of the salvation of any sinner; but every sinner justly deserves to be endlessly excluded from salvation.—Again, a punishment which satisfies justice, is one which is perfectly just and deserved by the sinner. Therefore, if the sinner be punished according to his desert, he can never be saved.—But both the scriptures and Dr. C. hold, that the damned will be punished according to their deserts; therefore they will never be saved.

CONCLUSION.

I HAVE now finished a work which has been attended with considerable labour to me, and with some to the reader who has perused the whole. I am sensible that controversial writers often misunderstand each other, and therefore often spend their own time and labour, and the time of their readers for nought. I have been aware of the danger of this, and have endeavoured to my utmost to avoid it: how successfully, must be submitted. I have often wished for an opportunity of conversation with some sensible and thorough believer in Dr. C's scheme, that I might obtain explanation of some things, to me unaccountable. But I have not been favoured with such an opportunity. I have endeavoured to meet the Doctor's chief arguments, and not to carp at particulars which are of no importance to the scheme, and have not designedly shunned any argument which appeared to me to be important, and not implied in other arguments particularly noticed. I hope that whoever shall undertake the confutation of what is now offered to the public, will treat it with the same candour. In a work of this length, and on a subject of such intricacy, it would be strange indeed if there were not some slips which would give advantage to an antagonist; yet those slips may not affect the main question. If any man shall write to point out such errata, it will hardly be worth while for me to trouble either myself or the world with a reply. But if any gentleman will candidly point out the fallacy of the main arguments, on which I have rested what I fully believe to be truth; however I may be affected by it, I doubt not but that the public will have the candour ingenuously to acknowledge it. If on the

contrary his reply shall consist chiefly of declamation and warm addresses to the passions and imaginations of mankind, pathetical and frightful representations of the torments of the damned, interlarded with sarcastic fleers and other essays at wit; I doubt not the same candid public will properly notice it, and draw an inference not very favourable to the cause which is to be supported by such auxiliaries. Such artifices are unworthy of theologians, philosophers and any inquirers after truth.—I hope whoever undertakes a reply, will tell us what punishment sin justly deserves; what is the penalty of the moral law; or that curse of the law from which Christ hath redeemed us.* I hope he will further inform us whether all men shall be saved in the way of forgiveness. If they be, he will reconcile that mode of the salvation of all men with those declarations of scripture which assert, that the wicked shall be punished according to their works, shall have judgment without mercy, and shall pay the uttermost farthing. If it shall be his opinion, that the damned will be punished according to their demerits, and then be saved without forgiveness, it is to be hoped he will reconcile this idea with the whole New Testament, which every where represents, that all who are saved, are saved in the way of forgiveness. If he shall hold, that αιωνιος, *eternal*, εις τον αιωνα, *forever*, and εις τους αιωνας των αιωνων, *forever and ever*, generally in the scripture mean a limited duration, let him point out the instances of that use of them, that they may be compared with those instances in which they are used in the endless sense.—But I need not enumerate the various particulars, which ought to be minutely and distinctly considered, in a candid and judicious discussion of this important question.

* Dr. C. explains Gal. iii. 10, to mean the curse of the moral law, or the law under which all men are; Twelve Sermons, p. 13.

I have no apprehension, that the doctrine of endless punishment will suffer at all by a thorough discussion. In the course of the disquisition many may be perverted to fatal error; yet the final result will be the more clear elucidation of the truth. However "many may run to and fro, yet knowledge shall be increased."

Finally, if any man, after a careful perusal of what has been, or may be offered, on both sides of this important question, shall be in doubt on which side the truth lies; it will certainly be most prudent and safe for him to act as he would, if he fully believed endless punishment; it will be most prudent and safe for him to yield a cordial compliance with the gospel, in repentance, faith and obedience. Then he will be safe on either supposition. But if he trust to the flattering doctrine, that all are finally to be saved, and in this presumption shall neglect the gospel, its invitations and requirements; and it shall finally prove, that that doctrine is a mere imagination of men; alas! he is lost; irrecoverably lost: while those who receive the gospel with "the obedience of faith," shall through the blood of atonement, "have right to the tree of life, and shall enter in through the gates into the City."

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING REMARKS ON SEVERAL AUTHORS.

I. REMARKS on Bishop *Newton's* Dissertation on the Final State and Condition of Men, contained in Vol. vi. of his works, page 325, &c.

N. B. In page 38 *this dissertation was referred to, as quoted in the Monthly Review. The reason was, I had not then seen the Dissertation itself.*

The Bishop held, that all the damned will be punished according to their demerits; as may appear by the following passages:—"There will be different degrees of happiness or misery, *in proportion to their different conduct and behaviour in this world.* As nothing is *juster* and more *equitable* in itself, so nothing is clearer and more demonstrable from scripture. Shall not the judge of all the earth *do right*, in every single instance, as well as in the general account? It is not only agreeable to the first principles of reason, but may also be confirmed by the most express testimonies of revelation."*—"Our Saviour threateneth different punishments to the wicked, as he promiseth different rewards to the righteous, greater or less, *according to the nature and qualities of their actions.*"† "It is evident then and undeniable, that every man shall receive his own reward or punishment, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad."‡ "It must be then admitted, that God hath threatened everlasting

* Page 344. † Page 347. ‡ Ibid.

misery to the wicked, as plainly and positively as he hath promised everlasting happiness to the righteous. He hath fairly set before us life and death, blessing and cursing, eternal happiness as well as everlasting misery, the one to balance the other. Is there any injustice in this? Are not the terms and conditions equal? And if men will choose cursing rather than blessing, and voluntarily incur everlasting misery, when they might as easily attain eternal happiness, whom have they to complain of, or whom can they arraign of unequal proceeding but themselves? (Ezek. xviii. 29.) Are not my ways equal? Are not your ways unequal, saith the Lord? You cannot then complain of injustice, for the rewards and punishments are equal: and it was really necessary, that these rewards and punishments should be everlasting."*—"Would any thing less than everlasting rewards and punishments be sufficient to encourage the good, to deter the bad, and secure obedience to the divine commands?†—How then can you complain, that God is an arbitrary governor, and annexeth greater penalties to his laws than are necessary.—You cannot then complain, that the sanction of eternal penalties is unreasonable, for you see plainly, that it is no more than is absolutely necessary. But possibly you may think, though it may be necessary in the government of this world for such things to be denounced by God, and believed by man, yet there may not be the like necessity for inflicting them in the world to come: God is not obliged to execute his threatenings, as he is to make good his promises. But why is he not obliged to perform the one as well as the other? His threatenings are never, like those of men, made rashly, never founded in passion or caprice, that it should be better not to execute, than execute

* Page 356. † Page 357.

them.—If God will not execute as well as threaten, why doth he threaten at all?—Is it not more suitable to the character of a God of truth, and becoming the simplicity and sincerity of a divine revelation, to declare the truth, and nothing but the truth, and leave it to work upon men as it can, rather than denounce in the most solemn manner what was never intended, and never shall come to pass, and so endeavour to alarm them with false fears, and to work upon them with false persuasions, which have nothing to answer them?"*—God must be just as well as merciful. He can never exercise one of his attributes so as to clash or interfere with another."†

On these quotations it may be remarked, that the Bishop plainly held, that endless misery is threatened; for he always uses the word *everlasting* in the endless sense, and believed this to be the scriptural sense of it, when applied to future punishment.‡ He also rejected the doctrine of annihilation.§ Now then his opinion was either, that endless misery is unconditionally threatened to all who die impenitent; or that it is threatened to them on condition of their continued impenitence in the future world. If it be threatened unconditionally, it follows, (1) That endless misery is the just punishment of the sins committed in this life. For who will pretend, that God hath made a law, which contains an unjust penalty? This would be equally inconsistent with the divine moral rectitude, as to make a law containing unjust or unreasonable precepts; or to execute the unjust penalty. But if this were the opinion of the Bishop, to be consistent he must have given up the doctrine of universal salvation, to establish which he wrote his Dissertation. For he not only declares in the passages already quoted, that "God must be just as well as merciful, and can

* Pages 357, 358. † Page 388. ‡ See page 355.
§ See page 349.

never exercise one of his attributes so as to interfere with another;" and "that his threatenings are never like those of men, made rashly, never founded in passion or caprice, that it should be better not to execute, than execute them;"* but †according to Matt. v. 26, and xviii. 34, he acknowledges, that the damned shall pay the uttermost farthing, and all that is due.—(2) It will follow, that sin is an *infinite evil.* Certainly that moral evil which deserves an infinite natural evil to be inflicted by way of punishment, is an infinitely ill-deserving moral evil; this is plain by the very terms: and a moral evil, which is infinitely ill-deserving, is all that is meant by the infinite evil of sin. Yet this sentiment he reprobates in the strongest terms.

But if those who die impenitent be threatened with endless misery, *on condition of their continued impenitence only;* then a mere salutary discipline is all the punishment which any sinner deserves according to strict justice. The law is the rule of righteousness; the penalty of that is adequate to the demand of justice; and if the penalty of that be an endless punishment unless the sinner shall repent, the penalty in reality is so much punishment only as shall lead the sinner to repentance; and this salutary and necessary discipline is the whole penalty or curse of the law.

That this was really the opinion of the Bishop may appear from the following expressions: "If God will not execute as well as threaten, why doth he threaten at all? It must be said, to reclaim a sinner; and it is allowed that if the sinner be reclaimed, the end is obtained, and the threatening is voided of course."‡—"Several of the fathers conceived the fire of hell to be a *purging* as well as a *penal* fire—But this penal purging fire is very

* Page 358. † Page 382. ‡ Page 358.

different from the purgatory of the church of Rome; for that is not once mentioned in scripture, but this is often repeated."*—"If the offender be corrected and reformed, the first end is fully answered, and the punishment should cease of course. If he still remain incorrigible, it is fitting that the punishment should be continued and increased, till it have the due effect."†—"It is just, and wise, and good, and even merciful, to correct a sinner as long as he deserves correction, to chastise him into a sense of his guilt, to whip and scourge him, as I may say, out of his faults."‡—"If they will not repent, why should he not execute upon them the threatenings which they have despised?"—"This is the only means of escaping, there is none other *condition* or *reservation*."§—"This I conceive to be the true notion of the eternity of rewards and punishments. Righteousness will be forever happy and glorified, wickedness will be forever miserable and tormented. But if righteousness should become wickedness, and wickness should become righteousness—with the change of their nature, their state and condition would be changed too."‖

But where in all the scriptures is any such condition mentioned in the account of future punishment? It is not said Depart ye cursed into fire which shall be everlasting unless ye repent: These shall go away into punishment which shall be everlasting unless they repent: Their worm shall not die unless they repent: They cannot pass the great gulf unless they repent: The smoke of their torment shall ascend up forever and ever, unless they repent.—And to say that the meaning of the scripture is thus conditional, is to assert without any proof or evidence: nor does the Bishop pretend to produce any.

* Page 379. † Page 365. ‡ Ibid. § Page 359. ‖ Ibid.

The Bishop argues universal salvation in this manner, "He would have all men to be saved; and whence then ariseth the obstruction to his good will and pleasure, or how cometh it to pass, that his gracious purposes are ever defeated?"*—So it may be said, "God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, and *now* commandeth all men every where to repent." It is the will of God that all mankind should repent *now this very day.* Yet all mankind do not repent this very day. Whence then ariseth the obstruction to his good will and pleasure, or how cometh it to pass that his gracious purposes are defeated?

"Nothing," says the Bishop, "is more contrariant to the divine nature and attributes, than for God to bestow existence on any beings, whose destiny he foreknows must terminate in wretchedness without recovery."† The truth of this proposition depends on the following principle, That it is not, nor can be, in any case, consistent with the general good implying the glory of God, that a sinner should be miserable without end. For if God foresee that the endless misery of a man will be subservient to the general good; there is nothing contrariant to the divine nature, to bestow existence upon him, though he foreknow that he will sin, that he will deserve endless misery, and that his destiny will terminate in wretchedness without recovery.

We find that there are in fact temporary miseries in the world. On what principle can these be reconciled with the divine attributes? If it be answered, on the sole principle, that they will issue in the personal good of the patients; the reply is, (1.) That this will be fact wants proof. It is by no means evident, that God aims at the personal good of every individual in all his dispensations,

* Page 367. † Ibid.

however distressing; it is not evident that the inhabitants of the old world, of Sodom and Gomorrah, &c. are more happy in the whole of their existence, than if they had lived and died like other men.—(2.) Especially it is not evident, that all the sin and wickedness which any man commits will finally make him a more happy man, than he would have been, if he had committed no sin. If God may without a view to promote the personal good of a man, permit him to fall into sin, why may he not without a view to the same object, punish him for that sin? To say that God could not consistently with the moral agency of the man, prevent his falling into sin, will infer that God cannot consistently with the moral agency of the man, certainly and infallibly lead him to repentance.—(3.) The principle now under consideration implies that there is not now nor ever has been in the universe, any thing which on the whole is a real evil to any man considered in his individual capacity: that no man ever was or ever will be the subject of any curse, or any calamity which any man, with a view to his own happiness only, should wish to avoid.

Or if temporary calamities be reconciled with the divine attributes on this principle, that they are subservient to the general good; on the same principle we reconcile with the divine attributes, the endless misery of the damned —This whole argument depends on the supposition, that the final misery of any sinner cannot be subservient to the general good. To take this for granted is intolerable.

As we have seen, it is a fundamental principle with the Bishop, that such a punishment as is sufficient to lead a sinner to repentance, is all which is threatened in scripture. This then is the penalty or curse of the divine law: this is the utmost which strict justice will admit: and he on this supposition justly asserts, "that

some time or other satisfaction may be made, the debt of sin may be discharged, and the sinner himself released out of prison."*—This is utterly inconsistent with the salvation of the damned in the way of forgiveness. Yet his texts to prove universal salvation, imply salvation in the way of forgiveness only. After quoting Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7; "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin;" he adds, "But how can such attributes consist with a system of irrevocable vengeance for thousands, transgressions never to be forgiven," &c.? To which I answer, They can just as well consist with such a system, as with Bishop Newton's system, which implies that the damned suffer all that they deserve; for what is this but irrevocable vengeance to the highest degree? And surely the transgressions of those who suffer such a punishment are never forgiven.

It is absurd therefore for him to argue from grace, compassion, the divine readiness to forgive, &c. And equally absurd to argue as he does from the merits of Christ—For do they obtain any relief by Christ, who themselves suffer the whole penalty of the law, and thus make satisfaction for their own sins? Yet he abundantly holds the salvation of all men by the merits of Christ: as in the following passages out of many: "It is the declared end and purpose of our blessed Saviour's coming into the world, to recover and to redeem lost mankind.—How often is he styled the Saviour of the World in the full extent and meaning of the words?"†—"His very enemies are reconciled to God by the *merit* and *sufferings* of his beloved Son."‡—"He only requires us to exert our best endeavours, and the *merits* of our Saviour will *atone for the rest*."§

* Page 382. † Page 382. ‡ Page 383. § Page 387.

"To suppose that a man's happiness or misery to all eternity should absolutely and unchangeably be fixed by the uncertain behaviour of a few years in this life, is a supposition even more unreasonable and unnatural, than that a man's mind and manners should be completely formed in his cradle, and his whole future fortune and condition should depend upon his infancy; infancy being much greater in proportion to the few years of this life, than the whole of this life to eternity."*—The same might be said, if the time of man's probation were ever so long, but limited. Thus; To suppose that a man's happiness or misery to all eternity should be unchangeably fixed by the uncertain behaviour of millions of millions of ages, is a supposition even more unreasonable, than that a man's mind and manners should be completely formed in his cradle, and his whole future fortune and condition should depend upon his infancy; infancy being much greater in proportion to the few years of this life, than millions of millions of ages to eternity.

"Nor could even his" [God's] "justice for short-lived transgressions inflict everlasting punishment."†—But how long-lived must the transgressions be, that justice may consent to inflict for them everlasting punishments? Let them be ever so long-lived, provided they are limited, they are still infinitely short-lived in comparison with an everlasting duration. And will it be said that the transgression must be as long-lived as the punishment, and that justice will not admit that the punishment of any transgression be of longer continuance, than the transgression was in the preparation?

"What glory to God, to see a number of his creatures plunged in the depth of misery? What good-will towards men, to consign so many of them to everlasting punish-

* Page 361. † Page 368.

ments?"* It is doubtless glory to God, that they be plunged into the depth of misery, if both they deserve it, and it be subservient to the good of the universe: and the gospel is a revelation of divine good-will towards men, though many of them reject the infinite grace and eternal salvation exhibited in that revelation, and by this and their other sins justly deserve and finally bring on themselves everlasting punishment.

II. *A few remarks on* James Relly's *Treatise on Union.*

He seems to hold, that all mankind were from eternity so united to Christ, that he and they make properly one whole or complex person. But it is extremely difficult to determine with precision what his ideas were. I shall therefore make several quotations from him, and subjoin such remarks as appear pertinent. "It doth not appear how God—could punish sin upon Christ, without the concurrence of righteousness and truth: nor can this concurrence be proved, without union between Christ and those, for whom he endured the cross—because contrary to truth, which declareth, that every man shall die for *his own* sin."†—"Such an union between Christ and his church, as gives him the right of redemption, and brings him under that character, which is obnoxious to punishment, is absolutely necessary."‡—"Without the consideration of union, where is the justice of charging the black rebellion and crying guilt of man, upon the pure and spotless head of Jesus."§ "Sin is—a crime—only atoned for—by the death, yea, the *eternal* death of the sinner: which justice must inflict before it can be properly satisfied; nor can it possibly admit of a surety here; because it can only punish him, whom it first finds

* Page 382. † Page 3. ‡ Ibid. § Page 4.

guilty; and not by reckoning him, to be what he is not, according to human quibbles, but according to artless, reasonable, divine equity; which can only declare such guilty, on whom the fault is found, and can only find the fault on such who have committed it. We only committed the fault; upon us only can it be found. Therefore, without such an union between Christ and us, as exposes us in his person, to judgment and condemnation, the harmony of the divine perfections doth not appear in the things which he suffered, because contrary to truth and justice."* He largely illustrates this union between Christ and his church, by the union between the head and members in the natural body, and adds, "The union and harmony of the body renders it equitable to punish and chastise the whole body in one member, for its offence in another. Because if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it. As the union of the body makes it equitable to punish the head, for the offence of the other members; with like equity do the members participate with the head, in all its honours and glory. Thus the crowning of the head, crowns the whole man, and every member partakes of the honour."

These quotations may serve to give an idea of the union between Christ and mankind, for which Mr. Relly pleads. I now proceed to the following remarks.

1. It appears by the foregoing quotations, that Relly held such an union between Christ and his church, that he upon the ground of justice became liable to punishment on account of their sins. Otherwise the sufferings of Christ were both unjust and contrary to truth: unjust, as he did not deserve them, contrary to truth as the divine declaration is "The soul that sinneth shall die." —But if this be true, if Christ was liable to punishment

* Page 4.

on the ground of justice, distributive justice; then Christ deserved death as much as the sinner. In his sufferings the Father did but treat him according to his own character and conduct: he did but cause him to eat the fruit of his own ways and to be filled with his own devices: and no more thanks or praise are due to Christ on account of his sufferings, than are due to the damned sinner, on account of his enduring the pains of hell.—Beside; how contrary is this to the scripture! That declares, that "Christ suffered the *just* for the unjust;" that "he was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners;" That "he did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth."—Now if Christ was a "character obnoxious to punishment" on the foot of distributive justice, he was very far from being *just*, and from being *holy, harmless, undefiled;* he *did sin*, and *guile was found* in his mouth. Indeed this is no more than Relly asserts in the above quotations, when he says, "that justice can only punish him whom it finds guilty; not by reckoning him what he is not, but according to artless divine equity, which can only find the fault on such as have committed it." Therefore, according to this, Christ as one with sinners, committed the fault, and therefore deservedly suffered for it.

If it should be granted, that Christ did not himself commit the fault or sin, for which he suffered, but that by a *wise*, sovereign, divine constitution, to which he himself fully consented, he suffered for the sins of others; this would be to give up all, and to acknowledge, that Christ did not suffer for sin on the footing of distributive justice.

2. It appears by the same quotations, that Relly was not of the opinion, that Christ suffered in consequence of the imputation of sin to him, or because he was the surety of his church: but on the ground of his proper

union with men. This appears by these words: "Sin is a crime only atoned for by death, which justice must inflict; nor can it possibly admit of a *surety* here: because it can only punish him whom it first finds guilty: and not by reckoning him to be what he is not." Yet he holds* that Christ suffered on the sole ground of *imputation*. His words are, "The doctrine of union, which represents Jesus suffering under the character of the sinner, doth not suppose him such in his own particular person; nay strongly witnesseth the contrary, and respects him only thus by such an *imputation* as is just and true."—If then the sufferings of Christ do not suppose him to be a sinner "in his own particular person;" how can this be reconciled with what is quoted above from page 3d, in which he argues, that unless Christ be one with those for whom he died, his sufferings cannot be reconciled with the scripture, which declares that every man shall die for *his own* sin? Or with what is quoted from page 4th, which declares, that justice does not admit of a *surety*, or of reckoning Christ to be what he is not?

3. It further appears by the same quotations, that Relly considers Christ and mankind, as one, in the same sense that the head and members in the natural body are one. If this be so, then we are no more indebted to Christ for our redemption, than a man's hands are indebted to his head for inventing means for his livelihood; or his head is indebted to his hands for applying those means.

4. It also appears, that on this plan Christ is now suffering, and will without end suffer, an *eternal death*. Observe the quotation from page 4th, "Sin is a crime only atoned for by the death, yea the *eternal death* of

* Page 41.

the *sinner;* which justice must inflict, before it can be properly satisfied: nor can it possibly admit of a *surety* here; because it can only punish him whom it first finds guilty; and not by reckoning him to be what he is not, according to human quibbles, but according to divine equity, which can only declare such guilty on whom the fault is found, and can only find the fault on such who have committed it." These expressions manifestly declare, (1) That Christ is a sinner, and committed the sin or fault for which he suffered, and that not by *imputation* and as the *surety* of his people, but really and literally.—(2) That sin can be atoned for by the suffering of *eternal death* only. This and this only will properly satisfy justice.—(3) That therefore, as Christ is the propitiation for our sins, he is now, and will without end, be suffering *eternal death.*

But I need not trouble the reader with any further remarks on such wild and confused mysticism; such horrid doctrine.

III. *Remarks on* M. Petitpierre's "*Thoughts on the Divine Goodness, relative to the government of moral agents, particularly displayed in future rewards and punishments.*"

This author is a Swiss, who was a clergyman in his own country; but falling into universalism, was censured and deposed.—After this he went to London, where he published the book which is now the subject of remark. It first appeared in French, and was published in English in 1788.

If I mistake not, the fundamental principles of this book are these two,—That the sinner on the footing of strict justice, deserves no other punishment, than that which is necessary to lead him to repentance and pre-

pare him for happiness—That the happiness of every individual creature is necessary to the greatest happiness of the general system.

In page 38th, of the preceding work, a quotation or two was made to show, that the first of the two propositions now mentioned, is a principle of this author. To those quotations a great part of his book may be added to show the same; but I shall add the following sentences only.—"The Deity being infinitely just, will inflict on the wicked just and equitable punishments; punishments exactly proportioned both in degree and duration, to the nature and extent of their crimes."*—"The second rule which divine justice follows in the dispensation of punishment, is, to employ rigour only so much, and so long, as shall be necessary to the destruction of sin, and the conversion of the sinner."†—"The third rule of divine justice in the dispensations of sufferings, informs us, when the Supreme Being ceases punishment;" i. e. when the sinner repents.‡—"We have established a principle whence to form consistent ideas of the *justice* and *severity* of God, who punishes the wicked that he might bless them in turning them every one from their iniquities."§—Infinite justice adapts with the most perfect and minute detail, the respective suitableness of his dealing to our *moral state*, and consequently to *our wants*, throughout the whole of our existence."‖

On these quotations it may be remarked,

1. That according to this plan, the most *exact* and *rigorous justice*, *divine* justice, *infinite* justice, admits that a sinner be made to suffer till he repents, and no further. Such a punishment as this, is "exactly proportioned both in degree and duration, to the nature and extent of

* Page 91. † Page 102. ‡ Page 110. § Page 137.
‖ Page 76.

the crimes" of the sinner. This then is the utmost which the divine law will admit: this is the true *curse* of the divine law; even that curse from which Christ hath redeemed us.

2. This punishment inflicted on any sinner, utterly precludes all pardon, forgiveness and mercy. How is he forgiven, who suffers to the utmost extent of justice? How is any sparing mercy exercised toward him, on whom the curse of the law is fully executed?—Yet M. Petitpierre constantly holds, that the salvation of sinners is effected in the way of *mercy*, *pardon* and *forgiveness*. Thus, speaking of the divine goodness, he says,* "Are men miserable? It is termed that *infinite compassion* he has for their wretchedness.—But when by a sincere repentance they turn from their iniquity, then it is his *clemency*, his *pardon*, his *mercy*, and his *grace*, that is extended to them."—"How striking, how awful, and at the same time how *merciful*, are the representations of future torments!"†—"He will constantly *pardon*, and receive into favour the sincerely penitent offender. Repentance appeases divine anger and disarms its justice, because it accomplishes the end infinite goodness has in view, even when arrayed in the awful majesty of *avenging justice;* which was severe, because the moral state of the sinner required such discipline; and which when that state is reversed by conversion—will have nothing to bestow suitable to it, but the delightful manifestations of *mercy* and *forgiveness*." It seems then, that not only is *justice satisfied* by the repentance of the sinner; but *justice*, even *the awful majesty of avenging justice*, will bestow *mercy* and *forgiveness*. But how forgiveness can be an act of *justice*, and especially an act of *avenging* justice, remains to be explained.

* Page 6. † Page 109.

3. The punishment now under consideration, is utterly inconsistent with redemption by Christ. How are they redeemed or delivered from the curse of the law, who in their own persons suffer that curse? And if Christ should deliver them from it, he would deprive them of an inestimable benefit.

4. If "*infinite justice* adapts with the most perfect and minute detail, the respective suitableness of his dealings to our moral state, and consequently to our wants, throughout the whole of our existence;" then what is *goodness?* and how is it distinguished from justice? What more kind and favourable than this, can goodness, the divine goodness, infinite and incomprehensible goodness, do for us? According to this definition of *infinite justice*, the institutions, promises and scheme of the gospel, nay the unspeakable gift of Christ himself, are mere communications of justice, and not of goodness and grace: and according to the same definition there never has been, and never can be, any benefit granted by the Deity to any of his creatures, which is any more than a fruit of mere justice, and which may be withholden consistently with justice: and all that God ever has done, and ever will or can do, for the happiness of his creatures, is barely sufficient to save his character from a well grounded charge of injustice.

But I mean not to dwell on this subject: I do but hint these particulars. It would be an infinite labour to point out the endless absurdities of this scheme of justice and punishment. I have considered the point more largely in chap. ii. to which I beg leave to refer the reader.

The other fundamental principle of this book is, That the happiness of every individual creature is necessary to the greatest happiness of the system. This idea is expressed in various passages, particularly in the following, "It is impossible the Divine Being should ever dis-

pense any evil in this world, or in the world to come; which is not even to the individuals an actual exercise of perfect goodness."*

And that this is necessarily implied in the scheme of this author, and of all others who argue universal salvation from the divine perfections, without respect to the atonement, must be manifest upon the slightest reflection. Goodness will always seek the greatest good or happiness of intelligent beings. And that the happiness of the system is a greater good than the happiness of any individual or individuals of that system, is a self-evident proposition. Therefore goodness will never seek the happiness of any individuals, so as to diminish the happiness of the system: for this would be not to seek the advancement of happiness on the whole, but the diminution of it. If therefore the divine goodness seeks the final happiness of every intelligent creature, it must be because the happiness of every creature promotes and is necessary to secure the greatest happiness of the system. If it be not necessary to the greatest happiness of the system, it is no object to goodness.

Concerning this principle the following strictures are suggested:

1. The truth of it is by no means evident.—Indeed M. *Petitpierre* supposes the absurdity of the contrary position to be exceedingly clear, and therefore indulges himself in the following ardent effusion: "Can we suppose that intelligent creatures capable by their nature of perfection and felicity, would be unable to attain to this glorious destination, unless at the same time a number of intelligent beings existed in eternal misery? Among creatures of the same nature, thence capable of the same happiness; must a part be made happy at the

* Page 220.

expense of a considerable portion devoted to endless misery and despair? Cannot a Being infinitely perfect and happy communicate beatitude to his intelligent offspring, on other and more favourable terms? Can he not be to some the inexhaustible source of happiness; unless he is to others the never-failing source of misery? But let us cease to heap contradiction on contradiction, horror upon horror, and end this disagreeable discussion."—M. P——rre did not reflect, that if this passage contain any argument, it is equally forcible against the evils which *in fact* take place in this world, as against the punishments of the future: and that the passage may be retorted thus; Can we suppose that intelligent creatures capable by nature of peace, liberty, and all the enjoyments of human society, would be unable to attain to this excellent destination, unless at the same time a number of intelligent beings were rendered miserable by fines, confiscations, ignominy, prisons, chains, stripes and the gallows? Among creatures of the same nature, thence capable of the same happiness; must a part be made safe and happy at the expense of a considerable portion devoted to misery and despair, in the ways just mentioned? Cannot a Being infinitely perfect and happy communicate beatitude to his intelligent offspring on other and more favourable terms? Can he not be to some the source of peace, safety, liberty and happiness; unless he be to others the source of misery? But let us cease to heap contradiction on contradiction, horror upon horror, and end this disagreeable discussion.

To say that God can convert the wicked, and without endless imprisonment and punishment, prevent the mischief which they would do the system, affords no satisfaction. So God can convert the wicked in this world, and prevent all the mischief which they do here. The question is not, what God has power to do, but what he

will in fact do; and what he may see fit to permit others to do.

M. P——rre proceeds to argue against the possibility, that the misery of some intelligent creatures should be necessary to the happiness of the rest; and urges that instead of this, it would subvert their happiness; because the inhabitants of heaven are so full of benevolence and compassion, that they cannot be happy, while numbers of their fellow creatures are miserable; and especially because it must be still more painful to them, to know that the eternal sufferings of those their fellow creatures, were necessary to their own happiness.*— But these observations are no more reconcileable with fact and with experience, than those which I just now quoted from the same author. Are the best of men in this world, so compassionate, that they cannot be happy so long as thieves and robbers are confined in work-houses and prisons, and murderers die on gibbets? And do they disdain to enjoy their lives, their liberty, their peace and their property, unless they can be secured in the possession of them, on terms less ignominious and painful to some of their fellow creatures?

Such are the arguments by which M. P——rre endeavours to prove, that the misery of some men cannot be necessary to the greatest good of the system. If these arguments be not convincing, it is in vain to expect convincing evidence of the proposition now under consideration, from M. P——rre.

2. The reader has doubtless taken notice that the proposition now under consideration implies, not only that endless misery, but any temporary calamity cannot be inflicted on an individual, consistently with the good of the whole, unless that temporary calamity be

* Page 215, &c.

subservient to his personal good. Observe the words quoted above, "It is impossible the Divine Being should ever dispense any evil *in this world* or in the world to come, which is not even *to the individuals*, an act of perfect goodness."—Then all evils and calamities which have ever existed, or do exist, or ever will exist, in this world, as well as the future, are no real evils, no *curse* to the patients themselves; but they are all so many benefits and *blessings* to them. The destruction of the old world, of Sodom, &c. were real blessings to the patients personally. But how does this appear? They certainly did not in this world operate for the good of the patients; and how does it appear, that they will operate for their good in the future world? To assert this without assigning a reason, is impertinent.—Beside; on this hypothesis, there is no such thing as any *curse* either in this world or the future; and there is no difference between a *curse* and a *blessing*. What then shall we make of the scriptures, which speak abundantly of curses, and constantly distinguish between curses and blessings?

3. This, which I have called the second fundamental principle of this author, is in reality not distinct from the first.—If the good or happiness of the system require the happiness of every individual, it surely cannot require the misery of any individual: and if it do not require his misery, it is not consistent with justice, that he should be made miserable by punishment; or it is not consistent with justice that he be punished any further than is subservient to his own personal happiness.—No punishment is consistent with justice, which in view of the criminal alone, without respect to a substitute, or an atonement, the public good does not require.

So that the whole system of this author depends on this single principle, That it is not consistent with jus-

tice, to punish a sinner any further, than is subservient to his own personal good: and this principle, as I have endeavoured to show in chap. ii. and viii. really comes to this, *Whether sin be a moral evil.* Moral evil is in its own nature odious, and justly the object of divine disapprobation, and of the manifestation of disapprobation, whether such manifestation of disapprobation be subservient to the personal good of the sinner or not. But the manifestation of divine disapprobation is punishment. Therefore moral evil may justly be punished, whether such punishment be subservient to the personal good of the sinner or not. But as sin according to the principle now under consideration, cannot be justly punished any further than is subservient to the personal good of the sinner, of course it is no moral evil.

Again; moral evil in its own nature impairs the good of the moral system. Therefore God as a friend to that system, must necessarily, and may justly disapprove it, and manifest his disapprobation, though it may not tend to the personal good of the sinner. But this manifestation of divine disapprobation is punishment, and just punishment. But sin, according to the principle now under consideration, cannot justly be thus punished. Therefore sin is not, according to this principle, a moral evil.

If therefore M. P——rre believe, that sin is a moral evil, and in its own nature deserves the divine abhorrence, he must, to be consistent, give up his whole system of universal salvation.

As the book now before us is a later publication than Dr. *Chauncy's;* and as the Doctor's book, which at its first appearance was so highly extolled for deep learning and demonstrative reasoning, did not convert the world the zealots for universalism have been lavish of their encomiums on this work of Petitpierre, and as it seems have great expectations from it. However, it requires

no spirit of prophecy to foresee, that this book will not effect more numerous conversions, than that of Dr. C. The author has a good talent at *declamation;* and those who are already persuaded of the truth of his system, may be much comforted by his pathetic representations of the divine goodness and universal happiness. But those who are doubtful, and wish to see a consistent system established on the broad basis of reason and revelation, will doubtless find themselves necessitated to prosecute their inquiries further, than M. *Petitpierre* will lead them.

APPENDIX II.

IN WHICH IS SHOWN THE PECULIAR ABSURDITY AND FATAL TENDENCY OF THE MODERN SCHEME OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION.

BY NATHANIEL EMMONS, D. D.

THE doctrine of Universal Salvation is of great antiquity. It was first received and propagated by Origen and Clement of Alexandria, who lived in the latter end of the second century. They maintained, that God will, through the medium of the gospel, make all mankind eventually happy, though he will punish all who die in impenitence and unbelief, until they have received the due reward of their deeds, and are completely purged from their moral depravity, and become meet for the kingdom of heaven. This original scheme of universal salvation has been handed down from age to age, with a few modifications and shades of difference. But Mr. James Relly a few years since, formed a different scheme of universal salvation, which he founded upon a supposed *personal union* between Christ and the whole human race. By virtue of this mystical union, he supposes, that all men, whether penitent, or impenitent, will immediately, after death, go to heaven and be completely and forever happy there. He asserts,

"That Christ as mediator was so united to mankind, that his actions were theirs, his obedience theirs, and his sufferings theirs, and consequently he has as fully restored the whole human race to the divine favour, as if they had all obeyed and suffered in their own persons. The divine law has now no demands upon them, nor condemning power over them. Their salvation solely depends upon their *union* to Christ, which God established before the world began. Accordingly, they being *in him*, as branches in the vine, as members in the body, &c. they are considered together with him, through all the circumstances of his birth, life, death, resurrection, and glory. Thus considering the whole law fulfilled in Jesus, its *precepts* obeyed, its *penalties* endured, *he* now inherits the promise: and thus standing *in him*, and united to *him*, through all his *doings*, and *sufferings*, *his* condition, and state is *theirs*. And they can read the law, or the doctrine of rewards and punishments, without fear; because all the punishments threatened in the book of God, have been *executed upon them* (as sinners and law-breakers) *in him*." This is the corner-stone or sole foundation, which supports the scheme of universal salvation, as maintained by Mr. Relly, Mr. Murray, Dr. Huntington, and all their unlearned, unstable, and deluded followers. If this should give way, their whole fabric falls to the ground, and their hopes perish. Though this novel doctrine may meet the wishes of those who are under the dominion of an unholy heart; yet it deeply concerns them to inquire whether it be true, before they build their future and eternal hopes upon it. And whoever will

seriously and impartially consider the few following observations, it may be hoped, will be convinced, that it is repugnant to reason, scripture, and the plain dictates of common sense.

In the *first* place, the *union*, upon which this doctrine is founded, is entirely false and visionary. It is impossible to conceive, that all mankind were personally "with Christ through all the circumstances of his birth, life, death, resurrection, and glory." For he was born of the virgin Mary; was circumcised the eighth day; was baptized by John in Jordan; was forty days and forty nights in the wilderness; was betrayed by Judas; was condemned by Pilate; was crucified between two malefactors; was buried by Joseph of Arimathea; and was raised from the dead by the Father, and seated at his own right hand in glory. Had there been such a supposed personal union between Christ and all mankind, by which his obedience, sufferings, and glory are theirs; then they must all now be conscious of having the same views, the same affections, and the same sorrows that he had, while he lived and when he died; and of the same glory and blessedness which he now enjoys in heaven. But where is the man, who is conscious of being personally united with Christ, in all these stupendous scenes of his birth, life, death, resurrection, and glory! If it be said, that this is an unfair representation of the matter; and that by "Christ's being *in* mankind and their being *in* him," is only intended, that according to a certain divine constitution, God considers what Christ did and suffered as being done and suffered by mankind personally; the answer to

this is obvious. No divine constitution or appointment whatever, could make Christ's personal obedience and sufferings theirs. A divine constitution cannot alter the nature of things, nor effect impossibilities. Who can conceive that it is now in the power of the Supreme Being, by a new positive constitution, to make Christ the betrayer of Judas, the crucifier of his crucifiers, and the perpetrator of all the sins that ever have been committed in the world? But it is no more impossible for God to do this now, than it was from eternity, to make a constitution by which, not only the actions of Christ and of Judas, but the actions of Christ and of all mankind should be the same. The supposition of a divine constitution relieves no difficulty here. The notion that all mankind were "with Christ through all the circumstances of his birth, life, death, resurrection, and glory," is as absurd as the doctrine of transubstantiation, of which no man can form an idea. The doctrine, therefore, which is built upon such a false and visionary *union*, is repugnant to the plainest dictates of reason and common sense.

Nor, in the *second* place, is it less contradictory to the whole current of scripture, which assures us, that all unrenewed, unholy, impenitent sinners are unfit for, and shall never be admitted into the kingdom of heaven. Our Saviour said, "Except a man be born again, he cannot *see* the kingdom of God." Paul said, "Without holiness, no man shall *see* the Lord." And Solomon said, "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness: but the righteous hath hope in his death." These, with a multitude of other passages of scripture, which might be adduced,

bear directly on the point under consideration, and clearly prove that those who die in their sins, are absolutely excluded from heaven, and shall never be suffered to *enter* into the kingdom of glory. We know nothing about the state of the dead but what God has told us in his word, and what he has there told us we are bound to believe, because we know it is infallibly true. He has there told us some plain and undeniable facts, which confirm the construction given of the texts just quoted. He has there told us, that Judas was the son of perdition, that he did not go to heaven, but to his own place, and that it would have been good for him, if he had never been born, which plainly implies that he will never *enter* into the kingdom of heaven. He has told us, that he raised up Pharaoh, hardened his heart, and fitted him for destruction, that his name might be praised for his conduct towards him, in both time and eternity. He has caused it to be recorded, by the pen of inspiration, that Korah, Dathan and Abiram, Balaam and the men of Sodom and Gomorrah, are *examples*, suffering the vengeance of *eternal fire*. And he who holds the keys of death and of hell has told us, that Dives lived and died in sin, and *immediately* lifted up his eyes in torments. Whether the account of Dives be literal or figurative, it equally proves, that the wicked are driven away in their wickedness, *excluded* from heaven, and doomed to destruction. If we may believe the declarations, the doctrines, and the facts contained in the Bible, we may as confidently believe, that some wicked men have been driven away in their wickedness, and are *now* in a state of misery and despair; as we may

believe, that Enoch, Abraham, Moses, and Elijah are *now* in the kingdom of glory. We know of no doctrine, ever broached among those who call themselves Christians, so absurd and unscriptural as the novel notion, that all wicked men, even the most vile and profligate, when they leave the world, go *immediately* to heaven and enjoy endless felicity there.

Hence, *thirdly*, this novel scheme of universal salvation is extremely licentious and dangerous. It directly tends to destroy all religion and morality. It teaches, that holiness and piety are empty names; that repentance, faith, humility, and devotion, are no other than hypocrisy, pride, and self-righteousness; and that the most irreligious, abandoned, and profligate sinners go *immediately* to heaven, and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of glory. Such a doctrine as this is replete with infinite mischief. It strikes at the root of all experimental religion. It destroys all moral distinction between virtue and vice. It takes off every restraint from the corruption of the human heart, and opens the flood-gates of iniquity. It renders the prophets, Christ, and the apostles the ministers of sin; and speaks peace to all the wicked, to whom God says, *there is no peace.* It has every mark of a damnable doctrine. Some seem reluctant to pronounce absolutely upon its corrupt and fatal tendency, and choose only to say, *if it be true*, then those who *deny* it, are as *safe* as those who *embrace* it. But we ought rather to say, if there be no future state, then *we are all safe*, but not otherwise. Admit a future state, and there remains no room to doubt, whether God will make a difference between

him that serveth him, and him that serveth him not; between him that sweareth, and him that feareth an oath. The very supposition that no distinction will be made between the righteous and wicked in a future state, supercedes the necessity and even propriety of a *general* Judgment. Why should God appoint a day, in which to judge the world in righteousness, if no persons are to be judged, no characters to be examined, and no displays of retributive justice to be made! Some of the most sensible, learned, and respectable Universalists despise and condemn this novel scheme of universal salvation. Dr. Chauncy in particular deserves to be mentioned in this connexion. In his Preface to the Extracts which he made from the writings of noted Authors on his side of the question, he condemns, in the strongest terms, the novel and licentious sentiment, that all men, however vile and vicious, go immediately to heaven, without passing through a previous state of extreme sufferings. He remarks; "It may not be unseasonable to add here, that it is fully and freely acknowledged, by all the above writers, that *many* among the sons and daughters of Adam, will pass through a state of *unutterable misery;* before they will be prepared for, and admitted to the joys of God's presence, in the heavenly world. This I judge proper to mention, because the doctrine of universal salvation has, in this, and some other towns, been held forth by a stranger, (meaning Murray) who has, of himself, assumed the character of a *preacher*, in direct contradiction not only to all the beforementioned writers, but to the *whole tenor of the New Testament books*, from their beginning to

end. According to this *preacher*, a man may go to heaven, notwithstanding all the sins he has been guilty of in the course of his life. Such a doctrine looks very like an *encouragement* to libertinism, and falls in with the scheme of too many in this degenerate age, who, under the pretence of *promoting religion, undermine it* at the *very root*. It is certainly fitted to this end, and has already had this effect upon many; especially of our younger people, who, by means of it, have lost all sense of religion, and given themselves up to the most criminal excesses! If this kind of preaching is encouraged, it may prove as hurtful to *civil society* as to *religion*. Would to God it might be realized as an *undoubted truth*, that there is the same reason, from scripture, to believe there is a HELL as a HEAVEN. And those who are infidels as to the former, would do well to take care lest they should know, from their *own experience*, the *horrors* of that *dreadful place*."

Since the human heart naturally prefers darkness to light and error to truth, there is a propriety in addressing the hopes and fears of men, and giving divine truths all the weight and influence, which they derive from the motives of Eternity. This the Apostles tell us was their practice. "Knowing the *terror* of the Lord, we *persuade* men." Directed by their example, there needs no apology for addressing those, who are particularly concerned in this serious subject, and warning them against the fatal dangers to which they are exposed.

There are many, at this day, who are labouring to reason themselves out of the belief of all truth, both

human and divine; and boast of arriving to a certainty that all things are uncertain. But it may be questioned whether the human mind, which is formed to see and feel the force of truth, will permit any man to approach nearer to perfect *Scepticism*, than perfect knowledge. By an habit of resisting truth, however, some may have unsettled their minds respecting divine things, and become exposed to embrace *error* instead of *truth*, in matters of religion. And for this reason, they are very liable to fall in with the delusive scheme of universal salvation, which has a tendency to diffuse some glimmering rays of light in their dark and desponding minds. But they are entreated to awake from their reveries, and attend to the great realities with which they are surrounded and connected. Eternal rewards and punishments are substantial realities, whether they them believe to be so or not. By shutting their eyes against them, their danger is not in the least diminished, but greatly augmented. The period is approaching when they must be thoroughly awakened from their delusive dreams. The solemn scenes of Eternity will draw the curtain aside, and open upon their astonished minds such awful realities as, at a distance, made Felix and Belshazzar tremble, and as will more terribly shock their guilty souls, when their presence can no longer be resisted.

There is a larger number than these, perhaps, who are making swift and bold advances in the cause of Infidelity, and leave no methods unemployed to discredit divine Revelation, and subvert the foundations of Christianity. They need not tell the world their motives. Were they not convinced that the Bible

contains the doctrine of eternal punishments, they would not rack their invention to find arguments to persuade themselves and others, that the Scriptures are a cunningly devised fable. Let this doctrine be erased from the Bible, and every Deist would become its votary, and exchange his Bolingbroke, Voltaire, or Chesterfield, for that sacred volume. It is this doctrine alone that compels them to renounce a book, which bears so many signatures of divinity, and which they are constrained to acknowledge contains the most excellent institutions, instructions, and commands. But *so weak is their infidelity*, we presume they would rejoice to find the Bible on their side, to confirm their wavering hopes and feeble prospects of future happiness. And this is what the scheme of universal salvation promises. It flatters them that the Bible is their friend, and announces eternal felicity to them and to all mankind. Accordingly, it is well known, that numbers of a deistical turn have become converts to this agreeable doctrine, and many others are imminently exposed to fall into the fatal snare. But this is flying from the iron weapon, and rushing on the bow of steel. For if any discard the Bible because they know that it does contain the doctrine of future and eternal punishments, or embrace it because they imagine it does not contain that doctrine, they will infallibly meet with disappointment and ruin in the end.

The sons of pleasure, who indulge in every sinful gratification, find it extremely difficult, in their serious moments, to stifle their natural apprehensions of guilt and punishment; and therefore readily

catch hold of any thing, which promises them impunity in the paths of vice. The doctrine of salvation for *all* men, without exception or distinction of characters, perfectly gratifies their hearts, and coincides with their reigning views and pursuits. Accordingly, when this doctrine is proposed to their belief, they will, if possible, yield their assent, and shake off their painful fears of wrath to come, through which, they have all their life time been subject to bondage. But let them beware of this slender shelter. It will infallibly deceive and disappoint them. The agreeableness of the doctrine is a strong indication of its repugnancy to the gospel of Christ, which was never relished by persons of an immoral, profligate character. When John preached, Herod was offended. When Christ preached, a whole congregation was filled with wrath. And when Paul preached upon *righteousness*, *temperance*, and *judgment to come*, the loose and abandoned Felix trembled. And it is the genuine tendency of the pure doctrines of the gospel to convince profligate sinners that they are in the gall of bitterness and bonds of iniquity. They may therefore be assured, that the soothing doctrine of universal salvation is diametrically opposite to the truth as it is in Jesus. Let none then listen to the pleasing delusion, and bless themselves, saying, we shall have peace, though we walk in the imagination of our hearts, to add drunkenness to thirst. For the Lord will not spare them, but his anger, and his jealousy shall smoke against them, and all the curses that are written in the book of God shall fall and lie upon them forever. "Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart

cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes : *but know thou, that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment.*"

Here it seems proper to subjoin several directions how to shun the baneful influence of such dangerous opinions as some are propagating with great apparent zeal, at the present day.

In the first place, let none be deceived by their pretensions to superior penetration and knowledge. Men of the strongest minds and most extensive literature have often committed the grossest blunders in their religious speculations, and then employed all their learning and ingenuity to maintain and propagate them. Some of their admirers seem to have been allured into their errors by an implicit faith in their great abilities. But this betrays weakness. Great men are not always wise. They are liable to err, and consequently their opinions are to be strictly examined, and admitted only upon the ground of real evidence.

Nor, in the second place, are we to be biassed in favour of the licentious principles of Errorists, on account of their amiable moral characters. Doctor Brown justly observes, that men of strict morality have disseminated very false and pernicious doctrines. It is well known, that Epicurus, the father of theoretical licentiousness, never lived up to his principles, but maintained a regular and exemplary life. Spinoza the Atheist was a man of sobriety and apparent devotion. And the Lord Herbert, who, if not the father, yet the principal advocate of Deism in England, appears to have had a serious mind, and

a conscientious regard to duty. It is readily conceded, that some of the advocates of universal salvation are men of amiable dispositions and fair moral characters. But none ought to entertain a more favorable regard for atheism, deism, or any other licentious doctrines, on that account. Those who teach and disseminate them are to be shunned as dangerous corrupters.

Nor, in the last place, are any to believe the propagators of error, though they make the most solemn asseverations of their sincerity, impartiality, and uncommon intercourse with the Deity. Though we scruple not their sincerity, yet we scruple the propriety of their throwing out the profession of it, which can have no tendency to enlighten, but only to prejudice the minds of the credulous. This, which may properly be called an artifice, is often employed by the advocates of universal salvation. Mr. White, in his Treatise on the universal restoration of all sinful creatures to the divine favour,* makes the most solemn asseverations of his sincerity and sacred regard for the divine glory. His expressions are these: "And here I do in the fear of God most humbly prostrate myself before his divine majesty, and in the deepest sense of my own darkness and distance from him, do with all my might beg of that infinite goodness I am endeavouring to represent to others, that if something like this platform and prospect of things be not agreeable to that revealed and natural light he hath given to us, that my understanding may be interrupted and my design

* Page 6, 7.

fall, and that the Lord would pardon my attempt: and I know he will do so, for he hath given me to have no further concern for this matter, than as I apprehend it to be a most glorious truth, witnessed to, both by the scriptures of truth, and by the most essential principles of our own reason, and which will be found at the last opening of the everlasting gospel, to recover in that opening a degenerate world."

Mr. Relly holds out the same lure to his readers, to place an implicit confidence in the rectitude of his views and the divinity of his doctrines. In a Preface to one volume of his writings, he assures his readers, that his discourses were delivered extempore, without any previous study or forethought, and flowed from his lips as they were dictated by the divine Spirit. For, says he, I followed that divine direction given to the apostles, "Take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, neither do ye premeditate: for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost." How presumptuous is it for any man, at this day, to pretend to imitate the apostles in this respect! and especially for Mr. Relly, who in his writings every where ridicules all experimental religion, inward piety, holy affections, and Christian graces!

Errorists often employ such artifices as divine truth neither requires nor approves. They sometimes, however, succeed, and deceive the inattentive and unguarded. Those who use such artifices, therefore, are dangerous persons, and their seducing influence is studiously to be avoided. Their doctrines are fatal if imbibed; and even when they are not

fully embraced, they tend to harden the heart, and stupify the conscience. The bare thought that some maintain that all men will be saved, begets a secret hope that possibly it may be true, and that there is not so much danger in *impenitence* and *unbelief* as many have long imagined and pretended. Therefore to hear the *universalists* preach, or to read their writings, merely to know what they can say in defence of their errors, is like Eve's listening to the sophistry of the serpent, and may in the end prove equally fatal. The Scripture characterizes false teachers, and warns every one to avoid them. The apostle Paul, who was troubled with the perverters of the gospel, treats them with great plainness and severity. "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you, than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." The beloved apostle John directs men to have no intimate connexion with false teachers. "If any man come unto you, and bring not this doctrine, (which he had just mentioned) receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed. For he that biddeth him God speed, is partaker of his evil deeds." Solomon gives a similar caution and direction: "Cease, my son, to hear the instruction *that causeth to err*." Thus we have not only the voice of reason, but the voice of God, to warn us to shun the presence and influence of those, who lie in wait to deceive and to destroy.

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